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ABSTRACT 
The term capital structure is commonly .understood to be the mixture of debt and equity 
forms of financing used by a firm,^  However, the priniary einphasis of the term is on the 
extent of debt financing used a firm. This is because debt financing has a two pronged 
impact on the firm. On the one-hand it can increase retunis to the shareholders and it 
provides tax benefits to the firm. Qn. the other hand it exposes the firm to increased 
financial risk that arises out of the likelihood of bankruptcy which occurs when the firm 
is not able to make the committed payments to its lenders. 
One of the most important decisions of a firm (or its financial manager) is to decide on 
the appropriate mixture of debt and equity financing in the capital structure of the firm. 
The appropriate mixture of debt and equity is the one that maximises the market value of 
the firm and such a mix is called the optimal capital structure. Pandey (2005) explains 
that the determination of optimal capital structure is a formidable task. 
The market value of the shares of a company is likely to be influenced by many factors, 
the capital structure being one of them. So it is indeed extremely difficult to precisely 
identify the optimal capital structure. Evidence on the existence of optimal capital 
structure which is targeted by the firms has been reported by Marsh (1982), Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Ozkan (2001). This has led researchers to look for the 
determinants of capital structure because under the influence of the determinants the 
optimal capital structure of a firm will change. One of the rapidly expanding areas of 
research on this subject is the study of the determinants of capital structure. 
The modem theory of capital structure had its inception with the celebrated paper of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). The ingenuity of their work is that it establishes the 
conditions under which capital structure would not be relevant for the market value of the 
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firm. This has led to the directions of investigation in this area because deviations from 
the conditions under which capital structure would be irrelevant (i.e. deviations from the 
assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller, 1958) make capital structure relevant for 
the value of a firm. As Rajan and Zingales (1995) state "We now vmderstand the most 
important departures from the Modigliani and Miller assumptions that make capital 
structure relevant to a firm's value." 
Over decades of research work that followed Modigliani and Miller (1958) researchers 
have made significant progress on this subject and have developed alternative theories 
that explain how the capital structure of a firm is determined. There are three theories 
which have gained importance over the years viz. the trade-off theory, the pecking order 
hypothesis and the agency theory. The trade-off theory emerged out of the contributions 
of Baxter (1967), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Warner (1977). According to the 
trade-off theory there is an optimal capital structure which is arrived at by the firm by 
trading off the benefit and costs of debt financing. The trade-off theory successfully 
explains the differences in capital structure between industries but it cannot explain the 
differences in capital structure observed within any specific industry i.e. it can explain the 
interindustry differences in capital structure but it carmot explain the intraindustry 
differences. 
The emergence of the pecking order hypothesis can be traced back to two divergent 
schools of thought resulting from the works of Donaldson (1961), and Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984); however this theory gained prominence due to Myers (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984). At the base of this theory is the concept of asymmetric 
information, which is the information gap between the firm insiders (the managers) and 
the external investors. This theory was put forward as an alternative to the trade-off 
theory and it denies the existence of any optimal capital structure because, as it explains, 
the changes in capital structure occur due to the imbalances between internally generated 
funds of firnis and, the need to pay dividends aiid make investments. 
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According to the pecking order hypothesis the firms prefer to use internal financing 
sources for financing their investment needs. These internal financing sources largely 
consist of cash and bank balances, and retained profits. When the internal financing 
sources are not sufficient to fulfill the financing needs of firms they resort to external 
financing and they first raise debt and then they raise equity only as a last resort i.e. they 
raise external equity only if the requirement of funds cannot be met through internal 
sources and external debt. The pecking order theory explains the intraindustry difference 
in capital structure but it cannot clearly explain the interindustry differences in capital 
structure. 
The agency theory has evolved mainly due to the research work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Jensen (1986). This theory is based on the conflict of interest between 
shareholders, managers and debtholders in a firm. There are two types of conflicts - (1) 
conflict between shareholders and debtholders, and (2) conflict between shareholders and 
managers. These conflicts results in costs to be borne by the firm and these costs are 
called agency costs. According to the agency theory the firm should select such a capital 
structure (i.e. use debt to that extent) which minimises the agency costs faced by the firm 
and maximises the shareholders' wealth. So the capital structure which minimises the 
agency costs is the optimal capital structure for the firm. 
These theories have guided the search for the factors that determine the capital structure 
of firms. These factors are the determinants which would explain how the optimal capital 
structure of firms would change under their influence. The theoretical progress was 
followed by a spate of empirical studies which have attempted to find out the relevance 
of the capital structure theories through the search for the determinants of capital 
structure. These studies have revealed some commonly found empirical facts relating to 
the corporate financing behaviour. 
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Delcoure (2007) states that despite decades of intensive empirical research after 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), there is a surprising lack of consensus as to what factors 
determine optimal corporate capital structure. Most of the empirical research work in this 
area has been largely based on the publicly traded companies in the United States and 
some of the other developed countries. Some of the important empirical studies on capital 
structure determinants in the context of developed countries, which may be cited here are 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), Friend and Lang (1988), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995), Graham (1996), and 
Ozkan(2001). 
In order to find out whether these empirical findings are universal realities or are plainly 
spurious in nature these findings must be verified in environments, time periods and 
contexts different from the ones in which they were revealed. The first landmark study in 
this direction was done by Rajan and Zingales (1995) when they compared the capital 
structure determinants across the G-7 countries. Though this was a study which went 
beyond the United States and sparmed across several countries (the United States also 
being one of them) all the countries covered in this study were the developed countries. 
Their study was followed by several studies in the context of developing countries and 
transitional economies including India. Some of the important studies are Booth, 
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001); Pandey (2001); Fandey (2002); 
Bhaduri (2002); Chen (2004); Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004); Huang and Song 
(2006); Saravanan (2006) and Delcoure (2007). 
The studies in the Indian context are still fewer in number compared to those that have 
been carried out in both the developed and developing countries other than India, and so 
there is a great scope for research work on this subject in the Indian context. This 
research work has been conceived and carried out in the light of the major capital 
structure theories and the findings of the earlier empirical research, and an attempt has 
been made to extend the scope of research work in this subject by considering other 
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possible dimensions. The term 'Capital Structure Behaviour' in the title of this study has 
been used mainly to refer to the cross-sectional variations in capital structure that can be 
observed across the cross-section of firms within specific industries as well as across 
different industries, and the possible linkages between the cross-sectional variations in 
capital structure and the firm characteristics as revealed by the financial statements of the 
firms. 
FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of research work in the area of capital structure is vast and the review of extant 
literature in this area cannot be claimed to be exhaustive. However, some patterns do 
emerge from the review of literature in this area. 
• Firstly, prima facie it appears that the greater portion of the body of literature on 
capital structure appears to be devoted to the development of theoretical 
foundations in this area, compared to empirical research work. 
• Secondly, even within the bulk of the theoretical work a significant portion of the 
theoretical work is devoted to the search for an optimal capital structure. 
• Thirdly a significant part of the empirical research work is concerned with the 
study of determinants of capital structure. This is an expanding area in the context 
of capital structure and several studies in the context of developing countries 
(including India) mentioned earlier focus on the capital structure determinants. 
• Fourthly, part of the empirical literature is also concerned with the testing of some 
of the major capital structure theories. 
• Fifthly, major portion of the literature on capital structure consists of studies in 
the context of developed countries. However several research studies on capital 
structure have also been carried out in the context of transitional and developing 
countries. So there is sufficient scope for carrying out research work on capital 
structure in the context of developing countries. 
• As it has been found in the course of literature review some of the important 
empirical works on this subject in the context of transitional and developing 
economies including India are contributed by Pandey (1983); Chamoli (1985); 
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Singh, Hamid, Salimi and Nakano (1992); Mittal and Singia (1992); Cherian 
(1996); Cobham and Subramaniam (1998); Kakani (1999); Misra and Misra 
(1999); Babu and Jain (1999); Babu and Jain (2000); Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001); Pandey (2001); Pandey (2002); Bhaduri (2002); 
Chen (2004); Deesomsak, Paudyai and Pescetto (2004); Dashti and Sarlak (2005); 
Saravanan (2006); Delcoure (2007); Chang, Lee and Lee (2009); and Datta and 
Agarwal (2009). 
The usefulness of the empirical studies on capital structure determinants both in 
the context of developed countries and in the context of developing countries 
including India, are: (1) They provide a generalised description of capital 
structure behaviour of firms belonging to various industries, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. (2) They have established in a generalised manner the 
significance or the lack of it of various determinants in influencing capital 
structure. (3) These studies show the nature of influence of various determinants 
on capital structure of firms. 
MAJOR THEMES OF RESEARCH 
Further the literature review has helped in identifying the major themes of research work 
in the area of capital structure. The researcher has come across the following broad 
themes of research works in the area of capital structure: 
1. Theoretical research on optimal capital structure 
2. Theoretical research on potential determinants of capital structure 
3. Empirical research on capital structure determinants based on firm/industry 
characteristics 
4. Empirical research on general trends of capital structure 
5. Empirical research on event studies which assess the stock price reaction to 
announcements of changes in capital structure 
6. Empirical research on relationship between capital structure and corporate control 
considerations 
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7. Empirical research on testing the relevance of contending capital structure 
theories 
8. Miscellaneous & others. 
It appears from the findings of literature review that there is sufficient scope for carrying 
out empirical studies on capital structure behaviour, especially in the context of a 
developing country like India where firms have chronically faced difficuUies in the 
mobilisation of capital. 
RESEARCH GAPS 
Finally the literature review has revealed the following research gaps in the area of 
capital structure: 
1. There appears to be further scope for extending the determinants of capital 
structure because the studies reviewed by the researcher do not take into 
consideration the cost factor. Intuitively firms which have a high proportion of 
non-financial costs will have a smaller margin left from their total income to 
cover the financial costs (interest expense). So the non-financial costs are likely to 
influence the leverage used by the firms. 
2. There appears to be further scope for extending the research on capital structure 
by studying the cross-sectional behaviour of leverage defined in terms of secured 
debt and unsecured debt. The financial reporting norms and practices in India 
require the disclosure of the secured and unsecured types of debt in the corporate 
balance sheets. 
3. Many firms follow a practice of revaluing their assets which results in an increase 
in the value of assets. The debt level employed by the firm in relation to an 
increased asset base due to revaluation will result in the understatement of 
leverage compared to what it should be in reality. It is indeed relevant to find out 
whether the extent of leverage used by the firms which revalue their assets is 
same as that of the firms which do not. 
Abstract 
4. Further there is a need to compare the capital structure behaviour between the 
firms which revalue their assets and those which do not in order to find out the 
similarities and differences in capital structure behaviour of the two categories of 
firms. 
The researcher has not come across any study which uses non-financial costs as a 
determinant of capital structure. Nor do the studies describe the influence of firm 
characteristics on the secured and unsecured types of debt used by the firms in their 
capital structure. The need to study the behaviour of leverage defined in terms of secured 
and unsecured types of debt arises because there are differences in the costs and benefits 
associated with the use of these two types of debt. Moreover there is a need to find out 
whether there are differences in the nature of influence of the determinants on different 
types of debt and whether the influence of the determinants differs in significance for 
different types of debt. 
Lenders bear a greater degree of risk by providing unsecured loans than by providing 
secured loans because no collateral security is provided for the unsecured loans by the 
borrower in order to protect the interests of the lenders in the event of default. Hence in 
general unsecured debt tends to be more expensive than secured debt because the interest 
rates on unsecured debt include a risk premium to compensate the lenders for the higher 
risk associated with such debt. The benefit to the borrower that is associated with the 
unsecured debt is that there is greater flexibility in the use of such debt and also it is 
easier to get such debt because there is no need to provide any collateral security. 
In general the firms should tend to use relatively more secured debt when their debt 
service capacity is higher and they have the resources to provide security for such debt, 
and consequently the likelihood of default is lower. Conversely the firms should tend to 
use relatively more unsecured debt when their debt service capacity is lower and they 
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lack the resources to provide collateral security, and consequently the likelihood of 
default is higher. It is due to these differences in the costs and benefits, the use by the 
firms of secured and unsecured types of debt may respond to the firm characteristics 
differently because the firm characteristics may influence the firm's capacity and choice 
for these two types of debt. 
As stated earlier the practice of revaluation of assets is likely to result in an 
understatement of leverage and hence an understatement of the risk arising out of the use 
of leverage. It is important at least from the point of view of good corporate governance 
that the firm makes appropriate disclosures about its assets, liabilities and net worth. 
Whatever may be the real reason behind the practice of revaluation of assets, it is likely 
to result in a lack of clarity about the extent of leverage employed by the firm. This in 
txim is likely to result in the stakeholders of the firm not having the correct understanding 
of the extent of financial risk involved in the firm or the extent of both the used and 
unused debt capacity of the firm. 
There are two research issues which are related with the practice of revaluation of assets. 
The first issue is whether the two categories of firms use the same or different levels of 
leverage. An answer to this question will help us in understanding whether there are any 
differences in the extent of financial risk or the target capital structure in the two 
categories of firms. 
The second issue relates to the similarities and differences in capital structure behaviour 
of the two categories of firms. The similarities can be generalised across all firms 
whereas the differences will indicate the possibility that the capital structure of the firms 
in the two categories respond differently to the firm characteristics. This will help both 
the managers as well as the financiers in determining the financing needs of the two 
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categories of firms in a more rational way. Moreover the differences will also show the 
directions for future research in this area. 
Though the review of capital structure literature for the purpose of this study is not 
claimed to be exhaustive the same does not throw light on the aforementioned issues. 
Hence there is scope for expanding research work in the area of capital structure on the 
basis of these research gaps. 
OTHER RESEARCH ISSUES 
The research gaps discussed above have arisen because the extant literature on capital 
structure does not appear to provide answers to the aforementioned issues. However, 
there are other research issues which do exist simply because the knowledge generated by 
the earlier research studies on those matters needs to be verified in the later studies in 
order to find out whether the findings of the prior research studies are universally 
applicable or not. Hence these research issues are not the result of any research gaps but 
instead they give rise to continuing research needs. These research issues are as follows: 
1. There is a need to revisit the observed or predicted relationships between capital 
structure and the determinants. This will help us in finding out whether the 
relationships observed in the earlier studies are common and real phenomena or 
they change with the region, the time period or the context of the study or other 
associated conditions, or they are merely spurious in nature. Though this is not a 
research gap it is a research need which shall be always relevant. 
2. There is a need to verify whether the nature of industry influences the capital 
structure. Empirical evidences in this context have been found in the prior 
research studies. Nevertheless this will help us in finding out whether the findings 
of the earlier studies in this matter are a common phenomenon or they change 
with the region, the period or the context of the study or other associated 
conditions. Again this is not a research gap but a relevant research need. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research gaps and the other research issues lead to the research questions which 
provide the basis for development of hypotheses in this study. The hypotheses have been 
developed in Chapter 4 on the basis of the major theories on capital structure and the 
empirical evidence found in the earlier studies.The research questions are as follows: 
1. Does leverage differ across industries? In other words, does the industry type 
influence the debt ratios? 
2. Is leverage related with the firm characteristics in the same way as predicted by 
the major theories on capital structure and are the relationships between leverage 
and firm characteristics similar to those found in the developed countries? 
3. Can the determinants of capital structure be extended by including the non-
financial costs as a potential determinant of firm leverage? 
4. Can the firm characteristics be used to explain measures of leverage based on 
secured debt and unsecured debt, and do the firm characteristics equally explain 
the behaviour of various measures of leverage? 
5. Is there any significant difference in the various measures of leverage between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets? 
6. Is there any similarity or difference in capital structure behaviour in response to 
the firm characteristics, between firms which revalue their assets and firms which 
do not revalue their assets? 
Till date many eminent researchers have empirically reported a host of firm 
characteristics that have been found to be the potential determinants of capital structure, 
hi their classic review of capital structure literature Harris and Raviv (1991) have 
documented the following firm characteristics which have been used as the determinants 
of capital structure in different studies viz. volatility, probability of bankruptcy, fixed 
assets / assets mix, non-debt tax shields, advertising expenditure, research and 
development expenditure, profitability, growth opportunities, size, free cash flow and 
uniqueness. Subsequently, in their landmark study Rajan and Zingales (1995) have used 
four determinants of capital structure viz. tangibility of assets, investment or growth 
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opportunities, firm size and profitability, because they explain that these four factors have 
been found to be the most consistently correlated with leverage. These two important 
studies together have provided the starting point for the present study. 
In the empirical studies which were carried out after the review by Harris and Raviv 
(1991), various types of determinants of capital structure have been tested and reported. 
All the studies irrespective of whether they were covered in the review by Harris and 
Raviv or reported afterwards have been carried out in different countries, in different 
periods of time and in different contexts. From all the determinants of capital structure 
that were identified through the review of empirical literature those determinants which 
were found to be tested and reported very frequently, were selected for studying the 
capital structure behaviour. The determinants which have been found to be tested and 
reported very frequently have been commonly found to influence capital structure in 
different countries, in different periods of time and in different contexts. Further, for such 
determinants greater amount of empirical evidence is available amongst all the 
determinants of capital structure that were identified. 
On this basis the determinants of capital structure which have been selected from 
empirical literature for the purposes of this study are: firm size, profitability, growth 
opportunities, fixed assets or tangibility of assets, earnings volatility and non-debt tax 
shields. These six determinants indeed include all those determinants which have been 
tested and reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995) because they have found those 
determinants to be most consistently correlated with leverage viz. tangibility of assets, 
investment or growth opportunities, firm size and profitability. 
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In addition to the six variables mentioned above viz. profitability, firm size, tangibility, 
growth opportunities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields, this study has included 
a new variable, non-financial costs, as a potential determinant of capital structure in an 
attempt to extend the set of determinants of capital structure. Since the researcher did not 
come across any empirical findings in this regard in the course of the literature review, 
the inclusion of this new determinant was based on prima facie evidence collected by the 
researcher to support the inclusion. Cross-sectional correlations calculated between 
various types of debt ratios used in this study and the ratio of non-financial costs to total 
costs have shown a predominance of negative correlation, which strongly indicated the 
possibility of a negative relationship between leverage and non-financial costs. 
Accordingly this study has used altogether seven variables as the determinants of capital 
structure viz. profitability, firm size, tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility 
and non-debt tax shields and non-financial costs. 
This study has used five different measures of financial leverage based on different 
measures of debt viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. Different measures of leverage have been used in 
order to find out whether the firm characteristics, which have been identified to be the 
determinants of capital structure, influence the different types of debt in different ways or 
to different extent. The researcher has not come across any studies which explain the 
cross-sectional variations in secured debt and unsecured debt. The Indian financial 
reporting system requires the firms to disclose their secured and unsecured debt. Hence it 
is relevant to study the relationships of the secured debt and unsecured debt with the firm 
characteristics. 
This study has extended the research on capital structure further by comparing the capital 
structure and its behaviour between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. The issue of revaluation of assets is indeed important 
not only fi-om a purely financial point of view but also from the perspective of corporate 
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governance. The practice of revaluation of assets results in an increase in the value of 
assets. The debt level employed by the firm in relation to an increased asset base due to 
revaluation v^ U result in the understatement of leverage compared to what it should be in 
reality. Hence the practice of revaluation of assets may ultimately lead to the projection 
of an inappropriate picture of the financial risk of the firm in the eyes of the creditors and 
other stakeholders. 
HYPOTHESES 
This empirical study attempts to draw conclusions from 18 hypotheses which have been 
discussed in detail and stated in the Thesis. Hypothesis HI has been used to find out 
whether there is industry influence on capital structure i.e. whether capital structure 
differs across industries. Hypotheses H2 through H8 have been used to find out the 
relationship between capital structure and its determinants (the firm characteristics). 
Hypothesis H9 has been used to find out the explanatory power of the determinants for 
the behaviour of different types of debt ratios. Hypotheses HIO through HI 8 have been 
used to draw conclusions on comparison of capital structure and its behaviour between 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Hypotheses HI through H9 have been stated in the form of alternative hypothesis. 
Hypotheses HIO through HI 8 have been stated in the form of null hypothesis. This style 
of stating different types of hypotheses in different forms i.e. null and alternative forms, 
has been adopted from Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008). Jong et al have used alternative 
hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is commonly available whereas they have used 
null hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is not clearly or commonly available. 
For the purposes of this study empirical evidence is generally available (to different 
extent) for the industry influence on capital structure, the relationship between capital 
structure and its determinants and the explanatory power of the determinants for different 
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types of debt ratios. Hence hypotheses HI through H9 have been stated in the form of 
alternative hypothesis. No empirical evidence is available with regard to the comparison 
of capital structure and its behaviour between the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not. Hence hypotheses HIO through HI 8 have been stated in the form of 
null hypothesis. These hypotheses have been stated below along with brief explanation. 
A. HYPOTHESIS ON THE INDUSTRY INFLUENCE ON CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
According to the trade-off theory differences in capital structure exist between industries. 
Further there is strong evidence available in the prior empirical studies, that the industry 
factor influences capital structure. This evidence has been mainly found in the context of 
long term debt and total debt. A common hypothesis has been formulated based on the 
evidences available and conclusions on whether the hypothesis can be accepted or 
rejected for the other types of debt have been drawn from the empirical results. 
HI: Debt ratios differ across industries. 
B. HYPOTHESES ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS IDENTIFIED FROM EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE 
In the absence of sufficient evidence independently available for various measures and 
types of debt a common set of hypotheses have been formulated based on the evidences 
found with reference to long term and total debt, and conclusions as to whether these 
hypotheses can be accepted or rejected for the various types of debt ratios used in this 
study have been drawn on the basis of whether the empirical evidences in this study 
support or do not support these hypotheses. 
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Profitability 
According to the pecking order hypothesis there should be a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage because the higher the profitability the higher is the 
capacity of the firms to retain their earnings, which in turn means that the lower will be 
the need for external debt. According to the trade-off theory the capital structure of firms 
moves towards a target debt ratio on the basis of trade-off between tax advantages of debt 
and the bankruptcy costs or costs of financial distress; so according to the trade-off theory 
there should be a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
According to the agency theory leverage can be used as a mechanism to discipline the 
managers in order to ensure that they work in the interests of the shareholders and 
increase shareholders' wealth instead of increasing their own benefits; so firms with high 
profitability can use high levels of debt to control management discretion. Most of the 
empirical studies report a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. Thus 
empirical evidence largely supports the pecking order hypothesis with regard to leverage. 
H2: Profitability is negatively related with leverage. 
Firm Size 
According to the pecking order hypothesis there should be a negative relationship 
between firm size and leverage because information asymmetries existing between the 
insiders of firms and the capital markets are likely to be lower for large firms; so large 
firms are likely to be more capable of issuing equity which is sensitive to information 
asymmetries Chen (2004). Chen further explains that large firms tend to be more 
diversified and so they are less exposed to bankruptcy risk; moreover large firms are 
likely to have a higher debt capacity and they may be able to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with the issue of long term debt. So according to the trade-off theory large 
firms are likely to be more highly geared (there should be a positive relationship). 
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Chen (2004) further explains the implication of agency theory. According to Chen larger 
firms have a more diluted ownership and thus have less control over individual managers. 
So, large firms tend to issue more long term debt in order to better control management 
behaviour. In contrast smaller firms are more likely to be subject to shareholder 
intervention in the event of mismanagement. So the implication of the agency theory for 
leverage is that there should be a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
The empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage. Hence it is hypothesised that firm size is positively related to leverage. 
H3: Size of the firm is positively related with leverage. 
Tangibility 
Tangibility refers to the extent of fixed assets held by the firms. Different authors have 
referred to this firm characteristic by other terms such as asset structure or collateral 
value of assets. According to the agency theory there should be a positive relationship 
between tangibility of assets and leverage. Jensen (1986) explains that debt can be used 
to discipline the managers so that they work in the interests of the shareholders and 
increase shareholders' wealth instead of increasing their own benefits. Firms can use their 
tangible assets to provide collateral to the lenders for obtaining debt. 
According to the trade-off theory, which is based on the balancing of the tax benefits of 
debt with the bankruptcy costs, there should be a positive relationship between leverage 
and tangibility of assets. Harris and Raviv (1990) explain that firms with higher 
liquidation value i.e. those with tangible assets and / or firms with lower investigation 
costs, will have more debt. Assets with higher liquidation value such as tangible assets 
provide better protection to the lenders in the event of bankruptcy of the firm. 
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The empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship tangibility and leverage. 
Thus empirical evidence largely supports the trade-off theory and the agency theory in 
this context. Hence a positive relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage has 
been hypothesised. 
H4: Tangibility is positively related with leverage. 
Growth Opportunities 
Growth opportunities refer to the future prospects of growth for the firm. Different 
researchers have used other terms such as investment opportunities with a similar 
meaning. Raj an and Zingales (1995) explain with reference to Myers (1977) that highly 
levered firms are more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities. So firms 
expecting high future growth should use a higher amount of equity financing. It can be 
understood from their explanation that according to the agency theory there should be a 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Chen (2004) explains that according to the trade-off theory of capital structure firms 
having future growth opportunities (which are intangible assets by nature) tend to borrow 
less than firms having more tangible assets (or less growth opportunities in future) 
because grov^h opportunities cannot be collateralised (due to their intangible nature). It 
can be understood from this explanation that according to the trade-off theory there 
should be a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Saravanan (2006) explains with reference Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2002) that 
faster growing firms are likely to be in need of external funds to finance their positive 
investment opportunities. It can be understood from their explanation that according to 
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the pecking order hypothesis there should be a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. 
The empirical literature mostly reports a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. Thus the empirical evidence generally supports the 
relationship predicted by trade-off theory and the agency theory. Hence it is hypothesised 
that there should be a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
H5: Growth opportunities are negatively related with leverage. 
Earnings Volatility 
The volatility of earnings of the firms often arise out of their business risk and are likely 
to lead to situations of financial distress or bankruptcy. Hence this factor has been often 
used by the researchers as a proxy for expected bankruptcy or financial distress costs. 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) explain that higher volatility of earnings 
increases the likelihood of financial distress because firms may not be able to fulfill their 
debt servicing commitments. Hence the firm's debt capacity decreases with increases in 
earnings volatility leading to an expected inverse relation with leverage. This implies that 
according to the trade-off theory there should be a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage. 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is 
mixed though several studies have reported a negative influence of earnings volatility on 
leverage. However majority of the studies have hypothesised a negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage because the earnings volatility leads to an 
increase in the probability of financial distress which in turn has a negative influence on 
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leverage. Hence following the earlier research works, in this study also a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage has been hypothesised. 
H6: Earnings volatility is negatively related with leverage. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shields are the tax shield effects which arise out of the expense items like 
depreciation and amortisation. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) explain that tax shields 
arising out of depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the interest tax 
shields arising out of debt financing. Accordingly the presence of non-debt tax shields, 
such as depreciation and investment tax credits, reduces the capacity of a firm to benefit 
firom the interest tax shields arising out of debt. Therefore, the optimal leverage of a firm 
is negatively influenced by non-debt tax shields. So according to the trade-off theory the 
firms with high non-debt tax shields should have lower levels of debt in their capital 
structure. 
Though theory predicts a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage 
the empirical evidence on the relationship is mixed. However most of the earlier 
researchers have been found to base their research works on a hypothesis of negative 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. Hence following the earlier 
research works, in this study also a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields 
and leverage has been hypothesised. 
H7: Non-Debt Tax Shields are negatively related with leverage. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE AND NON-FINANCIAL COSTS AS A NEW DETERMINANT 
The present study proposes to extend the set of firm characteristics used as determinants 
of capital structure by inclusion of a new firm characteristic - the non-financial costs. 
Intuitively firms which have a high proportion of non-financial costs will have a smaller 
margin left from their total income to cover the financial costs (interest expense) before 
the net profit can be obtained. So it is likely that the extent of non-financial costs incurred 
by the firms may have an influence on their capital structure. 
It is expected that the higher the proportion of non-financial costs the lower would be the 
income available to the firms for the deduction of interest expense (financial costs). 
Further in the presence of volatility of revenues the higher the level of the non-financial 
costs the higher will be the probability of financial distress because with given volatility 
of revenues higher level of non-financial costs tend to increase the likelihood of lower 
earnings available to cover the interest expense. Hence from the point of view of the 
trade-off theory it can be understood that the higher the level of non-financial costs the 
higher is the likelihood of financial distress and the lower should be the leverage. 
The researcher has not come across any study so far which explains the relationship 
between non-financial costs and leverage. A search for prevailing empirical evidence in 
this regard was made in order to formulate a reasonable hypothesis on the basis of the 
logical explanation of the likely relationship and observable empirical evidence, if any. 
For each of the five industrywise samples search for cross-sectional evidence was made 
on the basis of the undivided samples i.e. before dividing the samples into the two 
categories - firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Cross-sectional correlations between each of the five debt ratios and the measure for non-
financial costs (ratio of non-financial costs to total costs) were calculated separately for 
each industry and for each year in the sampling period, 1999 through 2008. These 
correlations were calculated on the full samples. 
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Out of the 250 values of correlation coefficients for the five industries 243 correlation 
values were negative and only seven values were small and positive (falling between 0 
and 0.055). The highest negative value of correlation was -0.7296 and the smallest 
negative value of correlation was -0.0223. As many as 98 out of the 250 correlation 
values were in the range -0.50 to -1. Prima facie this evidence very strongly indicates that 
in general there is a high likelihood of a negative relationship between non-financial costs 
and leverage in all the five industries covered in this study. Accordingly a negative 
relationship between non-financial costs and leverage has been hypothesised. 
H8: Non-Financial Costs are negatively related with leverage. 
D. HYPOTHESIS ON THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE 
DETERMINANTS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF DEBT RATIOS 
From the point of the firms different types of debt will entail different costs, benefits and 
risk for the borrowing firms. For instance long term loans tend to carry higher interest 
rate than short term loans because other things remaining the same in a long term loan the 
borrowed money will be available to the borrower for a longer period of time than in a 
short term loan. Further vmsecured loans tend to be more expensive than secured loans 
because the lender's risk is higher in the unsecured loans than in the secured loans. The 
firms will have to choose fi"om these types of loans on the basis of their requirements and 
the practicability of the specific type of loan based on their costs, benefits and risks, and 
the characteristics of the firm. 
In the present study different measures of leverage have been computed on the basis of 
different types of debt. Many of the earlier empirical studies have used multiple measures 
of leverage based on long term debt, short term debt and total debt. All such studies 
indeed show that the determinants do not explain equally the variations in the different 
debt ratios (i.e. leverage measured in terms of different types of debt). Hence in the light 
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of this evidence it is expected that the determinants of capital structure will not equally 
explain the behaviour of different types of debt ratios. Accordingly the following 
hypothesis has been formulated. 
H9: The determinants taken together do not equally explain the behaviour of the different 
types of debt ratios. 
E. HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISON OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ITS 
BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS AND 
FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
So far there has been no empirical evidence on the comparison of capital structure 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Since the debt ratios of a firm are likely to be understated when assets are revalued 
compared to what they should really be, a comparison of the different types of debt ratios 
and their relationship with the various firm specific determinants, need be made between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. However no 
such empirical evidence was foimd in the survey of literature. So in the absence of any 
evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the leverage (debt ratios) of the two 
categories of firms are equal. 
HIO: There is no significant difference in leverage between the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H2, profitability has been hypothesised to be 
negatively related with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature 
of relationship between profitability and leverage should be different for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
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empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship between 
profitability and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification 
or any empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of 
relationship between profitability and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H l l : The nature of relationship between profitability and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H3 that the firm size is positively 
related with leverage. Theoretically there is no justification as to why the nature of 
relationship between the size of firm and leverage should be different for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Further no empirical 
evidence is available which shows that the nature of relationship between firm size and 
leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. So due to the lack of theoretical justification and empirical evidence 
in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of relationship between firm size 
and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H12: The nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H4 tangibility of assets is positively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical explanation which suggests that there should be a 
different relationship between tangibility and leverage for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Further there is no empirical 
evidence which shows that the nature of relationship between tangibility and leverage is 
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different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification or any empirical evidence in this 
regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of relationship between tangibility and 
leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H13: The nature of relationship between tangibility and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H5 that growth opportunities are 
negatively related with leverage. Theoretically there is no justification as to why the 
nature of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage should differ between 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Further no empirical evidence is available which shows that the nature of relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature 
of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is similar for the two 
categories of firms. 
H14: The natiire of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H6 earnings volatility is negatively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical explanation which suggests that there should be a 
different relationship between earnings volatility and leverage for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
empirical evidence which shows that the nature of relationship between earnings 
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volatility and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification or any 
empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H15: The nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is similar for the 
firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H7 that non-debt tax shields are 
negatively related with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature 
of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage should be different for the 
firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover 
there is no empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature 
of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is similar for the two categories 
of firms. 
H16: The nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H8 non-financial costs are negatively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature of relationship 
between non-financial costs and leverage should be different for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship between non-
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financial costs and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification 
or any empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of 
relationship between non-financial costs and leverage is similar for the two categories of 
firms. 
H17: The nature of relationship between non-financial costs and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
There is no justification in theoretical terms as to why the explanatory power of the 
determinants for the various types of debt ratios should not be equal for firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
empirical evidence available which shows that the explanatory power of the determinants 
for the various types of debt ratios is not equal for the firms which revalue their assets 
and firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the 
explanatory power of the determinants for the various types of debt ratios is equal for the 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
H18: The explanatory power of the determinants for the various types of debt ratios is 
equal for the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This research work has been carried out in the context of industries selected fi-om the 
manufacturing sector in India. All the prior empirical studies on determinants of capital 
structure in the context of developed as well as developing countries including India have 
been carried out on the firms in the manufacturing industries. Ihe scope of this study is 
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limited to the companies (within the selected manufacturing industries) which are listed 
in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
This research work studies the capital structure behaviour of those manufacturing 
industries in India which are characterised by a higher concentration of firms. The 
number of listed companies (at BSE) within the nianufacturing industries has been used 
as a proxy for the concentration of firms in those industries. The various industries in the 
manufacturing sector in India were ranked on the basis of the number of companies 
within the industries which are listed at the BSE. The top five manufacturing industries in 
terms of the number of companies listed at BSE were selected for the study. 
These industries are: chemicals industry (excluding drugs and pharmaceuticals), textiles 
industry, ferrous metal and ferrous metal products industry, food products (excluding 
beverages and sugar) industry and, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. In order to 
simplify the reference to these industries they have been referred to as chemicals 
industry, textiles industry, ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and, 
drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. These five industries together comprise 
approximately 62 percent of all the manufacturing companies listed at the BSE and so 
they represent the major part of the manufacturing sector in India. 
From these five industries samples of companies were selected on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
1. The firms must be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) on or before the 
financial year 1998-1999 
2. The firms must be listed on the BSE continuously up to the financial year 2007-
2008 
3. The firms should have reported their annual accounts without any gaps for all the 
financial years during the sampling period 
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4. The firms should have the same accounting period 
5. The firms should have positive sales and net worth 
6. The firms should not have issued any convertible securities during the sampling 
period 
After the initial selection of the samples, firms in the samples were subdivided into two 
categories: firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Finally there were two sets of samples, which consisted of companies from all the five 
industries and the two sets of samples differed on whether the firms in the samples had a 
practice of revaluing their assets or not. Whether the firms revalued their assets or not 
was determined by finding out whether they had revaluation reserves or not in any year 
during the 10 year sampling period. If any firm had revaluation reserves in any year 
during the sampling period then it was put into the category of firms which revalue their 
assets, otherwise it was put into the category of firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This classification enables the comparison of capital structure and its behaviour between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. The issue of 
revaluation of assets is indeed important not only from a purely financial point of view 
but also from the perspective of corporate governance. The practice of revaluation of 
assets results in an increase in the value of assets. The debt level employed by the firm in 
relation to an increased asset base due to revaluation will result in the understatement of 
leverage compared to what it should be in reality. Hence the practice of revaluation of 
assets may ultimately lead to the projection of an inappropriate picture of the financial 
risk of the firm in the eyes of the creditors and other stakeholders. 
For the sampled companies the financial data were collected firom the CMIE PROWESS 
database. The CMIE PROWESS is a highly reputed database on the Indian corporate 
sector and has been extensively used by the research studies in the Indian context. 
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ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
The main analytical techniques used are ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks, F 
tests for equality of variance, t tests for difference between means, Mann-Whitney U 
tests, cross-sectional correlation analysis, correlation matrix, cross-sectional analysis by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) Multiple Regression Technique, checking for the presence 
of autocorrelation / serial correlation between the residuals using Durbin-Watson d 
statistic and checking for the presence of multicoUinearity using Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). The statistical analysis was carried out using Statistica software package 
(Release 8). This study has resulted in several interesting findings on capital structure 
behaviour in the industries which have been covered i.e. chemicals, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, ferrous metal and metal products, food and textiles. 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks were used to find out whether the 
capital structure differs across industries. ANOVA assumes that the populations from 
which the samples are drawn are normally distributed. Hence additional evidence on 
whether the capital structure differs across industries was obtained through the non-
parametric method Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks, which does not make any 
distributional assumptions about the underlying populations. This has helped to draw the 
conclusions in a more reliable manner. 
The t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out separately for each of the five 
industries for comparing the capital structure between the two categories of firms - those 
which revalue their assets and those which do not. The t-test on the equality or difference 
between sample means assumes that the populations fi-om which the samples are dravm 
are normally distributed. Hence additional evidence on whether the capital structure is 
same or different between the two categories of firms was obtained through the non-
parametric method Mann-Whitney U test, which does not make any distributional 
assumptions about the underlying populations. This has helped to draw the conclusions in 
a more reliable maimer. 
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Cross-sectional correlation analyses were carried out for each industry in order to find out 
prima facie evidence on whether there is any association between capital structure and 
non-financial costs. This was necessary because no empirical evidence was available on 
the relationship between capital structure and non-financial costs. The findings from the 
cross-sectional correlation analyses were used as the basis for introducing non-financial 
costs as a new determinant of capital structure. 
OLS Multiple Regression Analysis was used to find out the cross-sectional relationships 
between capital structure and the determinants. For each measure of leverage three 
regression relationships were estimated. The first one uses only the determinants selected 
from the prior empirical studies; the second one extends the first relationship by adding 
the industry dummy variables and the third regression relationship extends the second 
one by adding the new determinant non-financial costs. 
JUSTIFICATION FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
According to Theobald (1978) and McCabe (1979) the cross-sectional testing method is 
more appropriate than the inter-temporal testing method for analysing long term 
relationships among variables because the inter-temporal test method reveals only short 
term relationships. Several important studies on capital structure determinants have used 
the cross-sectional analysis method such as Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Deesomsak, 
Paudyal and Pescetto (2004), and Saravanan (2006). Moreover long term relationships 
tend to be more stable than short term relationships. 
Some of the previous studies explain that the average values of the variables used are 
better than a single point estimate for testing theories which relate to long term behaviour 
of firms in order to avoid distortions that may be caused by short term variations from the 
target ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988, in uS, and Bennett and Donnelly, 1993, in UK). 
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Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) average the values of the variables over time in order to 
minimise the effects of transient variations through time because of business cycles. 
Further as Bradley et al explain there may be lagged adjustments of leverage ratios by 
firms towards their target leverage ratios and this factor has been adjusted by them by 
using average values of leverage ratios over time. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) average the variables to reduce noise and to account for slow 
adjustments. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) explain that the averaging process 
also reduces the possibility of measurement error and the effects of random fluctuations 
in the variables. Accordingly the values of the dependent and independent variables used 
in the analytical techniques in this study are averages calculated over the entire sampling 
period (ten financial years from 1998 to 2008). 
Moreover, it is particularly required for the dependent variable (the debt ratio) because in 
some of the years the debt ratio may be extremely low or zero if the firm has repaid most 
or all of its debt or has not taken any new loans. So, average values of the variables over 
the entire sampling period are more representative in nature than the values for the 
individual years. There is only one exception in this process. Volatility of earnings has 
been calculated as the standard deviation of Return on Assets (ROA) calculated over the 
entire sampling period (ten financial years from 1998 to 2008). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidences found in this study show that long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio significantly differ across the 
five industries studied viz. chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and textiles industry. This is 
found for firms which revalue their assets as well as for firms which do not revalue their 
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assets. Hence it can be generally concluded that the debt ratios differ across these five 
industries irrespective of whether they revalue their assets or not. 
In other words it can be generalised that the nature of industry influences the capital 
structure of firms. This might indicate that firms belonging to a specific industry tend to 
follow a capital structure that is desirable for that industry from the perspective of the 
operating characteristics and business risks of that industry. The desirable capital 
structure is typical for the specific industry and it differs with the nature of the industries. 
In each industry it is found that there is no significant difference in any of the debt ratios 
(viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio) between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do 
not revalue their assets. This implies that even after revaluation of assets the debt ratios of 
the firms which revalue their assets do not significantly differ from the pattern of debt 
ratios in a particular industry. This conclusion leads us to a new possibility. 
As it has been found that after the effect of revaluation there is no significant difference 
in the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets, it might indicate the possibility that without revaluation of assets the 
debt ratios may significantly differ between the firms in the two categories. This may be a 
subject matter for fiature research. However if this is true this may indicate that firms 
revalue their assets so that their debt ratios fit into the desired pattern of debt ratios in 
their industry. 
Thus the following generalised conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 
relationships between the firm characteristics and leverage fi-om the similarities in the 
relationships observed between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
Abstract 33 
do not revalue their assets in the chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and the textiles industry. At the 
same time the differences have been pointed out so that the same can provide the 
directions for future research for extending knowledge in this direction. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between profitability and leverage is 
inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, short 
term debt, total debt and secured debt. But the nature of relationship is different 
for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not when leverage 
is measured with regard to unsecured debt - it is insignificant for firms which 
revalue their assets whereas it is significantly negative for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. So the difference observed between the two categories is that 
the use of imsecured debt does not significantly change with profitability across 
the firms which revalue their assets whereas it tends to decrease with increasing 
profitability across the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is 
positive when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt and total debt. 
But the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is different for the 
two categories when leverage is measured with regard to secured debt - it is 
insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly 
positive for firms which do not revalue their assets. For both categories of firms 
the relationship with firm size is insignificant for short term debt and unsecured 
debt. Thus the difference observed between the two categories is that the use of 
secured debt does not significantly change with firm size across firms which 
revalue their assets whereas it tends to increase with increasing firm size across 
firms which do not revalue their assets. 
• For both categories of firms it can be generally concluded that the nature of 
relationship between tangibility and leverage is similar when leverage is measured 
in terms of long term debt and short term debt. The relationship is positive for 
long term debt and negative for short term debt in both the categories and hence is 
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applicable to all firms. However the nature of relationship is different for the two 
categories when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and secured debt -
it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly 
negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. For both categories of firms 
the relationship with tangibility is insignificant for unsecured debt. Thus in 
general the use of long term debt tends to increase and the use of short term debt 
tends to decrease with increase in tangibility across all the firms in the five 
industries. However the difference observed between the two categories is that the 
total debt and secured debt does not significantly change with tangibility across 
firms which revalue their assets whereas total debt as well as secured debt 
decreases with increase in tangibility across firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is positive when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and 
secured debt. However difference in relationship has been observed between the 
two categories of firms when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, 
short term debt and unsecured debt. When leverage is measured in terms of long 
term debt the nature of relationship is positive for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is insignificant for firms which do not revalue their assets. When 
leverage is measured in terms of short term debt the nature of relationship is 
positive for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is insignificant for 
firms which revalue their assets. When leverage is measured in terms of 
unsecured debt the nature of relationship is positive for firms which revalue their' 
assets whereas it is insignificant for firms which do not revalue their assets. This 
implies that for firms which revalue their assets long term debt, secured debt and 
imsecured debt tend to increase with growth opportunities (i.e. growing firms in 
this category tend to increase borrowings in the form of all these three types of 
debt); this resuUs in the increase in their total debt in their capital structure. 
However for firms which do not revalue their assets total debt tends to increase 
with growth opportxmities due to increase in secured debt and short term debt. 
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Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage 
is inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to short term debt. For 
both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when leverage is 
measured in terms of long term debt and unsecured debt. However the difference 
observed between the two categories is that when leverage is measured with 
regard to total debt and secured debt the relationship is significant and negative 
for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for firms 
which revalue their assets. This implies that firms which revalue their assets tend 
to use lower levels of short term debt relative to their capital if their earnings are 
volatile; however total debt does not change significantly across the firms. Firms 
which do not revalue their assets tend to use lower levels of short term debt as 
well as secured debt in their capital structure if their earnings are volatile; for such 
firms this results in lower levels of total debt with increasing earnings volatility. 
Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage is positive when leverage is measured in terms of long term debt. For 
both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when leverage is 
measured with regard to short term debt and unsecured debt. However it is 
observed that the nature of relationship is different for the two categories of firms 
when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and secured debt - it is 
significant and positive for both measures of debt for firms which do not revalue 
their assets whereas it is not significant for both measures of debt for firms which 
revalue their assets. This implies that the use of long term debt in capital structure 
tends to increase with non-debt tax shields across firms which revalue their assets; 
the increase in the use of long term debt however does not significantly increase 
their total debt in their capital structure. The use of long term debt and secured 
debt tends to increase with non-debt tax shields across firms which do not revalue 
their assets; this results in increase in total debt with increasing non-debt tax 
shields for such firms. 
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Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between non-financial costs and leverage 
is negative when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, short term 
debt, total debt and secured debt. However it is observed that the nature of 
relationship is different for the two categories of firms when leverage is measured 
in terms of unsecured debt - it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is significant and negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This implies that the use of long term debt, short term debt and secured debt in 
capital structure tends to decrease with increase in non-financial costs across 
firms which revalue their assets; for such firms this decreases the use of total debt 
in capital structure with increase in non-financial costs without resulting in any 
significant change in the use of unsecured debt. For firms which do not revalue 
their assets the use of all types of debt including unsecured debt and total debt in 
capital structure tends to decrease with increase in non-financial costs. 
Finally it can be concluded that though the debt ratios differ across the industries 
studied, within each of the industries the debt ratios do not significantly differ 
between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. This implies that even after revaluation of assets the debt ratios of such 
firms fit into their characteristic patterns within specific industries i.e. revaluation 
of assets does not cause the debt ratios to differ significantly from their patterns in 
the specific industries. 
The following conclusions can be drawn with reference to the five industries covered in 
the study about the explanatory power of the determinants for various measures of 
leverage for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. The differences observed between the two categories of firms in this context have 
also been discussed. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the determinants taken together do not equally explain the cross-
sectional variations in the different measures of leverage used in this study viz. 
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long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio. 
Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that collectively the determinants provide the highest amount of 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the long term debt ratio and the 
lowest amount of explanation for the unsecured debt ratio. This means that among 
the debt ratios the relationship between long term debt and the firm characteristics 
is most systematic and orderly whereas the relationship between unsecured debt 
and the firm characteristics is the least systematic and orderly by nature. 
The industry factor and the empirically identified firm characteristics viz. 
profitability, firm size, tangibility of assets, growth opportunities, earnings 
volatility and non-debt tax shields collectively have higher explanatory power for 
the cross-sectional variations in leverage for firms which revalue their assets than 
for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
The inclusion of non-financial costs in addition to the empirically identified firm 
characteristics and the industry factor, results in a significant improvement in the 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the various types of debt ratios for 
both categories of firms. However the improvement in explanation due to the 
inclusion of non-financial costs is remarkably higher for the firms which do not 
revalue their assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. Collectively the 
explanation of the cross-sectional variations in all the debt ratios provided by the 
empirically known determinants and the newly introduced determinant, non-
financial costs, is remarkably higher for the firms which do not revalue their 
assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. Hence in general the 
determinants of capital structure can be extended by including the non-financial 
costs as a potential determinant of firm leverage. However the capital structure of 
firms which do not revalue their assets are found to be more systematically related 
to the non-financial costs than the capital structure of firms which revalue their 
assets. 
It can be generally concluded that the explanatoiy power of the determinants for 
the different types of debt ratios is not equal for firms which revalue their assets 
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and firms which do not revalue their assets. This means that the cross-sectional 
variations in the different types of debt ratios are not equally explained by the 
determinants for both categories of firms. This might happen because the debt 
ratios of the firms in the two categories have different extent of systematic 
relationship with the determinants. 
The following additional findings have been made: 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the various measures of leverage (i.e. based on long term debt, short term debt, 
total debt, secured debt or unsecured debt) are not related with all the firm 
characteristics used in this study in the same way as predicted by one or more of 
the theories viz. trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and agency theory. 
That is each measure of leverage is related only to some of the firm characteristics 
in the same manner as predicted by one or more of the theories. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the relationships between the firm characteristics and unsecured debt follow the 
predictions of the theories to the least extent. It is already established by the 
regression findings that among all types of debt unsecured debt is the least 
systematically related with the firm characteristics. This implies that the 
behaviour of the unsecured debt ratio is least likely to be predicted by the 
theories. 
• For the other types of debt the observed relationships wdth the firm characteristics 
follow the theoretically predicted relationships to different extent for both 
categories of firms. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the relationships between the firm characteristics and unsecured debt exhibit the 
least matching vdth the empirical evidence for other measures of debt found in the 
developed countries like USA. No empirical evidence on the relationship between 
firm characteristics and unsecured debt have been found in the context of the 
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USA or other developed countries or even in the studies in some of the 
developing countries. 
For the other measures of debt the observed relationships with the firm 
characteristics match with the empirical evidence found in the developed 
countries to different extent for both categories of firms. However there is greater 
evidence for matching relationships for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
In general the evidences show that the capital structure behaviour of the firms in the 
chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, ferrous metal and metal products 
industry, food industry and textiles industry do not provide complete support for any 
single theory on capital structure. The trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and 
agency theory can individually describe only some important aspects of the capital 
structure behaviour in these industries. So the observed capital structure behaviour in 
these five industries fits better with the collective explanation provided by these three 
capital structure theories. Moreover the evidences found in these five manufacturing 
industries in the Indian context partially match v\ath the generally found evidence in the 
developed countries like USA. 
SUGGESTIONS 
On the basis of the findings from this study the following suggestions are made for the 
financial theorists and the practitioners: 
• It should be noted by the financial theorists that the trade-off theory, pecking 
order hypothesis and the agency theory do not individually provide complete 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in capital structure of firms. 
However they collectively explain a significant part of the variations. Hence each 
of these three theories has some relevance in explaining the capital structure 
behaviour of firms. This implies that firms do attempt to achieve an optimal 
capital structure by trying to balance between the benefits and costs of debt 
financing, and also by taking into consideration the agency costs. At the same 
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time for raising their financing they do follow a pecking order in order to adjust 
their financing practices with the information asymmetries. 
It shoujd be noted by the financial practitioners that the optimal capital structure 
of firms is likely to change under the influence of the firm characteristics as 
discussed in this study. Thus the firm characteristics profitability, firm size, 
tangibility of assets, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields 
and non-financial costs are likely to influence the optimal capital structure of 
firms. 
However all the firm characteristics do not tend to influence all the measures of 
debt. So different measures of leverage based on different measures of debt are 
likely to be influenced by some of the firm characteristics only. 
In planning for their capital structure the firms should take into consideration at 
least those firm characteristics which significantly influence specific types of 
debt. At the same time while deciding on the amounts of different types of loans 
to be given to the firms, the banks and financial institutions should take into 
consideration those firm characteristics which significantly influence specific 
types of debt. 
Moreover as found in this study capital structure of firms which revalue their 
assets is likely to be influenced by the firm characteristics in somewhat different 
manner from the capital structure of firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Hence the optimal capital structure of these two categories of firms is likely to 
change with some difference under the influence of the firm characteristics. The 
firms as well as their lenders should consider this possibility so that the firms can 
follow an optimal capital structure policy. 
In order to plan for long term debt the firms as well as their lenders should take in 
to consideration the profitability, size, tangibility, non-debt tax shields and non-
financial costs of the firms. In addition the firms which revalue their assets should 
also take into consideration the growth opportunities, which is a significant factor 
for them particularly. 
In order to plan for short term debt the firms as well as their lenders should take 
into consideration the profitability, tangibility of assets, earnings volatility and 
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non-financial costs of the firms. The firms which do not revalue their assets 
should also take into consideration growth opportvmities because this factor is 
particularly significant for them. 
In order to plan for the total debt the firms as well as their lenders should take into 
consideration the profitability, size, growth and non-financial costs of the firms. 
Additionally the firms which do not revalue their assets should also take into 
consideration tangibility and earnings volatility because these factors are 
particularly significant for such firms. 
In order to plan for secured debt the firms as well as their lenders should take into 
consideration the profitability, growth and non-financial costs of the firms. Apart 
fi-om these factors the firms which do not revalue their assets should also take into 
consideration size, tangibility and earnings volatility because these factors are 
particularly significant for them. 
It can be understood for all firms irrespective of whether they revalue their assets 
or not that under the influence of the firm characteristics the optimal capital 
structure with reference to total debt is more likely to change due to the changes 
in long term debt or due to the changes secured debt. So in order to move closer to 
the optimal capital structure the firms should follow a target capital structure fixed 
in terms of long term debt or secured debt. 
Under the normal circumstances the firms should avoid using unsecured debt. The 
firms should borrow imsecured debt only as a temporary measure such as when 
there is a sudden contingency. Unsecured debt is more expensive due to its 
unsecured nature. Moreover raising imsecured debt is likely to send a signal that 
that the firm is uncertain about its ability to repay its debt. So using imsecured 
debt may cause a deviation fi-om the optimal capital structure due to its possible 
adverse signaling impact on the market value of the firm. 
Firms whose earnings are volatile should be particularly carefijl about the use of 
short term debt. For such firms indiscriminate use of short term debt can increase 
the risk of financial distress which wall have an adverse impact on their market 
value resulting in a deviation fi-om the optimal capital structure. 
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One of the major findings from this study is that the non-financial costs have a 
very significant negative influence on the capital structure of firms. So other 
things remaining the same, for firms which have high levels of non-financial 
costs, the optimal capital structure is likely to consist of lower levels of debt and 
vice versa. For such firms using higher debt levels is likely to increase the risk of 
financial distress which may cause an adverse impact on their market value 
resulting in a deviation fi-om the optimal capital structure. 
As found in this study, the capital structure of firms which do not revalue their 
assets is better explained and hence more predictable on the basis of the firm 
characteristics than that of the firms which revalue their assets. This might be 
because of the reason that the basis for revaluing the assets may have no relation 
with the firm characteristics or the factors which influence capital structure and so 
the practice of revaluing the assets might distort the likely relationships between 
capital structure and its determinants. Hence compared to firms which revalue 
their assets firms which do not revalue their assets are likely to be in a better 
position to plan and implement a policy of targeting an optimal capital structure 
because such firms can fix a more accurate target capital structure on the basis of 
the firm characteristics than the firms which revalue their assets. So in general for 
better capital structure planning and practice it can be suggested that unless there 
is a highly compelling need the firms should avoid revaluing their assets. 
This study makes a modest attempt to contribute to the body of knowledge in several 
ways. It has revisited the relationships between firm characteristics and leverage found in 
the prior empirical studies in the US and other developed countries, and also in some of 
the developing coimtries. It has extended the determinants of capital structure by making 
a maiden attempt to introduce a new determinant, non-financial costs, together with other 
firm characteristics to explain capital structure behaviour. It has extended the explanation 
of capital structure behaviour by making a maiden attempt to explain the behaviour of 
secured debt and unsecured debt on the basis of the firm characteristics. It has extended 
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the research work in this area by comparing the capital structxire and its behaviour for 
firms which revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their eissets. 
However this study has two limitations. The scope of the study does not cover the entire 
manufacturing sector - it covers five industries within the manufacturing sector which 
together constitute approximately 62 percent of the listed companies in the manufacturing 
sector. The next limitation is that the study does not attempt to explain the short term 
variations in capital structure i.e. the variations in capital structure over time - it takes 
into consideration the variations in capital structure over the cross-section of firms in the 
industries that were studied. 
This study provides directions for fiiture research by revealing the differences in capital 
structure behaviour between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. Such research work may lead to the finding of possible differences, if 
any, in the financing policies and practices of the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover research work in this new direction 
may also help to find out whether there is any cormection between the practice of 
revaluation of assets and the financing behaviour of firms which revalue their assets. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The modem theory of capital structure had its inception with the celebrated paper of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). The ingenuity of their work is that it establishes the 
conditions under which capital structure would not be relevant for the market value of the 
firm. This has led to the directions of investigation in this area because deviations from 
the conditions under which capital structure would be irrelevant (i.e. deviations from the 
assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller, 1958) make capital structure relevant for 
the value of a firm. One of the most important decisions of firms is to decide on the 
appropriate level of debt in their capital structure. Researchers have been searching for 
the determinants of capital structure because the optimal capital structure of a firm is 
likely to change under the influence of the determinants. 
Over decades of research work that followed researchers have made significant progress 
on this subject and have developed alternative theories that explain how the capital 
structure of a firm is determined. The trade-off theory and the agency theory were put 
forward to explain the existence of optimal capital structure of firms which arise out of 
the benefits and costs of debt financing. In contrast the pecking order hypothesis was put 
forward which explains that the changes in capital structure occur not due to the existence 
of any target optimal capital structure but due to the imbalances between internally 
generated fimds of firms and, the need to pay dividends and make investments. These 
theories have guided the search for the factors that determine the capital structure of 
firms. If an optimal capital structure does exist in reality then these determinants would 
explain how the optimal capital structure of firms would change under the influence of 
these determinants. 
The theoretical progress was followed by a spate of empirical studies which have 
attempted to find out the relevance of the capital structure theories and search for the 
factors which determined the capital structure of firms. These studies have revealed some 
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commonly fovmd empirical facts relating to the corporate financing behaviour. Most of 
the empirical research work in this area has been largely based on the publicly traded 
companies in the United States and some of the other developed countries. In order to 
determine whether these empirical findings are universal realities or are spurious 
observations these findings must be verified in environments, time periods and contexts 
different from the ones in which they were revealed. 
The first landmark study in this direction was done by Rajan and Zingales (1995) when 
they compared the capital structure determinants across the G-7 coimtries. The studies in 
the Indian context are still few in number and there is sufficient scope to expand research 
work on this subject in the Indian context. This research work has been conceived and 
carried out in the light of the major capital structure theories and the findings of the prior 
empirical research, and an attempt has been made to extend the scope of research work in 
this subject by considering other possible dimensions. The term 'Capital Structure 
Behaviour' in the title of this study has been used mainly to refer to the cross-sectional 
variations in capital structure that can be observed across the cross-section of firms 
within specific industries as well as across different industries, and the possible linkages 
between the cross-sectional variations in capital structure and the firm characteristics as 
revealed by the financial statements of the firms. 
In the present research work an attempt has been made to study those determinants which 
have been found to be tested and reported very frequently in the earlier empirical studies 
because for such determinants greater amount of empirical evidence is available amongst 
all the determinants that were identified. In particular the firm characteristics which have 
been used as determinants of capital structure in this study are: profitability, firm size, 
tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields. In addition 
to these six variables this study has included a new variable, non-financial costs, as a 
potential determinant of capital structure in an attempt to extend the set of determinants 
of capital structure. Since there was no empirical evidence available on this new 
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determinant prima facie evidence was collected by finding out the cross-sectional 
correlations between the various types of debt ratios used in this study and the ratio of 
non-financial costs to total costs. These cross-sectional correlations were predominantly 
negative strongly indicating the possibility of a negative relationship between leverage 
and non-financial costs. 
This study has used five different measures of financial leverage based on different 
measures of debt viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. Different measures of leverage have been used in 
order to find out whether the firm characteristics influence the different types of debt in 
different ways or to different extent. The researcher has not come across any studies 
which explain the cross-sectional variations in secured and unsecured debt. The Indian 
financial reporting system requires the firms to disclose their secured and unsecured debt. 
Hence it is relevant to study the influence of the firm characteristics on the secured and 
unsecured debt. 
This empirical study has extended the research on capital structure fiirther by comparing 
the capital structure and its behaviour between the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets. The issue of revaluation of assets is not only 
important fi-om a purely financial viewpoint but also from the viewpoint of corporate 
governance. The practice of revaluation of assets results in an increase in the value of 
assets. The debt level employed by the firm in relation to an increased asset base due to 
revaluation will result in the understatement of leverage compared to what it should be in 
reality. Hence the practice of revaluation of assets may ultimately lead to the projection 
of an inappropriate picture of the financial risk of the firm in the eyes of the creditors and 
other stakeholders. 
All the prior empirical studies on determinants of capital structure have been carried out 
on the firms in the manufacturing industries. Hence this research work has also been 
carried out in the context of industries selected from the manufacturing sector in India. 
The scope of this study is limited to the companies in the manufacturing sector which are 
listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
This research work studies the capital structure behaviour of those manufacturing 
industries in India which are characterised by a higher concentration of firms. The 
number of listed companies (at BSE) within the manufacturing industries has been used 
as a proxy for the concentration of firms in those industries. The various industries in the 
manufacturing sector in India were ranked on the basis of the nxomber of companies 
within the industries which are listed at the BSE. The top five manufacturing industries in 
terms of the number of companies which are listed at BSE were selected for the study. 
These industries are: chemicals industry (excluding drugs and pharmaceuticals), textiles 
industry, ferrous metal and ferrous metal products industry, food products (excluding 
beverages and sugar) industry and, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. In order to 
simplify the reference to these industries they have been referred to as chemicals 
industry, textiles industry, ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and, 
drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. These five industries together comprise 
approximately 62 percent of all the manufacturing companies listed at the BSE and so 
they represent the major part of the manufacturing sector in India. 
The main analytical techniques used are ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks, F 
tests for equality of variance, t tests for difference between means, Mann-Whitney U 
tests, cross-sectional correlation analysis, correlation matrix, cross-sectional analysis by 
OLS Multiple Regression Technique, checking for the presence of autocorrelation / serial 
correlation between the residuals using Durbin-Watson d statistic and checking for the 
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presence of multicollinearity using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The statistical 
analysis was carried out using Statistica software package (Release 8). 
The evidences found in this study show that long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio significantly differ across the 
five industries studied viz. chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and textiles industry. This is 
found for firms which revalue their assets as well as for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. It can be generalised that the industry characteristics influence the capital structure 
of firms. 
In each industry it is fovmd that there is no significant difference in any of the debt ratios 
between the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This implies that even after revaluation of assets the debt ratios of the firms which 
revalue their assets do not significantly differ from the pattern of debt ratios in a 
particular industry. This conclusion leads us to a new possibility. It might indicate the 
possibility that without revaluation of assets the debt ratios may significantly differ 
between the firms in the two categories. This may be a subject matter for fiiture research. 
It has been generally found for the firms in the five industries that irrespective of whether 
firms revalue their assets or not, the nature of relationship between profitability and 
leverage is similar and is inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to 
long term debt, short term debt, total debt and secured debt. But the nature of relationship 
is different for the two categories when leverage is measured with regard to unsecured 
debt - it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly 
negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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It has been found that the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is similar 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets and 
it is positive when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt and total debt. But 
the nature of relationship between size and leverage is different for the two categories 
when leverage is measured with regard to secured debt - it is insignificant for firms 
which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly positive for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. For both categories of firms the relationship with firm size is 
insignificant for short term debt and unsecured debt. 
Further for the firms in the five industries it is found that the nature of relationship 
between tangibility and leverage is similar between firms which revalue their assets and 
firms which do not revalue their assets, when leverage is measured in terms of long term 
debt and short term debt. Interestingly the relationship is positive for long term debt and 
negative for short term debt in both the categories and hence is applicable to all firms in 
the five industries. However the nature of relationship is different for the two categories 
of firms when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and secured debt - for total 
debt and secured debt the relationship is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is significantly negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. For both 
categories of firms the relationship with tangibility is insignificant for unsecured debt. 
It has been found that the nature of relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets, and it is positive when leverage is measured with regard to total debt 
and secured debt. However the relationship is different for the two categories when 
leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, short term debt and unsecured debt. 
When leverage is measwed in terms of long term debt the nature of relationship is 
positive for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is insignificant for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. When leverage is measured in terms of short term debt the nature 
of relationship is positive for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is 
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insignificant for firms which revalue their assets. When leverage is measured in terms of 
unsecured debt the nature of relationship is positive for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is insignificant for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It is found that the nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is 
similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, and it is inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to short term 
debt. For both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when leverage is 
measured in terms of long term debt and unsecured debt. However the nature of 
relationship is different for the two categories of firms when leverage is measured with 
regard to total debt and secured debt - it is significant and negative for both measures of 
debt for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for both 
measures of debt for firms which revalue their assets. 
Further it has been found that the nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage is similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets, and it is positive in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to 
long term debt. For both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when 
leverage is measured with regard to short term debt and unsecured debt. However the 
nature of relationship is different for the two categories of firms when leverage is 
measured with regard to total debt and secured debt - it is significant and positive for 
both measures of debt for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not 
significant for both measures of debt for firms which revalue their assets. 
It has been found that the nature of relationship between non-financial costs and leverage 
is similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, and it is negative in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to long term 
debt, short term debt, total debt and secured debt. However the nature of relationship is 
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different for the two categories when leverage is measured with regard to unsecured debt 
- it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significant and 
negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been generally found for the firms in the five industries irrespective of whether 
they revalue their assets or not, that the determinants taken together do not equally 
explain the cross-sectional variations in the different types of debt ratios used in this 
study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio 
and unsecured debt ratio. Collectively the determinants provide the highest amount of 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the long term debt ratio and the lowest 
amount of explanation for the unsecured debt ratio. This means that long term leverage is 
most systematically related to the firm characteristics whereas unsecured debt is least 
systematically related. 
The empirically identified firm characteristics viz. profitability, firm size, tangibility of 
assets, growth opportunities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields, and industry 
factor collectively have higher explanatory power to explain the cross-sectional variations 
in leverage for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. The inclusion of non-financial costs among the set of determinants results in a 
significant improvement in the explanation of the cross-sectional variations in the debt 
ratios of firms in both the categories. However the improvement in explanation due to the 
inclusion of non-financial costs is remarkably higher for the firms which do not revalue 
their assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. Collectively the empirically 
known determinants and the new determinant, non-financial costs, provide remarkably 
higher explanation for the cross-sectional variations in all the debt ratios of the firms 
which do not revalue their assets than of the firms which revalue their assets. It has been 
generally found for the firms in the five industries that the explanatory power of the 
determinants for the different types of debt ratios is not equal for firms which revalue 
their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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It has been generally found for the firms in the five industries irrespective of whether 
they revalue their assets or not, that the various measures of leverage are not related with 
all the firm characteristics used in this study in the same way as predicted by one or more 
of the theories viz. trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and agency theory. Each 
measure of leverage is related only to some of the firm characteristics in the same manner 
as predicted by the theories. It has been further found that the relationships between the 
firm characteristics and unsecured debt follow the predictions of the theories to the least 
extent. 
It has been generally found in the five industries that the relationships between the firm 
characteristics and unsecured debt have the least matching with the empirical evidence 
for other types of debt found in the developed countries (no evidence on imsecured debt 
was found in the prior empirical studies). For the other measures of debt the observed 
relationships with the firm characteristics match with the empirical evidence found in the 
developed countries to different extent for both categories of firms. However there is 
greater evidence for matching relationships for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This thesis consists of six chapters followed by a separate section on Annexures. The first 
chapter introduces and explains the concept of capital structure and its significance. It 
also explains the growing importance of the study of the potential determinants of capital 
structure and the need for further research in this area. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the major capital structure theories viz. the trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and 
agency theory. Chapter 3 presents a review of the existing literature on this subject 
followed by a summary of the findings from the literature review, the broad themes of 
research identified, the research gaps found and the research questions for this study. 
Chapter 4 provides the explanation of the research methodology used in this study. It 
broadly includes the development of hypotheses, the explanatory models, definitions of 
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the variables, collection of data and the analytical techniques used in this study. Chapter 5 
provides a detailed discussion of the results obtained from analytical techniques used. 
Chapter 6 is the concluding part of the thesis and it summarises the conclusions drawn 
from this study and the suggestions. The section on Annexures provides the graphical 
plots of the debt ratios and the residuals from the regression analysis of the data. 
This research work makes a modest attempt to contribute to the body of knowledge in 
various ways. It has revisited the relationships between firm characteristics and leverage 
found in the prior empirical studies. It has extended the determinants of capital structure 
by making a maideri attempt to introduce a new determinant, non-financial costs, to 
explain capital structure behaviour. 
It has extended the explanation of capital structure behaviour by making a maiden 
attempt to explain the behaviour of secured debt and unsecured debt. It has extended the 
research work by comparing the capital structure and its behaviour for firms which 
revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets. Further this study 
provides directions for future research by revealing the differences in capital structure 
behaviour between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. The Bibliography provides more than 90 references that could be an 
important source of knowledge for the future researchers on this subject. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The term capital structure represents the various sources of capital used by a firm. It 
generally means the mixture of different sources of financing used by a firm. In general 
the sources of financing used by a firm fall into two broad categories - the fiinds 
contributed by the owners or the shareholders of the firm, which is also called owner' 
equity, and the funds obtained by the firm by borrowing from lenders, which is called 
debt or leverage. Thus commonly the term capital structure implies the mixture of debt 
and equity forms of financing used by a firm. 
However the primary emphasis of capital structure is on the extent of debt financing used 
a firm. This is because debt financing has a two pronged impact on the firm. On the one 
hand it can increase returns to the shareholders and it provides tax benefits to the firm. 
On the other hand it exposes the firm to increased financial risk. The financial risk arises 
out of the likelihood of bankruptcy which occurs when the firm is not able to make the 
committed payments to its lenders; such a situation is also called financial distress. 
Bankruptcy or its likelihood entails various types of costs on the firm which are called 
bankruptcy costs or the costs of financial distress. 
Hence one of the most important decisions of a firm (or its financial manager) is to 
decide on the appropriate mixture of debt and equity financing in the capital structure of 
the firm. Pandey (2005)*^ explains that the financial manager must strive to obtain the 
optimal capital structure for the firm. An optimal capital structure is one which 
maximises the market value of the firm. According to Pandey in the absence of debt the 
return to the shareholders is equal to the firm's return (which is the return on the firm's 
assets because in order to do its business the firm has to invest its funds, irrespective of 
the sources fi"om where they have been obtained, in the assets that are necessary for doing 
business). 
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Debt financing affects both the return and risk of the firm and the shareholders - in the 
absence of debt financing the only risk the firm faces is the business risk whereas in the 
presence of debt financing the firm faces the business risk as well as financial risk with 
the tax benefits of debt and a likelihood of higher returns to the shareholders. According 
to Pandey (2005)'' a proper balance has to be achieved between return and risk. The 
firm's capital structure will be optimal when the market value of the firm is maximised 
and this happens when the shareholders' return is maximised with given risk. Pandey 
explains that the determination of optimal capital structure is a formidable task. 
The market value of the shares of a company is likely to be influenced by many factors, 
the capital structure being one of them. So it is indeed extremely difficult to precisely 
identify the optimal capital structure. Evidence on the existence of optimal capital 
structure which is targeted by the firms has been reported by Marsh (1982)''*, Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984)'* and Ozkan (2001)'^ . This has led researchers to look for the 
determinants of capital structure because under the influence of the determinants the 
optimal capital structure of a firm will change. One of the rapidly expanding areas of 
research on this subject is the study of the determinants of capital structure. 
The modem theory of capital structure had its inception with the celebrated paper of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)'^ The ingenuity of their work is that it establishes the 
conditions under which capital structure would not be relevant for the market value of the 
firm. This has provided the directions of investigation in this area because deviations 
from the conditions under which capital structure would be irrelevant make capital 
structure relevant for the value of a firm. As Rajan and Zingales (1995) '^ state "We now 
understand the most important departures from the Modigliani and Miller assumptions 
that make capital structure relevant to a firm's value." 
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Brealy and Myers (1997)^  explain that if debt policy were completely irrelevant then 
actual debt ratios should vary randomly from firm to firm and industry to industry. They 
report some commonly observed facts such as that the firms in capital intensive industries 
like steel, aluminum, chemicals, petroleum and mining depend heavily on debt financing. 
On the other hand rapidly growing firms particularly those in the drugs and 
pharmaceuticals industry or technology based industries tend to use lower levels of debt 
in spite of heavy requirements of capital due to their rapid expansion. These evidences 
indicate that capital structure does not vary randomly and that there are observable 
patterns of capital structure which vary by the nature of industries and also by the nature 
of the firms, which in turn implies that debt policy or capital structure does matter. 
Over decades of research work that followed Modigliani and Miller (1958)'^  researchers 
have made significant progress on this subject and have developed alternative theories 
that explain how the capital structure of a firm is determined. The trade-off theory and the 
agency theory were put forward to explain the existence of optimal capital structure of 
firms which arise out of the benefits and costs of debt financing. In contrast the pecking 
order hypothesis was put forward which explains the non-existence of any optimal capital 
structure because, as it explains, the changes in capital structure occur not due to the 
existence of any target optimal capital structure but due to the imbalances between 
internally generated fiinds of firms and, the need to pay dividends and make investments. 
f 
These theories have guided the search for the factors that determine the capital structure 
of firms. These factors are the determinants which would explain how the optimal capital 
structure of firms would change under their influence. 
The theoretical progress was followed by a spate of empirical studies which have 
attempted to find out the relevance of the capital structure theories through the search for 
the determinants of capital structure. These studies have revealed some commonly found 
empirical facts relating to the corporate financing behaviour. Delcoure (2007)^  states that 
despite decades of intensive empirical research after Modigliani and Miller (1958)'^ , 
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there is a surprising lack of consensus as to what factors determine optimal corporate 
capital structure. Most of the empirical research work in this area has been largely based 
on the publicly traded companies in the United States and some of the other developed 
covintries. Some of the important empirical studies on capital structure determinants in 
the context of developed countries, which may be cited here are Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984/, Friend and Hasbrouck (1988f, Friend and Lang (1988)'°, Titman and Wessels 
(1988)2^ Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995)', Graham (1996)", and Ozkan (2001)'^ 
In order to determine whether these empirical findings are universal realities or are 
plainly spurious in nature these findings must be verified in environments, time periods 
and contexts different from the ones in which they were revealed. The first landmark 
study in this direction was done by Rajan and Zingales (1995) '^ when they compared the 
capital structure determinants across the G-7 countries. Though this was a study which 
went beyond the United States and spanned across several countries (the United States 
also being one of them) all the countries covered in this study were the developed 
countries. Their study was followed by several studies in the context of developing 
countries and transitional economies including India. Some of the important studies are 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) ;^ Pandey (2001)'*; Pandey 
(2002)''; Bhaduri (2002)^; Chen (2004)^ Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) ;^ 
Huang and Song (2006)'^ Saravanan (2006)" and Delcoure (2007)1 
The studies in the Indian context are still fewer in number compared to those that have 
been carried out in both the developed and developing coimtries other than India, and so 
there is a great scope for research work on this subject in the Indian context. The present 
study has been conceived and carried out in the light of the major capital structure 
theories and the findings of the earlier empirical research, and an attempt has been made 
to extend the scope of research work in this subject by considering other possible 
dimensions. The term 'Capital Structure Behaviour' in the title of this study has been 
used mainly to refer to the cross-sectional variations in capital structure that can be 
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observed across the cross-section of firms within specific industries as well as across 
different industries, and the possible linkages between the cross-sectional variations in 
capital structure and the firm characteristics as revealed by the financial statements of the 
firms. 
Till date many eminent researchers have empirically reported a host of firm 
characteristics that have been foimd to be the potential determinants of capital structure. 
In their classic review of capital structure literature Harris and Raviv (1991)'^  have 
docimiented the following firm characteristics which have been used as the determinants 
of capital structure in different studies viz. volatility, probability of bankruptcy, fixed 
assets / assets mix, non-debt tax shields, advertising expenditure, research and 
development expenditure, profitability, growth opportunities, size, free cash flow and 
uniqueness. Subsequently, in their landmark study Rajan and Zingales (1995) '^ have used 
four determinants of capital structure viz. tangibility of assets, investment or growth 
opportunities, firm size and profitability, because they explain that these four factors have 
been found to be the most consistently correlated with leverage. These two important 
studies together have provided the starting point for the present study. In the process of 
selecting the determinants fi-om empirical literature those determinants which have been 
reported by the other researchers have also been taken into consideration. 
In the present research work an attempt has been made to study those determinants which 
have been found to be tested and reported very firequently in the earlier empirical studies. 
The determinants which have been tested and reported very fi-equently have been 
commonly foimd to influence capital structure in different countries, in different periods 
of time and in different contexts. Further, for such determinants greater amount of 
empirical evidence is available amongst all the determinants that were identified. In 
particular the firm characteristics which have been selected from empirical literature and 
used as determinants of capital structme in this study are: profitability, firm size, 
tangibility, growth opportimities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields. 
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In addition to the six variables mentioned above viz. profitability, firm size, tangibility, 
growth opportunities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields, this study has included 
a new variable, non-financial costs, as a potential determinant of capital structure in an 
attempt to extend the set of determinants of capital structure. Since the researcher did not 
come across any empirical findings in this regard in the course of the literature review, 
the inclusion of this new determinant was based on prima facie evidence collected by the 
researcher to support the inclusion. Cross-sectional correlations calculated between 
various types of debt ratios used in this study and the ratio of non-financial costs to total 
costs have shovm a predominance of negative correlation, which strongly indicated the 
possibility of a negative relationship between leverage and non-financial costs. 
Accordingly this study has used altogether seven variables as the determinants of capital 
structure viz. profitability, firm size, tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility 
and non-debt tax shields and non-financial costs. 
This study has used five different measures of financial leverage based on different 
measures of debt viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. Different measures of leverage have been used in 
order to find out whether the firm characteristics, which have been identified to be the 
determinants of capital structure, influence the different types of debt in different ways or 
to different extent. The researcher has not come across any studies which explain the 
cross-sectional variations in secured and unsecured debt. The Indian financial reporting 
system requires the firms to disclose their secured and unsecured debt. Hence it is 
relevant to study the relationships of the secured and unsecured debt with the firm 
characteristics. 
This study has extended the research on capital structure further by comparing the capital 
structure and its behaviour between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets. The issue of revaluation of assets is indeed important not only 
firom a purely financial point of view but also fi"om the perspective of corporate 
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governance. The practice of revaluation of assets results in an increase in the value of 
assets. The debt level employed by the firm in relation to an increased asset base due to 
revaluation will result in the understatement of leverage compared to what it should be in 
reality. Hence the practice of revaluation of assets may ultimately lead to the projection 
of an inappropriate picture of the financial risk of the firm in the eyes of the creditors and 
other stakeholders. 
This research work has been carried out in the context of industries selected fi-om the 
manufacturing sector in India. All the prior empirical studies on determinants of capital 
structure in the context of developed as well as developing coimtries including India have 
been carried out for the firms in the manufacturing industries. The scope of this study is 
limited to the companies within the selected industries which are listed in the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE). 
This research work studies the capital structure behaviour of those manufacturing 
industries in India which are characterised by a higher concentration of firms. The 
number of listed companies at BSE within the manufacturing industries has been used as 
a proxy for the concentration of firms in those industries. The industries in the 
manufacturing sector in India were ranked on the basis of the number of companies listed 
at BSE. The top five manufacturing industries in terms of the number of companies listed 
at BSE were selected for the study. 
These industries are chemicals industry: (excluding drugs and pharmaceuticals), textiles 
industry, ferrous metal and ferrous metal products industry, food products (excluding 
beverages and sugar) industry and, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. In order to 
simplify the reference to these industries they have been referred to as chemicals 
industry, textiles industry, ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and, 
drugs and pharmaceuticals industry. These five industries together comprise 
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approximately 62 percent of all the manufacturing companies listed at the BSE and so 
they represent the major part of the manufacturing sector in India. 
The present study has been carried out with the following objectives: 
1. To find out whether leverage differs across industries. 
2. To find out the relationships between firm characteristics and leverage, and 
whether such relationships are the same as those predicted by the major theories 
on capital structure, and whether such relationships are similar to those found in 
the developed countries. 
3. To find out whether the determinants of capital structure can be extended by 
including non-financial costs as a potential determinant of firm leverage. 
4. To find out whether the firm characteristics can be used to explain the behaviour 
of leverage measured in terms of secured debt and unsecured debt, and whether 
the firm characteristics equally explain the behaviour of various measures of 
leverage 
5. To compare capital structure and its behaviour between firms which revalue their 
assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This study has resulted in several interesting findings on capital structure behaviour in the 
industries which have been covered. It has been foimd that all the various types of debt 
ratios differ across the industries studied for both categories of firms i.e. firms which 
revalue their assets as well as firms which do not revalue their assets. Further, though the 
debt ratios differ across the industries studied, within each of the industries the debt ratios 
do not significantly differ between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, which implies that the practice of revaluation of assets does 
not cause the debt ratios to deviate fi-om their characteristic patterns in the specific 
industries. 
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Several similarities and differences have been foxind in the cross-sectional behaviour of 
the different types of debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. For both categories of firms leverage measured in 
terms of long term debt, short term debt, total debt and secured debt has shown a 
consistent negative relationship with profitability. For both categories of firms leverage 
measured in terms of long term debt and total debt is positively related with firm size. For 
both categories of firms leverage measured in terms of long term debt is positively related 
to tangibility whereas leverage measured in terms of short term debt is negatively related 
to tangibility. 
Further for both categories of firms leverage measured in terms of total debt and secured 
debt is positively related with growth opportunities. For both categories of firms leverage 
measured in terms of short term debt is negatively related with earnings volatility. For 
both categories of firms leverage measured in terms of short term debt is negatively 
related with earnings volatility. 
For both categories of firms leverage measured in terms of long term debt is positively 
related with non-debt tax shields. For both categories of firms leverage measured in terms 
of long term debt, short term debt, total debt and secured debt is negatively related with 
non-financial costs. The nature of relationships of the various firm characteristics with 
some of the measures of leverage show clear differences between the two categories of 
firms. The detailed discussion of such observed differences in capital structure behaviour 
between the two categories of firms is provided in the later chapters. 
It has been fiirther found that the firm characteristics do not explain equally the cross-
sectional variations of the different debt ratios. Further it can be generalised for all firms 
irrespective of whether they revalue their assets or not, that collectively the determinants 
provide the highest amount of explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the long 
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term debt ratio and the lowest amount of explanation for the unsecured debt ratio. An 
interesting finding is the change in the explanation of the behaviour of the various debt 
ratios that was noticed after introducing the new determinant, non-financial costs. In 
general before introducing the new determinant, non-financial costs, the empirically 
identified determinants provided greater explanation for the behaviour of various debt 
ratios for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
However, after introducing the new determinant, non-financial costs, in general the 
explanation for the behaviour of various debt ratios was greater for the firms which do 
not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets, though the explanatory 
power increased for both categories of firms. 
It was found that the explanatory power of the determinants for the different types of debt 
ratios is not equal for firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets. Moreover the for both categories of firms all the debt ratios are not related 
with all the firm characteristics in the same way as predicted by one or more of the 
theories viz. trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and agency theory. For both 
categories of firms the relationships between the firm characteristics and unsecured debt 
follow the predictions of the theories to the least extent. For the other types of debt the 
observed relationships with the firm characteristics follow the theoretically predicted 
relationships to different extent for both categories of firms. 
It was fiirther found that the behaviour of unsecured debt ratio had the least matching 
with the empirical evidence for other types of debt found in the developed countries. For 
other types of debt the observed relationships with the firm characteristics match with the 
empirical evidence found in the developed countries to different extent for both 
categories of firms. In general the evidences show that the capital structure behaviour of 
the firms in the chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, ferrous metal 
and metal products industry, food industry and textiles industry do not provide complete 
support for any single theory on capital structure. The observed capital structure 
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behaviour in these five industries fits better with the collective explanation provided by 
the trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and the agency theory. The evidences 
found in these five manufacturing industries in India partially match with the generally 
found evidence in the developed countries like USA. 
The remaining part of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the major capital structure theories viz. the trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis 
and agency theory. Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on this subject, a 
summary of the findings firom the literature review, the broad themes of research 
identified, the research gaps found and the research questions that can be raised. 
Chapter 4 provides the explanation of the research methodology used in this study. It 
broadly includes the development of hypotheses, the models to explain capital structure 
behaviour, definitions of variables, collection of data and the analytical techniques used 
in this study. Chapter 5 provides the detailed discussion of the results of the analytical 
techniques used. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and it provides the conclusions drawn 
firom this study and the suggestions. This is followed by separate sections on Select 
Bibliography and Annexures. The Annexures provide the graphical plots of the debt 
ratios and the residuals fi-om the regression analysis of the data. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced and explained the concept of capital structure and its 
significance. It also explains the importance of the study of the potential determinants of 
capital structure. The study of the determinants of capital structure has gained in 
importance over the years. The need for fiirther research in this area has also been 
explained. This chapter specifies the objectives of this research work, explains the scope 
of the study, the major findings of the research work and provides the broad structure of 
the thesis. 
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The next chapter provides an overview of the major capital structure theories. In 
particular it explains three major capital structure theories which have gained importance 
over the years viz. trade-off theory, the pecking order hypothesis and the agency theory. 
These theories attempt to explain how the capital structure of firms is determined and 
they help us understand the influence of various determinants on the capital structure of 
firms. 
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Major 
Capital Structure Theories 
AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
The previous chapter has introduced the concept of capital structure and has explained its 
significance. It has also explained why the study of capital structure determinants has 
gained significance over the years. Further it has also stated the objectives and a broad 
overview of this research work. The present chapter provides an overview of the major 
capital structure theories. The understanding of the major theories of capital structure is 
important because they explain how the capital structure of firms is determined and they 
help in understanding the factors that should influence the optimal capital structure of 
firms. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)* have shown in their seminal work that capital structure is 
irrelevant for the value of the firm under perfect market conditions. In other words 
different mixes of debt and equity will not affect shareholders' wealth under perfect 
market conditions. The frame of reference assumed by Modigliani and Miller however 
does not exist in the real world because of various market imperfections such as existence 
of taxes, bankruptcy costs, information asymmetries and agency costs. In the real world 
capital structure does appear to affect the value of the firm and the market imperfections 
are likely to have important implications for capital structure itself as observed in the 
empirical studies on capital structure determinants which were carried out after 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)^ 
Several theories on capital structure were put forward after Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) , However over the years the theories on capital structure which have gained in 
importance and have evolved to be the major theories on this subject are - the trade-off 
theory, the pecking order hypothesis and the agency theory. All the major empirical 
studies on determinants of capital structure have been carried out on the basis of these 
three capital structure theories. In accordance with the earlier empirical studies in the 
present study also the hypotheses on the relationship between leverage and the various 
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firm characteristics have been developed on the basis of these three major capital 
structure theories - the trade-off theory, the pecking order hypothesis and the agency 
theory. It is thus relevant to discuss these three theories before explaining the details of 
the study. 
TRADE-OFF THEORY 
It is also popularly called the static trade-off theory. According to the trade-off theory 
there is an optimal capital structure which is arrived at by the firm by trading off the 
benefit and costs of debt financing. The benefit of debt financing is the tax savings on 
interest on debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963^ ) and the costs of debt financing include the 
expected costs of financial distress. The works of several important researchers has 
contributed to the emergence of this theory and the most prominent among them are 
Baxter (1967)' and Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)^ 
According to the trade-off theory a firm should increase its leverage until its marginal tax 
shield benefit is balanced by the expected costs of financial distress. An important result 
of this theory is that it explains the observed fact that the companies are generally 
financed by a combination of debt and equity. The theory explains that the advantage of 
debt financing is the tax shield on the interest on debt and the costs of debt financing 
include the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. 
Warner (1977)'^  explains the direct and the indirect costs of bankruptcy. The direct 
bankruptcy costs include the lawyers' and accountants' fees, and other costs involved in 
administering the bankruptcy. The indirect costs include lost sales and profits, the 
inability of the firm to obtain credit and other constraints faced by the firm. The other 
constraints faced by the firm generally include the key employees leaving the company, 
suppliers not offering trade credit or insisting on payment terms which put the firm at a 
disadvantage, customers switching over to other companies because of their concern for 
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the quality of the products supplied and the loss of continuity that may result if the 
company becomes bankrupt, etc. 
The marginal benefit of debt tends to reduce with increases in the level of debt whereas 
the marginal costs of debt (the expected direct and indirect costs of financial distress) 
tend to increase with increases in the level of debt. Since the value of the firm is the net 
result of the expected present value of the tax shield benefits of interest and expected 
present value of the costs of financial distress, the value of the firm is maximised at a 
level of debt at which expected benefits and costs of debt financing balance each other 
(the trade-off between costs and benefits of debt). That mix of debt and equity at which 
the value of the firm is maximised by this trade-off is the optimal debt ratio of the firm. 
Firms will tend to trade off between the costs and benefits while deciding on the 
financing mix of debt and equity. 
So according to the trade-off theory the optimal capital structwe does exist and at this 
optimal capital structure the value of the firm is maximised. The firm sets a target debt 
ratio, which is the optimal debt ratio for the firm, and it moves towards the target debt 
ratio by adjusting its capital structure by trading off between the benefits and costs of 
debt financing. The trade-off theory has important implications for the relationship 
between capital structure and various firm characteristics. According to Brealey and 
Myers (1997)^  the trade-off theory successfully explains the differences in capital 
structure between industries but it cannot explain why the most profitable companies 
within an industry generally borrow the least. Hence the trade-off theory fails to explain 
the differences in capital structure across firms within an industry. 
A later variation of the trade-off theory also takes into consideration the agency costs 
associated with capital structure. Several authors while explaining the trade-off theory 
also include the agency costs as part of the cost associated with debt financing. However 
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in this study the consideration of agency costs has been kept separately under the 
discussion of agency theory. The trade-off theory has important implications for the 
relationship between leverage and the firm characteristics such as profitability, firm size, 
tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields and non-
financial costs. 
PECKING ORDER HYPOTHESIS 
According to the pecking order hypothesis the firms prefer to use internal financing 
sources for financing their investment needs. These internal financing sources largely 
consist of cash and bank balances, and retained profits (internal equity). When the 
internal financing sources are not sufficient to fiilfiU the financing needs of the firms they 
resort to external financing. If external financing is required the firms prefer to obtain the 
same by borrowing first and they use external equity only as the last source for external 
financing. 
The literature shows two divergent schools of thought which explain the same pecking 
order in the financing choice of firms. According to Donaldson (1961)'* firms prefer 
internal financing to external financing because they do not want to incur the floatation 
costs associated with external financing. Further if external financing is required at all, 
then firms prefer debt financing to equity financing because the floatation costs 
associated with debt financing are generally less than those associated with external 
equity. 
Myers (1984)'° and Myers and Majluf (1984)" do not agree with Donaldson's (1961)'* 
explanation that firms prefer internal financing to external financing because they want to 
avoid floatation costs. They explain that the net benefit of debt financing resulting fi-om 
the tax benefits of debt and the expected costs of financial distress will exceed the 
floatation costs of debt financing. According to the authors the firms prefer intemal 
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financing because they tend to maximise the weaUh of the existing shareholders. They 
explain that issue of new equity shares results in a decrease in the market price of the 
existing shares; so issuing external equity is not in the interest of the existing 
shareholders of the firms. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)" fiirther explain that in the event of external financing firms 
prefer raising debt to issuing external equity. This is because if the firm raises risk free 
debt then it will not affect the market value of the existing equity shares of the firm. 
Moreover even if the firm raises risky debt the effect on the market value of the existing 
shares will be less than the effect of issuing fi-esh equity shares because of the priority of 
claims associated with debt over equity. This is because the signaling effect of issuing 
risky debt on the market value of existing shares is less than the signaling effect of 
issuing new equity shares. 
In spite of the differences in explanation both Donaldson (1961)'' and Myers and Majluf 
(1984)" arrive at the same conclusions about the preferred order of financing of the 
firms. The pecking order theory is based on the concept of asymmetric information, 
which is the information gap between the firm insiders, the managers, and the external 
investors. So according to the pecking order hypothesis the target debt ratio that might 
result fi-om trading off the costs and benefits of debt financing is of a lesser importance 
than the consequences of information asymmetry that exists between the managers of the 
firm and the investors. The information asymmetry arises because the managers being 
insiders have better access to the inside information on the business and financial 
conditions of the firm than do the outside investors. 
Information asymmetry results in costs due to improper selection of the financing source 
when the firm seeks external financing; this is the problem of adverse selection. As 
discussed earlier these costs consist of the adverse impact on the market value of the 
Chapter 2 21 
equity shares of the firm that results due to the type of security issued by the firm in order 
to raise external financing. Moreover as previously explained the costs resulting from 
information asymmetries tend to be lower when debt is issued than when equity is issued 
by the firm. Hence this results in the pecking order in the financing choices of the firms. 
The pecking order hypothesis has important implications for the relationship between the 
capital structure of firms and various firm characteristics such as profitability, firm size 
and growth opportunities. According to Brealey and Myers (1997)^  the pecking order 
theory explains the intraindustry difference in capital structure, particularly the inverse 
relationship between profitability and financial leverage within an industry. However, 
they explain that the pecking order theory is less successfiil in explaining the 
interindustry differences in debt ratios. 
AGENCY THEORY 
Also called agency costs theory, this theory has evolved mainly due to the research work 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976/ and Jensen (1986) .^ The agency theory is based on the 
conflict of interest between shareholders, managers and debtholders in a firm. There are 
two types of conflicts - (1) conflict between shareholders and debtholders, and (2) 
conflict between shareholders and managers. These conflicts results in costs to be borne 
by the firm and these costs are called agency costs. According to the agency theory the 
firm should select such a capital structure (i.e. use debt to that extent) which minimises 
the agency costs faced by the firm and maximises the shareholders' wealth. So the capital 
structure which minimises the agency costs is the optimal capital structure for the firm. 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders arises because of the fact 
that debtholders have a fixed and prior claim on the assets of the firm whereas 
shareholders have a residual claim which is only limited by the amount of assets 
remaining afler the claims of other providers of funds have been satisfied. Moreover 
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shareholders also have limited liability. Given their limited liability the shareholders (or 
the managers who are working for the shareholders) will be more willing to invest in 
projects characterised by a high degree of risk because of the possibility of increasing 
their gains at the cost of the debtholders interests. 
The increased risk arising out of investing in the high risk projects is passed on to the 
debtholders without compensating them for the added risk. This results in an 
expropriation of wealth from the debtholders to the shareholders because if the project 
fails the losses will be shared with the debtholders whereas if the project is successful the 
shareholders will get all the gains because the return of the debtholders is fixed. This is 
called the moral hazard problem. The managers may also replace their existing assets or 
investments bearing a lower level of risk by those assets or investments having a higher 
level of risk which lead to the same consequence of expropriation of debtholders' wealth 
by shareholders. This is called the asset substitution problem. 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and managers arises because the 
shareholders of a company are its legal owners whereas managers are the agents of the 
shareholders and they are supposed to work in the interests of the shareholders. So unlike 
the shareholders the managers do not have a claim on the profits of the firm and they 
receive remuneration for their service. In order to increase their remuneration from the 
company the managers may increase their benefits and perquisites which are to be borne 
by the company leading to a decrease in the profitability of the company. 
According to Jensen (1986)^ firms may use debt as a mechanism to discipline their 
managers. Increasing debt entails debt service payments to be made by the borrower. 
These debt service payments reduce the amount of free cash flow of the firm which 
otherwise would have been used by the managers in increasing their own benefits and 
perquisites; also managers have to work harder due to the pressure of the repayment of 
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debt. Another type of agency problem arises out of the conflict between shareholders and 
managers. In order to protect their employment with the firm the managers may not 
undertake any investment risk and may avoid even profitable investment opportunities 
resulting in the underinvestment problem. 
The agency problems discussed above give rise to agency costs which are to be borne by 
the firm. The debtholders impose restrictions on the firm through the loan covenants 
which reduce the operating and financing flexibility of the firms and they may also 
involve other experts to assess the financial condition of the firm. The shareholders 
generally offer incentives to managers in order to motivate them to work for 
maximisation of the shareholders' wealth. Further shareholders also put in place systems 
to monitor the fimctioning of the managers in order to ensure that they are working in the 
interests of the shareholders. Moreover there are other outside experts who also assess the 
performance of the firm and the management, and influence the investment decisions of 
the investor community by their advisory services. 
All this implies that firms have to incur costs which arise out of these agency problems. 
These costs are incurred either to put in place the monitoring mechanisms or to offer 
valuable incentives to the managers. Moreover the investor community at large are also 
aware that managers are likely to increase their own benefits at the cost of the 
shareholders' fimds and their assessment may be influenced fiirther by the investment 
advice of the outside experts. This may result in a decrease in the shareholders' wealth 
because the market price of the firms' equity shares may be at a discount compared to 
their intrinsic value and this decrease in valuation is also a cost that is borne by the 
shareholders of the firm. 
The sum total of the costs such as the cost of monitoring mechanisms, cost of incentives 
given to the managers and the lower than normal valuation of the equity shares of the 
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firm in the market are the agency costs which arise out of the various types of agency 
problems. These agency costs are uhimately borne by the shareholders and they result in 
a decrease in their wealth. Hence the implications of the agency theory for capital 
structure decisions are that the firm should use debt to the extent that it minimises the 
agency costs (or in other words maximises the shareholder value). The agency theory has 
important implications for the relationship between leverage and firm characteristics such 
as profitability, firm size, tangibility and growth opportunities. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed three major capital structure theories which have gained 
0 
importance over the years of research that followed Modigliani and Miller (1958) viz. 
the trade-off theory, the pecking order hypothesis and the agency theory. According to 
the trade-off theory there is an optimal capital structure which is arrived at by the firm by 
trading off the benefit and costs of debt financing. The most prominent researchers who 
have contributed to the emergence of this theory are Baxter (1967)', Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973)', and Warner (1977)'^. The trade-off theory successfully explains the 
differences in capital structure between industries but it carmot explain the differences in 
capital structure observed within any specific industry i.e. it can explain the interindustry 
differences in capital structure but it caimot explain the intraindustry differences. 
The pecking order hypothesis which was put forward as an alternative to the trade-off 
theory denies the existence of any optimal capital structure because, as it explains, the 
changes in capital structure occur due to the imbalances between internally generated 
funds of firms and, the need to pay dividends and make investments. The emergence of 
this theory can be traced back to two divergent schools of thought resultmg firom the 
works of Donaldson (1961)^ and Myers (1984)'° and Myers and Majluf (1984)"; 
however this theory gained prominence due to Myers (1984)'° and Myers and Majluf 
(1984)". At the base of this theory is the concept of asymmetric information, which is the 
information gap between the firm insiders (the managers) and the external investors. 
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According to the pecking order hypothesis the firms prefer to use internal financing 
sources for financing their investment needs. These internal financing sources largely 
consist of cash and bank balances, and retained profits. When the internal financing 
sources are not sufficient to fiilfill the financing needs of firms they resort to external 
financing and they first raise debt and then they raise equity only as a last resort i.e. they 
raise external equity only if the requirement of fimds cannot be met through internal 
sources and external debt. The pecking order theory explains the intraindustry difference 
in capital structure but it cannot clearly explain the interindustry differences in capital 
structure. 
The agency theory is based on the conflict of interest between shareholders, managers 
and debtholders in a firm. There are two types of conflicts - (1) conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders, and (2) conflict between shareholders and managers. These 
conflicts results in costs to be borne by the firm and these costs are called agency costs. 
According to the agency theory the firm should select such a capital structiare (i.e. use 
debt to that extent) which minimises the agency costs faced by the firm and maximises 
the shareholders' wealth. So the capital structure which minimises the agency costs is the 
optimal capital structure for the firm. This theory has evolved mainly due to the research 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1976)*^  and Jensen (1986)^ 
Thus it can be seen that the trade-off theory and the agency theory lay emphasis on the 
existence of an optimal capital structure whereas the pecking order hypothesis denies the 
existence of any optimal capital structure. As observed by researchers, the financing 
practices of firms tend to indicate the possible existence of an optimal capital structure. 
However the financing practices of firms also reflect the pecking order in their financing 
choices. The understanding of these theories on capital structure helps in imderstanding 
the influence of the firm characteristics on the capital structure of the firms; in other 
words it helps in understanding the relationship between capital structure and its 
determinants. 
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Chapter 3, which follows next, provides a review of the extant literature on the subject. 
The literature review is followed by a description of the findings from the review and the 
major themes of research that have been observed during the review. Following this the 
next chapter provides a description of the research gaps and other research issues. The 
next chapter ends with the statement of the research questions which arise out of the 
research gaps and research issues. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The previous chapter has provided an overview of the major capital structure theories viz. 
the trade-off theory, the pecking order hypothesis and the agency theory. These theories 
explain how the capital structure is determined. Following the overview to the major 
theories, a review of the literature on this subject is required in order to know the 
contributions of the various researchers. The present chapter provides a review of the 
body of literature on this subject. An attempt has been made to cover the major research 
works on this subject in the course of the review. 
This chapter is structured as follows. It starts with the survey of literature on capital 
structure. This is followed by the findings from the literatvire review and the major 
themes of research that were identified in the process of the review. Following this it has 
been attempted to identify the research gaps and the other research issues. This chapter is 
concluded v^ dth the statement of the research questions in the light of the research gaps 
and the other research issues. 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
The review of important works in the area starts with the classic paper of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)". Modigliani and Miller develop a theory of the effect of financial 
structure on the market value of firm and its implications for the capital structure 
problem. They prove using an arbitrage argument that if a firm can change its market 
value by a pure financial operation, the investors in the firm can act in a manner so as to 
replicate the resulting financial position of the firm. These actions of investors would lead 
to a change in weights within their portfolios and would resuh in zero profit in a perfect 
capital market. Three conclusions emerge from their argument: 
1, The market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure and it can be 
obtained by capitalising its expected operating income by the appropriate discount 
rate for its risk class. The average cost of capital for a firm is completely 
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independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalisation rate of a pure 
equity stream for the risk class to which the firm belongs. 
The expected return on the equity shares of a levered firm is equal to the sum of 
the capitalisation rate for the firms financed entirely by equity in that risk class 
plus a premium to compensate for the financial risk faced by the levered firm. The 
risk premiimi is equal to the debt-equity ratio multiplied by the difference 
between the capitalisation rate for the firms in that risk class and the interest rate 
on debt. 
The marginal cost of capital to the firm, notwithstanding its financial structure, is 
equal to the average cost of capital, which in turn is equal to the capitalisation rate 
for an unlevered firm in that risk class. So the cut-off rate of return for investment 
decision making is the marginal cost of capital. 
Modigliani and Miller apply mathematical analysis based on theoretical model in 
drawing their conclusions. They have arrived at these conclusions under the assumptions 
of perfect capital markets, a state of atomistic competition in capital markets and ease of 
access to capital markets. Moreover, they have not described the types of debt included 
within what they have considered as leverage, and it appears that it has been assumed to 
consist wholly of a single class of securities which have been referred to as bonds. 
Further they have also not considered the existence of short term debt which is a regular 
feature of business firms. They have also assumed the absence of corporate taxes. 
In their later work, Modigliani and Miller (1963)", they have taken into consideration 
corporate taxes and their effect. They have shown that the value of the firm will increase 
with the level of debt because interest on debt is a deductible expense for computation of 
tax. This implies tiiat the value of the levered firm will be greater than the value of the 
unlevered firm. Further they have shown using the same proof that the market values of 
firms in each risk class must be proportional at equilibriimi to their post-tax expected 
return. 
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Baxter (1967)' explains with reference to the Modigliani-Miller theory how excessive 
leverage may raise the cost of capital, which in turn would reduce the overall market 
value of the firm. The author uses graphical analysis and empirical evidence to arrive at 
the conclusions. Baxter provides empirical evidence that bankruptcy entails costs of 
administrative nature as well as that in the form of a decline in the net operating earnings 
of the firm. It is further shown that when the level of debt is low interest on debt will rise 
slowly but as the level of leverage increases the capital structvire becomes riskier and 
interest rates may tend to rise sharply. The ability of a firm to carry leverage will also 
depend on the variance of net operating income. Hence firms with risky streams of 
income may find that the overall cost of capital starts to rise with leverage, even at 
moderate levels of leverage. 
According to Baxter when the level of debt is low, the tax deduction effect of interest 
may be significant but as leverage increases the risk of ruin has a greater influence. The 
combined impact, when the Modigliani-Miller assumptions are relaxed, is that the cost of 
capital curve as per the traditional theory is obtained, which fall at lower levels of 
leverage and rises when leverage becomes high. The impact of the level of leverage on 
bankruptcy risk and its ultimate influence on firm valuation through the cost of capital is 
thus an important conclusion in the context of capital structure. 
Hamada (1969) uses the Sharpe - Lintner - Mossin market equilibrium Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) framework and a standard deviation - mean based portfolio 
model to derive the three propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958)". He uses the 
assumptions in the Modigliani-Miller theory as well as those in CAPM. Moreover, as 
shown by Hamada, the propositions I and II of Modigliani and Miller hold in the market 
equilibrium model, both in the presence and absence of corporate tax even without the 
requirement of the homogeneous risk class assumption and the arbitrage proof as given in 
Modigiliani and Miller (1958)". 
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Hamada interprets the cost of capital as the minimum required rate of return that the 
individual projects of the firm must earn in order to protect the shareholders from a loss 
in their expected utility. He uses mathematical analysis based on theoretical models to 
arrive at the conclusions. He shows that Modigliani-Miller's explanation of cost of 
capital is a special case of their approach. The relevance of his work is that it provides 
support to the validity of the propositions of Modigliani-Miller. 
Altman (1969)' analyses the effect of potential corporate bankruptcy on expected 
shareholder wealth over time and in turn its effect on total firm value. The Modigliani 
and Miller (1958)^^ theory did not explicitly consider the phenomenon of bankruptcy. 
The findings of the paper indicate that the longer a firm remains in the reorganisation 
process following bankruptcy, the higher the likelihood of the shareholders getting some 
form of remimeration. It is also shown that the returns from the securities of the bankrupt 
firms, in general, can be expected to be below the average market return, indicating a 
negative effect on equity valuation of the bankrupt firms. 
Altman's paper provides a framework for analysing the effect of corporate bankruptcy 
potential on equity share valuation and to assess the same empirically. The author 
develops a model to measure stockholder profitability and uses statistical techniques to 
draw conclusions on the basis of empirical evidence. The results of Altman's analysis 
provide significant evidence that the value of equity shares of a firm can be expected to 
fall in bankruptcy. His findings tend to support traditional financial theory. 
Modigliani and Miller (1969) '^* offer an alternative proof to their proposition that the 
value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. The authors use mathematical 
analysis and discussion to draw their conclusion. They show that if the levered and 
unlevered firms did not have the same overall market value, then it would be possible for 
those investors who hold the shares of the overvalued firm to form a portfolio based on 
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the shares in the undervalued firm so as to produce identical random outcome for a 
smaller net investment. This creates an incentive for the investors to sell the overpriced 
shares and buy the underpriced shares as long as the disequilibrium persists. Thus the 
equilibrium conditions in the capital markets require that the market values of the levered 
and unlevered firms be equal. 
Stiglitz (1974)^ ^ puts forward theorems which establish the irrelevance of financial policy 
under a general set of conditions. Financial policy has been defined to include the debt-
equity ratio, retention ratio, maturity structure of debt and holdings of securities of other 
firms. Conclusions are drawn by mathematical analysis based on theoretical models. The 
author shows that in the context of a general equilibrium model none of the financial 
policies has an effect on the valuation of the firm. The basic argument underlying the 
conclusions is that individuals can exactly undo any financial policy undertaken by the 
firm. However this analysis is based on the following assumptions: 
1. It requires that expectations of individuals remain unchanged as the firm changes 
its announced financial policy for the future. 
2. Individual borrowing is not a perfect substitute for firm borrowing. 
3. It assumes that there is no bankruptcy. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976/° integrate the theory of agency, the theory of property rights 
and the theory of finance, and develop a theory of ownership structure of the firm. The 
ownership structure has been considered to be synonymous with the capital structure of 
the firm. Agency costs are defined as the sum of monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, bonding expenditures by the agent and residual loss. Some of the major 
assumptions of their paper are that there are no taxes, only stocks and bonds can be 
issued as claims on the firm, all outside equity shareholders are non-voting and there 
exists a single manager with ownership interest in the firm. The authors use mathematical 
analysis based on theoretical models to draw coriclusions. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling the optimal scale of the firm in case of all equity 
financing occurs at the point where the manager stops increasing the size of the firm 
when the gross increment in value is just offset by the incremental loss involved in the 
consumption of additional fiinge benefits by him. If the equity market is competitive the 
total benefits (net of monitoring costs) will be capitalised in the price of the claims. So 
the owner-manager reaps all the benefits of the opportunity to vmte and sell the 
monitoring contract. In general it will pay the ovmer-manager to engage in bonding 
activities and to enter into contracts which allow monitoring so long as the marginal 
benefits of each are greater than their marginal costs. Further the agency costs will be 
incurred only if the benefits to the owner manager resulting from them are sufficiently 
large to outweigh them. 
Jensen and Meckling also explain that the owners of a firm with monopoly power have 
the same incentives to limit divergences of the manager from value maximisation, as the 
owners of competitive firms. With reference to the irrelevance of capital structure as 
proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958)^ ,^ they explain that in the presence of 
bankruptcy costs and tax deductibility of interest expense the value of the firm cannot be 
independent of capital structure. This is because the probability distribution of the fiiture 
cash flows changes with changes in the probability of incurrence of bankruptcy costs, 
which occurs with changes in the debt-equity ratio, and the agency costs provide a 
stronger reason for this proposition. 
Jensen and Meckling provide a theory of the corporate ownership structure. According to 
them the critical variables to be determined are not just relative amounts of debt and 
equity but also the fraction of equity held by the manager. The theory provided by them 
determines the three variables: inside equity held by the manager, outside equity held by 
anyone outside the firm and debt held by anyone outside the firm. They explain that the 
optimal fraction of the value of the firm held by outsiders (outside equity and debt-
holders) is determined by the intersection of marginal agency costs curve and demand 
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curve for outside financing required by the owner-manager. This in turn determines the 
total agency costs to be borne by the owner-manager. Some of the limitations of Jensen 
and Meckling's work are the following: 
1. The analysis has not considered the situation of large modem corporations whose 
managers own little or no equity. 
2. It does not explicitly consider the costs of creating new claims. 
3. It also does not include an analysis of the supply of contingent claims. 
Galai and Masulis (1976)^ ^ combine the option pricing model (0PM) with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and provide us with many insights regarding risk of equity 
and, changes in corporate asset structure and capital structure. They use mathematical 
analysis based on theoretical models to draw conclusions. According to them the 
systematic risk of equity is the product of the systematic risk of the firm and the elasticity 
of the value of equity with respect to the value of the firm. The systematic risk of equity 
is at least equal to the systematic risk of the firm. 
Galai and Masulis show that firms with apparently similar characteristics in terms of the 
face value of debt, total market value and profitability, but with a different variance of 
rate of return will have different capital structures in terms of market values. The debt-
equity ratio in terms of market values will be greater for the firm with lower variance of 
rate of return. Further if two firms are identical except that they differ by the same 
proportion in terms of asset value of the firm and face value of debt then the value of 
their equities and debts will also differ by the same proportion. The systematic risk of the 
debt and equity of the two firms remain identical and unaffected. Hence there is a 
financing policy fi-ee from redistribution effect. 
According to Galai and Masulis, as a result of the merger between two firms the market 
value of the combined firm will be greater than the sum of the market values of the bonds 
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of the individual merging firms. The market value of the combined firm's stock will be 
smaller than the sum of the market values of the stocks of the individual merging firms 
by the same amount. In case of spin-offs the value of the equity of those holders of the 
original firm who become equity-holders of the resulting entities, will increase at the cost 
of the debt-holders of the original firm. Galai and Masulis fiirther show that for an 
unanticipated increase in the variance of the percentage returns to the firm due to 
investment in a new project, there will be a fall in the value of the bonds and a rise in the 
value of the equity stock. This will also cause an increase in the systematic risk of the 
bond-holders and a decrease in the systematic risk borne by the equity stock-holders. 
Warner (1977)^ ^ considers some issues surrounding the role of bankruptcy costs in capital 
structure models. The bankruptcy costs are of two types: direct costs and indirect costs. 
Direct costs include lawyer's and accountant's fees and other costs involved in 
administering the bankruptcy. Indirect costs include lost sales and profits, the inability of 
the firm to obtain credit and other constraints faced by the firm. Warner has studied a 
sample of 11 bankrupt railroad firms in the U.S. reported by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. Empirical resuhs are drawn by using statistical techniques and graphical 
analysis. The results of the study show that the railroad firms with higher market values 
did incur higher bankruptcy costs; however the bankruptcy costs do not appear to be 
directly proportional to the market value. Warner explains that there are substantial fixed 
costs associated with the bankruptcy process and hence there are economies of scale with 
reference to bankruptcy costs. 
Warner does not consider it to be unreasonable to conclude that for the firms of the size 
considered in the study the expected direct bankruptcy costs are lower than the tax 
savings on debt expected at the tax rates prevailing during the time period considered. 
According to Warner, it is the expected cost of bankruptcy that is relevant for a firm in 
order to decide on its capital structure. However there are some practical constraints that 
restrict the generalisation of Warner's conclusions across industries: 
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1. The magnitude of bankruptcy costs and the scale effect may be industry specific. 
2. Some of the bankruptcy costs of railroads might have been subsidised and the 
extent of subsidy may not be same for other industries. 
3. It is also not clear whether the bankruptcy costs are same for railroad and non-
railroad U.S. firms of similar size. 
4. The differences between railroad firms and other firms may be even more 
significant when indirect costs are considered. 
5. The study only considers the explicit direct bankruptcy costs and not the indirect 
bankruptcy costs because they are difficult to estimate. 
6. The conclusions may not be portable across other countries. 
Myers (1977)^ ^ shows that it may be rational for firms to limit borrowing, even when 
there is a tax advantage of debt and, capital markets are strictly perfect, efficient and 
complete. Further lenders may resort to some form of capital rationing. According to 
Myers the firm may be considered to consist of two distinct types of assets: real assets 
and real options. Real options are separable, objectively identifiable, have a relatively 
long life and for which secondary markets exist, such as patents, trademarks, fi^nchises 
and operating licenses. Myers uses mathematical analysis based on theoretical models 
and graphical analysis to draw the conclusions. 
Myers provides in his paper a partial theory of the corporate borrowing decision. 
According to his theory the amount of debt issued by the firm should be set equal to the 
amount that maximises the market value of the firm. There is no direct relationship 
between the amount that maximises the market value of the firm and the probability of 
default or the amount lenders want to advance. According to Myers the following 
propositions should hold true: 
1. The assets-in-place (the existing assets) should be financed with more debt 
compared to growth opportunities. 
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2. For assets-in-place the factors that should be associated with heavy debt financing 
are: 
(a) Capital intensity and high operating leverage and 
(b) Profitability, ideally measured in terms of expected future value of firm's 
assets. 
Miller (1977/^ shows that even when interest payments are fially tax deductible, the 
value of the firm in equilibrium will be independent of its capital structure. Bankruptcy 
costs and agency costs do exist but they seem to be disproportionately small in 
comparison to the tax savings arising out of interest payments. The expected costs of 
bankruptcy are the relevant costs when a firm's capital structure decisions are being 
made. Miller quantifies the gain from leverage to the stockholders of the firm, in the 
presence of personal income tax rates applicable to income from equity shares and bonds, 
and corporate income tax rate. The author draws conclusions by mathematical analysis 
based on theoretical models and graphical analysis. 
According to Miller the market equilibrium will have the property that there will be an 
equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt (quantity of bonds) B , and so there will be 
an equilibrium debt equity ratio for the entire corporate sector. But there will not be any 
optimum debt-equity ratio for any individual firm. Miller explains that companies which 
follow a strategy of low leverage will sell their bonds to investors in high tax brackets 
whereas those which opt for high leverage will sell their bonds to investors in low tax 
brackets. However, one group of investors is as good as the other. In this sense the value 
of any firm, in equilibrivmi, would be independent of its capital structure in spite of the 
tax deductibility of interest payments. 
fin 
Ross (1977) develops a model based on asymmetric information in which the firm's 
choice of capital structure signals the insider's information to the outside investors. In 
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this model managers have knowledge of the true distribution of firm returns but investors 
do not have. Managers benefit when the firm's securities are highly priced by the market 
but they are penalised when the firm becomes bankrupt. Investors consider high levels of 
debt as signal of higher quality. Because lower quality firms have higher expected 
marginal bankruptcy costs for any amoimt of debt, managers of low quality firms do not 
issue more debt just as the higher quality firms do. The author uses mathematical analysis 
based on theoretical model to draw conclusions. According to Ross' model firm value or 
profitability, debt level and probability of bankruptcy are all positively related. 
Fama (1978)^ ^ shows that the irrelevance of the financing decisions of firms can be 
established either on the assumption that investors and firms have equal access to capital 
market or on the assumption that no firm issues securities for which there are not perfect 
substitutes from other firms. Other required conditions are that the capital market is 
perfect, investment strategies of the firms are given and investors have homogeneous 
expectations. The author primarily uses discussion based on theoretical model to draw 
conclusions. 
Fama explains that with equal access assumption the conclusion pertains to effects of 
financing decisions of all firms, and with the perfect substitutes assumption, only firms 
issue securities. He also shows that only the rule 'Maximise combined stockholder and 
bondholder wealth' is consistent with a stable capital market equilibrium. Maximum 
combined stockholder-bondholder wealth implies maximising the excess of the market 
value of the firm at any time, over the investment outlays needed to generate that market 
value. 
Kim (1978) * studies the issues of debt capacity and optimal capital structure, when firms 
are subject to bankruptcy costs of a stochastic nature and, corporate income taxes and 
wealth taxes, in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) fi-amework. The author draws 
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conclusions by mathematical analysis based on theoretical models and graphical analysis. 
The main assumption is that risky securities are priced according to CAPM. Kim shows 
that in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, but with a positive probability of 
bankruptcy, the market value of firm is independent of its capital structure. 
According to Kim, given a positive income tax rate and positive bankruptcy costs, the 
market value of the levered firm is equal to the sum of market value of the imlevered firm 
and the present value of the interest tax shields minus the present value of the loss of tax 
credits on the occurrence of bankruptcy. According to Kim, at the optimal capital 
structure the amount of debt financing is less than the firm's debt capacity. So a firm 
which aims to maximise shareholder wealth will not maximise its borrowing. It will 
instead search for its optimal capital structure to attain the maximum value of the firm. 
Kim argues that lenders subtract the ex ante costs of bankruptcy fi-om the amount they 
would have lent in the absence of bankruptcy costs. The paper illustrates a numerical 
example that the firm's value is a concave fimction of its end-of-period debt obligation, 
with a unique global maximum; the point of maximum is reached before the debt 
capacity occurs. According to Kim, in a single period fi-amework the wealth tax and 
income tax provide upper and lower limits of the tax subsidy. This is essentially the same 
as the traditional view on the relationship between the firm value and financial leverage. 
Kim's fmdings also imply that the tax benefit of debt has much less importance in capital 
structure than is generally understood. Kim has developed an explicit pricing model for 
evaluating corporate debt with or without bankruptcy costs. 
De Angelo and Masulis (1980) '^' formulate a model of corporate leverage choice which 
takes into account corporate and differential personal taxes. According to this model the 
non-debt tax shields such as depreciation deduction or investment tax credits imply a 
unique internal optimum leverage decision for each firm m market equilibrium, after 
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consideration of all supply side adjustments. The existence of a unique interior optimum 
does not require the consideration of bankruptcy, agency or leverage related costs. 
However, even v^ dth any of these leverage related costs each firm will also have a unique 
interior optimum capital structure, notwithstanding the availability of non-debt tax 
shields. The authors draw conclusions by mathematical and graphical analysis based on 
theoretical model. 
The model proposed by De Angelo and Masulis predicts that firms will select a level of 
debt which is negatively related to the level of non-debt tax shield substitutes for debt 
such as depreciation allowances and investment tax credits. With these non-debt tax 
shields relative market prices will adjust until each firm has a unique interior optimum 
leverage decision at market equilibrium. With bankruptcy costs, each firm will still have 
a unique interior optimum leverage decision in market equilibrium. Irrespective of the 
amount of bankruptcy costs the market's relative prices of debt and equity will adjust so 
that the net tax advantage of debt is of the same magnitude as expected marginal default 
costs. In equilibrium expected defauh costs equal the expected net tax advantage of debt. 
Marsh (1982)'*^ has developed a descriptive model of the choice of firms between equity 
and debt. A sample of 748 issues between the years 1959 and 1990 by listed companies 
of U.K. is studied. Empirical results are obtained by statistical techniques. Marsh shows 
that companies are strongly influenced by market conditions and the past history of 
security prices in choosing between issuing equity and debt. This study further provides 
evidence that companies appear to decide on their choice of financing instrument as if 
they had target levels for long term debt ratio as well as the ratio of short term debt to 
total debt. Moreover the results are consistent with the idea that these target levels are 
functions of company size, risk of bankruptcy and composition of assets. 
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Pandey (1983)^ ° studies the corporate managers' attitudes about the use of leverage, and 
the impact of size, profitability and growth on leverage. His study has two parts. The first 
part involves a questionnaire survey of managers of listed Indian companies. The survey 
revealed the following: 
1. Managers considered ordinary share capital to be most expensive and long term 
debt to be least expensive. 
2. Most of them felt that ordinary share capital and retained earnings were not 
costless. 
3. They have strong preference for borrowing due to the tax deductibility of interest 
payments. 
4. They also felt that lenders considered profitability, quality of management and 
security to be most important for lending money to the borrowing companies. 
5. Almost all respondents were aware of the concept of optimum capital structure. 
The second part of Pandey's study involves an analysis of sample of 743 Indian 
companies belonging to 18 industry groups, during the period 1973-1974 to 1980-1981. 
The following are the findings: 
1. The companies employed very high levels of leverage. 
2. No industry-wise patterns in the use of leverage were found. 
3. No impact of industry type on leverage was found. 
4. No definite relationship between leverage on one hand and, size, profitability and 
growth on the other, was revealed. 
Altman (1984) conducts an empirical investigation of bankruptcy costs. He has studied 
two samples of U.S. firms which became bankrupt. One of the samples consists of 19 
industrial firms of U.S. which became bankrupt during the period 1970 to 1978. The 
other sample consisted of 7 large U.S. companies which went bankrupt some time before 
1984. Direct and indirect bankruptcy costs of the failed firms are investigated and the 
probability of bankruptcy estimated for the sample of firms studied. A simple model is 
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presented for measuring bankruptcy costs. The author uses statistical techniques to arrive 
at empirical findings. 
The evidence firom Altman's study suggests that the less-than-expected performance of 
firms with high probabilities of bankruptcy is not limited to firms which actually become 
bankrupt. This indicates that indirect bankruptcy costs can be incurred by any firm 
regardless of its eventual fate. Altman puts forward a simple model for measuring the 
present value of expected bankruptcy costs and this is compared with the present value of 
expected tax benefits fi-om interest payments. The present value of expected bankruptcy 
costs is found to exceed the present value of tax benefits from debt. This indicates that an 
important factor in the issue of optimal capital structure is the factor of bankruptcy costs. 
Myers and Majluf (1984)^^ develop a model in which capital structure is used to reduce 
the inefficiencies in the firm's investment decisions that are caused by information 
asymmetry. The authors use mathematical and graphical analysis based on theoretical 
models to draw conclusions. They show that if investors are less informed than the firm 
insiders about the value of the firm's assets, then equity may be mispriced by the market. 
If firms need to finance their new projects by issuing external equity, underpricing may 
be to such an extent that the new equity investors get more than the net present value 
(NPV) of the new project which results in a loss to the existing shareholders of the firm. 
Myers and Majluf explain that due to the underpricing of external equity the project will 
not be accepted though its NPV is positive, thus leading to the problem of 
underinvestment. This problem of underinvestment can be avoided if the firm can finance 
the new project using a security which is not as severely xmdervalued by the market as the 
external equity. Since retained earnings or risk-free debt involve no undervaluation firms 
will show higher preference for the same than external equity. 
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Myers (1984)^^ discusses the static trade of theory, the pecking order theory and the 
factor of asymmetric information associated external financing. Facts about actual 
financing behaviour of firms are also discussed. Myers presents a modified pecking order 
theory which recognises both asymmetric information and costs of financial distress as 
given below: 
1. There are good reasons for firms to avoid financing real investments by issuing 
common stock. 
2. They set target dividend payout ratios so that normal requirements for equity 
investment can be met with internally generated fiinds. 
3. A firm may also finance a part of its normal investment outlays with new debt 
but it tries to use risk-fi'ee debt. 
4. Since target dividend payout ratios are sticky, and investment opportunities tend 
to fluctuate compared to internal cash flow, the firm will exhaust its ability to 
issue risk free debt fi-om time to time. 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)" develop a single period model of capital structure for a 
firm having two types of securities - debt and equity. Three determinants optimal capital 
structure are identified: (1) variability of firm value, (2) level of non-debt tax shields and 
(3) costs of financial distress. The authors study a sample of 851 U.S. firms covering 25 
industries for a 20-year period from 1962 to 1981. They use mathematical analysis, 
simulation and graphical analysis based on theoretical model. Empirical results are 
obtained by econometric techniques. They have estimated the relationship between the 
20-year average firm leverage ratios and the determinants, and have also attempted to test 
empirical propositions. 
Bradley et al show that there are strong industry influences across the firm leverage 
ratios. Further volatility of firm earnings is inversely related v^th firm leverage and is an 
important determinant because it helps to explain both within the industries and across 
the industries variations in firm leverage ratios. Moreover the intensity of research and 
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development (R&D) and advertising expenditures is also inversely related to leverage. 
These two findings are consistent with the balancing theory (static trade-off theory) of 
optimal capital structure. 
However, surprisingly the study by Bradley et al show that there is a strong direct relation 
between firm leverage and the level of non-debt tax shields, which is not consistent with 
the balancing theory. Nonetheless their study is important because it reveals intra-
industry similarities in firm leverage ratios and inter-industry differences. Further it 
shows that there is a significant inverse relationship between firm leverage ratios and 
earnings volatility, which tends to support the balancing theory of optimal capital 
structure. 
According to Titman (1984)'^  liquidation of a firm may impose costs on its customers in 
the form of non-availability of the product, spare parts and service. They shift these costs 
to the stockholders by lowering the prices for the firm's product. So stockholders would 
consider committing to liquidation only when the net gains to liquidation exceed the costs 
imposed on customers. The author uses mathematical analysis and graphical illustrations 
based on theoretical model to draw conclusions. Titman shows that the shareholders can 
be committed to an optimal liquidation policy by using the capital structure. 
According to Titman capital structure is arranged so that when bankruptcy occurs, 
shareholders never want to liquidate, bondholders always want to liquidate and the firm 
will default only if the net gain fi-om liquidation is more than the cost to customers. 
Titman ftirther shows that, other things remaining the same, firms for which this effect is 
more important will carry less debt than firms for which this effect is less important. 
Generally the costs imposed on customers when a producer stops doing business are 
higher for unique and/or durable products than for non durable products or those 
produced by multiple producers. 
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Chamoli (1985)'^  studies the capital structure pattern of the cement industry both in the 
private and public sector and makes a comparison of the observed long term debt-equity 
ratios with the standard norm of 2:1 fixed under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947, 
and identifies the factors responsible for the difference between them. Chamoli's work 
covers 24 cement companies, which consists of 20 private sector companies and 4 public 
sector companies, during the period 1972-73 to 1981-82. The author finds that the debt-
equity ratio in the cement industry is well below the norm of 2:1. 
Chamoli explains that many Indian companies use short-term debt to meet the long-term 
requirement of fimds; hence the long term debt to equity ratio is low. A second reason is 
that a substantial amount of retained earnings are used to finance the investments for 
growth in the cement industry. Next, there is also a misunderstanding by the management 
that high debt causes difficulties whenever default occurs. A fiirther reason is that of 
inclusion of convertibility clause in the loan agreements of financial institutions. 
Chamoli suggests that in order to improve the financial fimction of the cement industry 
the companies should finance their future expansion more by the use of long term debt 
and not by retained earnings; they should use their reserves to increase dividends. No 
quantitative technique has been used by the author, however. The conclusions have been 
arrived at on the basis of the movement in debt-equity ratios during the period of study. 
Titman and Wessels (1988)'^ extend the body of empirical work on capital structure in 
three ways: 
1. They extend the range of theoretical determinants of capital structure. 
2. They analyse separately short term, long term and convertible debt instead of an 
aggregate measure of total debt. 
3. They use a variant of the factor analysis technique, called linear structural 
modelling, to obtain empirical results. 
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Titman and Wessels have studied the data on U.S. manufacturing firms and labour 
statistics pertaining to U.S. manufacturing firms during the period 1974 to 1982. They 
show that firms with unique or specialised products have relatively low debt ratios. 
Smaller firms tend to use significantly more long term debt than larger firms. The model 
does not find sufficient evidence to support earlier theoretical work which predicts that 
debt ratios are related to a firm's expected growth, non-debt tax shields, volatility or 
collateral value of its assets. They find some support that profitable firms use relatively 
less debt with respect to the market value of their equity. Their model, however, does not 
explain the variation in convertible debt ratios across firms. 
Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) '^ reexamine the relationship between capital structure and 
theoretically relevant determinants, and extend the same. They have performed a cross-
sectional study of non-financial and non-utility U.S. corporations during the period 1974-
1983. A total of 1470 companies were included in the sample. Apart from the 
determinants such as firm size, asset composition, asset risk and profitability they have 
included variables which measure the extent of equity holding of the dominant insider. 
Friend and Hasbrouck have obtained the empirical results from their study by applying 
econometric techniques. The authors find that there is a generally negative correlation 
between size of insider holding variables and the debt ratio. However, even after 
including the insider holding variables they can only explain less than half the variations 
in debt ratio. 
Friend and Lang (1988)^ ^ have studied 984 companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) during the period 1979 to 1983, to find out whether capital structure 
decisions are at least partly driven by self interest of managers. They have extended the 
work done by Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) by including an additional variable to 
represent the fraction of equity held by the dominant non-managerial stockholder apart 
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from the earlier measures for the dominant managerial insider in Friend and Hasbrouck 
(1988). Friend and Lang obtain empirical results by econometric technique. They show 
that the level of debt decreases as the level of management stockholding in the firm 
increases. 
This finding by Friend and Lang is independent of the existence of dominant non-
managerial stockholders. However, where firms have large non-managerial investors the 
average debt ratio is significantly greater than those firms without large non-managerial 
stockholders. According to Friend and Lang this may indicate that the presence of 
dominant non-managerial stockholders may lead to a coincidence of interests of 
managers and public stockholders. 
Franks and Torous (1989)^ " analyse the institutional features of Ch.ll of U.S. 
Bankruptcy Law by an empirical investigation of 30 U.S. firms which have undergone 
proceedings under the legislation. These 30 firms had defaulted on outstanding bonds 
during the period 1970 to 1984 as reported by Standard and Poor's Bond Guide and 
Moody's Bond Record. The aforesaid legislation allows the bankrupt firm to reorganise. 
When such a firm enters into reorganisation all payments of capital and interest are 
postponed until the reorganisation is complete. The authors use mathematical analysis 
using theoretical model; empirical results are obtained by simulation technique. 
Franks and Torous find that violation of the absolute priority provision under the law, in 
favour of stockholders, are fi-equent. They attribute this observation to a stockholder 
oriented management. They raise several unanswered questions with reference to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Law. These questions relate to the efficiency of the reorganisation process, 
response of lenders to the proceedings under the bankruptcy law and the impact on 
capital structure. The question of the impact of the bankruptcy law on capital structure of 
the firm is relevant and is unanswered. 
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Baskin (1989)^ conducts a series of empirical tests in order to distinguish pecking order 
behaviour from continuous adherence to a statistically defined optimal capital structure. 
The study covers a sample of 378 firms from the 1960 Fortune 500 and covers the period 
1960-1972. Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. The evidence 
suggests that leverage varies positively with past growth and inversely with past profits. 
Also firms which paid higher dividends in the past tend to borrow more. Borrowing 
behaviour appears to be serially uncorrelated. 
Baskin concludes that tlie evidence is consistent with asymmetric information. The study 
shows that capital structure in practice seems to be somewhat passively determined in 
response to the need to finance investments with an imperfectly elastic supply of equity 
from retained earnings. According to Baskin it is possible to provide a rational theoretical 
underpinning to pecking order behaviour. 
70 
White (1989) analyses the situation of bankruptcy and argues that none of the 
commonly considered priority rules in bankruptcy give firms an incentive to choose 
bankruptcy or to remain out of bankruptcy. Since all creditors of a firm cannot be paid in 
fiill in bankruptcy, three possible priority rules have been contemplated: 
1. Me-firstrule 
2. Last-lender-first rule 
3. Equal priority rule 
White uses mathematical analysis and discussion based on theoretical model to draw 
conclusions. The author shows that there is no single priority rule in bankruptcy which 
gives the bank-equity coalition an incentive to choose continuation or liquidation, only 
when that alternative is economically efficient. Further, as long as firm's future earnings 
are risky, too many firms vdll reorganise in bankruptcy. Firms that reorganise may get 
subsidies from the government or from creditors. These subsidies increase the 
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attractiveness of reorganising to the bank-equity coalition compared to tiie alternatives of 
liquidating or continuing outside banlcruptcy. 
Diamond (1989)^ ^ develops a model based on agency costs arising out of conflicts 
between equityholders and debtholders. Diamond's model considers a firm's reputation 
for choosing projects that assure debt repayment. Since investors (debtholders) cannot 
distinguish the firms with regard to their access to safe or risky investment projects, ex 
ante, the initial lending rate reflects their beliefs about the projects chosen by the firms on 
average. 
Diamond explains that the longer the firm's history of repaying its debt, the greater is its 
reputation and the lower is its borrowing cost. Therefore older firms will tend to choose 
safe project whereas younger firms may choose the risky project. So firms with long 
track records will show lower default rates and lower costs of debt compared to firms 
with shorter track records. 
Weiss (1990)^ ^ has studied a sample consistmg of 37 NYSE and AMEX firms that filed 
for bankruptcy between November 1979 and December 1986. He explains that if either 
the direct costs of bankruptcy are high or creditors are not sure that priority of claims will 
be honoured, creditors will require higher interest rates raising the cost of borrowing and 
altering the capital structure. Weiss uses statistical and graphical analysis to obtain 
empirical results. His paper presents new evidence on the direct bankruptcy costs and the 
degree to which priority of claims is violated in bankruptcy proceedings of NYSE and 
AMEX firms. 
Weiss' study shows lower direct bankruptcy costs than studies by previous researchers. 
Weiss also shows that priority of claims is violated in majority of cases and the mainly 
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affected parties are the unsecured creditors. In most of the cases secured creditors receive 
their full claims. Equityholders of larger firms appear to fare better than those in smaller 
firms. 
Harris and Raviv (1990)^ ^ develop a model based on agency costs arising out of conflicts 
between equityholders and managers. They assimie that managers always want to 
continue the firm's operations although investors prefer liquidation of the firm. It is also 
assumed that the conflict cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flow and 
investment expenditure. Debt simplifies the problem by allowing debtholders the choice 
to force liquidation if cash flows are poor. This entails costs related to the production of 
information about the prospects of the firm, needed for the liquidation decision. The 
authors draw conclusions by mathematical and graphical analysis based on theoretical 
model. 
Harris and Raviv explain that at the optimal capital structure there is a trade off between 
improved liquidation decision and higher investigation costs. According to the model put 
forward by them firms with higher liquidation values will carry more debt and will be 
more likely to default, but such firms will have greater market value than similar firms 
with lower liquidation value. They further show that the probability of a bankrupt firm 
being reorganised instead of liquidated, decreases with liquidation value and is 
independent of costs of investigation. They also show that the level of debt relative to the 
expected income of the firm, probability of default, probability of reorganisation and 
bond yield are independent of the size of the firm. Harris and Raviv argue that higher 
leverage can be expected to be associated with larger value of the firm, higher level of 
debt relative to the expected income and lower likelihood of reorganisation after the 
occurrence of default. 
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Stulz (1990)^ '* develops a model based on agency costs arising out of conflicts of interests 
between equityholders and managers. Stulz assumes that managers always want to invest 
all available funds although a cash payout is better for investors. It is also assumed that 
the conflict cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flow and investment 
expenditure. The presence of debt entails debt service payments which reduce free cash 
flow, thus reducing the funds available for profitable investments. The author draws 
conclusions by mathematical analysis based on theoretical model. 
The optimal capital structure according to Stulz is determined by a trade-off between the 
benefit of debt in preventing investments in value decreasing projects and the cost of debt 
in preventing investment in value increasing projects. Stulz further argues that, generally 
managers will be reluctant to use the optimal levels of debt. However they are more 
likely to do so the greater is the threat of takeover. Finally, firms which have value-
increasing investment opportunities which create more value than is destroyed by their 
value-decreasing investment opportunities will have less debt than firms in the opposite 
situation. 
TO 
Harris and Raviv (1991) survey capital structure theories and summarise their results, 
relate them to known empirical evidence and suggest prospective areas for future 
research. They classify capital structure theories into four categories on the basis of the 
determinants of capital structure as explained in these theories: 
1. Agency costs (arising out of conflicts between equityholders and managers, and 
conflicts between debtholders and equityholders) 
2. Asymmetric information 
3. Product/input market imperfections 
4. Corporate control considerations 
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Harris and Raviv conclude that the models surveyed have identified many potential 
determinants of capital structure. However, empirically it is still not known with 
certainty, which of the determinants are important in different contexts. The theory has 
identified a small number of general principles based on the properties of the debt 
contract for determination of capital structure, such as bankruptcy provisions, convexity 
of payoffs of levered equity, the effect of debt on equity ovmership by managers and 
relative insensitivity of payoffs fi-om debt to firm performance. Further they according to 
them the empirical evidence is largely consistent with the theory except in few cases. 
Harris and Raviv point out that models relating to products/inputs appear to be 
underexplored and there is scope for further theoretical research work. 
Singh, Hamid, Salimi and Nakano (1992)''^  study top fifty listed manufacturing 
companies from nine developing countries during the period 1980 to 1987. The authors 
draw conclusions by statistical techniques. They conclude that although there are wide 
variations in the structures of corporate finance among the developing countries, these 
structures differ from those found in the advanced coimtries in important ways. 
Singh et al show that firms in less developed countries (LDCs) use more external finance 
than firms in developed countries. With a few exceptions, it was generally found that the 
gearing ratios of the firms in LDCs were somewhat similar to the pattern in advanced 
countries. The authors find no evidence that the large companies in the developing 
countries were inherently different from or pursued different goals from the large 
companies in the advanced economies. 
Further, in the Study by Singh et al wide intercountry variations were found in the 
average P/E ratios of companies in the LDCs which is similar to the advanced countries. 
The following findings are particularly relevant for Indian companies: 
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1. There is a negative relationship between size and corporate performance. 
2. There is a negative relationship between company size and internal financing. 
3. There is a positive relationship between corporate growth and retention ratio, 
between growth and profitability, and between growth and P/E ratio. 
4. There is a consistently positive relationship between profitability and internal 
financing. 
5. There is a negative relationship between profitability and either capital or income 
gearing. 
Mittal and Singla (1992) '^ study the debt-equity mix in the Indian private companies in 
the cement and automobile industries. 11 companies in the cement industry and 14 
companies in the automobile industry have been studied during the five year period 1986 
to 1990. The study considers five determinants of capital structure: company size, asset 
composition, debt service capacity, business risk and growth rate. Empirical results are 
obtained by econometric techniques. They find that these five variables together account 
for a major proportion of the variations in the debt-equity mix in the cement industry. The 
explanatory power of these variables in the cement industry is much more than in the 
automobile industry. 
Mittal and Singla demonstrate that in the cement industry there is a significant 
relationship between capital structure and size, asset composition, business risk and 
growth rate, and that there is no significance of debt service capacity as a determinant. 
However, the influence of size, business risk and growth rate are contrary to expectations. 
In the automobile industry the only significant determinant is found to be business risk 
and the other determinants are insignificant. Further the relationship between debt-equity 
mix and business risk is contrary to expectations. Except business risk there is no 
similarity as to the influence of the other determinants in the cement and automobile 
industries. >J^ <^ ft^ * ^'^^ iTi^ 
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Myers (1993)^ ^ has reviewed three capital structure theories viz. static trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory and organisational theory and has attempted to assess the ability of 
these theories to explain two observed facts about corporate financing: 
1. The investors consider almost all leverage increasing transactions as good news 
and leverage decreasing transactions as bad news. 
2. There is a strong negative correlation between profitability and financial leverage. 
Myers finds that the static trade-off theory explains neither of the two aforementioned 
facts. The pecking order theory appears to explain both facts. The organisational theory 
may be able to explain the two facts, but its predictions are not as clear as the pecking 
order theory. Myers concludes that there are only two theories which can possibly explain 
capital structure: pecking order theory and organisational theory. 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)* study the cross-sectional variation in the capital structure 
of the non-financial UK companies during the 12 year period firom 1977 to 1988. They 
use six different measures of leverage viz. market value measures of total gearing, long 
term gearing and short term gearing, and book value measures of total gearing, long term 
gearing and short term gearing. They use six determinants of capital structure viz. non-
debt tax shields, asset structure growth, earnings volatility, size and profitability. They 
use statistical techniques to draw conclusions. 
Bennett and Donnelly find that total leverage, measured in market value terms, is better 
explained by the determinants than total leverage, measured in book value terms. There is 
similar evidence for long term leverage and short term leverage. Further the explanatory 
power of the determinants is highest for long term leverage, followed by total leverage 
and it is the least for short term leverage. 
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Their study provides evidence that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with 
leverage. They also find that asset structure and size are positively related with leverage 
and profitability is negatively related with leverage. Further growth has no significant 
relationship with leverage. However their finding that earnings volatility is positively 
related with leverage is counterintuitive. They also find that industrial classification is 
significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in capital structure among the UK 
firms. 
Bennett and Donnelly also find evidence that while size and profitability are usefiil in 
explaining cross-sectional variation in long term leverage they do not explain the 
variations in short term leverage. According to the authors, their finding that short term 
leverage is least explained by the determinants, may indicate that firms use short term 
debt when they temporarily stray firom their long term target leverage. Further they 
explain that long term leverage is more representative of a firm's policy with regard to its 
capital structure. 
Leland (1994/^ studies corporate debt values and the issue of optimal capital structure in 
a unified analytical fi^amework. The author draws conclusions by mathematical analysis 
based on theoretical model. He derives closed form results which relate the value of long 
term corporate debt and optimal capital structure to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
bond covenants and other parameters. The results show two interesting aspects about 
optimal leverage: 
1. A rise in the risk fi-ee rate of interest leads to greater level of optimal debt. 
2. The optimal debt for firms having higher bankruptcy costs may carry a lower rate 
of interest than for firms having lower bankruptcy costs. Contrastingly, for 
protected debt higher bankruptcy costs imply higher interest rates at the optimal 
leverage. 
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Leiand shows that issuing debt without protective covenants yields higher tax benefits 
than issuing debt with protective covenants. This conclusion is reversed if the firms are 
able to increase the riskiness of their activities through asset substitution, when debt is 
unprotected leading the bondholders to demand higher interest rates even when the firm 
has low risk currently. Costs arising out of asset substitution are not incurred when firms 
issue protected debt. 
Leland's results also suggest that debt repurchases cannot be used to adjust leverage 
continuously to its optimal level. Renegotiation of debt can achieve simultaneous 
increases in values of debt and equity. Further, it may be desirable for shareholders to 
wait until the point of bankruptcy before renegotiating debt. Leland's model is based on 
the following critical assumptions: 
1. The activities of the firm are not influenced by capital structure. 
2. Once the capital structure decisions are made they are not changed subsequently. 
3. The debt structure has time independent payouts. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)^ study the G-7 countries viz. U.S., Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy, UK and Canada in order to establish whether capital structure in other countries is 
related to factors similar to those appearing to influence the capital structure of U.S. 
firms. Their study covers the non-financial firms of the G-7 countries representing more 
than 50 percent of the market capitalization in each country diuing the period 1987-1999. 
They identify and adjust for the major differences in accounting practices among the G-7 
countries and they compute adjusted measures of leverage in these countries in the light 
of the accounting differences. They then analyse the major institutional differences across 
the G-7 countries and their likely impact on financing decisions of the firms. Finally they 
compute the within country partial correlations between capital structure and factors 
considered to be important in the U.S. 
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Rajan and Zingales use two measures of leverage as dependent variables, one based on 
book value of equity and other on the market value of equity. They use four independent 
variables: tangibility of assets, market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for investment 
opportunities), firm size and profitability. They derive the empirical results by using 
econometric technique. It is found that in general, the factors found to be correlated with 
leverage in the U.S. appear to be similarly correlated in the other G-7 countries as well. 
The findings of Rajan and Zingales indicate that the observed correlations are not entirely 
spurious. However, these correlations are not strong. Further, the explanatory power is 
more for regressions based on market capital. The following are generally found by Rajan 
and Zingales across all the G-7 countries: 
1. There is a positive correlation between leverage and tangibility. 
2. There is a negative correlation between leverage and market-to-book ratio. 
3. Except Germany there is a positive correlation between leverage and firm size. 
4. Except Germany there is a negative correlation between leverage and 
profitability. 
Roden and Lewellen (1995)^ ^ study leveraged buy-out (LBO) transactions that took place 
in the U.S. between 1981 and 1990. Their sample includes 107 LBOs. They attempt to 
explain the financing choices made in executing the LBOs. They argue that the LBO 
financing decision will involve a trade off between leverage related costs and benefits, 
vnth reference to the buy-out group. 
Roden and Lewellen derive the empirical results fi-om their study by applying 
econometric analysis. The results show that the buy-out group seeks to balance potential 
leverage related benefits with leverage related costs. The capital structure choices involve 
various proportions of total financing package consisting of senior bank debt. 
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subordinated debt securities, preferred and common stock, cash flow from target firm and 
proceeds from asset sales. 
Roden and Lewellen's study shows evidence that the financing package is systematically 
designed in response to differences across firms in their growth prospects, variability of 
earnings, liquidity characteristics, plans for asset sales and opportunities for tax savings 
from interest expense. Further, the prospective cash flow profile of the target firm is also 
important for the financing decision. When the firm has substantial opportunities and the 
buy-out financing package contains a large component of debt, the LBO financing 
package is more dependent on reduced cash flow securities. 
Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995)^  analyse the leverage and dividend choices of 6780 
industrial companies in the U.S. over a 30 year period from 1963 to 1993. Their study 
attempts to provide a basis for assessing the relative importance of various factors such as 
taxes, contacting costs and signalling effects, in explaining corporate financial 
behaviour. Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. They present 
empirical evidence on determinants of leverage ratios and dividend policies both in the 
cross section of companies examined and firm-wise time series data, such as the tax 
position of the company, investment opportunities and signalling effects of new security 
issues or changes in dividends. 
Barclay, Smith and Watts find that companies with a large opportimity set for 
investments had significantly lower leverage than companies which did not have. 
Regulation has a significant impact on leverage. There is a significant positive relation 
between the size of the increase in company's earnings and its leverage ratio. However, 
their study does not find any support for the proposition that taxes have an important 
impact on corporate leverage choices. The economic impact of firm size on leverage is 
found to be relatively small. Barclay, Smith and Watts do not take into consideration 
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several differences in debt such as maturity, covenants, convertibility and call provisions, 
security and whether debt is privately placed or publicly held. 
Graham (1996)^ ^ studies sample data for 12197 companies covering the period 1980-
1992, listed in NASDAQ, OTC and NYSE, and empirically tests whether the incremental 
use of debt is related to simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates, which take into 
account net operating losses, investment tax credits and minimum alternative tax. 
Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. A statistically significant 
relation between leverage decisions and tax status is found. The explicitly calculated 
marginal tax rates by simulation process are used to show empirically a positive relation 
between tax status and incremental debt policy. Graham's study uses control variables for 
such factors as free cash flow, investment opportimity set, firm size, research and 
development (R & D) expense, advertising expense and tangibility of assets. 
Cherian (1996)'^ analyses the financing practices of U.S. and Indian firms with regard to 
their sources and uses of funds, in order to identify the role of stock market in financing 
firm expenditures. He has studied the RBI data on medium and large firms for the period 
1972 to 1991, the data on ICICI portfolio of firms for the period 1978 to 1993 and the 
data on U.S. firms for the period 1972 to 1992. The U.S. and Indian firms studied include 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Empirical results are obtained by 
descriptive statistics and analysis of sources and uses of funds of the firms covered in the 
study. 
Cherian shows that the stock market plays a very limited role as a source of finance for 
both Indian and U.S. firms. The basic difference between the financing choices of Indian 
and U.S. firms is that Indian firms depend less on internal finance and more on external 
debt compared to U.S. firms. This is because the Indian financial system is predominantly 
bank oriented compared to U.S. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997)^ ° study the issue of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to companies assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment. It deals with the agency problem of 
separation of ownership and control. Their study describes several broad approaches to 
corporate governance and is based on literature review and discussion. They show that 
the possibility of financing based on reputations of managers or on extremely optimistic 
expectations of investors about getting their money back, does not offer satisfactory 
explanation, without corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny explain that legal protection of investors' rights is one essential 
element of corporate governance, and that concentrated ownership through large 
shareholdings, takeovers and bank finance, is also a nearly universal method of control 
that helps investors to get their money back. However, large investors may also 
inefficiently redistribute wealth from other investors to themselves. Successfiil corporate 
governance systems combine significant legal protection with an important role for large 
investors. Understanding corporate governance is important in the context of capital 
structure because the nature and quality of corporate governance will have a bearing on 
the financing pattern or the capital structure of the firms. 
Johnson (1997)'" attempts to combine banking literature and capital structure literature 
and focuses on a complex scenario in which the type of debt a firm chooses, affects its 
optunal capital structure. The author studies a sample of 716 U.S. firms during the period 
1984 to 1989. Empirical results are obtained by statistical and econometric techniques. 
The results suggest that a bank debt increases optimal leverage for firms by mitigating the 
negative effects on leverage of potential asset substitution problem, but does not alter the 
relationships between leverage and potential underinvestment problems, or the likelihood 
of financial distress. 
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Johnson explains that the choice of debt ownership is an important element of capital 
structure decision. Decisions on leverage and choice of debt are made jointly. Johnson 
explains that the distinction between bank debt and private non-bank debt is meaningful. 
Fvtrther, firms that have access to public debt markets also have higher leverage if they 
borrow part of their debt from banks. However, Johnson's study only partially explains 
why firms with bank debt have higher leverage. 
Ryen, Vasconcellos and Kish (1997)^ * review and summarise the past financial literature 
which attempt to explain the factors which matter in the determination of capital structure 
with a focus on the most recent papers. They put forward some of the questions which 
have not all been answered: 
1. Is there truly an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or an industry? 
2. Does the debt ratio remain constant over time 
3. Why have corporate leverage ratios not fluctuated in response to changes in 
corporate tax rates? 
4. Why do transactions that alter leverage have consistent effects on firms' stock 
price? 
Ryan et al conclude that the most important determinant of optimal leverage ratio is the 
tax shield of debt vis-a-vis the bankruptcy costs trade-off. Further, the models based on 
agency costs and product input market model should be considered in the cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Brealy and Myers (1997)*^ suggest that firms maintain financial slack in the form of cash, 
marketable securities, real assets that can be readily sold and ability to quickly raise 
borrowed fiinds from debt markets or banks. Ability to quickly raise borrowed fiinds 
requires that firms finance themselves conservatively. They explain that in the long run 
the value of the firm depends more on the capital investment and operating decisions than 
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on financing. Maintaining financial slack is important for firms with plenty of 
opportunities to invest in positive NPV investments. 
However, Brealy and Myers explain that excessive financial slack may encourage 
managers to increase their remuneration or expand business without caution. Debt may 
be used to mitigate the problems associated with excessive financial slack. Debt imposes 
contractual obligations on the firm for making payments to service debt and forces it to 
pay out cash. Thus debt can be used either to discipline managers or to pressurise them to 
improve operating efficiency. 
Leland (1998/^ develops a model which explains the evolution of asset value that results 
from the joint effect of the initial capital structure and the restructuring of capital. The 
model reflects the interactions of financing decisions and investment risk strategies. 
Conclusions are drawn by mathematical analysis based on theoretical model. Leland 
shows that agency costs of debt associated with asset substitution are much less than the 
tax advantages of debt. Yield spreads increase as the potential for asset substitution 
increases. Asset substitution will occur even when there are no agency costs. However 
this occurs to a lesser extent than the situation when agency costs are present. 
According to Leland's model there may not be a positive association between agency 
costs and optimal levels of leverage. Greater benefits of hedging and environments with 
greater agency costs are not necessarily related. Further risk reduction arising out of 
hedging may lead to greater leverage and the tax advantage consequent on that is greater 
than the transfer value from equity holders to bondholders. However, Leland's model has 
the following limitations: 
1. The model assumes that managers act in the interests of shareholders. 
2. Dividend payout policies and investments are treated as exogenous variables. 
3. The model ignores information asymmetries. 
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Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998)'^ provide a theoretical explanation for the observation 
that some firms issue equity while paying out dividends, even when debt financing is 
viable. They determine conditions in which debt and dividends are employed in such a 
way that minimises the cost of signalling. It is assumed that the higher valued firm is 
distinguished from the lower valued firm by having a cash flow distribution with a lower 
variance. Conclusions are drawn by mathematical analysis based on theoretical model. 
Brick et al demonstrate that when the random error in their model is uniformly distributed 
the optimal level of debt, in a symmetric information environment, of the higher valued 
firm is lower than that of the lower valued firm. In an asymmetric information 
environment, the higher valued firm will decrease its debt and increase its equity to signal 
its value. However, if the informational symmetric optimal leverage has an inverse 
relationsl 
leverage. 
hip with risk one would expect that the firms will signal quality by increasing 
Cobham and Subramaniam (1998)^" study the corporate financing pattern in developing 
countries with specific reference to India. The study covers data for Indian firms from 
two sources: RBI Report on Currency and Finance, and Financial Performance of 
Companies, ICICI Portfolio. They compare gross sources of finance with gross uses, and 
also net sources wdth physical investment. 
The study by Cobham and Subramaniam covers the period 1975-76 to 1990-91. They 
also used data pertaining to the developed nations. Empirical results are obtained by 
statistical techniques.Their main finding is that large firms use more internal finance and 
bonds than smaller firms. Smaller firms use more bank loans and total borrowings than 
larger firms. Smaller firms also show higher extent of equity financing than larger ones. 
Chapters 65 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)'' test the static trade-off theory against the pecking 
order hypothesis. They examine a sample of 157 firms in USA during the period 1971 to 
1989.They develop simple models of the two theories for the purpose of testing them on 
the sample data. Empirical results are obtained by econometric techniques and 
simulation. They find that the pecking order model has greater explanatory power for 
time series data than the static trade-off model. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers conduct simulation experiments to examine the statistical 
power of the tests of the two theories. It is found that even when the target adjustment 
models (which are based on the static trade-off theory) are false they are not rejected. The 
pecking order model can be rejected, when false. However it cannot be concluded 
without doubt whether the pecking order model can be equally applied to a sample of 
growth companies which invest heavily in intangible assets (the entire sample considered 
by them consists of firms in mature industries). 
Rappaport and Sirrower (1999)^ ^ study the merger and acquisition deals that have taken 
place in established industries such as hotel and insurance in USA during the period 1988 
to 1998. They explain that stock issues are a natural way for young companies with 
limited access to other forms of financing particularly in new industries, to pay for the 
acquisitions. A high stock valuation can be a major advantage in such cases. 
Rappaport and Sirrower, however explain that once the market does not show its 
approval for the deal by decreasing the acquirer's share price, it is likely to be alert about 
future deals. They further explain that the selection between cash and stock should not be 
made without a thorough consideration of the possible consequences. To the extent that 
the merger of companies follow their prescription or otherwise the capital structure of the 
merged entity will be influenced. 
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Garvey and Hanka (1999)^ '* analyse the effect of antitakeover statutes in the U.S. on 
leverage of firms. They have considered in their study the antitakeover statutes passed by 
the states during the period 1987 to 1990. Their study covers a sample of 1203 firms 
excluding financial services and utilities, and they have obtained empirical results by 
econometric technique. They show that firms incorporated in those states which have 
passed antitakeover laws, substantially reduced their debt ratios compared to firms 
incorporated in those states that did not pass such laws, during the study period. They 
have also shown that their findings are not influenced by variations in size, industry or 
profitability. 
Garvey and Hanka further explain that leverage is affected by changes in either debt or 
equity, but changes in debt have larger impact on debt ratio and are mainly responsible 
for the leverage changes in the sample. Also the changes in debt are more strongly related 
to the passage of antitakeover laws. Garvey and Hanka also show that firms that were 
eventually covered by antitakeover legislation used leverage more aggressively in the 
years preceding the adoption of such laws. The results of their study suggest a significant 
instance of the disciplinary role of takeover threats and they indicate that capital structure 
is influenced by managerial discretion. Further, impediments to takeover induce a shift 
firom debt to equity financing. 
Kakani (1999/^ studies Indian private companies in the manufacturing sector. A sample 
of 100 firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was studied during the periods 
1984 to 1989 (pre-liberalisation) and 1991 to 1995 (post-liberalisation). This study 
identifies factors affecting long term and short term debt and compares the determinants 
of capital structure between pre- and post liberalisation periods. Empirical results have 
been obtained by econometric techniques. 
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Kakani shows that profitability is negatively related with the debt ratios. Capital intensity 
is also negatively related with the short term and long term debt ratios. Further, regulated 
firms and growth oriented firms had more total and long term debts during the pre-
liberalisation period. In the liberalised period net exports is a more important determinant 
of long term and total debt ratios. Volatility of earnings and non-debt tax shields were 
significantly negatively related to short term and total debt of the firm. This study shows 
that the Indian companies have been affected by various determinants of capital structure. 
Further profitability, capital intensity and non-debt tax shields appear to be important 
determinants of capital structure. 
Misra and Misra (1999)^ ° study the capital structure of the firms in the Indian automobile 
industry in order to find out the dominant factors in the determination of the capital 
structure of the Indian automobile companies. According to them the important factors 
which affect the capital structure of the firm are income of the equity shareholders and 
control (the proportion of the shares held by the original promoters). They explain that 
the choice of a firm for debt financing or equity financing depends upon the operating 
return oh investment and the market interest rate. 
If the operating return on investment is more than the market interest rate, the firm should 
use debt finance; if the operating return on investment is less than the market interest rate 
it should use equity finance. However if the regulatory norm of debt-equity ratio of 2:1 is 
imposed the firm cannot use debt financing entirely, even if the conditions favour debt 
financing. If the conditions favour equity financing and the management is afraid of 
losing control it may use debt financing by sacrificing the objective of maximising the 
income of equity shareholders. The actual choice depends on whether the management of 
the firm is a risk taker or risk averter. 
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Misra and Misra formulate a model to explain the firm's choice of debt and equity and 
use this model to derive the conditions in which the firm will use debt financing or equity 
financing for their new projects. They study a sample of 11 firms in the Indian 
automobile industry during the year 1998. They have compared the operating return on 
investment in these firms with an assumed interest rate on debt, which is fixed for all 
firms in the sample. No basis for this assumption has been given. 
Misra and Misra have explained the observed data in the light of the model they have 
formulated. They find that for most of the firms in the Indian automobile industry the 
operating return on investment is less than the market interest rate and thus equity 
financing is preferable to debt financing in these firms. Further, the authors' opine that 
the managements of all the firms in the Indian automobile industry where the conditions 
favour equity financing are risk averter in nature. 
Babu and Jain (1999), examine the preferences for short term and long term debt by the 
private corporate enterprises in India. Their study covers a sample of 91 companies listed 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Babu and Jain find that the firms in their sample showed 
a marked preference for long term debt compared to short term debt. Further, these firms 
sometimes also employed short term debt like bank cash credit to finance their long term 
requirements and, by and large they are satisfied with this type of financing arrangement. 
However, the authors explain that cash credit fi'om banks is only short term by name; in 
practice the firms use it as a substitute for long term debt by renewing the cash credit year 
after year. They expect this practice to continue among the Indian private firms in spite of 
the recent preferences for long term debt. The authors collected data through 
questionnaires mailed to the companies. The conclusions were drawn by the calculation 
of percentages of the sample fulfilling certain criteria. 
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Babu and Jain (2000)'* examine the variations in debt-equity ratio based on industry 
classification, in order to find out whether industry classification influences the capital 
structure. The study covers the firms belonging to nine different classifications of 
manufacturing industries, as per the Bombay Stock Exchange Official Directory. A 
sample of 527 firms has been studied during the 15-year period 1980 to 1994. The 
empirical results have been arrived at by using statistical techniques. The authors 
conclude that the factor, industry classification, affects the capital structure decisions of 
the private manufacturing firms in India. Further, the firms in due course of time adjust 
their capital structure to their industry average value. 
Pandey (2001) '^ studies Malaysian companies using data during the period 1984 to 1999. 
The study covers data on 106 Malaysian companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. The debt ratio is expressed in terms of long term debt, short term debt and 
total debt with reference to both market value and book value of total capital. Empirical 
results are obtained by econometric technique. 
The results of Pandey's study show that profitability, size, growth and risk have 
significant influence on all types of debt. However, unlike the developed markets 
investment opportunity has no significant impact on debt policy in Malaysia. Profitability 
has a consistent negative relation with all types of debt ratios in all periods, with all 
estimation methods. This indicates that pecking order theory may be applicable in an 
emerging capital market like Malaysia. 
Ozkan (2001)^' studies a sample of 390 U.K. fums excluding the financial sector firms 
and utility companies dxiring the period 1984 to 1996, and attempts to provide greater 
insight into the empirical determinants of target capital structure of firms and the 
adjustment process toward this target. Ozkan develops an empirical model which 
explains at least two important characteristics of corporate borrowing behaviour: 
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1. Firms have a long run optimal debt ratio which is assumed to be a function of 
several firm-specific characteristics, which change over time, over firms, or over 
both time and firms. 
2. There is an adjustment process which involves a lag in adjusting to changes in the 
optimal target debt ratio. 
Ozkan uses econometric techniques to obtain the empirical results. The study shows that 
the firms have long run target leverage ratios and they adjust to the target ratio relatively 
fast. So costs of not being at the target ratio and the costs of adjustment are equally 
important for firms. Further profitability, liquidity, non-debt tax shields and growth 
opportunities exert a negative effect on capital structure choice of firms. However, there 
is limited evidence for a positive effect of size on leverage. 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)'° study firm level data for the 
largest companies in ten developing countries during the period 1980 to 1990 in order to 
analyse whether capital structure theory as it is knovra for developed countries is also 
relevant for developing countries. They develop an empirical model for three different 
measures of leverage. Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. It is 
found that the variables that are relevant for explaining capital structures in the developed 
countries are also relevant for the developing countries. It is consistently found by them 
that the more profitable the firm is the lower is the leverage ratio, which fits into the 
pecking order hypothesis and indicates the existence of significant information 
asymmetries. This observation, however, does not fit well with the static trade-off theory. 
It is also found by Booth et al that the greater is the tangibility of asset mix, the higher is 
the long term debt ratio, but the smaller is the total debt ratio. Further, the individual 
country data show the impact of intangibles and growth factor on leverage. However, 
empirically measured tax rate does not seem to influence financing decisions. In general, 
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the study by Booth et al shows that debt ratios seem to be affected in the same mamier 
and by the same type of variables relevant for developed countries. However, there are 
systematic differences in the manner in which these ratios are affected by the country 
factors such as GDP growth rates, inflation rates and development of capital markets. 
Pandey (2002)^ ^ studies a sample of 208 Malaysian companies during the period 1994 to 
2000 listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. His study attempts to establish a 
relationship between capital structure on the one hand and market power (represented by 
Tobin's Q ratio), profitability, growth, systematic risk, size, ownership and tangibility, on 
the other. Empirical results are obtained by econometric techniques. This study 
establishes a cubic relationship between capital structure and market power. Pandey 
explains that at lower and higher ranges of Tobin's Q ratio, firms employ higher debt and 
reduce debt at the intermediate range due to the complex interaction of market conditions, 
agency costs and bankruptcy costs. 
Pandey further shows that there is a saucer shaped relation between capital structure and 
profitability. This happens due to the interaction of agency costs, costs of external 
financing and tax shield of interest payments. Size and tangibility have a positive 
relationship with capital structure. Growth, systematic risk and ownership have a 
negative relationship with capital structure. Pandey's study is the first to reveal a cubic 
relationship between capital structure and market power and a saucer shaped relationship 
between capital structure and profitability. 
Bhaduri (2002/ studies financial data on 363 Indian firms collected across 9 broad 
industries during the period 1990 to 1995 and develops a cost-of-adjustment model of 
capital structure (based on the static trade-off theory) for the Indian corporate sector. 
Bhaduri's model also includes a component based on the pecking order theory of 
financing. Empirical results are obtained by econometric and factor analytic techniques. 
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Bhaduri applies factor analytic technique to explain the xmobservable factors that 
influence capital structure decisions. The evidence suggests that the optimal capital 
structure choice can be influenced by factors such as growth, cash flow, size, uniqueness 
and industry characteristics. 
The model developed by Bhaduri fits the data moderately. Bhaduri's resuhs are 
consistent with many existing capital structure theories and they also indicate the 
possibility of costly restructuring by the Indian firms. The model also suggests a 
differential cost of adjustment for long term and short term borrowing. The speed of 
adjustment is greater for short term debt than long term debt. 
Cai and Ghosh (2003)''* study Fortune 500 manufacturing companies based in the U.S. 
during the period 1982 to 2001, covering 21 industries, except finance, insurance and real 
estate. They investigate whether a firm's debt-equity mix follows optimal capital 
structure theory or pecking order theory. Empirical results are obtained by statistical 
techniques. They show that the probability of a firm's debt level moving closer to the 
industry's mean is not significantly different fi*om the probability that it is moving away 
from the industry mean. 
Cai and Ghosh show that there is no single value of the optimal capital structure. Instead 
the optimal capital structure falls within a range of values from zero to the industry mean. 
Further a typical firm in the U.S. will only adjust the capital structure when the firm's 
debt level goes outside this range. They also find agreement with the pecking order 
theory. 
Ehrhardt and Brigham (2003)^'' discuss some of the factors that firms generally consider 
when making capital structure decisions. Firms whose sales are relatively stable can 
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employ more debt and incur higher debt service charges than firms with less sales 
stability. Firms which have general purpose assets tend to use more debt than firms with 
special purpose assets because general purpose assets serve as good collateral for 
obtaining debt. Firms with a high growth rate will tend to more debt than firms with low 
growth rate. Firms v^ ith very high profitability tend to use less debt than firms with low 
profitability. The higher the tax rate, the greater the tax advantage of debt and hence the 
higher will be the level of debt. 
Ehrhardt and Brigham fiuther explain that control considerations also influence capital 
structure. Conservative managements use less debt than aggressive managements. 
Companies also consider the attitudes of lenders and credit rating agencies, before 
deciding to borrow. Conditions in the stock and bond markets, which are always 
changing also influence capital structure decisions. A company's internal conditions also 
influence capital structure decisions. Finally firms tend to maintain flexibility which 
means maintaining reserve borrowing capacity; hence this factor may also influence the 
capital structure of firms. 
Francois and Morellec (2004)^' examine the impact of the U.S. bankruptcy procedure on 
the valuation of corporate securities and capital structure decisions. They provide closed 
form solutions for corporate debt and equity values under the condition that defaulting 
firms can either liquidate their assets or renegotiate outstanding debt with protection of 
the court. Conclusions are drawn by mathematical analysis based on theoretical model. 
They show that the possibility to file for the bankruptcy procedure and to renegotiate debt 
contracts has an unambiguous effect on both the shareholder's incentives to default and 
credit spreads. Debt renegotiation encourages early default and increases credit spreads 
on corporate debt. 
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However, the impact of renegotiation on leverage choices of the firm is ambiguous. 
Francois and Morellec show that when debtors (creditors) have most of the bargaining 
power, leverage can be expected to decrease (increase), with the constraints on the 
renegotiation process. In contrast, credit spreads on corporate debt show little sensitivity 
to bargaining power of claimholders on corporate financing decisions. 
Chen (2004)'^  studies the listed companies in China in order to find out whether and how 
closely, do the determinants of capital structure in China support the Western finance 
theory. The author studies the listed companies in China during the period 1995 to 2000. 
A sample of 77 firms is selected from the Dow-China 88 Index. These firms are listed in 
either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. All firms in the sample 
are non-financial firms. 
The author uses two measures of capital structure based on total debt and long term debt. 
Empirical results are obtained by econometric techniques. Chen shows that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and debt. There is a positive relationship 
between growth opportimity and debt. Tangibility is positively related with debt. Firm 
size is negatively related with long term debt whereas it is positively related with total 
debt. The influence of volatility and non-debt tax shields on capital structure is not found 
to be statistically significant. 
A notable difference between the financing choices of firms in the developed economies 
and firms in China that is found in this study is that Chinese firms prefer short term debt 
and have substantially lower levels of long term debt. Neither the static trade-off model 
nor the pecking order hypothesis derived in the Western economies has robust 
explanatory power for the financing preferences of the Chinese firms, because the 
fundamental institutional assumptions imderlying the models in the Western economies 
are not applicable to China. According to Chen the financing choices of the Chinese 
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firms appear to follow a 'Different Pecking Order' - retained profit followed by external 
equity and lastly debt. 
Chen explains that the static trade-off model has limited explanatory power in China 
because the effects of financial distress are not significant in China as it is still 
characterised by the features of a centrally planned economy. The pecking order 
hypothesis along with the asymmetric information theory appears to provide explanation 
partially. Significant institutional differences such as the legal system governing 
companies' operations, banking and securities markets, ownership concentration and the 
corporate governance structure of the listed firms, the agency problems arising out of 
public ownership and constraints in the banking sector influence the roles of firm-specific 
factors on the leverage decisions of Chinese firms. However, some of the firm-specific 
factors that affect leverage of firms in the Western economies also affect leverage of the 
Chinese firms. 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)^ '* examine the determinants of capital structure 
in four countries in the Asia Pacific region - Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia. They study samples of firms fi:om these four coimtries during the period 1993 
to 2001. The samples include 294 Thai firms, 669 Malaysian firms, 345 Singaporean 
firms and 219 Australian firms. Further a comparison is made between the periods 
preceding and following the East Asian Financial Crisis, 1997. The samples include non-
financial firms in these coimtries. 
The measure of leverage used in this study is Total Debt to Capital ratio. The firm 
specific determinants used in this study are - tangibility, profitability, firm size, growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shields, liquidity, earnings volatility and share price 
performance. Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. Deesomak et al 
find that the relationship between tangibility and leverage is positive; however, it is not 
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significant for any country except Australia. The relationship between leverage and 
profitability is found to be negative; however it is insignificant for all countries except 
Malaysia. 
A significantly positive relationship between firm size and leverage is found in all 
countries except Singapore. The impact of growth opportunity on leverage is found to be 
negative for all countries except Australia. However, this influence is significant only for 
Thailand and Singapore. The relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage is 
negative and is significant for all countries. Further, liquidity and share price performance 
have a negative and significant relationship with leverage in all countries. Earnings 
volatility is not found to have significant effect on leverage in any country. 
Deesomak et al find that the East Asian Financial Crisis has significantly influenced the 
role of firm size on capital structure decision; firm size became a significant factor after 
the crisis particularly for Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The role of growth 
opportimity differs across the sample coimtries; growth became significant for Malaysian 
firms after the crisis whereas it became insignificant for Thai firms after the crisis. For all 
countries in the sample non-debt tax shield is significant before the crisis but insignificant 
after the crisis. The role of liquidity on capital structure decisions increased significantly 
after the crisis for Thailand and Singapore. In all countries except Australia, the impact of 
share price performance is significantly different between the ppi^ (0\3)s-bef^ e'&iM f^i§j^ die 
East Asian Financial Crisis. l* f " ^ ^VA\ ^ ^ * 
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In general the results of the study by Deesomak et al support the^ 
respect to firm-specific determinants. The impact of firm size, growth opportunities, non-
debt tax shields, liquidity and share price performance on leverage tend to support the 
major capital structure theories. The impact of determinants varies across countries 
covered in this study. Hence managerial decisions on financing may be affected by 
Chapter 3 77 
country specific considerations. The East Asian Financial Crisis appears to have changed 
the role of both firm and country specific factors. The authors conclude that capital 
structure decision is not only the resuh of firm's own characteristics but also the result of 
corporate governance, legal framework and institutional environment of the countries. 
Khan and Jain (2004/"* explain that capital structure should be examined fi-om the 
viewpoint of its effect on the value of the firm. Theoretically capital structure can 
influence the value of a firm by influencing either its expected income or its cost of 
capital or both. Capital structure cannot influence the total operating income of the firm, 
because it is determined by the investment decisions of the firm, but it can influence the 
value of the firm through the income available to the shareholders and the cost of capital. 
Chandra (2004)'^ attempts to combine the prescriptions of the static trade-off theory, 
agency costs theory and the asymmetric information theory (which underlies the pecking 
order theory). According to Chandra firms should employ some debt in their capital 
structure because debt financing provides tax savings. However, due to the possibility of 
financial distress and presence of agency costs, debt financing cannot be used without 
limits. Firms that have significant intangible assets and growth options should use debt to 
a lesser extent compared to firms that have predominantly tangible assets. 
Chandra explains that firms with low growth rates should follow a pecking order in their 
capital structure with the highest priority given to retained earnings and the least priority 
giveii to external equity. However, high growth firms which depend primarily on tangible 
assets should rely on external equity in addition to debt, whereas high growth firms 
which depend primarily on intangible assets or growth options should depend more on 
external equity than debt due to potential financial distress costs. Further, firms should 
maintain reserve borrowing ability in order to exploit profitable opportunities and avoid 
the problem of asymmetric information associated with firesh issue of equity shares. 
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Pandey (2005)^ ^ explains some practical considerations in determining capital structure. 
Tangible fixed assets can be used as collateral for obtaining debt whereas intangible 
assets, such as human resources, brands, reputation, relations with stakeholders etc., 
cannot be used as collateral. So companies with higher tangible assets will have relatively 
higher debt ratios. Pandey explains that firms with high growth opportunities would 
prefer debt with lower maturities in order to lower the borrowing costs and retain 
financial flexibility. Low growth firms would prefer high leverage in order to prevent 
managers from spending the fi-ee cash flows into unprofitable and risky ventures. Firms 
with larger non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and losses carried forward would 
tend to employ low debt, as they may not have sufficient taxable profit to deduct a high 
amount of interest. 
Further, according to Pandey, maintaining financing flexibility and not maximum 
utilisation of debt capacity may be a more important consideration, in order to enable the 
firm to adjust to any adverse developments in future. Stability or the lack of it 
characterising the business environment may also influence capital structure of a firm. 
Promoters' desire for control over the affairs of the firm may also influence capital 
structure. Capital market conditions and issue costs may also influence the type of 
security that the firm might issue, thereby affecting the capital structure. The size of a 
firm may also influence the capital structure because a smaller firm may face difficulty in 
raising long term loans or raising equity capital fi-om the capital markets, and so may 
depend more on retained earnings. 
Dashti and Sharlak (2005) '^ study the capital structure practices of the Indian automobile 
industry in the pre- and post-liberalisation periods of the Indian economy. They study a 
sample of 15 Indian automobile companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
and have covered the periods 1985-1991 (pre-liberalisation) and 1997-2003 (post-
liberalisation). Empirical results are obtained by using statistical techniques. Their study 
shows that there is a significant variation in the capital structure practices of the firms in 
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the Indian automobile industry between the pre- and post-liberalisation periods. Further 
the firms in the automobile industry are shifting towards a more equity oriented capital 
structure. 
Dashti and Sharlak attribute these findings to the following developments: 
1. Removal, of the licensing regime and the reduction of customs and excise duties, 
which has led to increased competition. 
2. Decrease in the corporate tax rate, which has resulted in a decrease in the tax 
advantage of debt. 
3. Emergence of a dominant new class of investors in stock markets: foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs), non-resident Indians (NRIs), mutual fimds, venture 
capital funds, financial institutions and investment bankers, who have immense 
fimds at their disposal which may be invested in the equity issues of the Indian 
corporates. 
4. Shortage of funds available vdth the Indian financial institutions for lending. 
Huang and Song (2006)^' attempt to find out whether financial decisions made by 
Chinese listed companies differ fi"om those made by firms in the Western economies and 
whether the factors that affect capital structure in the other countries have similar effects 
on the capital structure of Chinese firms. The Chinese listed companies are studies during 
the period 1994 to 2003. The study uses six measures of leverage - book long term debt 
ratio, book total debt ratio, book total liabilities ratio, market long term debt ratio, market 
total debt ratio and market total liabilities ratio. Further, nine determinants have been 
used - profitability, tangibility, size, non-debt tax shields, growth opportimities, 
volatility, ownership structure and managerial shareholdings. Industry and region dummy 
variables are also used. Empirical results are obtained by statistical techniques. 
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Huang and Song find that companies in different industries tend to have different 
leverage. Ownership structure in terms of institutional shareholdings does not have 
significant impact on leverage. Managerial shareholdings are weakly negatively 
correlated with leverage. The influence of the determinants on firms' capital structure for 
China is similar to that in other countries. Leverage measured in terms of long term debt, 
total debt and total liabilities decreases with profitability, non-debt tax shields, 
managerial shareholdings and increases with company size. Tangibility and effective tax 
rate have a positive impact on long term leverage and total leverage ratios. Firms that 
have bright growth opportunities tend to have lower leverage. 
Huang and Song find evidence that state shareholdings or institutional shareholdings 
have no significant impact on capital structure. It is found that Chinese companies have 
less long term debt, less total liabilities and higher shareholders' equity compared to the 
firms in developed countries such as US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK and Canada. 
Further, Chinese companies appear to depend on higher levels external financing 
especially high equity financing, than the firms in the developed countries. The market 
value of leverage is, in general much lower than the book value in China, and their 
difference in China is much higher than in other countries. 
Saravanan (2006)*^ studies a sample of 423 Indian companies belonging to seven 
industries in the manufacturing sector during the period 1992-93 to 2001-02. His work 
extends the body of empirical literature in the Indian context by examining the impact of 
ownership structure on the capital structure of a firm. Ownership structure, represented 
by promoters' holding, has been used as a determinant in addition to the generally used 
determinants such as profitability, asset composition, firm size, business risk and growth 
opportunities. Empirical results are obtained by econometric technique. 
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Saravanan's study shows that the ownership structure is positively associated with 
leverage. Further, firm size and asset composition have a negative relationship with 
leverage. Profitability has an insignificantly positive relation with leverage. Growth, tax 
shield and business risk have a positive relationship with leverage. The results of 
Saravanan's study were found to be different from the findings in the context of 
developed countries. 
Delcoure (2007)^ ^ attempts to find out whether capital structure determinants in the 
transitional Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries support traditional capital 
structure theory developed in the Western economies. The study is carried out for 
publicly traded companies excluding the financial and utility sectors during the 1996 
through 2002 in four transitional economies: Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Slovak 
Republic. The study uses three measures of leverage based on total debt, long term debt 
and short term debt. Empirical results are obtained by econometric techniques. 
Delcoure's study reveals a positive relationship between firm size, total debt and short 
term debt. However, the relationship between firm size and long term debt is negative for 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. The relationship between tangibility of assets and 
leverage is positive for all types of leverage - total debt, long term debt and short term 
debt, and for all the four countries. The relationship between profitability and leverage is 
negative for all types of debt and for all the four countries. 
Delcoure's study shows a strong positive relation between total, long term and short term 
leverage and non-debt tax shields. The total and long term leverage for Russian 
companies, and long term and short term leverage for Czech companies are negatively 
related to earnings volatility. The relationship between taxes and leverage is positive for 
all the CEE countries. 
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It is found in Delcoure's study that there is a difference in the capital structwe choices 
between firms in the CEE countries and the firms in the developed countries. The 
pecking order theory, trade-off theory and the agency theory partially explain capital 
structure choices in the CEE countries. The differences and the financial constraints of 
banking systems, disparity in legal systems governing firm's operations, protection of 
rights of bondholders and shareholders, sophistication of financial markets and corporate 
governance structure of listed firms influence leverage decisions of firms in the CEE 
coimtries. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008/^ study the importance of firm-specific and country-
specific factors in the leverage choice of firms in 42 countries around the world. Firms in 
these 42 countries have been selected firom every continent during the period 1997 to 
2001. They use a sample of 11845 firms of various sizes during the period 1997 to 2001 
selected firom 42 countries. Their sample includes firms firom equal number of developed 
and developing coimtries and excludes financial firms and utilities. They analyse the 
impact of firm specific determinants of leverage such as firm size, tangibility of assets, 
profitability, firm risk, growth opportunities, tax and liquidity. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen use long term debt ratio as the measure of leverage. They also 
use country specific variables to analyse the direct and indirect impact on leverage such 
as efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, legality, corruption, standardised 
enforcement, creditor right protection, bond market development, market or bank based 
financial system, stock market development, standardised stock market, protection of 
shareholders rights, capital formation and GDP growth. They use statistical techniques 
for drawing conclusions. They find that the level of bond market development has a 
positive influence on capital structure and creditor right protection has a negative 
influence on capital structure. The influence of GDP growth rate is significant and 
positive for all countries. 
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Jong, Kabir and Nguyen find that country specific factors also influence the roles of firm 
specific determinants of capital structure. There is a significantly negative impact of 
market or bank based financial system and stock market development on the coefficient 
of tangibility of assets. Capital formation has a significantly negative impact on the 
coefficients of profitability and liquidity. The legal system of the coxmtry has a negative 
impact on the coefficient of firm size and that factors related with legal enforcement and 
variables characterizing economic development of countries appear to have the greatest 
impact on capital structure, both directly and indirectly. 
It is found by Jong, Kabir and Nguyen that the impact of firm specific determinants such 
as assets tangibility, firm size, risk, growth and profitability on capital structure across 
countries is significant and in accordance with the major theories on capital structure. 
Further, in each country there is no significant relation between one or more firm specific 
determinants and leverage. In case of few countries they find that the results are not 
consistent with the predictions of the capital structure theories. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen find that country specific factors such as protection of creditor 
rights, bond market development and GDP growth rate have a direct and significant 
influence on capital structure. Other country specific factors such as legal enforcement, 
protection of shareholder rights and capital formation have an indirect impact on capital 
structure. The authors conclude that country specific factors do matter in determining and 
affecting capital structure choice around the world. 
Chang, Lee and Lee (2009)'' attempt to emphasise the use of structural equation 
modeling technique in the study of capital structure determinants, and to find out the 
relative impact of the determinants vin a cause-effect framework. They use a 16 year 
pooled sample consisting of ail firms in the Compustat Industrial database during the 
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1988 to 2003. They use three measures of capital structure based on long term debt, short 
term debt and convertible debt. 
It is found that the explanatory power of the model is highest for long term debt ratio 
followed by short term debt ratio and convertible debt ratio. The relative impact of the 
determinants of capital structure in terms of firm characteristics has been ranked in this 
study and it is in the following order: growth, profitability, collateral value of assets, 
volatility, non-debt tax shields and uniqueness. However, the nature of impact (positive 
or negative) of these attributes on capital structure changes when these attributes are 
measured in different ways. This is particularly noticeable for growth, profitability and 
volatility. All the determinants used in this study have statistically significant effect on 
capital structure choice. 
Datta and Agarwal (2009) attempt to identify the main determinants of capital structure 
for Indian companies during the period 2003-04 to 2006-07. They study firm level data of 
major companies included in the BSE 200 index. They exclude the companies in the 
financial and the banking sector and study a sample of 76 companies during the specified 
period. They use total debt ratio as the measure of leverage and six determinants viz. 
profitability, firm size, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, tangibility and tax. 
They use econometric techniques to draw conclusions. 
Datta and Agarwal find that profitability is negatively related with leverage positively 
related with firm size. The influence of non-debt tax shields and the role of tax are not 
found to be significant. A negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is found in their study. Further they find a positive relationship between 
tangibility and leverage. They explain that profitability supports pecking order theory 
whereas growth and tangibility support trade-off theory. 
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FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of research work in the area of capital structure is vast and the review of extant 
Hterature in this area cannot be claimed to be exhaustive. However, some patterns do 
emerge from the review of literature in this area. 
• Firstly, prima facie it appears that the greater portion of the body of literature on 
capital structure appears to be devoted to the development of theoretical 
foundations in this area, compared to empirical research work. 
• Secondly, even within the bulk of the theoretical work a significant portion of the 
theoretical work is devoted to the search for an optimal capital structure. 
• Thirdly a significant part of the empirical research work is concerned with the 
study of determinants of capital structure. This is an expanding area in the context 
of capital structure and several studies in the context of developing countries 
(including India) mentioned earlier focus on the capital structure determinants. 
• Fourthly, part of the empirical literature is also concerned with the testing of some 
of the major capital structure theories. 
• Fifthly, major portion of the literature on capital structure consists of studies in 
the context of developed countries. However several research studies on capital 
structure have also been carried out in the context of transitional and developing 
coimtries. So there is sufficient scope for carrying out research work on capital 
structure in the context of developing countries. 
• As it has been found in the course of literature review some of the important 
empirical works on this subject in the context of transitional and developing 
economies including India are contributed by Pandey (1983)^ '^ ; Chamoli (1985)'^ ; 
Singh, Hamid, Salimi and Nakano (1992)^^ Mittal and Singla (1992)^'; Cherian 
(1996)'^ Cobham and Subramaniam (1998)^°; Kakani (1999)*^ Misra and Misra 
(1999)^°; Babu and Jain (1999)^ Babu and Jain (2000/; Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)'°; Pandey (2001)*'; Pandey (2002)"; 
Bhaduri (2002)^; Chen (2004)'^ Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)^ *^; 
Dashti and Sarlak (2005)^'; Saravanan (2006)* ;^ Delcoure (2007)^^ Chang, Lee 
and Lee (2009)'^; and Datta and Agarwal (2009)^1 
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The usefulness of the empirical studies on capital structure determinants both in 
the context of developed countries and in the context of developing countries 
including India, are: (1) They provide a generalised description of capital 
structure behaviour of firms belonging to various industries, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. (2) They have established in a generalised manner the 
significance or the lack of it of various determinants in influencing capital 
structure. (3) These studies show the nature of influence of various determinants 
on capital structure of firms. 
MAJOR THEMES OF RESEARCH 
Further the literature review has helped in identifying the major themes of research work 
in the area of capital structure. The researcher has come across the following broad 
themes of research work in the area of capital structure: 
1. Theoretical research on optimal capital structure (15 research papers). 
2. Theoretical research on potential determinants of capital structure (8 research 
papers). 
3. Empirical research on capital structure determinants based on firm/industry 
characteristics (32 research papers). 
4. Empirical research on general trends of capital structure (8 research papers). 
5. Empirical research on event studies which assess the stock price reaction to 
announcements of changes in capital structure (reported by Harris and Raviv, 
1991). 
6. Empirical research on relationship between capital structure and corporate control 
considerations (3 research papers). 
7. Empirical research on testing the relevance of contending capital structure 
theories (4 research papers). 
8. Miscellaneous & others (10 references including textbook references). 
Chapter 3 87 
In total 79 literatures have been covered in the review out of which one study has been 
classified both under the heads 3 and 7 above due to which the total number of themes 
above comes to 80 instead of 79. No study under the head 5 has been covered in this 
review. It is relevant to mention the same in this context because it was reported in the 
classic review of capital structure literature by Harris and Raviv (1991) . 
RESEARCH GAPS 
Finally the literature review has revealed the following research gaps in the area of 
capital structure: 
1. There appears to be further scope for extending the determinants of capital 
structure because the studies reviewed by the researcher do not take into 
consideration the cost factor. Intuitively firms which have a high proportion of 
non-financial costs will have a smaller margin left firom their total income to 
cover the financial costs (interest expense). So the non-financial costs are likely to 
influence the leverage used by the firms. 
2. There appears to be fiirther scope for extending the research on capital structure 
by studying the cross-sectional behaviour of leverage defined in terms of secured 
debt and unsecured debt. The financial reporting norms and practices in India 
require the disclosure of the secured and unsecured types of debt in the corporate 
balance sheets. 
3. Many firms follow a practice of revaluing their assets which results in an increase 
in the value of assets. The debt level employed by the firm in relation to an 
increased asset base due to revaluation will result in the understatement of 
leverage compared to what it should be in reality. It is indeed relevant to find out 
whether the extent of leverage used by the firms which revalue their assets is 
same as that of the firms which do not. 
4. Further there is a need to compare the capital structure behaviow between the 
firms which revalue their assets and those which do not in order to find out the 
similarities and differences in capital structure behaviour of the two categories of 
firms. 
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The researcher has not come across any study which uses non-financial costs as a 
determinant of capital structure. Nor do the studies describe the influence of firm 
characteristics on the secured and unsecured types of debt used by the fums in their 
capital structure. The need to study the behaviour of leverage defined in terms of secured 
and unsecured types of debt arises because there are differences in the costs and benefits 
associated with the use of these two types of debt. Moreover there is a need to find out 
whether there are differences in the nature of influence of the determinants on different 
types of debt and whether the influence of the determinants differs in significance for 
different types of debt. 
Lenders bear a greater degree of risk by providing unsecured loans than by providing 
secured loans because no collateral security is provided for the unsecured loans by the 
borrower in order to protect the interests of the lenders in the event of default. Hence in 
general unsecured debt tends to be more expensive than secured debt because the interest 
rates on unsecured debt include a risk premium to compensate the lenders for the higher 
risk associated with such debt. The benefit to the borrower that is associated with the 
unsecured debt is that there is greater flexibility in the use of such debt and also it is 
easier to get such debt because there is no need to provide any collateral security. 
In general the firms should tend to use relatively more secured debt when their debt 
service capacity is higher and they have the resources to provide security for such debt, 
and consequently the likelihood of default is lower. Conversely the firms should tend to 
use relatively more unsecured debt when their debt service capacity is lower and they 
lack the resources to provide collateral security, and consequently the likelihood of 
default is higher. It is due to these differences in the costs and benefits, the use by the 
firms of secured and unsecured types of debt may respond to the firm characteristics 
differently because the firm characteristics may influence the firm's capacity and choice 
for these two types of debt. 
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As stated earlier the practice of revaluation of assets is likely to result in an 
understatement of leverage and hence an understatement of the risk arising out of the use 
of leverage. It is important at least from the point of view of good corporate governance 
that the firm makes appropriate disclosures about its assets, liabilities and net worth. 
Whatever may be the real reason behind the practice of revaluation of assets, it is likely 
to result in a lack of clarity about the extent of leverage employed by the firm. This in 
turn is likely to result in the stakeholders of the firm not having the correct understanding 
of the extent of financial risk involved in the firm or the extent of both the used and 
xmused debt capacity of the firm. 
There are two research issues which are related with the practice of revaluation of assets. 
The first issue is whether the two categories of firms use the same or different levels of 
leverage. An answer to this question will help us in understanding whether there are any 
differences in the extent of financial risk or the target capital structure in the two 
categories of firms. 
The second issue relates to the similarities and differences in capital structure behaviour 
of the two categories of firms. The similarities can be generalised across all firms 
whereas the differences will indicate the possibility that the capital structure of the firms 
in the two categories respond differently to the firm characteristics. This will help both 
the managers as well as the financiers in determining the financing needs of the two 
categories of firms in a more rational way. Moreover the differences will also show the 
directions for fiiture research in this area. 
Though the review of capital structure literature for the purpose of this study is not 
claimed to be exhaustive the same does not throw light on the aforementioned issues. 
Hence there is scope for expanding research work in the area of capital structure on the 
basis of these research gaps. 
Chapter 3 90 
OTHER RESEARCH ISSUES 
The research gaps discussed above have arisen because the extant literature on capital 
structure does not appear to provide answers to the aforementioned issues. However, 
there are other research issues which do exist simply because the knowledge generated by 
the earlier research studies on those matters needs to be verified in the later studies in 
order to find out whether the findings of the prior research studies are universally 
applicable or not. Hence these research issues are not the result of any research gaps but 
instead they give rise to continuing research needs. These research issues are as follows: 
1. There is a need to revisit the observed or predicted relationships between capital 
structure and the determinants. This will help us in finding out whether the 
relationships observed in the earlier studies are common and real phenomena or 
they change with the region, the time period or the context of the study or other 
associated conditions, or they are merely spurious in nature. Though this is not a 
research gap it is a research need which shall be always relevant. 
2. There is a need to verify whether the nature of industry influences the capital 
structure. Empirical evidences in this context have been found in the prior 
research studies. Nevertheless this will help us in finding out whether the findings 
of the earlier studies in this matter are a common phenomenon or they change 
with the region, the period or the context of the study or other associated 
conditions. Again this is not a research gap but a relevant research need. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research gaps and the other research issues lead to the research questions which 
provide the basis for development of hypotheses in this study. The hypotheses have been 
developed in Chapter 4 on the basis of the major theories on capital structure and the 
empirical evidence found in the earlier studies.The research questions are as follows: 
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1. Does leverage differ across industries? In other words, does the indxistry type 
influence the debt ratios? 
2. Is leverage related with the firm characteristics in the same way as predicted by 
the major theories on capital structure and are the relationships between leverage 
and firm characteristics similar to those foimd in the developed countries? 
3. Can the determinants of capital structure be extended by including the non-
financial costs as a potential determinant of firm leverage? 
4. Can the firm characteristics be used to explain measures of leverage based on 
secured debt and unsecured debt, and do the firm characteristics equally explain 
the behaviour of various measures of leverage? 
5. Is there any significant difference in the various measures of leverage between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets? 
6. Is there any similarity or difference in capital structure behaviour in response to 
the firm characteristics, between firms which revalue their assets and firms which 
do not revalue their assets? 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented a review of the existing literature on capital structure. The 
literature review reveals the major themes of research on this subject, the research gaps 
and other research issues which leads to the formulation of the research questions for this 
research work. The major themes of research on capital structure that were identified are 
theoretical research on optimal capital structure and its determinants, and empirical 
research on determinants of capital structure, general trends, event studies, influence of 
corporate control considerations, testing of different theories and miscellaneous studies 
on this subject. 
The research gaps arise out of the possibility of expanding the determinants of capital 
structure by including the non-financial costs as one of the determinants, the possibility 
of using the determinants to explain the use of secured and unsecured types of debt, and 
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comparing the capital structure and its behaviour between firms which revalue their 
assets and those which do not. The research questions have been put forth to gain 
knowledge about the research gaps that were identified. These questions mainly relate to 
the industry influence on leverage, the relationship between firm characteristics and 
leverage, the possibility of using non-financial costs as a potential determinant of capital 
structure, the possibility of explaining measures of leverage based on secured and 
unsecured debt by the determinants, and comparison of capital structure and its behaviour 
between the firms which revalue their assets and those which do not. 
Chapter 4 which follows next explains in detail the research methodology used. It broadly 
covers identification and selection of determinants, development of hypotheses, 
measurement of variables and collection of data. Chapter 4 fiirther explains the analytical 
techniques and the explanatory models that have been used in this study. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
^ ' ^ ' 
RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
The previous chapter has presented a review of the literature on capital structure. It has 
provided the findings from the review, the major themes of research, the research gaps 
and the other research issues, and finally the research questions. This research work has 
been guided by the findings in the previous chapter. The present chapter provides the 
methodology that has been followed in carrying out this study. 
This chapter starts with a broad overview of the research methodology. Next it explains 
the selection of the determinants of capital structure fi-om the empirical literature. It then 
explains the hypotheses developed for this study. Next the chapter explains the 
measurement of variables, data collection and the analytical tools used in this study. This 
chapter is concluded with a discussion of the explanatory models that have been used to 
explain the capital structure behaviour across the cross-section of firms. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used in this study is broadly spread over the following steps: 
• Literature Review: In chapter 3 review of both empirical and theoretical literature 
has been carried out for identifying the research gaps and the determinants of capital 
structure. This has helped in finding out the scope for extending research in the 
context of capital structure. 
• Identification and Selection of Determinants: The determinants of capital structure 
which were identified through literature review represent the broader set fi"om which 
the most relevant determinants have to be selected. Accordingly the determinants for 
the present study were selected from the identified set of determinants by using 
explicitly stated criterion. 
• Hypotheses Development: Hypotheses were developed for finding out answers to 
research questions mainly related with five broad aspects of the study. Firstly 
hypothesis was formulated to find out the whether there was any industry influence 
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on capital structure. This was followed by formulation of hypotheses on the 
relationship between leverage and the determinants selected from the empirical 
literatixre. Following this, hypothesis was formulated on the relationship between 
leverage and non-financial costs as a new determinant of capital structure. Next 
hypothesis was formulated on the explanatory power of the determinants for various 
leverage ratios. Finally hypotheses were formulated for comparing the capital 
structure behaviour of firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
Measurement of Variables: In order to draw conclusions on the basis of the 
hypotheses the relevant variables were defined. This mainly includes the definition of 
the dependent, independent and dummy variables. 
Data Collection: All the data used in this study are quantitative in nature and they 
were collected fi-om the CMIE-PROWESS database, which is a reputed and well 
known financial database for the Indian companies. The previous studies on the 
determinants of capital structure in the Indian context were also based on the CMIE-
PROWESS database. For the present study samples were collected fi-om the database 
on the basis of explicitly stated criteria. 
Analytical Techniques: The collected raw data were converted in to the variables 
defined in the earlier step. Various statistical techniques were identified for analysing 
the relevant variables obtained by converting the raw data. These statistical 
techniques have been stated later. 
Explanatory Models: Models for explaining the cross-sectional relationship between 
leverage and the various determinants of capital structure were formulated. These 
models would help in xmderstanding the variations in the different measures of 
leverage used in this study, on the basis of the determinants used. The detailed 
description of these models is given later. Further these models were estimated using 
statistical techniques conclusions were drawn on the relationship between leverage 
and the various determinants. Other statistical techniques were also used to draw 
conclusions on the basis of the other hypotheses formulated earlier. 
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SELECTION OF DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE FROM 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
In their classic review of capital structure literature, Harris and Raviv (1991) discuss 
about theoretical as well as empirical research on capital structure and the determinants. 
On the basis of the empirical studies on capital structure determinants they have 
documented several determinants of capital structure based on firm / industry 
characteristics which have been used in different empirical studies. These are volatility, 
bankruptcy probability, fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, advertising, R&D 
expenditures, profitability, growth opportunities, size, fi-ee cash flow and imiqueness. 
These determinants have not been tested and reported simultaneously in the empirical 
studies covered in their review. 
Subsequent to the review by Harris and Raviv (1991) '^ further empirical research on 
capital structure determinants have been carried out. In their study of great significance 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)'" have focused on only four of the aforementioned 
determinants docimiented by Harris and Raviv (1991)^'. These four determinants were 
tangibility of assets (the extent of fixed assets used), investment or growth opportunities, 
firm size and profitability, Rajan and Zingales (1995)'" explain with reference to Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984)^ Long and Malitz (1985a) '^ and Harris and Raviv (1991)^ ^ that 
these four factors have been found to be most consistently correlated with leverage. 
Hence Rajan and Zingales (1995)'" have chosen these four determinants for studying the 
influence on capital structure. 
In the empirical studies which were carried out after the review by Harris and Raviv 
(1991) '^, various types of determinants of capital structure have been tested and reported. 
All the studies irrespective of whether they were covered in the review by Harris and 
Raviv or reported afterwards have been carried out in different countries, in different 
periods of time and in different contexts. From all the determinants of capital structure 
that were identified through the review of empirical literature those determinants which 
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were found to be tested and reported very frequently, were selected for studying the 
capital structure behaviour. The determinants which have been found to be tested and 
reported very frequently have been commonly found to influence capital structure in 
different coimtries, in different periods of time and in different contexts. Further, for such 
determinants greater amoimt of empirical evidence is available amongst all the 
determinants of capital structure that were identified. 
Accordingly for the purposes of this study only those determinants have been considered 
to be tested and reported very frequently in the prior empirical studies, which have been 
found to be reported with a high frequency (i.e. reported in many of the studies). Table 1 
enumerates the various firm characteristics that have been tested and reported to be the 
determinants of capital structure in the prior empirical studies. The frequencies with 
which such firm characteristics have been tested and reported in the prior empirical 
studies have been shown in the table. 
In total 32 empirical studies on capital structure determinants have been referred to in 
Table 1, in which 28 determinants were found. Out of these 32 empirical studies 10 
studies were reviewed by Harris and Raviv (1991)^' and 22 studies were carried out after 
Harris and Raviv (1991)^'. As shown in Table 1 firm characteristics with serial numbers 
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22 and 23 have been used as determinants in the 
empirical studies reviewed by Harris and Raviv (1991)^'. The remaining firm 
characteristics specified in Table 1 have been used as determinants in the empirical 
studies carried out after Harris and Raviv (1991)^'. With reference to Table 1 the 
selection of the determinants which have been tested and reported very frequently in the 
prior empirical studies is explained below. 
Out of the 32 empirical studies referred to in Table 1 the lowest frequency is 1 (i.e. the 
determinant has been tested and reported in only one study) and the highest fi-equency is 
Chapter 4 105 
a 
« a 
1 
I 
£ 
9 
U 
s 
1/3 
C8 U 
o 
o 
^ H 
o 
a< 
a 
< 
ns 
4) 
m 
V H 
en 
» 
.a 
U 
S 
u 
.a 
H 
tw 
'u 
DC 
"i 
en 
IS 
IS 
Cft 
00 
Q 
< 
QQ 
OH" 
Q 
cw CQ X 
4 
i 
o 
>-> 
Q 
5 
^ 
00 
• 4 
CQ 
> 
.1 
U 
O 
m 
<N 
o 
H 
s 
u 
>-) o 
b 
b 
o o 
(O CO 
VO 
4> 
Q 
i4 
U 
c 
§ tf 
CQ 
O 
( S 
O 
H 
u 
1—> 
CQ 
•3 
H 
•4-t ja 
u Q 
I 
c 
o 
2 
VO 
CQ 
U 
o 
J 
b 
b 
vo 
c 
o r ) 
o 
o 
S J . ^ 
O CO 
c«" 
u 
Q 
i 
CQ 
s 
Q 
ffl O O 
«3 p 
<L> 
U 
H 
c/f 
1^ 
• i 
b 
b 
O 
g fe 
4> 
N 
'vi 
b 
o 
'3 
I 
I 
o 
I 
I 
fS ^0 
Chapter 4 106 
u s 
,a 
'•S 
a o 
f2 
•S 
a 
a 1 
4> ts Q 
SI 
s 
g 
-w 
CO 
1 •mm 
a 
U 
V 
CQ 
o H 
1 
o 
a 
u OS 
a 
-< 
1 
H 
tn 
U 
A 
u 9 ja 
i 
S 
2 $ 
^"s 
1 
•? 
X 
<«! 
'•3 
S 
CA 
^^^ 
>. 
1 
<^  
M 
•5a 
b 
<^ 
1 
> H (A 
s 
V3 
Is 
.§ 
"3 
a 
12 
"O 
s 
•*•! 
«5 
.a 
i> 
4> 
U 
2 
S 
-J d 
«i z. 
^^  
-^< 
C^ 
a: 
o 
1 1 
t ^ 
""^  
^ H 
-
(N 
s 
2 
o 
a 
C/5 
0 0 
< - H 
r " ^ 
f—1 
• ^ i 4 
•^ 
^ 
i 
1 
<?; 
•^^  
i - ^ 
-
s 
~ 
i 
d 
(N 
^^  
-
H J 
n. r . 
K b 
1 
.3 
i 
Q 
00 •'H 
^ 
(S 
^ H 
-
_) 
u. 
4 « * 
Q g 
^^ 
X> CO 
•-S 00 
<N 
CS 
w^ 
t^^ 
J 
b 
n 
ffi b 
2 73 
* 1 
il 
•i -s 
«C . C 1—( 
f i 
fS 
»—H 
e 
r 
C/3 
2 
"o 
IS 
"is 
•«t 
n 
i - ^ 
(/5 
X 
60 
1 
1 
•n 
1 
ir, 
CA 
w^ 
1/1 
a 
«>0 
•1 
1 
1 
1 
o 1 
VO 
(N 
^^  
•d 
•S 
ca 
OA 
< 
r-
<N 
w^ 
.a 
n 
^ ' 
M 
CQ 
.1' 1 
0 0 
<N 
» " H 
a< 
cu Q 
i 
O H 
4> 
U 
£ 
1 
Ov 
CS 
•r u 
« 
«« 
PQ 
_£• PS " ^ <N 
VO 
(N 
t . 
s 
J ' ^ ' 
cy .S 
pu. 
S 8<^ 
tS 
s^ 
1^ 
i2' 
-^ 
o o o o 
Chapter 4 107 
27 (i.e. the determinant has been tested and reported in 27 out of the 32 studies). For the 
purposes of this study those determinants which have been tested and reported in 50 
percent or more of the empirical studies mentioned in Table 1, have been considered to 
be tested and reported very frequently. As per the criterion used in this study the cut-off 
frequency value should be 16 times (50 percent of 32 studies). So the firm characteristics 
that have been selected from prior empirical literature and used as determinants of capital 
structure in this study are the ones which have been tested and reported in 16 or more of 
the empirical studies mentioned in Table 1. 
So on the basis of the selection criterion the determinants of capital structure that have 
been selected from empirical literature are: firm size (27 times), profitability (25 times), 
growth opportunities (24 times), fixed assets or tangibility of assets (24 times), earnings 
volatility (20 times) and non-debt tax shields (16 times). Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001)^ have used earnings volatility as a proxy for bankruptcy 
probability; hence their proxy has been classified under the determinant earnings 
volatility and not under bankruptcy probability. Even if the cut-off frequency value of 16 
times were not used for selection, Table 1 clearly reveals that the prior empirical studies 
have actually laid greater emphasis on these six determinants only. 
This is because majority of the determinants which have not been selected as per the 
above criterion were used with a frequency of 1 time only (i.e. only in one study). The 
highest frequency among the determinants which have not been selected is 6 (for taxes) 
which is too small compared to the number of studies i.e. 32. Thus the determinants of 
capital structure which have been selected from empirical literature for the purposes of 
this study are: firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, fixed assets or tangibility of 
assets, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields. It should be noted here that these six 
determinants indeed include all those determinants which have been tested and reported 
by Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*' because they have found those determinants to be most 
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consistently correlated with leverage viz. tangibility of assets, investment or grov^h 
opportunities, firm size and profitability. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
On the basis of well known theories on capital structure and evidences found in prior 
empirical studies the following hypotheses have been developed. In particular the 
hypotheses on the relationship between firm characteristics and capital structure have 
been formulated on the basis of three well known theories of capital structure viz. trade-
off theory, pecking order hypothesis and agency theory, and available empirical 
evidences, if there is any. The summary of the implications of these capital structure 
theories and sample empirical evidence on the relationship between the firm 
characteristics and capital structure has been presented in Table 2. 
A. HYPOTHESIS ON THE INDUSTRY INFLUENCE ON CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
According to the trade-off theory differences in capital structure exist between industries. 
Further, it is a well known fact, as well as there is strong evidence available in the prior 
empirical studies, that the industry factor influences capital structure. The evidence on the 
industry influence on capital structure has been mainly found in the context of long term 
debt and total debt. Evidences on industry differences in capital structure have been 
reported by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)^ in the US context, Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993)^ in the UK context and Babu and Jain (2000)^ in the Indian context. Such 
evidences are generally not available in the prior empirical studies with reference to the 
short term debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. 
So a common hypothesis has been formulated based on the evidences on long term and 
total debt. Conclusions on whether the hypothesis can be accepted or rejected for the 
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Table 2 
Theoretically Predicted Relationships And Sample Empirical Evidence On Capital Structure 
Determinants 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Profitability 
Firm Size 
Tangibility 
Growth 
Opportunities 
Earnings 
Volatility 
Non-Debt Tax 
Shields 
Non-Financial 
Costs 
Expected Relationship with 
Capital Structure 
on the Basis of Theories 
Pecking order hypothesis -
Trade-off theory + 
Agency theory + 
Pecking order hypothesis -
Trade-off theory + 
Agency theory + 
Trade-off theory + 
Agency theory + 
Trade-off theory 
Agency theory 
Pecking order hypothesis + 
Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory 
Mostly Reported 
Empirical 
Evidence 
+ 
+ 
+ o r -
+ o r -
None found 
Sample Empirical 
Studies 
Friend and Lang (1988), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Baskin (1989), Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and 
Pescetto (2004), Jong, Kabir 
and Nguyen (2008) 
Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Chen (2004), Delcoure 
(2007), Chang, Lee and Lee 
(2009) 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Barclay, Smith and Watts 
(1995), Ozkan (2001), 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and 
Pescetto (2004), Jong, Kabir 
and Nguyen (2008) 
Marsh (1982), Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984), Titman and 
Wessels (1988) 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984), Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993), Deesomsak, Paudyal 
and Pescetto (2004), Huang 
and Song (2006), Delcoure 
(2007) 
None found 
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other types of debt ratios will be drawn from the empirical results. Accordingly the 
following generalised hypothesis has been formulated for all the five types of debt ratios. 
HI: Debt ratios differ across industries. 
B. HYPOTHESES ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS IDENTIFIED FROM EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE 
The majority of the empirical research works on capital structure determinants have been 
carried out for long term debt and total debt. However, studies including short term debt 
ratios are very few and the evidence is not clear enough to formulate relationships with 
the determinants objectively. Further, the researcher has not come across any empirical 
research work based on secured or unsecured forms of debt. So in the absence of 
sufficient evidence independently available for various measures and types of debt no 
hypotheses have been separately formulated for the debt ratios based on long term debt, 
short term debt, secured debt, unsecured debt and total debt. 
Instead a common set of hypotheses have been formulated based on the evidences found 
with reference to long term and total debt, and conclusions as to whether these 
hypotheses can be accepted or rejected for the various types of debt ratios used in this 
study have been drawn on the basis of whether the empirical evidences in this study 
support or do not support these hypotheses. Accordingly a generalised set of hypotheses 
have been formulated for five types of debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term 
debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. The detailed 
explanation of the formulation of hypotheses on the relationship between leverage and 
the firm characteristics identified to be the determinants of capital structure is given in the 
following paragraphs. Table 2 summarises the implications of capital structure theories 
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and sample empirical evidence on the relationships between firm characteristics and 
capital structiire. 
Profitability 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ refer to the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984^ ^ and 
Myers and Majluf, 1984^^ for explaining the relationship between profitability and 
leverage. They explain that the preference for internally generated fiinds by the firms 
leads one to hypothesise that firms which have been profitable in the immediate past will 
have high retained earnings and low borrowings. It can be understood fi-om the 
explanation of Bennett and Donnelly that according to the pecking order hypothesis there 
should be a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*' explain that the theoretical predictions on the effects of 
profitability on leverage are conflicting. They refer to Myers and Majluf (1984) '^ who 
predict a negative relationship because firms will prefer to finance with internal fiinds 
instead of debt. Rajan and Zingales fiirther refer to Jensen (1986)^ ^ who predicts a 
positive relationship if the market for corporate control is effective and firms are forced 
to commit to paying out cash by levering it up. However if it is not effective then 
managers of profitable firms would prefer to avoid the disciplining role of debt leading to 
a negative correlation between profitability and debt. From the explanation of Rajan and 
Zingales it can be understood that in general according to the pecking order hypothesis 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984 '^) there should be a negative relationship between profitability 
and leverage whereas according to the agency theory (Jensen, 1986^) there should be a 
positive relationship between profitability and leverage (with the assumption of an 
effective market for corporate control). 
According to the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984''* and Myers and Majluf, 1984 '^) 
the order in which firms fiilfill their need for funds starts witii retained earnings. If 
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retained earnings are not sufficient to fulfill their financing needs and the firms have to 
fulfill their financing needs by external financing then they prefer debt to issuing equity. 
Hence according to the pecking order hypothesis there should be a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage because the higher the profitability the higher is the 
capacity of the firms to retain their earnings when such a need arises, which in turn 
means that the lower will be the need for external debt. 
According to the trade-off theory the capital structure of firms moves towards a target 
debt ratio on the basis of trade-off between tax advantages of debt and the bankruptcy 
costs or costs of financial distress (Baxter, 1967^  and Leland, 1994^°). This theory 
suggests that firms with high profitability are likely to have higher debt ratios. This type 
of a relationship between profitability and leverage may arise because of several reasons. 
Other things remaining the same, higher profitability implies higher potential for tax 
savings from the usage of debt and lower likelihood of bankruptcy. It also implies that 
higher retention of profits arising out of higher profitability will tend to lower the debt 
ratio of the firm than its target debt ratio and in order to adjust its debt ratio closer to its 
target the firm has to issue more debt. All these suggest that highly profitable firms are 
likely to have higher debt ratios. Hence according to the trade-off theory there should be 
a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
According to the agency theory leverage can be used as a mechanism to discipline the 
managers in order to ensure that they work in the interests of the shareholders and 
increase shareholders' wealth instead of increasing their own benefits (Jensen, 1986 ). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976/'* explain that managers of profitable firms try to reduce the 
agency costs of equity by increasing the debt ratio. So firms with high profitability can 
use high levels of debt to control management discretion. High leverage prevents the 
managers fi-om using the firee cash flow of the company for their own advantage like 
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taking expensive perquisites or building corporate empires because managers are under 
pressure to payout free cash flow of the firm to repay the debt. Hence according to the 
agency cost theory high profitabiUty should be associated with high leverage and vice 
versa i.e. there should be a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Friend and Lang (1988)'^ Titman and Wessels (1988)'*^ Baskin (19S9)\ Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993) ,^ Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*' and, Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic (2001) ,^ report a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Most of the other empirical studies also report a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage; thus empirical evidence largely supports the pecking order 
hypothesis with regard to leverage. Hence on the basis of the major theories on capital 
structvire and the dominant empirical evidence it is hypothesised that the profitability has 
a negative relationship with leverage. 
H2: Profitability is negatively related with leverage. 
Firm Size 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)* explain that there are a number of reasons why size may be 
justified to be a potential explanatory variable for cross-sectional differences in leverage. 
According to them size is a factor that is related to risk and bankruptcy costs. They 
explain that larger companies tend to be more diversified due to which they are less risky 
as well as have lower probability of bankruptcy. Hence there is likely to be a negative 
correlation between size and expected bankruptcy costs and risk. From their explanation 
it can be understood that according to the trade-off theory there should be a positive 
relationship between firm size and leverage. 
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Bennett and Donnelly further explain with reference to Marsh (1982)^ ^ that size may also 
be related to accessibility to capital markets and economies of scale with regard to the 
issue of securities. So, smaller companies may tend to depend on bank loans and internal 
equity. Hence according to them smaller firms may have lower long term target debt 
ratios and higher short term debt ratios. Because of these possibilities Bennett and 
Dormelly explain that though firm size is likely to be an explanatory variable for cross-
sectional differences in leverage it is not clear at all which theoretical variables it may be 
representing. However, they explain that theory generally suggests a positive relationship 
between size and leverage. 
According to Rajan and Zingales (1995)'" the effect of size on equilibrium leverage is 
more ambiguous. They explain that larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less 
often; so size may be an inverse proxy for bankruptcy probability. Thus size should have 
a positive impact on the supply of debt. This is an implication of the trade-off theory. 
They further explain that size may also be a proxy for the information outside investors 
have, which should increase their preference for equity relative to debt. So the 
implication of the pecking order hypothesis is that there should be a negative relationship 
between firm size and leverage. 
According to Chen (2004) theoretically the relationship between firm size and leverage 
is not clear. Chen explains that the information asymmetries existing between the insiders 
of firms and the capital markets are likely to be lower for large firms; so large firms are 
likely to be more capable of issuing equity which is sensitive to information asymmetries. 
So it can be imderstood from this explanation that according to the pecking order 
hypothesis there should be a negative relationship between firm size and leverage. Chen 
further explains that large firms tend to be more diversified and so they are less exposed 
to bankruptcy risk; moreover large firms are likely to have a higher debt capacity and 
they may be able to reduce the transaction costs associated with the issue of long term 
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debt. It can be understood from this explanation that according to the trade-off theory 
large firms are likely to be more highly geared. 
Chen discusses about another possibility that arises out of agency relationships. 
According to Chen larger firms have a more diluted ownership and thus have less control 
over individual managers. So, large firms tend to issue more long term debt in order to 
better control management behaviour. In contrast smaller firms are more likely to be 
subject to shareholder intervention in the event of mismanagement because a small group 
of shareholders can have controlling interest in the firms. So according to Chen's 
explanation the implication of the agency cost theory for leverage is that there should be 
a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
According to Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''* larger firms tend to have lower 
bankruptcy risk and relatively lower bankruptcy costs. They explain that large firms have 
less volatile cash flows, easier access to credit markets and require more debt in order to 
fully utilitse the tax shield benefits. So according to the trade-off theory there should be a 
positive relation between firm size and leverage. Deesomsak et al further explain that 
large firms have lower agency costs of debt and lower monitoring costs. So according to 
the agency theory firm size should have a positive influence on leverage. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^ ^ refer to the static trade-off framework and explain that 
firm size is an inverse proxy for bankruptcy probability whereby larger firms are less 
likely to face bankruptcy. They explain that bankruptcy costs have a negative impact on 
leverage. It might be understood from their explanation that there should be a positive 
relationship between firm size and leverage. So the implication of the trade-off theory is 
that there should be a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
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Kester (1986)^ ^ and, Titman and Wessels (\9S%f^ find a negative relationship between 
firm size and leverage. Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ Rajan and Zingales (1995)'", 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''', and, Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^ ^ find a 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage. Chen (2004)" finds both positive 
and negative relationships with firm size for different measures of leverage. The 
empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
Hence on the basis of the major theories on capital structure and the dominant empirical 
evidence it is hypothesised that firm size is positively related to leverage. 
H3: Size of the firm is positively related with leverage. 
Tangibility 
Tangibility refers to the extent of fixed assets held by the firms. This is generally 
expressed comparatively by expressing fixed assets relative to the total assets of the 
firms. Different authors have referred to this firm characteristic by other terms such as 
asset structure or collateral value of assets. 
According to the agency theory the agency costs of equity arise out of the problem of 
expropriation of shareholders' wealth by the managers. Managers may increase their 
compensation and perquisites and thus misuse shareholders' wealth. Further they may not 
undertake risks and avoid profitable investments in order to protect their jobs. According 
to Jensen (1986) debt can be used to discipline the managers so that they work in the 
interests of the shareholders and increase shareholders' wealth instead of increasing their 
own benefits. Firms can use their tangible assets to provide collateral to the lenders for 
obtaining debt; so there should be a positive relationship between tangibility of assets and 
leverage. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976)^ '* explain in their pioneering work on agency costs and 
ownership structure that agency costs of debt arise because the firm may shift to risky 
investments after issuing the debt resulting in a transfer of wealth from lenders to 
shareholders. Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*' explain that if a large fi-action of a firm's 
assets are tangible then the assets should serve as collateral reducing the risk of the lender 
who incurs the agency costs of debt (such as risk shifting). Further tangible assets should 
also have more value in the event of liquidation than intangible assets. They explain that 
the higher the proportion of tangible assets the more willing should the lenders be to 
provide loans resulting in a higher leverage. It can be understood fi"om the explanation of 
Rajan and Zingales that according to both trade-off theory and agency theory leverage 
should increase with tangibility of assets; so according to both these theories there should 
be a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
Harris and Raviv (1990)^ ° explain that firms with higher liquidation value i.e. those with 
tangible assets and / or firms with lower investigation costs will have more debt. Assets 
with higher liquidation value such as tangible assets provide better protection to the 
lenders in the event of bankruptcy of the firm. Since the trade-off theory of capital 
structure is based on the balancing of the tax benefits of debt with the bankruptcy costs 
the explanation of Harris and Raviv indicates the possible implication of the trade-off 
theory on the influence of tangibility on leverage. It can be understood that according to 
the trade-off theory there should be a positive relationship between leverage and 
tangibility of assets. 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ explain with reference to Scott (1977)'*^  that a firm with an 
optimal capital structure will issue as much secured debt as possible because the agency 
costs of secured debt are lower than those of unsecured debt. So according to them firms 
with securable assets should issue more debt. The explanation in Myers (1977) '^ implies 
that capital intensive firms should employ relatively higher levels of debt, Bennett and 
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Donnelly hypothesise, with reference to both Scott (1977)''^  and Myers (1977)", that 
asset structure (tangibility of assets) should be positively related with leverage. 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)'"* explain that firms with high leverage tend to 
invest sub-optimally and transfer wealth away from debtholders to equityholders. This 
causes lenders to demand collateral because the use of secured debt can alleviate this 
problem. It can be understood from this explanation by Deesomsak et al that the 
implication of the agency theory is that there should be a positive relationship between 
tangibility and leverage. This is because the higher the tangibility of assets the higher will 
be the amount of debt that can be obtained by using the assets as collateral. 
Deesomsak et al also explain that the liquidation value of the firm increases with the 
tangibility of assets and decreases the likelihood of mispricing in the event of bankruptcy. 
They further explain with reference to Scott (1977)'*^  that firms which cannot provide 
collateral will have to pay more interest or will have to issue equity instead of debt. Their 
explanation implies that firms with higher tangibility of assets will prefer to use them as 
collateral and can obtain higher amoimt of debt. It can be further understood from their 
explanation that due to the implications of the frade-off theory there should be a positive 
relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage. 
Delcoure (2007)'^  explains that according to the trade-off theory of capital structure firms 
use tangible assets as collateral for borrowings in order to protect their lenders in the 
event of financial distress. From this explanation it can be understood that according to 
the frade-off theory there should be a positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976)^ '* the collateral protects the lenders 
from the moral ha2ard problem resulting from the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and lenders. Tangible assets provided as collateral for the debt tend to 
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mitigate the lender's risk. So it can be understood that according to the agency theory 
there should be a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
Chang, Lee and Lee (2009)' explain that the type of assets owned by a firm may affect its 
capital structure choice. They explain with reference to Myers and Majluf (1984) that 
selling secured debt is beneficial to firms because issuing secured debt can avoid the 
costs of issuing securities; firms with more collateral value of assets tend to issue more 
debt in order to take advantage of the low cost. They explain that the firms with more 
collateral value of assets are more capable of issuing secured debt and revealing less 
information about fixture profits; so the collateral value of assets can be a proxy for 
agency costs and the costs of financial distress. 
Chang et al fiirther explain with reference to Jensen and Meckling (1976)^ '* that 
stockholders of leveraged firms tend to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from 
the firm's bondholders. Thus according to them there is a positive relation between debt 
ratios and the collateral value of assets. It can be imderstood from the explanation of 
Chang et al that according to the trade-off theory and agency theory there should be a 
positive relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^ ^ refer to the static trade-off framework and explain that 
higher tangibility of assets indicates lower risk for the lender as well as reduced direct 
costs of bankruptcy. It can be imderstood from their explanation that higher tangibility of 
assets should give rise to higher leverage. So according to the trade-off theory there 
should be a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
Titman and Wessels (1988)''^ Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ Rajan and Zingales 
(1995)''*, Chen (2004)", Delcoure (2007)'^ and, Chang, Lee and Lee (2009)' report 
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significant positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. The empirical literature 
mostly reports a positive relationship tangibility and leverage. Hence on the basis of the 
major theories on capital structure and the dominant empirical evidence it is hypothesised 
that there should be a positive relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage. 
H4: Tangibility is positively related with leverage. 
Growth Opportunities 
Growth opportimities refer to the future prospects of growth for the firm. Different 
researchers have used other terms such as investment opportimities with a similar 
meaning. Further different proxies have been used by different researchers to represent 
this factor. 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ explain with reference to Myers (1977)^ ^ that firms with a 
higher proportion of their value arising out of options to undertake potentially profitable 
projects in the fiiture will tend to have lower leverage. This implies that firms with higher 
growth opportunities will tend to have lower leverage. Bermett and Donnelly hypothesise 
a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)'" explain v^th reference to Myers (1977)" that highly levered 
firms are more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities. So firms expecting 
high future growth should use a higher amount of equity financing. They explain that if 
market-to-book ratio (the proxy they have used for growth opportunities) proxies for 
underinvestment costs associated -wiih high leverage then firms with high market-to-book 
ratios should have low debt. Their explanation indicates the implication of agency theory 
for the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. It can be understood from 
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their explanation that according to the agency theory there should be a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Chen (2004)" explains that according to the trade-off theory of capital structure firms 
having future growth opportunities (which are intangible assets by nature) tend to borrow 
less than firms having more tangible assets (or less growth opportunities in future) 
because growth opportunities cannot be coUateralised (due to their intangible nature). It 
can be understood from this explanation that according to the trade-off theory there 
should be a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Chen 
further refers to Myers (1977)^'' and Jensen (1986)^^, and explains that according to the 
agency theory firms have a tendency to expropriate wealth from the debtholders. The 
author explains that firms with higher growth opportunities have greater flexibility to 
invest suboptimally, and thus they expropriate wealth away from debtholders to 
shareholders. It can be understood from this explanation that according to the agency 
theory there should be a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportimities. 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''* explain that higher growth opportunities 
provide incentives to invest suboptimally, that is to invest in risky projects that 
expropriate wealth from debtholders. As a result of this the cost of borrowing is raised 
and so firms with growth opportunities tend to use internal resources or equity instead of 
debt. In addition, high growth firms whose value comes from intangible growth 
opportunities do not want to commit themselves to debt servicing as their revenue may 
not be available when needed. It can be imderstood fi-om the explanation of Deesomsak et 
al that according to both agency theory and trade-off theory that there should be a 
negative relationship between growth opporttinities and leverage. 
Saravanan (2006)^ *^  explains with reference Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2002) that 
faster growing firms are likely to be in need of external funds to finance their positive 
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investment opportunities. According to the pecking order hypothesis when firms need 
external funds they prefer debt than equity. Saravanan explains that this causes an 
increase in debt and growth should be positively associated with leverage. It can be 
understood firom the explanation of Antoniou et al (2002)' and Saravanan (2006)'*^ that 
according to the pecking order hypothesis there should be a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^^ explain that agency conflicts between stockholders and 
bondholders arise from asset-substitution and underinvestment problems. In order to 
minimize these agency conflicts firms with high growth opportunities use lower leverage, 
and use equity financing for their new projects instead of debt financing. It can be 
understood fi"om the explanation of Jong et al that according to the agency theory there 
should be negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Further it is likely that firms in the manufacturing sector (which are the subject matter of 
the present study) having fiiture growth opportunities may have to invest funds in the 
fixed assets which necessitates capital expenditure by the firms. This is because any 
growth opportunity in future is intangible in nature and in order to exploit such grov l^h 
opportunities and realise gains out of that firms in the manufacturing sector have to make 
physical investments by incurring capital expenditure. So capital expenditure by such 
frnns should represent future growth opportunities. To the extent the capital expenditures 
by firms cannot be supported by internal financing and necessitate external financing, 
firms are likely to borrow according to the pecking order hypothesis. Hence according to 
the pecking order hypothesis there should be a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*^ Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995)^ Ozkan (2001)'*^ 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''* and, Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)" fmd 
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negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Chen (2004) and 
Saravanan (2006)''^  find positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
However, the empirical literature mostly reports a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. Hence on the basis of the major theories on capital structure 
and the dominant empirical evidence it is hypothesised that there should be a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
H5: Growth opportunities are negatively related with leverage. 
Earnings Volatility 
The volatility of earnings of the firms often arise out of their business risk and are likely 
to lead to situations of financial distress or bankruptcy. Hence this factor has been often 
used by the researchers as a proxy for expected bankruptcy or financial distress costs. 
This firm characteristic has been referred to by various terms and measured in different 
ways by different researchers. 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ follow Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)^  in using the proxy 
for volatility of earnings. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''* explain that higher 
volatility of earnings increases the likelihood of financial distress because firms may not 
be able to fulfill their debt servicing commitments. Hence the firm's debt capacity 
decreases with increases in earnings volatility leading to an expected inverse relation with 
leverage. Huang and Song (2006) explain that volatility or business risk is a proxy for the 
probability of financial distress and it is generally expected to be negatively related with 
leverage. This implies that according to the trade-off theory there should be a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. 
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Delcoure (2007)'^ explains on the basis of trade-off theory that higher earnings volatility 
increases the probability of financial distress. According to the researcher when 
bankruptcy costs are larger, an increase in earnings volatility decreases the firm's debt 
ratio. Delcoure uses in the model a measure of risk, which is based on the volatility of 
earnings. Hence according to the trade-off theory there should be a negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^^ explain that higher business risk indicates higher 
volatility of earnings and higher probability of bankruptcy. They hypothesise that 
business risk has a negative effect on leverage. They have measured business risk in 
terms of earnings volatility; so it implies that that earnings volatility is negatively related 
to leverage. Therefore according to the trade-off theory there should be a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. 
Marsh (1982) found that risky companies were more likely to issue equity; however 
their finding was not a strong evidence in statistical terms. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984)* find strong evidence that earnings volatility is inversely related to a firm's 
leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988)''^ find negative correlations between earnings 
volatility and various measures of leverage. However they conclude that their results do 
not provide support for the effect of volatility on the debt ratios. 
Firms whose earnings are highly variable have a high degree of business risk. Highly 
risky firms have a high likelihood of defauUing on their debt service payments. Hence 
such fums do not have the capacity to carry a high level of leverage because they have a 
low debt service capacity. Many of the researchers have used volatility of the operating 
earnings of firms as a proxy for business risk and the likelihood of bankruptcy. Further 
they have hypothesised a negative relationship between earnings volatility and leverage 
by referring to the trade-off theory. 
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The empirical evidence on the relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is 
mixed though several studies have reported a negative influence of earnings volatility on 
leverage. However majority of the studies have hypothesised a negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage because the earnings volatility leads to an 
increase in the probability of financial distress which in turn has a negative influence on 
leverage. Hence following the earlier research works, in this study also a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage has been hypothesised. 
H6: Earnings volatility is negatively related with leverage. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shields are the tax shield effects which arise out of the expense items like 
depreciation and amortisation. As the tax shields provided by these items to the firms 
arise out of non-debt sources these items are alternative sources of tax benefits available 
to the firms compared to that available from the use of debt capital. The impact of non-
debt tax shields on the extent of leverage used by the firms has been studied by many 
researchers. According to the trade-off theory the non-debt tax shields and debt related 
tax shields are substitutes. So the trade-off theory should predict a negative relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)'^  explain the impact of non-debt tax shields on the optimal 
level of debt by constructing an optimal capital structure model. They explain that tax 
shields arising out of depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the 
interest tax shields arising out of debt financing. Accordingly the presence of non-debt 
tax shields, such as depreciation and investment tax credits, reduces the capacity of a firm 
to benefit from the interest tax shields arising out of debt. Therefore, the optimal leverage 
of a firm is negatively influenced by non-debt tax shields. So the firms with high non-
debt tax shields should have lower levels of debt in their capital structure. 
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Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)'* explain that according to the trade-off theory, 
a major motivation for using debt instead of equity capital is to reduce corporate tax. 
However, firms can also use non-debt tax shields such as those arising out of depreciation 
in order to reduce corporate tax. So according to the authors higher non-debt tax shields 
reduce the potential tax benefit that may arise out of debt; hence according to the trade-
off theory non-debt tax shields should be inversely related with leverage. Delcoure 
(2007)'^ states that the finance literature is inconclusive whether the non-debt tax shields 
associated with depreciation expenses exhibits a positive (as in Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 
1984 ) or a negative (as in DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980 ) relation with the debt / asset 
ratio. 
Bradley et al. (1984)^ find a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage. Bennett and Doimelly (1993)^ find a significant negative relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and leverage. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''' find a 
significant negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. Huang and 
Song (2006) find a significant negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage. Delcoure (2007)'^ finds a significant positive relationship between non-debt tax 
shields and leverage. 
From above we can see that though theory predicts a negative relationship between non-
debt tax shields and leverage the major empirical studies both reveal both negative and 
positive relationship between the two. So the empirical evidence on the relationship is 
mixed. However most of the researchers of the empirical studies referred to in this study 
have been foimd to base their research works on a hypothesis of negative relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. Hence following the earlier research works, in 
this study also a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage has been 
hypothesised. 
H7: Non-Debt Tax Shields are negatively related with leverage. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE AND NON-FINANCIAL COSTS AS A NEW DETERMINANT 
The present study proposes to extend the set of firm characteristics used as determinants 
of capital structure by inclusion of a new firm characteristic - the non-financial costs. 
Intuitively firms which have a high proportion of non-financial costs will have a smaller 
margin left firom their total income to cover the financial costs (interest expense) before 
the net profit can be obtained. So it is likely that the extent of non-financial costs incurred 
by the firms may have an influence on their capital structure. 
The researcher has not come across any study so far which explains the relationship 
between non-financial costs and leverage. Table 1 clearly shows that none of the 
empirical studies reviewed in this research work as well as those reviewed earlier by 
Hams and Raviv (1991) , have considered the influence of the cost factor on capital 
structure. So no evidence on this new relationship could be found from prior literature. A 
search for prevailing empirical evidence in this regard was made in order to formulate a 
reasonable hypothesis on the basis of the logical explanation of the likely relationship and 
observable empirical evidence, if any. 
It is expected that the higher the proportion of non-financial costs the lower would be the 
income available to the firms for the deduction of interest expense (financial costs). 
Further in the presence of volatility of revenues the higher the level of the non-financial 
costs the higher will be the probability of financial distress because with given volatility 
of revenues higher level of non-financial costs tend to increase the likelihood of lower 
earnings available to cover the interest expense. This happens because when the revenues 
of the firm decline due to a decline in its volume of business the firm will be left with a 
smaller margin after deduction of its non-financial costs fi-om its total income, to cover its 
interest expense. The amount of the profit margin or income available after deduction of 
the non-financial costs for meeting the interest expense is dependent on the volume of 
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business whereas the amount of interest expense is dependent on the level of borrowings 
and not on the volume of business. 
So firms which have a higher level of non-financial costs relative to their total cost will 
have a higher likelihood of financial distress. From the point of view of the trade-off 
theory it can be understood that the higher the level of non-financial costs the higher is 
the likelihood of financial distress and the lower should be the leverage. In other words 
the implication of the trade-off theory is that there should be a negative relationship 
between non-financial costs and leverage. 
Further the managers generally try to maximise the profitability of the firms or at least 
they try their best to prevent a decline in profitability. The higher the level of non-
financial costs the lower will be the margin available to the firms to cover the financial 
costs and earn their desired profit margin. Since the majority of the non-financial costs 
are determined by the nature of the industry (i.e. the costs of materials, labour, overheads 
and the other operating costs) the managers may have little flexibility to reduce these 
costs in order to increase profits. Hence in order to earn their desired profit margm firms 
which have a high proportion of non-financial costs will tend to borrow less in order to 
reduce their financial costs. So a negative relationship between the non-financial costs 
and leverage can be expected. 
So far the researcher in this study has not come across any theoretical or empirical 
evidence as to the inverse relationship between non-financial costs and leverage. Hence 
some evidence in this context was required before proceeding fiirther. For each of the 
five industrywise samples search for cross-sectional evidence was made on the basis of 
the undivided samples i.e. before dividing the industrywise samples into the two 
categories - firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Cross-sectional correlations between each of the five debt ratios and the measure for non-
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financial costs (ratio of non-financial costs to total costs) were calculated separately for 
each industry and for each year in the sampling period, 1999 through 2008. These 
correlations were calculated on the full samples i.e. the industrywise samples were not 
separated in to the categories - firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
The results are presented in Tables 65(a) through 65(e). Out of the 250 values of 
correlation coefficients for the five industries 243 correlation values were negative and 
only seven values were small and positive (falling between 0 and 0.055). The highest 
negative value of correlation was -0.7296 and the smallest negative value of correlation 
was -0.0223. As many as 98 out of the 250 correlation values were in the range -0.50 to -
1. Prima facie this evidence very strongly indicates that in general there is a high 
likelihood of a negative relationship between non-financial costs and leverage in all the 
five industries covered in this study. Accordingly a negative relationship between non-
financial costs and leverage has been hypothesised. 
H8: Non-Financial Costs are negatively related with leverage. 
D. HYPOTHESIS ON THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE 
DETERMINANTS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF DEBT RATIOS 
From the point of the firms different types of debt will entail different costs, benefits and 
risk for the borrowing firms. For instance long term loans tend to carry higher interest 
rate than short term loans because other things remaining the same in a long term loan the 
borrowed money will be available to the borrower for a longer period of time than in a 
short term loan. Further xmsecured loans tend to be more expensive than secured loans 
because the lender's risk is higher in the unsecured loans than in the secured loans. The 
firms will have to choose fi*om these types of loans on the basis of their requirements and 
the practicability of the specific type of loan based on their costs, benefits and risks, and 
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the characteristics of the firm. So indeed it is a matter of interest to find out whether or 
not the firm characteristics equally explain the variations in the different types of debt 
ratios. 
In the present study different measures of leverage have been computed on the basis of 
different types of debt. Many of the earlier empirical studies have used multiple measures 
of leverage based on long term debt, short term debt and total debt. All such studies 
indeed show that the determinants do not explain equally the variations in the different 
debt ratios (i.e. leverage measured in terms of different types of debt). Hence in the light 
of this evidence it is expected that the determinants of capital structure will not equally 
explain the behaviour of different types of debt ratios. Accordingly the following 
hypothesis has been formulated. 
H9: The determinants taken together do not equally explain the behaviour of the different 
types of debt ratios. 
E. HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISON OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ITS 
BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS AND 
FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
So far there has been no empirical evidence on the comparison of capital structure 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Since the debt ratios of a firm are likely to be understated when assets are revalued 
compared to what they should really be, a comparison of the different types of debt ratios 
and their relationship with the various firm specific determinants, need be made between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. However no 
such empirical evidence was foimd in the survey of literature. So in the absence of any 
evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the leverage (debt ratios) of the two 
categories of firms are equal. 
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The hypothesis on the equality or inequality between the leverage of the two categories of 
firms has been formulated in the form of a null hypothesis unlike the hypotheses 
discussed and stated earlier (which have been stated in the form of alternative 
hypotheses). This style of stating different hypotheses in null and alternative forms has 
been adopted fi-om Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^^ Jong et al have used alternative 
hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is conunonly available whereas they have used 
null hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is not clearly or conmionly available. 
HIO: There is no significant difference in leverage between the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Next the hypotheses for comparing capital structure behaviour between firms which 
revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets have been formulated. 
These hypotheses have been separately stated with regard to the relationship between 
capital structure and each determinant. Moreover as there is no theoretical justification 
available for expecting differences in relationship between leverage and the firm 
characteristics for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, and there is no empirical evidence available in this regard, the hypotheses for 
comparing capital structure behaviour between the two categories of firms have been 
stated in the form of null hypotheses. As stated earlier this style of stating different 
hypotheses in null and alternative forms has been adopted from Jong, Kabir and Nguyen 
(2008) . They have used alternative hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is 
commonly available whereas they have used null hypotheses when prior empirical 
evidence is not commonly available. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H2, profitability has been hypothesised to be 
negatively related with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature 
of relationship between profitability and leverage should be different for the firms which 
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revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship between 
profitability' and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification 
or any empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of 
relationship between profitability and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H l l : The nature of relationship between profitability and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H3 that the firm size is positively 
related with leverage. Theoretically there is no justification as to why the nature of 
relationship between the size of firm and leverage should be different for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Further no empirical 
evidence is available which shows that the nature of relationship between firm size and 
leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. So due to the lack of theoretical justification and empirical evidence 
in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of relationship between firm size 
and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H12: The nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H4 tangibility of assets is positively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical explanation which suggests that there should be a 
different relationship between tangibility and leverage for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Further there is no empirical 
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evidence which shows that the nature of relationship between tangibility and leverage is 
different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification or any empirical evidence in this 
regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of relationship between tangibility and 
leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H13: The nature of relationship between tangibility and leverage is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H5 that growth opportimities are 
negatively related with leverage. Theoretically there is no justification as to why the 
nature of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage should differ between 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Further no empirical evidence is available which shows that the nature of relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature 
of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is similar for the two 
categories of firms. 
H14: The nature of relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H6 earnings volatility is negatively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical explanation which suggests that there should be a 
different relationship between earnings volatility and leverage for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
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empirical evidence which shows that the nature of relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification or any 
empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the natxire of relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage is similar for the two categories of firms. 
H15: The nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is similar for the 
firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It has been discussed and stated earlier in hypothesis H7 that non-debt tax shields are 
negatively related with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature 
of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage should be different for the 
firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover 
there is no empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature 
of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is similar for the two categories 
of firms. 
H16: The nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As discussed earlier and stated in hypothesis H8 non-financial costs are negatively related 
with leverage. There is no theoretical justification as to why the nature of relationship 
between non-financial costs and leverage should be different for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
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empirical evidence available which shows that the nature of relationship between non-
financial costs and leverage is different for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. So in the absence of any theoretical justification 
or any empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the nature of 
relationship between non-financial costs and leverage is similar for the two categories of 
firms. 
H17: The nature of relationship between non-financial costs and leverage is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
There is no justification in theoretical terms as to why the explanatory power of the 
determinants for the various types of debt ratios should not be equal for firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover there is no 
empirical evidence available which shows that the explanatory power of the determinants 
for the various types of debt ratios is not equal for the firms which revalue their assets 
and firms which do not revalue their assets. Hence due to the lack of theoretical 
justification and empirical evidence in this regard it has been hypothesised that the 
explanatory power of the determinants for the various types of debt ratios is equal for the 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
H18: The explanatory power of the determinants for the various types of debt ratios is 
equal for the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Five measures of leverage have been used as dependent variables in this study. These 
measures of leverage are based on different measures of debt viz. long term debt, short 
term debt, total debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. Different measures of leverage 
have been used in order to find out whether the firm characteristics, which have been 
identified to be the determinants of capital structure, influence the different types of debt 
in similar or different ways. Moreover the influence of the determinants on leverage may 
differ in significance for different types of debt. The aggregation of the different types of 
debt into a single measure such as total debt would lead to loss of information which 
would prevent us from studying the differences in the impact of the determinants on the 
different types of debt. Accordingly this study has used the following measures of 
leverage as the dependent variables: 
Total Debt Ratio (TDR) ^ ° ^ ^ " ^ ' 
Capital 
Long Term Debt Ratio (LTDR) = Long Term Debt 
Capital 
Short Term Debt Ratio (STDR)= Short Term Debt 
Capital 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) = Secured Debt 
Capital 
TT jT^u*n*- /TTT-.T>N Unsccurcd Dcbt Unsectired Debt Ratio (UDR) = 
Capital 
Long Term Debt = Total Debt - Short Term Debt 
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Short Term Debt = Total Short Term Debt from Banks + Total Short Term Debt from 
Financial Institutions + Commercial Papers 
Secured Debt = Total Secured Debt 
Unsecured Debt = Total Unsecured Debt 
Capital = Total Debt + Net worth 
Note: All definitions of debt exclude current liabilities and provisions. 
Further all values in the nimierator and denominator of the debt ratios explained above 
have been measured in terms of book values and not market values; i.e. the measures of 
debt and equity (net worth) have been made in book value terms. Baskin (1989/ explains 
that book value debt ratios tend to measure the amount of debt capital actually obtained 
from various sources. Further, Baskin explains that book value variables are stated in 
terms of amounts historically raised thus should reflect the cumulative effect of fimding 
pressures. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)^  explain that book value of debt is more 
representative of the promised payments to the debtholders than is the market value of 
debt. (Hence book value of debt should be a better measure of the extent of indebtedness 
of the firms). 
Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995)'' explain that many corporate treasurers and rating 
agencies express leverage ratios completely in terms of book values because these 
measures help keep their financial planning free of the distortions caused by the volatility 
of the market prices. Marsh (1982)''^  explains that as corporate decisions are tried to be 
explained, it is important to use ratios which accord as closely as possible with those 
which managements use. Marsh explains fiirther that survey evidence from Stonehill et 
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al. (1973)'*'* strongly indicates that corporate treasurers tend to think in terms of book 
value rather than market value ratios. Moreover, as Marsh (1982)^ ^ explains, debt limits 
in trust deeds and articles of association are nearly always expressed in terms of book 
values. 
The above explanation is also applicable to the measurement of equity which is exposed 
to price fluctuations due to volatility in the capital markets, which may simply arise out 
of speculative pressures or price manipulation by the market operators. Further the 
market price data is not likely to be available on a regular basis if the share is not 
frequently traded. So it is also appropriate to use book value measure for equity. If only 
those firms are included in the samples for which regular market price data are available 
for the entire sampling period then the sample size will be very small because those firms 
for which regular market price data are not available for the entire sampling period will 
be excluded from the samples. 
As explained earlier each type of debt ratio has been expressed with respect to capital in 
the denominator. Capital has been defined to be the simi total of debt and net worth (here 
debt has been defined to exclude current liabilities and provisions). Raj an and Zingales 
(1995)'*' explain that the effect of past financing decisions is best represented by the ratio 
of total debt to capital. It can be imderstood from their explanation that the merits of 
using capital in the denominator are: (a) the measure of leverage Mdll not be influenced 
by non-debt liabilities such as trade credit which can be offset against the assets and (b) 
the measure of leverage will not be affected by factors that may have nothing to do with 
financing such as assets held against pension liabilities. They explain that liabilities such 
as trade credit may be used for transactions purposes rather than for financing. 
Baskin (1989)'* uses invested capital (book value of debt and equity) to compute the 
leverage ratios because trade credit is not viewed as a source of capital but as a deduction 
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from the total quantity of investment. The author explains that suppliers provide credit as 
a convenient means of sale and not in order to seek return. Providing trade credit is 
actually a v^ i^despread business practice and not a mechanism of providing capital to 
organizations. 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The determinants identified in the previous sections have been measured in the following 
manner: 
Profitability 
As found in the survey of empirical literature the most commonly used measure of 
profitability is return on assets (ROA) which has been defined to be the ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. However, there are other variations also 
such as the ratio of earnings before depreciation interest and tax (EBDIT) to total assets. 
Measures of profitability based on profit such as EBIT are more stringent than those 
based on cash flow such as EBDIT. For this study ROA as explained above has used as 
the measure of profitability. 
EBIT Profitability = Return on Assets (ROA) = 
Total Assets 
Firm Size 
The most commonly used proxies for firm size are: natural logarithm of sales and natural 
logarithm of assets. As the need for capital directly arises out of the need to invest in 
assets the proxy for firm size used in this study is the natural logarithm of assets (assets 
have been defined to be total assets). 
Firm size = Natural Logarithm of Tutal Assets 
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Tangibility 
The most commonly fovind measure of tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets. There are minor variations in this measure also; for example few authors have also 
included inventories in the numerator. However as the most commonly used measure 
uses fixed assets in the numerator the same has been used in this study. 
^ ..... Net Fixed Assets 
Tangibility = 
Total Assets 
Growth Opportunities 
The most commonly used proxy for growth or investment opportunities as found in 
empirical literature is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. The other proxy 
that has been found in several studies is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. In 
this study the latter proxy has been used because the former measure requires market 
price information for all firms during all the years in the sampling period and this 
information was not be available for all firms in the sample. However, the latter proxy 
does not depend on market price data. 
/^  ..t- -^  _x- •.• Capital Expenditures Growth Opportunities = - ^ 
Total Assets 
Earnings Volatility 
The most commonly found measure of earnings volatility or business risk in empirical 
literature is standard deviation of return on assets (ROA). However, there are few 
variations also. For this study the standard deviation of ROA has been used as a proxy for 
business risk. 
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Earnings Volatility = Standard Deviation of ROA during the 10 year period 1998 to 2008 
Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
The most commonly used proxy for NDTS found in the recent studies is the ratio of 
depreciation to total assets. In the present study this measure will be used with a 
variation. Since amortisation is also an item which brings in tax shields similar to 
depreciation, the proxy for NDTS that has been used in the present study is the ratio of 
the sum total of depreciation and amortisation to total assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) = Depreciation + Amortisation 
Total Assets 
Non-Financial Costs 
The new determinant that has been introduced in this study is the non-financial costs. It 
has been measured as the ratio of non-financial costs to total costs. The non-financial 
costs have been expressed as a proportion of total costs because this measure better 
reflects the cost structure of the firm. 
Non-Financial Costs to Total Costs Ratio = 
Total Costs 
Where, 
Non-Financial Costs = Total Income - Profit After Tax 
- Provision for Direct Tax 
- Indirect Taxes 
- hiterest 
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Total Costs = Total Income - Profit After Tax 
- Provision for Direct Tax 
- Indirect Taxes 
C. DUMMY VARIABLES 
Dummy for Secured Foreign Currency Loans 
This dummy variable has been used to represent any secured foreign currency loans 
outstanding in the books of the firm at any time during the sampling period 1998 to 2008. 
SFX-DUM = 0 if the firm does not have any secured foreign currency loans during the 
period 1998 to 2008 
= 1 if the firm has any secured foreign currency loans during the period 1998 
to 2008 
Dummy for Unsecured Foreign Currency Loans 
This dummy variable has been used to represent any unsecured foreign currency loans 
outstanding in the books of the firm at any time during the sampling period 1998 to 2008. 
UFX-DUM = 0 if the firm does not have any unsecured foreign currency loans during the 
period 1998 to 2008 
= 1 if the firm has any unsecured foreign currency loans during the period 
1998 to 2008 
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Dummy for Both Secured and Unsecured Foreign Currency Loans 
This dximmy variable has been used to represent any type of foreign currency loans, 
whether secured or unsecured outstanding in the books of the firm at any time during the 
sampling period 1998 to 2008. 
AFX-DUM = 0 if the firm neither has secured foreign currency loans nor unsecured 
foreign currency loans during the period 1998 to 2008 
= 1 if the firm has either secured foreign currency loans or imsecured foreign 
currency loans during the period 1998 to 2008 
Dummy for Acquisition 
This dummy variable has been used to represent whether or not the firm has acquired any 
other firm at any time during the sampling period 1998 to 2008. 
ACQUIRER = 0 if the firm has not acquired any other firm during the period 1998 to 
2008 
= 1 if the firm has acquired any other firm during the sampling period 1998 
to 2008 
Industry Dummies 
These are dummy variables used to represent whether any firm belongs to one of the five 
industries covered in this study viz. chemicals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, ferrous metal 
and metal products, food and textiles industries. 
CHEMICALS = 0 if the firm does not belong to the chemicals industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the chemicals industry 
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PHARMA = 0 if the firm does not belong to the drugs and pharmaceuticals industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the drugs and pharmaceuticals industry 
FERROUS = 0 if the firm does not belong to the ferrous metal and metal products 
industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the ferrous metal and metal products industry 
FOOD = 0 if the firm does not belong to the food industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the food industry 
It is to be noted that a separate industry dimrniy is not required for the textiles industry 
because when the four industry dummies viz. CHEMICALS, PHARMA, FERROUS and 
FOOD are all equal to zero, the implication is that the firm belongs to the textiles 
industry (because it does not belong to the other four industries). Hence inclusion of 
another dummy variable for the textiles industry will be superfluous and it will unduly 
affect the estimation of the explanatory model for capital structure behaviour. The 
category for which no separate dummy variable is used is generally called the control 
group or benchmark group and the interpretation of the explanatory model is done by 
comparing the other categories with the control group. 
There is no formal rule or principle specified by the experts for identifying the category 
which should be designated as the control group and the choice can be arbitrary. Since 
the purpose of using these industry dummy variables is only to include a representation of 
the industries in the explanatory model, no formal logic has been used in selecting the 
industries for which dummies have been used and the mdustry for which dummy has not 
been used (the control group). Accordingly the textiles industry has not been represented 
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by any separate dummy variable (i.e. it has been treated as the control group) just because 
the other four industries have been represented by dummy variables. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
It was foimd in the literature review that almost all the empirical studies on capital 
structure in the context of developed as well as developing countries including India have 
been carried out for the firms in the manufacturing industries. Following the prior 
research works the industries for the present study have been selected from the 
manufacturing sector in India. The selection of the industries has been done on the basis 
of the number of companies listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) within each 
industry group, from the manufacturing sector in India. The number of listed companies 
within the industries has been used as a proxy for the concentration of firms in the 
industries. Hence selecting the industries on this basis helps in selecting and studying the 
capital structure behaviour in those industries which have a dominant presence in the 
Indian manufacturing sector (as measured in terms of the concentration of firms). 
The information on the number of companies in each industry listed in the BSE was 
collected from the CMIE PROWESS database. The industries within the Indian 
manufacturing sector were ranked on the basis of the number of listed companies in the 
BSE within the industry groups, in the descending order. The top five industries, ranked 
in terms of the number of BSE listed companies, were selected for the present study. For 
the purpose of ranking, the classification of industries according to Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE) was followed. The classification of industries within the 
manufacturing sector with the companies listed in the BSE is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Manufacturing Sector Industries And Companies Listed In BSE 
Industry Classification Within Manufacturing Sector 
Chemicals (Excluding Drugs & Pharmaceuticals) 
Textiles 
Ferrous Metal & Ferrous Metal Products 
Food Products (Excluding Beverages & Sugar) 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Non-Electrical & Non-Electronics Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Electronics 
Automobile Ancillaries 
Paper 
Cement 
Beverages (Tea, Coffee, Beer &, Alcohol) 
Non-Ferrous Metal & Non-ferrous Metal Products 
Sugar 
Transport Equipment (2, 3,4 - Wheelers, cycles, 
shipyards, commercial vehicles) 
Paper Products 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
No. Of Companies 
Listed In BSE 
As on April 04,2009 
600 
469 
283 
250 
215 
140 
138 
124 
115 
69 
59 
59 
50 
50 
29 
15 
288 
2953 
Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess Database 
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The following important points should be noted with reference to Table 3: 
1. The classification has been adopted from CMIE. 
2. The CMIE classification was adopted in such a way that the underlying industries 
were as much homogeneous as possible. 
3. The most heterogeneous category in this classification is 'Miscellaneous' which 
consists of 288 listed companies in BSE. So this category was excluded from the 
selection process. 
4. Except the Miscellaneous category all other manufacturing industries are arranged in 
the decreasing order of companies listed in BSE. 
5. From this classification (excluding the 'Miscellaneous' category) the top five 
manufacturing industries have been selected for the present study. Hence the selected 
industries are: chemicals (excluding drugs and pharmaceuticals), textiles, food 
products (excluding beverages and sugar), ferrous metal and ferrous metal products, 
and, drugs and pharmaceuticals. 
In order to make the reference to the selected industries easier, in the subsequent pages 
the industries selected above have been referred to as: chemicals, textiles, food, ferrous 
metal and metal products, and, drugs and pharmaceuticals. Out of the seventeen industry 
groups these five industries together comprise approximately 62 percent of all the 
manufacturing companies listed at the BSE. Thus it is clear that the top five industries 
selected from the manufacturing sector represent the most dominant group in terms of the 
concenfration of firms (measured in terms of the number of listed companies). From these 
five industries samples of companies were selected on the basis of the following criteria: 
1. The firms must be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) on or before the 
financial year 1998-1999 
2. The firms must be listed on the BSE continuously up to the financial year 2007-
2008 
3. The firms should have reported their annual accounts without any gaps for all the 
financial years during the sampling period 
4. The firms should have the same accounting period 
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5. The firms should have positive sales and net worth 
6. The firms should not have issued any convertible securities during the sampling 
period 
After the initial selection of the samples, firms in the samples were subdivided into two 
categories: firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Finally there were two sets of samples, which consisted of companies from all the five 
industries and the two sets of samples differed on whether the firms in the samples had a 
practice of revaluing their assets or not. Whether the firms revalued their assets or not 
was determined by finding out whether they had revaluation reserves or not in any year 
during the 10 year sampling period. If any firm had revaluation reserves in any year 
during the sampling period then it was put into the category of firms which revalue their 
assets, otherwise it was put into the category of firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This classification enables the comparison of capital structure and its behaviour between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. The issue of 
revaluation of assets is indeed important not only from a purely financial point of view 
but also from the perspective of corporate governance. The practice of revaluation of 
assets results in an increase in the value of assets. The debt level employed by the firm in 
relation to an increased asset base due to revaluation will result in the understatement of 
leverage compared to what it should be in reality. Hence the practice of revaluation of 
assets may ultimately lead to the projection of an inappropriate picture of the financial 
risk of the firm in the eyes of the creditors and other stakeholders. 
The details of the industrywise and categorywise samples collected from the CMIE 
PROWESS database are given in Table 4. For the sampled companies the financial data 
were collected from the CMIE PROWESS database. The CMIE PROWESS is a highly 
reputed database on the Indian corporate sector and has been extensively used by all the 
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Table 4 
Category^ise Samples Collected From Selected Industries 
Industry 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous Metal & Ferrous 
Metal Products 
Food Products 
Total 
No. of Companies 
Which Revalue 
Their Assets 
58 
32 
21 
19 
7 
137 
No. of Companies 
Which Do Not 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
157 
87 
52 
50 
46 
392 
Total 
215 
119 
73 
69 
53 
529 
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research studies in the Indian context. These samples were subjected to the statistical 
analytical techniques stated later. 
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
The following statistical techniques have been carried out with the help of Statistica 
(Release 8) software package to analyse the data: 
1. Computation of industrywise and categorywise descriptive statistics viz. mean, 
median and standard deviation, for firms which revalue their assets and firms which 
do not revalue their assets 
2. Industry-wise and category-wise Probability-Probability Plots (PP plots) of the 
various types of debt ratios used in this study 
3. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test whether the debt ratios differ across the 
industries studied: Chemicals, Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products, Food and Textiles, separately performed for firms which revalue their 
assets and firms which do not revalue their assets 
4. Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks to test whether the debt ratios differ across the 
industries studied: Chemicals, Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products, Food and Textiles separately performed for firms which revalue their assets 
and firms which do not revalue their assets 
5. F-test for equality of variance of debt ratios of firms which revalue their assets and 
firms which do not revalue their assets 
6. t-tests for difference between mean debt ratios of firms which revalue their assets and 
firms which do not revalue their assets 
7. Mann-Whitney U tests to find out whether debt ratios differ between firms which 
revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets 
8. Cross-sectional correlation analysis to find out evidence of correlation between debt 
ratios and non-financial costs 
9. Correlation matrix between the explanatory variables 
10. Multiple Regression Analysis by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for cross-
sectional analysis 
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11. Durbin-Watson d statistic for detection of autocorrelation / serial correlation between 
the residuals 
12. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for detection of multicollinearity 
13. Normal Probability Plot of residuals to find out whether they are normally distributed 
14. Standardised Residual Plots against each independent variable for detection of 
heteroskedasticity 
The OLS Multiple Regression Analysis performed by the Statistica software package 
generates in its output the regression coefficients, result of F-test for the overall goodness 
of fit of the regression model and results of t-tests for the significance of the individual 
regression coefficients. After providing the OLS multiple regression output the software 
also provides the additional feature to carry out Residual Analysis of the regression 
results. Accordingly the Statistica software generates the Durbin-Watson d statistic for 
detection of the presence of autocorrelation / serial correlation between the residuals. As 
part of the additional feature of Residual Analysis the Statistica software also generates 
Normal Probability Plot of residuals for finding out whether they are normally distributed 
and Standardised Residual Plots against each independent variable for detection of 
heteroskedasticity. 
JUSTIFICATION FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
According to Theobald (1978)'*^  and McCabe (1979)^ '* the cross-sectional testing method 
is more appropriate than the inter-temporal testing method for analysing long term 
relationships among variables because the inter-temporal test method reveals only short 
term relationships. Several important studies on capital structure determinants have used 
the cross-sectional analysis method such as Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)*, Titman and 
Wessels (1988/^ Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ Rajan and Zingales (1995/', 
Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''*, and Saravanan (2006)''^ . Moreover long term 
relationships tend to be more stable than short term relationships. 
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Some of the previous studies explain that the average values of the variables used are 
better than a single point estimate for testing theories which relate to long term behaviour 
of firms in order to avoid distortions that may be caused by short term variations from the 
target ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988''^ , in US, and Bennett and Donnelly, 1993^, in 
UK). Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)* average the values of the variables over time in 
order to minimise the effects of transient variations through time because of business 
cycles. Further as Bradley et al explain there may be lagged adjustments of leverage 
ratios by firms towards their target leverage ratios and this factor has been adjusted by 
them by using average values of leverage ratios over time. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*' average the variables to reduce noise and to account for slow 
adjustments. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004)''' explain that the averaging 
process also reduces the possibility of measurement error and the effects of random 
fluctuations in the variables. Accordingly the values of the dependent and independent 
variables used in the analytical techniques in this study are averages calculated over the 
entire sampling period (ten financial years from 1998 to 2008). 
Moreover, it is particularly required for the dependent variable (the debt ratio) because in 
some of the years the debt ratio may be extremely low or zero if the firm has repaid most 
or all of its debt or has not taken any new loans. So, average values of the variables over 
the entire sampling period are more representative in nature than the values for the 
individual years. There is only one exception in this process. Volatility of earnings has 
been calculated as the standard deviation of Return on Assets (ROA) calculated over the 
entire sampling period (ten financial years from 1998 to 2008). 
Chapter 4 153 
MODELS TO EXPLAIN CAPITAL STRUCTURE BEHAVIOUR ACROSS THE 
CROSS-SECTION OF FIRMS - CROSS-SECTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND DETERMINANTS 
This study attempts to explain the cross-sectional relationship between capital structure 
and the determinants observed across the cross-section of firms in the selected industries. 
These relationships have been represented in the form of models for explanatory 
purposes. Accordingly three models viz. Model A, Model B and Model C have been 
formulated. 
Model A attempts to explain the cross-sectional variations in capital structure solely with 
the help of firm specific determinants which have been selected on the basis of empirical 
evidences and theoretical justifications. As already explained earlier, these determinants 
are profitability, size, growth opportimities, tangibility, non-debt tax shields and volatility 
of earnings. In order to control for the influence on capital structure of such factors as 
foreign currency loans and acquisition of any other firm, two dummy variables have been 
used. 
Model B is an extension of Model A in that it includes in addition to the entire 
components of Model A, the influence of the industry factor. Four dummy variables have 
been used to represent the chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry and the food industry. As explained earlier no 
separate dummy variable is required for the textiles industry because the exclusion of a 
firm fi-om the other four industries naturally indicates that the firm belongs to the textiles 
industry (hence a separate dummy variable for the textiles industry will be superfluous). 
The Textiles industry will be referred to as the control group because the regression 
coefficients of the dummy variables for the remaining four industries represent the 
influence of those industries on the debt ratio in comparison to the textiles industry. 
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Model C is a further extension. It includes all the components of both Models A and B 
and adds a new determinant, the Non-Financial Costs (NFC). As already explained 
earlier, the researcher has not come across any study so far which includes this factor. A 
search for empirical evidence was made by studying the cross-sectional correlations 
between NFC and the different types of debt ratios separately for each year and for each 
industry. The evidence very strongly indicates a possible negative relationship. 
Accordingly the new variable is introduced in Model C. 
So Model A is the basic model and Models B and C are the extensions from the basic 
model. The main purpose of using these three models is to find out how the explanatory 
power of the models changes as the industry factors and the new determinant are added 
and whether the new factors that are added to the basic model have a significant influence 
on capital structure. These models were estimated by the OLS multiple regression 
analysis technique carried out in three stages. 
Model A 
LeveragCi = a + Pi Profitabilityj + P2 Sizei + P3 Growthi + P4 Tangibilityi + ps Non-Debt 
Tax Shields + Pe Volatility, + P7 Dummy for Foreign Currency Loansj + 
p8 ACQUIRERi 
Model B 
Leverage) = a + pi Profitabilityj + P2 Sizcj + pa Growthi + p4 Tangibilityi + ps Non-Debt 
Tax Shields + Pg Volatilityi + P7 Dummy for Foreign Currency Loansi + 
p8 ACQUIRERi + p9 CHEMICALSi + Pio PHARMAi + Pn FERROUSi + 
P12 FOODi 
Chapter 4 155 
Model C 
Leverages = a + Pi Profitabilityj + p2 Sizcf + p3 Growthi + P4 Tangibilityj + ps Non-Debt 
Tax Shieldsi + Pe Volatilityj + p7 Non-Financial CostSi + Pg Dummy for 
Foreign Currency Loansi + p9 ACQUIRERi + pio CHEMICALSj + 
pii PHARMAi + P12 FERROUSj + pu FOODi 
Where subscript' i ' denotes firm' i ' in the cross-section of firms studied. 
The dependent variable. Leverage, has been defined by five different measures viz. Long 
Term Debt Ratio (LTDR), Short term Debt Ratio (STDR), Total Debt Ratio (TDR), 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR) and Unsecured Debt Ratio (UDR). For any firm ' i ' these 
measures of leverage are defined as follows: 
TDRi = Total Debt Ratio of firm ' i ' = ^ ° ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Capital 
LTDRi = Long Term Debt Ratio of firm ' i ' = Long Term Debt 
Capital 
STDRi = Short Term Debt Ratio of firm ' i ' = Short Term Debt 
Capital 
SDRi = Secured Debt Ratio of firm ' i ' = Secured Debt 
Capital 
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Unsecured Debt 
UDRj = Unsecured Debt Ratio of firm ' i ' = 
Capital 
Long Term Debt = Total Debt - Short Term Debt 
Short Term Debt = Total Short Term Debt from Banks + Total Short Term Debt from 
Financial Institutions + Commercial Paper 
Capital = Total Debt + Net worth 
The independent variables included in the models have been calculated as follows: 
FRTT 
Profitabilityi = Return on Assets of firm ' i ' = 
Total Assets 
SizCi = Size of firm ' i ' = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets = In (Total Assets) 
Growthj = Growth Opportimities of firm' i ' = 
Total Assets 
Tangibilityi = Tangibility of assets of firm' i ' = 
Total Assets 
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Non-Debt Tax Shieldsj = Non-Debt Tax Shields of firm 'i' 
_ Depreciation + Amortisation 
Total Assets 
Volatilityi = Earnings Volatility (a proxy for business risk) of firm ' i ' 
= Standard Deviation of ROA during the 10 year sampling period 1998 to 
2008 
Non-Financial Costsi = Non-Financial Costs to Total Costs Ratio of firm ' i ' 
_ Non - Financial Costs 
Total Costs 
Non-Financial Costs = Total Income - PAT - Provision for Direct Tax - Indirect Taxes 
Interest 
Total Costs = Total Income - PAT - Provision for Direct Tax - Indirect Taxes 
Dummy for Foreign Currency Loansi: It is a dummy variable used to represent any 
foreign currency loans outstanding in the books of the firm ' i ' any time during the 
sampling period. For the different types leverage ratios this dummy has different 
representations and different meanings as explained below. 
SFX-DUM: It is the dummy variable used to represent any SECURED foreign currency 
loans outstanding in the books of the firm at any time during the sampling period. 
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This dummy is used when the leverage in the LHS of the models is defined as 
Secured Debt Ratio (SDR). 
UFX-DUM: It is the dummy variable used to represent any UNSECURED foreign 
currency loans outstanding in the books of the firm at any time during the sampling 
period. This dummy is used when the leverage in the LHS of the models is defined as 
Unsecured Debt Ratio (UDR). 
AFX-DUM: It is the dummy variable used to represent any type of foreign currency 
loans, whether SECURED or UNSECURED outstanding in the books of the firm at any 
time during the sampling period. This dummy is used when the leverage in the Left Hand 
Side of the equations is defined as either Total Debt Ratio (TDR) or Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) or Short Term Debt Ratio (STDR). 
SFX-DUMi = 0 if the firm ' i ' does not have any SECURED foreign currency 
loans outstanding in its books at any time during the sampling period 
= 1 if the firm' i ' has any SECURED foreign currency loans outstanding in 
its books at any time during the sampling period 
UFX-DUMi = 0 if the firm ' i ' does not have any UNSECURED foreign currency 
loans outstanding in its books at any time during the sampling period 
= 1 if the firm ' i ' has any UNSECURED foreign currency loans 
outstanding in its books at any time during the sampling period 
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AFX-DUMi = 0 if the firm ' i ' does not have any foreign currency loans, whether 
SECURED or UNSECURED, outstanding in its books at any time 
during the sampUng period 
= 1 if the firm ' i ' has any foreign currency loans, whether SECURED or 
UNSECURED, outstanding in its books at any time during the sampling 
period 
ACQUIRERi = Dummy variable used for firm ' i ' to represent whether or not it has 
acquired any other firm at any time during the sampling period 
= 0 if the firm has not acquired any other firm during the sampling period 
= 1 if the firm has acquired any other firm during the sampling period 
CHEMICALSj = Dununy variable used for firm ' i ' to represent whether or not it 
belongs to the Chemicals industry 
= 0 if the firm does not belong to the Chemicals industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the Chemicals industry 
PHARMAj = Dummy variable used for firm ' i ' to represent whether or not it belongs to 
the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry 
= 0 if the firm does not belong to the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry 
FERROUSi = Dummy variable used for firm ' i ' to represent whether or not it belongs to 
the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry 
= 0 if the firm does not belong to the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products 
industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry 
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FOODj = Dummy variable used for firm ' i ' to represent whether or not it belongs to the 
Food industry 
= 0 if the firm does not belong to the Food industry 
= 1 if the firm belongs to the Food industry 
It is to be noted that a separate industry dummy is not required for the textiles industry 
because when the four industry dummies viz. CHEMICALS;, PHARMAj, FERROUSj 
and FOODj are all equal to zero, the implication is that the firm belongs to the textiles 
industry (because it does not belong to the other four industries). Hence inclusion of 
another dummy variable for the textiles industry will be superfluous and it will unduly 
affect the estimation of the regression equations. 
As it has been mentioned earlier the dependent variable Leverage is measured in five 
different ways. For each measure of the dependent variable the models are estimated in 
three stages by using OLS multiple regression analysis. So for all the measures of 
leverage a total of 15 regression equations are estimated. Further the analysis has been 
carried out by separating the firms into two categories at the beginning itself - Firms 
Which Revalue Their Assets and Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets. 
Accordingly the regression equations are estimated separately for the two categories of 
firms. So, altogether 30 regression equations have been estimated (2 categories x 5 
dependent variables x 3 stages of regression); i.e. 15 regression equations for each 
category of firms. 
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SUMMARY 
In this chapter the methodology of this research work has been explained in detail. The 
determinants of capital structure were identified from the empirical studies on capital 
structure determinants and selection of the determinants was made for this study. The 
determinants of capital structure which have been selected from empirical literature and 
used in this study are profitability, firm size, tangibility of assets, growth opportunities, 
earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields. In addition to the empirically foimd 
determinants it has been proposed to introduce non-financial costs as a new determinant 
of capital structure. 
Hypotheses were developed for finding out answers to the research questions. These 
hypotheses are associated with the industry influence on capital structure, the relationship 
between capital structure and the determinants, the relationship between capital structure 
and non-financial costs as a new determinant, the explanatory power of the determinants 
for various leverage ratios, and comparison of capital structure and its behaviour between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not. Further some of the hypotheses 
have been stated in the form of alternative hypotheses whereas others have been stated in 
the form of null hypotheses. This style of stating different hypotheses in null and 
alternative forms has been adopted from Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008)^ .^ They have 
used alternative hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is commonly available and 
null hypotheses when prior empirical evidence is not commonly available. 
Further this chapter has defined the different variables which have been used in this study 
such as the dependent, independent and the dummy variables. The dependent variable 
which is the leverage of the firm has been measured in terms of five different measures of 
debt viz. long term debt, short term debt, total debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. 
Accordingly debt ratios based on these five measures of debt have been used as 
dependent variables. 
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Majority of the empirical evidences are available with respect to long term debt ratio and 
total debt ratio, and some evidences (to a lesser extent) are also available on short term 
debt ratio. However no prior evidences on leverage based on secured debt and unsecured 
debt were found. The independent variables represent the determinants of capital 
structure stated above. The dimimy variables have been used to provide control for the 
influence on capital structure of factors other than the determinants. These factors include 
the influence of the type of industry, the influence of foreign currency loans and the 
influence of acquisition of other firms. 
The collection of samples of data has been explained. The techniques which have been 
used for analysing the data have been explained. The techniques include both univariate 
and multivariate analysis, and also parametric and non-parametric techniques. The 
models for explaining capital structure behaviovu- have been explained. Chapter 5 which 
follows next discusses in detail the results of the analytical techniques used in this study. 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Discussion 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter has explained the methodology of this research work in detail. It 
has explained the selection of the determinants from empirical literature, the development 
of hypotheses for this study, the measurement of the variables used, the data collected for 
the study, the analytical techniques used and the models for explaining capital structure 
behaviour. The present chapter discusses in detail the results of the analytical techniques 
used in this study. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the descriptive statistics of the debt ratios. 
Subsequently it provides detailed discussion of the findings from ANOVA, Kruskal-
Wallis ANOVA, t tests, Mann-Whitney U tests and OLS multiple regression analysis. 
The analyses were carried out separately for long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. 
The t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out separately for each of the five 
industries for comparing each of the debt ratios between the two categories of firms. 
ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA and OLS multiple regression analysis were carried 
out for each type of debt ratio separately for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets using data for the all the five industries covered in 
this study. Comparison of the regression relationships for each type of debt ratio was 
made between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, and the similarities and differences were found out. 
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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEBT 
RATIOS 
The descriptive statistics of the debt ratios of the firms belonging to the Chemicals 
industry. Drugs & Pharmaceuticals industry, Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Food industry and Textiles industry are given in Tables 5 to 14. These tables also provide 
the descriptive statistics of the determinants of capital structure that have been discussed 
earlier. Tables 5 to 9 provide the descriptive statistics of the firms in the five industries 
which revalue their assets and Tables 10 to 14 provide the descriptive statistics of the 
firms in the five industries which do not revalue their assets. 
The following observations can be made from the descriptive statistics of the debt ratios 
of the firms which revalue their assets in the five industries: 
1. Across the cross-section of firms in all the five industries viz. Chemicals, Drugs & 
Pharmaceuticals, Ferrous Metal and Metal Products, Food and Textiles, the average 
secured debt ratio (SDR) is higher than the average unsecured debt ratio (UDR). This 
indicates that in all the five industries the firms which revalue their assets tend to use 
higher amounts of secured debt in their capital structure than unsecured debt. 
2. Except the Food industry in the other four industries the average long term debt ratio 
(LTDR) is higher than the average short term debt ratio (STDR). This indicates that 
with the exception of the Food industry the firms in the other four industries, which 
revalue their assets, tend to use higher amounts of long term debt in their capital 
structure than short term debt. 
3. The cross-sectional average long term debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Food industry. 
4. The cross-sectional average short term debt ratio is highest in the Food industry and 
lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
5. The cross-sectional average total debt ratio (TDR) is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
6. The cross-sectional average secured debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry and 
lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
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7. The cross-sectional average unsecured debt ratio is highest in the Chemicals industry 
and lowest in the Textiles industry. 
8. The cross-sectional variability of long term debt ratio is highest in the Textiles 
industry and lowest in the Food industry. 
9. The cross-sectional variability of short term debt ratio is highest in the Food industry 
and lowest in the Textiles industry. 
10. The cross-sectional variability of total debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Food industry. 
11. The cross-sectional variability of secured debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
12. The cross-sectional variability of unsecured debt ratio is highest in the Chemicals 
industry and lowest in the textiles industry. 
The following observations can be made from the descriptive statistics of the debt ratios 
of the firms which do not revalue their assets in the five industries: 
1. Across the cross-section of firms in all the five industries the average secured debt 
ratio (SDR) is higher than the average unsecured debt ratio (UDR). This indicates that 
in all the five industries the firms which do not revalue their assets tend to use higher 
amounts of seciired debt in their capital structure than unsecured debt. This 
observation is similar to the firms which revalue their assets. 
2. Except the Food industry in the other four industries the average long term debt ratio 
(LTDR) is higher than the average short term debt ratio (STDR). This indicates that 
with the exception of the Food industry the firms in the other four industries, which 
do not revalue their assets, tend to use higher amoimts of long term debt in their 
capital structure than short term debt. This observation is similar to the firms which 
revalue their assets. 
3. The cross-sectional average long term debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is partly 
similar to the firms which revalue their assets. This observation differs fi-om the firms 
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which revalue their assets in that the lowest average long term debt ratio is observed 
in Food industry for firms which revalue their assets. 
4. The cross-sectional average short term debt ratio is highest in the Food industry and 
lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is similar to the 
firms which revalue their assets. 
5. The cross-sectional average total debt ratio (TDR) is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is similar to 
the firms which revalue their assets. 
6. The cross-sectional average secured debt ratio is highest in the Textiles mdustry and 
lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is similar to the 
firms which revalue their assets. 
7. The cross-sectional average unsecured debt ratio is highest in the Chemicals industry 
and lowest in the Textiles industry. This observation is similar to the firms which 
revalue their assets. 
8. The cross-sectional variability of long term debt ratio is highest in the Textiles 
industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is 
partly similar to the firms which revalue their assets. This observation differs from the 
firms which revalue their assets in that the lowest cross-sectional variability of long 
term debt ratio is observed in the Food industry for firms which revalue thek assets. 
9. The cross-sectional variability of short term debt ratio is highest in the Food industry 
and lowest in the Textiles industry. This observation is similar to the firms which 
revalue their assets. 
10. The cross-sectional variability of total debt ratio is highest in the Chemicals industry 
and lowest in the Textiles industry. This observation totally differs fi-om the firms 
which revalue their assets. 
11. The cross-sectional variability of secured debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is partly 
similar to the firms which revalue their assets. This observation differs from the firms 
which revalue their assets in that the lowest cross-sectional variability of secured debt 
ratio is observed in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry for firms which 
revalue their assets. 
Chapters 1^ 2 
12. The cross-sectional variability of unsecured debt ratio is highest in the Chemicals 
industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. This observation is 
partly similar to the firms which revalue their assets. This observation differs from the 
firms which revalue their assets in that the lowest cross-sectional variability of 
unsecured debt ratio is observed in the Textiles industry. 
On the basis of the above observations the following similarities can be observed 
between firms which revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets: 
1. For both categories of firms average secured debt ratio (SDR) is higher than the 
average unsecured debt ratio (UDR) across the cross-section of firms in all the five 
industries. 
2. For both categories of firms average long term debt ratio (LTDR) is higher than the 
average short term debt ratio (STDR) across the cross-section of firms in the 
Chemicals industry. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry, Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products industry, and Chemicals industry. The reverse is found in the Food industry. 
3. For both categories of firms the average long term debt ratio across the cross-section 
of firms is highest in the Textiles industry. 
4. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional average short term debt ratio is 
highest in the Food industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
5. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional average total debt ratio (TDR) is 
highest in the Textiles industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
6. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional average secured debt ratio is highest 
in the Textiles industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
7. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional average unsecured debt ratio is 
highest in the Chemicals industiy and lowest in the Textiles industry. 
8. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional variability of long term debt ratio is 
highest in the Textiles industry. 
9. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional variability of short term debt ratio is 
highest in the Food industry and lowest in the Textiles industry. 
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10. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional variability of secured debt ratio is 
highest in the Textiles industry. 
11. For both categories of firms the cross-sectional variability of unsecured debt ratio is 
highest in the Chemicals industry. 
The following dissimilarities can be observed between firms which revalue their assets 
and those which do not revalue their assets: 
1. The lowest average long term debt ratio is observed in Food industry for firms which 
revalue their assets whereas the lowest average long term debt ratio is found in the 
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
2. The lowest cross-sectional variability of long term debt ratio is observed in the Food 
industry for firms which revalue their assets whereas the lowest cross-sectional 
variability of long term debt ratio is observed in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
industry for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. The cross-sectional variability of total debt ratio is highest in the Textiles industry 
and lowest in the Food industry for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is 
highest in the Chemicals industry and lowest in the Textiles industry for firms which 
do not revalue their assets. 
4. The lowest cross-sectional variability of secured debt ratio is observed in the Ferrous 
Metal and Metal Products industry for firms which revalue their assets whereas the 
lowest cross-sectional variability of secured debt ratio is observed in the Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals industry for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
5. The lowest cross-sectional variability of unseciired debt ratio is observed in the 
Textiles industry for the firms which revalue their assets whereas the lowest cross-
sectional variability of unsecured debt ratio is observed in the Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals industry for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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On the basis of the descriptive statistics of the debt ratios and their similarities and 
dissimilarities between the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets the following general observations can be made across the five 
indxistries: 
1. The use of secured debt in the capital structure generally appears to be higher than the 
use of unsecured debt in all the five industries. This type of financing behaviour can 
be expected because generally unsecured debt tends to be more expensive for the 
borrower than the secured debt, in order to compensate the lender for the higher 
default risk associated with the unsecured debt. 
2. With the exception of the Food industry the use of long term debt in the capital 
structure generally appears to be higher than the use of short term debt. In general 
because compared to a short term loan, a long term loan has to be repaid over a longer 
period of time, it is easier for the borrower to make the debt service payments and so 
the borrower faces a lower risk of insolvency. Moreover compared to a short term 
loan, the fimds fi-om a long term loan are available for use in the borrower's business 
for a longer period of time; so the benefits of debt financing will be available to the 
borrower for a longer period of time fi-om long term loans than from short term loans. 
Hence this type of financing behaviour can be expected. However it should be 
remembered that the relative requirement of long term and short term debt in any 
industry will depend upon the nature of business in that industry. 
3. The use of debt (i.e. debt in general irrespective of its long term or short term nature 
or irrespective of its secured or imsecured nature) in the capital structure appears to be 
highest in the Textiles industry and lowest in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
4. Differences in financing behaviour or variability in the use of the different types of 
debt in the capital structure appear to be dissimilar not only among the two categories 
of firms but also across the five industries. 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was carried out by the one way ANOVA procedure of 
the Statistica software package (Release 8). The ANOVA procedure was carried out for 
each type of leverage ratio used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt 
ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. These leverage ratios 
have been defined earlier. Further, this procedure was carried out separately for the two 
categories of firms viz. firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets. The significance level used for the procedure was 0.05 (i.e. a = 5%). The 
outputs of the one way ANOVA procedure have been reproduced in the tables 15 through 
24. 
ANOVA assumes that the populations from which the samples are drawn are normally 
distributed. So to start with probability-probability plots (PP-plots) of the five types of 
debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt 
ratio and unsecured debt ratio were made with the help of the Statistica software to find 
out the extent to which the debt ratios were close to the normal distribution. The PP-plot 
for each debt ratio was made separately for each industry and within each industry 
separately for the two categories of firms viz. firms which revalue their assets and fums 
which do not revalue their assets. So there were 50 graphs of PP-plots in total (5 
Industries x 5 Debt Ratios x 2 Categories). 
The industrywise and categorywise PP-plots of only the long term debt ratio (LTDR) 
have been provided in Annexure-1 for reference. The PP-plots of the other types of debt 
ratios have not been provided because they are very similar to the PP-plots of the long 
term debt ratio. From the visual inspection of the PP-plots it was found that the majority 
of the debt ratios were very close to the normal distribution. However, they cannot be 
said to be perfectly normally distiibuted. At the same tune it should be also noted tiiat the 
graphs were based on sample data and some of the samples were not large enough to 
reflect the actual distributional characteristics of the populations. 
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Hence in order to analyse the data in a more reliable manner it was decided to carry out in 
addition to ANOVA, the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks, which is considered to be 
the non-parametric equivalent of the ANOVA. Moreover in the subsequent stages of 
analysis where the industrywise debt ratios have been compared between the two 
categories of firms both parametric and non-parametric methods have been used to draw 
the conclusions. Accordingly t-tests for difference between mean debt ratios between the 
two categories of firms and Mann-Whitney U tests for finding out whether debt ratios 
differ between the two categories of firms have been carried out. 
ANOVA OF DEBT RATIOS FOR FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Table 15 shows the ANOVA results for long term debt ratio (LTDR) for firms which 
revalue their assets. The variation arising fi'om 'Between' the groups implies variation 
between the industries viz. Chemicals, Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, Ferrous Metal and 
Metal Products, Food and Textiles. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 
0.05 and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. The results clearly indicate that the F 
statistic is not only significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant at 1% 
and even lower significance levels. 
Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is significantly different 
across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. This finding is consistent 
with Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)" in the US context and with Babu and Jain (2000)^  
in the Indian context. However their findings were not specifically in relation to the firms 
which revalue their assets. The finding confirms the influence of industry or nature of 
business on the leverage ratios of firms. 
Table 16 shows the ANOVA results for short term debt ratio (STDR) for firms which 
revalue their assets. It has been explained earlier that the variation arising from 'Between' 
the groups implies variation between the industries. The p-value is less than the 
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Table 15 
ANOVA Of LTDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
133 
137 
Sum of 
Squares 
3.303221 
6.464769 
9.767990 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
0.825805 
0.048607 
F Statistic 
16.98933 
. 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4, 133) = 2.439760 
Table 16 
ANOVA Of STDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
133 
137 
Sum of Squares 
0.987026 
4.380075 
5.367101 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
0.246757 
0.032933 
F Statistic 
7.492708 
p Value 
0.000018 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4, 133) = 2.439760 
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significance level (a) of 0.05 and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. The results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% significance level but 
also it is significant at 1% and even lower significance levels. 
Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is significantly different 
across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. The researcher has not 
come across any studies on the industry influence on the short term debt ratio. 
Table 17 shows the ANOVA results for total debt ratio (TDR) for firms which revalue 
their assets. As explained earlier the variation arising from 'Between' the groups implies 
variation between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 
and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. The results clearly indicate that the F statistic 
is not only significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even 
lower significance levels. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is 
significantly different across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. 
Table 18 shows the ANOVA results for secured debt ratio (SDR) for firms which revalue 
their assets. The variation arising from 'Between' the groups implies variation between 
the Industries. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the F statistic 
exceeds the critical value. The results clearly indicate that the F statistic is not only 
significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even lower 
significance levels. Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio 
significantly differs across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. The 
researcher has not come across any studies on the industry influence on the secured debt 
ratio. 
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Table 17 
ANOVA Of TDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
133 
137 
Sum of 
Squares 
7.74537 
18.13865 
25.88401 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
1.936341 
0.136381 
F Statistic 
14.19805 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,133) = 2.439760 
Table 18 
ANOVA Of SDR For Firms Vi'hich Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
133 
137 
Sum of 
Squares 
5.03643 
12.44384 
17.48026 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
1.259107 
0.093563 
F Statistic 
13.45737 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,133) = 2.439760 
Chapter 5 190 
Table 19 shows the ANOVA results for unsecured debt ratio (UDR) for firms which 
revalue their assets. The variation arising from 'Between' the groups implies variation 
between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the 
F statistic exceeds the critical value. The resuhs clearly indicate that the F statistic is not 
only significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even 
lower significance levels. Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio 
is significantly different across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. 
The researcher has not come across any studies on the industry influence on the 
unsecured debt ratio. 
For firms which revalue their assets the findings fi-om ANOVA provide evidence in 
support of hypothesis HI with reference to all the debt ratios used in this study viz. long 
term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured 
debt ratio. It may be concluded that at least for firms which revalue their assets the debt 
ratios long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio differ across the industries studied. 
ANOVA OF DEBT RATIOS FOR FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR 
ASSETS 
ANOVA for each of the debt ratios was performed for the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. Table 20 shows the ANOVA results for long term debt ratio (LTDR) for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. The variation arising from 'Between' the groups 
implies variation between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level 
(a) of 0.05 and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. The results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant 
at 1% and even lower significance levels. 
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Table 19 
ANOVA Of UDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
133 
137 
Sum of Squares 
0.564827 
1.306795 
1.871622 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
0.141207 
0.009826 
F Statistic 
14.37142 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,133) = 2.439760 
Table 20 
ANOVA Of LTDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
388 
392 
Sum of Squares 
5.50699 
22.30312 
27.81011 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
1.376748 
0.057482 
F Statistic 
23.95083 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,388) = 2.394943 
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Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is significantly different 
across the five industries for firms which do not revalue their assets. This finding is 
consistent with Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984/ in the US context and with Babu and 
Jain (2000)^  in the Indian context. The finding confirms the influence of industry or 
nature of business on the leverage ratios of firms. 
Table 21 shows the ANOVA results for short term debt ratio (STDR) for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. It has been explained earlier that the variation arising fi^om 
'Between' the groups implies variation between the industries. The p-value is less than 
the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. 
The results clearly indicate that the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% 
significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even lower significance levels. 
Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is significantly different 
across the five industries for firms which do not revalue their assets. The researcher has 
not come across any studies on the industry influence on the short term debt ratio. 
Table 22 shows the ANOVA results for total debt ratio (TDR) for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. As explained earlier the variation arising fi-om 'Between' the groups 
implies variation between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level 
(a) of 0.05 and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. The results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% significance level but also it is significant 
at 1% and even lower significance levels. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total 
debt ratio significantly differs across the five industries for firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
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Table 21 
ANOVA Of STDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
388 
392 
Sum of 
Squares 
1.67036 
13.73928 
15.40964 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
0.417590 
0.035411 
F Statistic 
11.79284 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4, 388) = 2.394943 
Table 22 
ANOVA Of TDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
388 
392 
Sum of 
Squares 
13.13744 
60.28009 
73.41754 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
3.284360 
0.155361 
F Statistic 
21.14018 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,388) = 2.394943 
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Table 23 shows the ANOVA results for secured debt ratio (SDR) for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. The variation arising from 'Between' the groups implies variation 
between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the 
F statistic exceeds the critical value. 
The results clearly indicate that the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% 
significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even lower significance levels. 
Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio is significantly different 
across the five industries for firms which do not revalue their assets. The researcher has 
not come across any studies on the industry influence on the secured debt ratio. 
Table 24 shows the ANOVA results for unsecured debt ratio (UDR) for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. The variation arising firom 'Between' the groups implies 
variation between the industries. The p-value is less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 
and the F statistic exceeds the critical value. 
The results clearly indicate that the F statistic is not only significant at the 5% 
significance level but also it is significant at 1% and even lower significance levels. 
Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio significantly differs across 
the five industries for firms which do not revalue their assets. The researcher has not 
come across any studies on the industry influence on the unsecured debt ratio. 
With reference to all the debt ratios used in this study the findings from ANOVA provide 
evidence in support of hypothesis HI for firms which do not revalue their assets. It may 
be inferred that for firms which do not revalue their assets the debt ratios long term debt 
ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio 
differ across the industries studied. 
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Table 23 
ANOVA Of SDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
388 
392 
Sum of 
Squares 
7.85888 
39.03057 
46.88945 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
1.964720 
0.100594 
F Statistic 
19.53114 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,388) = 2.394943 
Table 24 
ANOVA Of UDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Effect 
Between 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
4 
388 
392 
Sum of Squares 
0.915336 
5.433797 
6.349133 
Mean Sum of 
Squares 
0.228834 
0.014005 
F Statistic 
16.33988 
p Value 
0.000000 
At a = 0.05 Critical value of F (4,388) = 2.394943 
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DISCUSSION ON THE ANOVA RESULTS 
The ANOVA procedure performed on the debt ratios of firms which revalue their assets 
as well as on the debt ratios of firms which do not revalue their assets, provide evidences 
in support of hypothesis HI. That is, in general there are evidences that the debt ratios 
long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio differ across the industries studied. Moreover these findings also 
tend to support the trade-off theory of capital structure. Further the findings on long term 
debt ratio are consistent with Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984/ in the US context and with 
Babu and Jain (2000)^ in the Indian context. 
However, before any generalised conclusions are drawn in this regard one should take 
into account the fact that the ANOVA technique is based on the assumption that the 
populations, fi-om which the samples are drawn, are normally distributed. Hence before 
generalising the findings from ANOVA additional evidence was sought by using non-
parametric techniques which do not make any assumptions about the probability 
distribution of the underlying populations. The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks is an 
important technique in this context and it was used to find out whether each type of debt 
ratio differed across the industries studied. 
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANOVA BY RANKS 
The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure of the Statistica Software package 
(Release 8) was carried out. This procedure was applied for each type of leverage ratio 
used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and imsecured debt ratio. Further, this procedure was carried out separately for 
the two groups of firms viz. firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets. The significance level used for the procedure was 0.05 (i.e. a = 5%). 
The outputs of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure have been reproduced 
below. 
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The sampling distribution of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic can be approximated by a 
chi-square distribution with k - 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of 
populations. Accordingly the critical values for the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic have been 
obtained for drawing the inferences. 
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANOVA OF DEBT RATIOS FOR FIRMS WHICH 
REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Table 25 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for long 
term debt ratio (LTDR) for firms which revalue their assets. The p-value is less than the 
significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore the 
resuhs clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05. This implies that the 
long term debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be concluded 
that long term debt ratio differs across the five industries for firms which revalue their 
assets. 
Table 26 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for short 
term debt ratio (STDR) for firms which revalue their assets. The p-value is less than the 
significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore the 
results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05. This implies that the 
short term debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be concluded 
that for firms which revalue their assets short term debt ratio differs across the five 
industries. 
Table 27 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for total 
debt ratio (TDR) for firms which revalue their assets. The p-value is less than the 
significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore the 
results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05. This implies that the 
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Table 25 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of LTDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs «& Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
58 
21 
19 
7 
32 
Sum of Ranks 
3798.000 
1129.000 
1369.000 
370.000 
2787.000 
Dependent Variable: LTDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 137) =11.47013, p = 0.0218 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
Table 26 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of STDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
58 
21 
19 
7 
32 
Sum of Ranks 
3598.000 
1283.000 
1671.000 
681.500 
2219.500 
Dependent Variable: STDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 137) = 10.52410, p = 0.0325 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
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Table 27 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of TDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
58 
21 
19 
7 
32 
Sum of Ranks 
3599.000 
1100.000 
1516.000 
509.000 
2729.000 
Dependent Variable: TDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 137) = 12.30793, p = 0.0152 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
Table 28 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of SDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
58 
21 
19 
7 
32 
Sum of 
Ranks 
3205.000 
1117.000 
1653.000 
503.000 
2975.000 
Dependent Variable: SDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 137) =25.89540, p = 0.0000 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
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total debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be concluded that 
total debt ratio differs across the five industries for firms which revalue their assets. 
Table 28 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for 
secured debt ratio (SDR) for firms which revalue their assets. The p-value is less than the 
significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore the 
results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this case the test 
statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies that the 
secured debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be concluded 
that for firms which revalue their assets secured debt ratio differs across the five 
industries. 
Table 29 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for 
unsecured debt ratio (UDR) for firms which revalue their assets. The p-value is less than 
the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore 
the results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this case the 
test statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies that the 
Unsecured Debt Ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be 
concluded that unsecured debt ratio differs across the five industries for firms which 
revalue their assets. 
For frnns which revalue their assets the fmdings firom the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by 
Ranks procedure provide evidence in support of hypothesis HI with reference to all the 
debt ratios used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt 
ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. It may be concluded that for firms 
which revalue their assets the debt ratios long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total 
debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio differ across the industries studied. 
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Table 29 
Kniskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of UDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
58 
21 
19 
7 
32 
Sum of Ranks 
4748.000 
1587.000 
1226.000 
506.000 
1386.000 
Dependent Variable: UDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 137) =20.35996, p = 0.0004 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
Table 30 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of LTDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
157 
52 
50 
46 
87 
Sum of Ranks 
31550.00 
7570.50 
10350.00 
7364.50 
20193.00 
Dependent Variable: LTDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic: H (4, N= 392) = 24.51002, p = 0.0001 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
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KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANOVA OF DEBT RATIOS FOR FIRMS WHICH DO NOT 
REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Table 30 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for long 
term debt ratio (LTDR) for firms which do not revalue their assets. The p-value is less 
than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Therefore the results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this 
case the test statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies 
that the long term debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be 
concluded that long term debt ratio differs across the five industries for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. 
Table 31 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for short 
term debt ratio (STDR) for firms do not which revalue their assets. The p-value is less 
than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Therefore the results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05. This 
implies that the short term debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may 
be concluded that for firms which do not revalue their assets short term debt ratio differs 
across the five industries. 
Table 32 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for total 
debt ratio (TDR) for firms which do not revalue their assets. The p-value is less than the 
significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Therefore the 
results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this case the test 
statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies that the total 
debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be concluded that for 
firms which do not revalue their assets total debt ratio differs across the five industries. 
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Table 31 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of STDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
157 
52 
50 
46 
87 
Sum of Ranks 
28587.50 
8630.50 
10705.00 
10097.00 
19008.00 
Dependent Variable: STDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic: H (4, N= 392) =12.69263, p = 0.0129 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
Table 32 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of TDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
157 
52 
50 
46 
87 
Sum of Ranks 
30074.00 
7511.00 
10571.00 
8796.00 
20076.00 
Dependent Variable: TDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic: H (4, N= 392) =20.19648, p = 0.0005 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
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Table 33 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for 
secured debt ratio (SDR) for firms which do not revalue their assets. The p-value is less 
than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Therefore the results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this 
case the test statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies 
that the secured debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be 
concluded that for firms which do not revalue their assets secured debt ratio differs across 
the five industries. 
Table 34 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure for 
unsecured debt ratio (UDR) for firms which do not revalue their assets. The p-value is 
less than the significance level (a) of 0.05 and the test statistic exceeds the critical value. 
Therefore the results clearly indicate that the test statistic is significant at a = 0.05; in this 
case the test statistic is even significant at a higher significance level of 1%. This implies 
that the unsecured debt ratios for the five industries are not identical. Hence, it may be 
concluded that unsecured debt ratio differs across the five industries for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. 
With reference to all the debt ratios used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term 
debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio, the findings from 
the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks procedure provide evidence in support of 
hypothesis HI for firms which do not revalue their assets. It may be inferred that for 
firms which do not revalue their assets the debt ratios long term debt ratio, short term 
debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio differ across the 
industries studied. 
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Table 33 
Kniskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of SDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
157 
52 
50 
46 
87 
Sum of Ranks 
28361.00 
7924.50 
10578.00 
8630.50 
21534.00 
Dependent Variable: SDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic: H (4, N= 392) = 29.75853, p = 0.0000 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
Table 34 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA By Ranks Of UDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Chemicals 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ferrous 
Food 
Textiles 
Code 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Valid N 
157 
52 
50 
46 
87 
Sum of Ranks 
33818.00 
9320.00 
10467.00 
9318.50 
14104.50 
Dependent Variable: UDR 
Independent (Grouping) Variable: INDUSTRY 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic: H (4, N= 392) = 14.36297, p = 0.0062 
At a = 0.05 Critical Value = 9.487729 
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DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS FROM ANOVA AND KRUSKAL-WALLIS 
ANOVA BY RANKS 
Both the statistical techniques reveal similar results wdth reference to all the debt ratios 
used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. It was foimd that all the five types of debt ratios 
differed across the industries studied. Further for both categories of firms i.e. those which 
revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets, the findings were similar. 
All the evidences so far support the hypothesis HI for both categories of firms. There 
appears to be strong evidence that debt ratios differ across industries. 
The findings match with our expectations. Saravanan (2006)'^ explains that firms in the 
same type of industry are likely to experience similar business risk and they are equally 
subject to systematic factors which influence their business prospects. Further they 
operate in similar environment and economic conditions. So the industry as a whole 
evolves its own capital structure resulting fi-om the influences of its business 
environment. 
Hence it is concluded that the debt ratios differ across industries. In other words the 
industry factor influences the capital structure of firms. Moreover this finding also 
provides support to the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
T TESTS FOR DIFFERENCE IN MEAN DEBT RATIOS BETWEEN FIRMS 
WfflCH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS AND FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE 
THEIR ASSETS 
The t-tests for difference between means of two independent samples are applicable when 
one or both the samples are small and the population variances are not known. The 
samples in this study include both large and small samples, and the population variances 
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are not known. So in order to maintain uniformity in the testing process the t-tests were 
used (instead of using Z-test for the large samples and t-test for the small samples). 
The t-tests assume that the populations from which the samples are drawn are normally 
distributed. As already explained earlier in the context of ANOVA the probability-
probability plots (PP-plots) of the five types of debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short 
term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio were made 
with the help of the Statistica software to find out the extent to which the debt ratios were 
close to the normal distribution. The PP plot for each debt ratio was made separately for 
each industry and within each industry separately for the two categories of firms viz. 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. So in total 
there were 50 graphs of PP-plots. 
The industrywise and categorywise PP-plots of only the long term debt ratio (LTDR) 
have been provided in Annexure-1 for reference. The PP-plots of the other types of debt 
ratios have not been provided because they are very similar to the PP-plots of the long 
term debt ratio. From the visual inspection of the PP-plots it was found that the majority 
of the debt ratios were very close to the normal distribution. However, they cannot be 
said to be perfectly normally distributed. 
Moreover the graphs were based on sample data and some of the samples were not large 
enough to reflect the actual distributional characteristics of the populations. Hence in 
order to draw conclusions in a more reliable manner both parametric and non-parametric 
tests were carried out. Accordingly t-tests for difference between mean debt ratios 
between the two categories of firms and Mann-Whitney U tests for finding out whether 
debt ratios differ between the two categories of firms have been carried out. 
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Further the t-tests can be performed either with the assumption of equal variances or with 
the assumption of vmequal variances, in the populations. So in order to apply the t-testing 
procedure the assumption of equality of variances should be tested. Accordingly for each 
type of debt ratio the F-test for equality of variances was carried out between the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets before applying 
the t-test procedure. 
The F-tests for equality of variances and the t-tests for two-sample means were carried 
out by Microsoft Excel Data Analysis Tools (MS Office 2007), These tests were not 
carried out with the Statistica software because while carrying out the t-tests for two-
sample means Statistica internally carries out F-test for equality of variances and only 
shows the p-value of the F statistic instead of a detailed output. However a detailed 
output of the same was preferred. Hence these tests were carried out by the Microsoft 
Excel Data Analysis Tools (MS Office 2007). 
CHEMICALS INDUSTRY 
Table 35a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. The two samples have been designated as 
Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher 
variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has 
been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) 
and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate 
that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of LTDR is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
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Table 35a 
Chemicals: 
F-Test For Variance Of LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.226501196 
0.024864819 
157 
156 
1.32461842 
0.111564255 
1.462403366 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.208156646 
0.018771307 
58 
57 
Table 35b 
Chemicals: 
t-Test For Mean LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.226501196 
0.024864819 
157 
0.023234161 
0 
213 
0.783227901 
0.21718164 
1.652038879 
0.434363279 
1.971163837 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.208156646 
0.018771307 
58 
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Table 35b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean long term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Chemicals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal 
variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The 
same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 35b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean long term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 36a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Short Term Debt 
Ratio (STDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. The two samples have been designated as 
Variable I and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher 
variance has been designated as Variable. 1 and the sample with the lower variance has 
been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) 
and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate 
that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of short term debt ratio is not 
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Table 36a 
Chemicals: 
F-Test For Variance Of STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.148821117 
0.011253093 
58 
57 
1.035222858 
0.423822047 
1.41171247 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.150326455 
0.010870213 
157 
156 
Table 36b 
Chemicals: 
t-Test For Mean STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.148821117 
0.011253093 
58 
0.010972674 
0 
213 
-0.093523886 
0.462787643 
1.652038879 
0.925575287 
1.971163837 
• Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.150326455 
0.010870213 
157 
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significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 36b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean short term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Chemicals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal 
variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The 
same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 36b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean short term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is not 
significantiy different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 37a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Total Debt Ratio 
(TDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Chemicals industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 
duad Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
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Table 37a 
Chemicals: 
F-Test For Variance Of TDR Between Firms Wliich Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.376827651 
0.039735717 
157 
156 
1.218851929 
0.1966342 
1.462403366 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.356977763 
0.032600939 
58 
57 
Table 37b 
Chemicals: 
t-Test For Mean TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.376827651 
0.039735717 
157 
0.03782641 
0 
213 
0.664209521 
0.253637296 
1.652038879 
0.507274592 
1.971163837 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.356977763 
0.032600939 
58 
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designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of total debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 37b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean total debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Chemicals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance 
in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 37b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean total debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by nature. 
So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
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Table 38a shows the resuhs of the F-test for equality of variance of Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Chemicals industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 
and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample vsdth the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 38b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean secured debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Chemicals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance 
in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 38b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean secured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than tiie significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio is not significantiy 
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Table 38a 
Chemicals: 
F-test For Variance Of SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.270661629 
0.029178731 
157 
156 
1.169745843 
0.250910391 
1.462403366 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.242352079 
0.024944505 
58 
57 
Table 38b 
Chemicals: 
t-test For Mean SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.270661629 
0.029178731 
157 
0.028045629 
0 
213 
1.100132429 
0.136258104 
1.652038879 
0.272516208 
1.971163837 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.242352079 
0.024944505 
58 
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different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 39a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Unsecured Debt Ratio 
(UDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Chemicals industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 
and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 39b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean imsecured debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Chemicals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal 
variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The 
same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 39b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean imsecured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
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Table 39a 
Chemicals: 
F-test For Variance Of UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable J 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.106166022 
0.010200246 
157 
156 
1.045410705 
0.433410822 
1.462403366 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.114625684 
0.009757167 
58 
57 
Table 39b 
Chemicals: 
t-test For Mean UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.106166022 
0.010200246 
157 
0.010081676 
0 
213 
-0.548316378 
0.29202445 
1.652038879 
0.5840489 
1.971163837 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.114625684 
0.009757167 
58 
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The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY 
Table 40a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance 
level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even 
at a significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of long term 
debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 40b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean long term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assimiption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
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Table 40a 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
F-test For Variance Of LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable J 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.164303464 
0.014931456 
21 
20 
1.084125909 
0.393346165 
1.779859106 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.150742067 
0.013772806 
52 
51 
Table 40b 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
t-test For Mean LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.164303464 
0.014931456 
21 
0.014099186 
0 
71 
0.441730397 
0.330013398 
1.666599659 
0.660026795 
1.993943341 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.150742067 
0.013772806 
52 
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Table 40b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean long term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 41a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Short Term Debt 
Ratio (STDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance 
level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even 
at a significance level of 10%, Hence it may be concluded that the variance of short term 
debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 41b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean short term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support 
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Table 41a 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
F-test For Variance Of STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.13848431 
0.013192661 
52 
51 
1.056324871 
0.463911218 
1.963381332 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.1437989 
0.012489208 
21 
20 
Drugs 
t-test For Mean STDR Between 
Table 41b 
& Pharmaceuticals: 
Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.13848431 
0.013192661 
52 
0.012994505 
0 
71 
-0.180318304 
0.428708188 
1.666599659 
0.857416376 
1.993943341 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.1437989 
0.012489208 
21 
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this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 41b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean short term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 42a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Total Debt Ratio 
(TDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The two samples have been designated 
as Variable J and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the 
higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance 
has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 
0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly 
indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a 
significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of total debt ratio 
is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
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Table 42a 
Drugs & Phannaceuticals: 
F-test For Variance Of TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.289226377 
0.038591816 
52 
51 
1.001671142 
0.51998469 
1.963381332 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.308102364 
0.038527432 
21 
20 
Table 42b 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
t-test For Mean TDR Betiveen Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.289226377 
0.038591816 
52 
0.03857368 
0 
71 
-0.37171837 
0.355604805 
1.666599659 
0.711209611 
1.993943341 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.308102364 
0.038527432 
21 
• 
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Table 42b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean total debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of 
eq\uil variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this 
assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated 
as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 42b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean total debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by nature. 
So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 43a shows the resuUs of the F-test for equality of variance of Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The two samples have been designated 
as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the 
higher variance has been designated as Variable I and the sample with the lower variance 
has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 
0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly 
indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a 
significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured debt 
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Table 43a 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
F-test For Variance Of SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.221556617 
0.028162375 
52 
51 
1.101382977 
0.42057241 
1.963381332 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.224064779 
0.025570012 
21 
20 
Table 43b 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
t-test For Mean SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.221556617 
0.028162375 
52 
0.027432132 
0 
71 
-0.05857007 
0.476729543 
1.666599659 
0.953459086 
1.993943341 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.224064779 
0.025570012 
21 
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ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 43b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean secured debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of 
equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this 
assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated 
as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 43b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean secured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 44a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Unsecured Debt Ratio 
(UDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The two samples have been designated 
as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the 
higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance 
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Table 44a 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
F-test For Variance Of UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.06766976 
0.004542693 
52 
51 
1.198270771 
0.337243676 
1.963381332 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.084037585 
0.003791041 
21 
20 
Drugs 
t-test For Mean UDR Between 
Table 44b 
& Pharmaceuticals: 
Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.06766976 
0.004542693 
52 
0.00433096 
0 
71 
-0.961941735 
0.169671803 
1.666599659 
0.339343606 
1.993943341 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.084037585 
0.003791041 
21 
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has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 
0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly 
indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a 
significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of unsecured debt 
ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
Table 44b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean unsecured debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F^est support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable I and Variable 2. 
Table 44b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean unsecured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. 
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FERROUS METAL AND METAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRY 
Table 45a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The two samples have 
been designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the 
sample with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with 
the lower variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the 
significance level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. 
Therefore the results clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance 
level of 5% or even at a significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the 
variance of long term debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal 
and Metal Products industry. 
Table 45b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean long term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 45b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean long term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
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Table 45a 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
F-test For Variance Of LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.227947841 
0.019645219 
50 
49 
1.025583002 
0.498511827 
2.037668781 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.229372826 
0.019155172 
19 
18 
Table 45b 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
t-test For Mean LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.227947841 
0.019645219 
50 
0.019513564 
0 
67 
-0.037851163 
0,484959454 
1.667916115 
0.969918907 
1.996008331 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.229372826 
0.019155172 
19 
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the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Table 46a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of short term debt ratio 
(STDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable I and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance 
level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even 
at a significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of short term 
debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products 
industry. 
Table 46b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean short term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 46b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
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Table 46a 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
F-test For Variance Of STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.182559443 
0.013056451 
50 
49 
1.070838706 
0.455096907 
2.037668781 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.222263381 
0.012192734 
19 
18 
Table 46b 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
t-test For Mean STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.182559443 
0.013056451 
50 
0.012824408 
0 
67 
-1.3009248 
0.098870312 
1.667916115 
0.197740625 
1.996008331 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.222263381 
0.012192734 
19 
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mean short term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Table 47a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Total Debt Ratio 
(TDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable J and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable J and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance 
level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even 
at a significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of total debt 
ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Table 47b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean total debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
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Table 47a 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
F-test For Variance Of TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.410507283 
0.038693057 
50 
49 
1.521523812 
0.165675543 
2.037668781 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.451636207 
0.025430464 
19 
18 
Table 47b 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
t-test For Mean TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.410507283 
0.038693057 
50 
0.035129972 
0 
67 
-0.814227376 
0.209199635 
1.667916115 
0.418399269 
1.996008331 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.451636207 
0.025430464 
19 
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Table 47b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean total debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by nature. 
So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Table 48a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance 
level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results 
clearly indicate that the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even 
at a significance level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured 
debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products 
industry. 
Table 48b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean secured debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
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Table 48a 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
F-test For Variance Of SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.319304442 
0.03130072 
50 
49 
1.264012952 
0.299915935 
2.037668781 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.385599635 
0.024762974 
19 
18 
Table 48b 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
t-test For Mean SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.319304442 
0.03130072 
50 
0.029544311 
0 
67 
-1.431140822 
0.078518941 
1.667916115 
0.157037882 
1.996008331 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.385599635 
0.024762974 
19 
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assumption of equal variance in the two samples, because the resuUs of the F-test support 
this assumption. The same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 48b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean secured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
Table 49a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Unsecured Debt Ratio 
(UDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The two samples have been 
designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample 
with the higher variance has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower 
variance has been designated as Variable 2. The p-value is not only less than the 
significance level (a = 0.05) for the test but also it is less than 0.01, and the F statistic 
exceeds the critical value. 
These resuhs clearly indicate that the F statistic is significant not only at a significance 
level of 5% but also at a significance level of 1%. Hence it may be concluded that the 
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Table 49a 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
F-test For Variance Of UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable J 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.091202841 
0.006366622 
50 
49 
2.816571755" 
0.00944984 
2.037668781 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.066036572 
0.002260415 
19 
18 
Note: 'a' indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 49b 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
t-test For Mean UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.091202841 
0.006366622 
50 
0 
54 
1.603559774 
0.057322406 
1.673564907 
0.114644812 
2.00487P275 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.066036572 
0.002260415 
19 
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variance of unsecured debt ratio is significantly different between the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and 
Metal Products industry. It is to be noted here that the variance of the other debt ratios 
viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio and secured debt ratio, 
have been found not to be significantly different between the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products industry. 
Table 49b shows the resuhs of the two sample t-test for mean unsecured debt ratio 
between firms which revalue then: assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. The t-test has been carried out with the 
assimiption that the variances in the two samples are not equal, because the results of the 
F-test show that the variances are significantly different between the samples. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 49b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean unsecured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry. 
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FOOD INDUSTRY 
Table 50a shows the resuhs of the F-test for equality of variance of Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 
and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5%. Hence it may be concluded 
that the variance of long term debt ratio is not significantly different between the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Food 
industry. 
Table 50b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean long term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue then: assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Food industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance 
in the two samples, because the resuhs of the F-test support this assxmiption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 50b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean long term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
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Table 50a 
Food: 
F-test For Variance Of LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.173904929 
0.020760717 
46 
45 
3.61932616 
0.05480698 
3.762859055 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.152223441 
0.005736072 
7 
6 
Table 50b 
Food: 
t-test For Mean LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.173904929 
0.020760717 
46 
0.018993111 
0 
51 
0.387776088 
0.349897769 
1.675284951 
0.699795538 
2.007583728 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.152223441 
0.005736072 
7 
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of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 51a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Short Term Debt 
Ratio (STDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable I 
and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of short term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 51b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean short term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Food industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance 
in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable I and 
Variable 2. 
Table 5lb shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean short term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
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Table 51a 
Food: 
F-test For Variance Of STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.200200999 
0.020685506 
46 
45 
1.187121999 
0.455929479 
3.762859055 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.249158297 
0.01742492 
7 
6 
Table 51b 
Food: 
t-test For Mean STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.200200999 
0.020685506 
46 
0.020301908 
0 
51 
-0.846913417 
0.200500082 
1.675284951 
0.401000165 
2.007583728 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.249158297 
0.01742492 
7 
Chapter 5 245 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 52a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Total Debt Ratio 
(TDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Food industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable I and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of total debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 52b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean total debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Food 
industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance in the two 
samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same samples as in 
the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Table 52b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
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Table 52a 
Food: 
F-test For Variance Of TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.374105928 
0.036405363 
46 
45 
1.439724491 
0.344824116 
3.762859055 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.401381737 
0.02528634 
7 
6 
Table 52b 
Food: 
t-test For Mean TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.374105928 
0.036405363 
46 
0.035097243 
0 
51 
-0.358865037 
0.360588744 
1.675284951 
0.721177489 
2.007583728 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.401381737 
0.02528634 
7 
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mean total debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by nature. 
So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 53a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Secured Debt Ratio 
(SDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Food industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 53b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean secured debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Food 
industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance in the two 
samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same samples as in 
the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and Variable 2. 
Chapter 5 248 
Table 53a 
Food: 
F-test For Variance Of SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.279541659 
0.029345584 
46 
45 
1.059788345 
0.526242244 
3.762859055 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.309884265 
0.027690042 
7 
6 
Table 53b 
Food: 
t-test for Mean SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable J 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.279541659 
0.029345584 
46 
0.029150814 
0 
51 
-0.4380438 
0.331602158 
1.675284951 
0.663204317 
2.007583728 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.309884265 
0.027690042 
7 
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Table 53b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean secured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean secured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 54a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Unsecured Debt Ratio 
(UDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Food industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a == 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of unsecured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 54b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean unsecured debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Food industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance 
in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
Chapter 5 250 
Table 54a 
Food: 
F-test For Variance Of UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-vaiue One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.094564269 
0.009191398 
46 
45 
1.360516379 
0.37594814 
3.762859055 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.091497472 
0.006755815 
7 
6 
Table 54b 
Food: 
t-test For Mean UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.094564269 
0.009191398 
46 
0.008904858 
0 
51 
0.080105342 
0.468233495 
1.675284951 
0.93646699 
2.007583728 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.091497472 
0.006755815 
7 
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samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 54b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean unsecured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean unsecured debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Food industry. 
TEXTILES INDUSTRY 
Table 55a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of Long Term Debt 
Ratio (LTDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Textiles industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 
and Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance 
has been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of long term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industiy. 
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Table 55a 
Textiles: 
F-test For Variance Of LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.299291603 
0.029417453 
32 
31 
1.267450089 
0.195729567 
1.584701722 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.265021179 
0.02320995 
87 
86 
Table 55b 
Textiles: 
t-test for Mean LTDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.299291603 
0.029417453 
32 
0.024854673 
0 
117 
1.051420829 
0.147616057 
1.657981659 
0.295232113 
1.980447532 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.265021179 
0.02320995 
87 
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Table 55b shows the resuUs of the two sample t-test for mean long term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Textiles industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal 
variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The 
same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 55b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean long term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean long term debt ratio is not significantiy 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 56a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of short term debt ratio 
(STDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Textiles industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of short term debt ratio is not 
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Table 56a 
Textiles: 
F-test For Variance Of STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.161020855 
0.00742574 
32 
31 
1.043131822 
0.425094974 
1.584701722 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.179494725 
0.007118697 
87 
86 
Table 56b 
Textiles: 
t-test For Mean STDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.161020855 
0.00742574 
32 
0.00720005 
0 
117 
-1.053055472 
0.147242752 
1.657981659 
0.294485503 
1.980447532 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.179494725 
0.007118697 
87 
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significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles mdustry. 
Table 56b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean short term debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Textiles industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal 
variance in the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The 
same samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable I and 
Variable 2. 
Table 56b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean short term debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean short term debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 57a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of total debt ratio (TDR) 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Textiles industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and Variable 
2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has been 
designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been designated as 
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Table 57a 
Textiles: 
F-test For Variance Of TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.460312458 
0.047660389 
32 
31 
1.358042888 
0.136073082 
1.584701722 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.444515904 
0.035094907 
87 
86 
Table 57b 
Textiles: 
t-test For Mean TDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.460312458 
0.047660389 
32 
0.038424222 
0 
117 
0.389781239 
0.348703475 
1.657981659 
0.697406949 
1.980447532 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.444515904 
0.035094907 
87 
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Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the F statistic 
does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that the F statistic 
is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level of 10%. 
Hence it may be concluded that the variance of total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 57b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean total debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Textiles industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of equal variance in 
the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 57b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean total debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by nature. 
So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the mean total debt ratio is not significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
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Table 58a shows the resuhs of the F-test for equality of variance of secured debt ratio 
(SDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Textiles industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable I and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and 
the F statistic does not exceed the critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the F statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance 
level of 10%. Hence it may be concluded that the variance of secured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 58b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean secured debt ratio between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in the 
Textiles industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assimiption of equal variance in 
the two samples, because the results of the F-test support this assumption. The same 
samples as in the F-test for sample variance have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2. 
Table 58b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean secured debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is more than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic 
does not go beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that 
the t-statistic is not significant at a significance level of 5% or even at a significance level 
of 10%. Hence it may be concluded tiiat the mean secured debt ratio is not significantiy 
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Table 58a 
Textiles: 
F-test For Variance Of SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.420943279 
0.042155139 
32 
31 
1.324527701 
0.156105664 
1.584701722 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.380011276 
0.031826544 
87 
86 
Table 58b 
Textiles: 
t-test For Mean SDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.420943279 
0.042155139 
32 
0.03456318 
0 
117 
1.064920754 
0.144552284 
1.657981659 
0.289104569 
1.980447532 
Variable 2 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.380011276 
0.031826544 
87 
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different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 59a shows the results of the F-test for equality of variance of unsecured debt ratio 
(UDR) between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, in the Textiles industry. The two samples have been designated as Variable 1 and 
Variable 2 on the basis of the sample variance; the sample with the higher variance has 
been designated as Variable 1 and the sample with the lower variance has been 
designated as Variable 2. The p-value is less than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the 
F statistic exceeds the critical value. 
These results clearly indicate that the F statistic is significant not only at a significance 
level of 5% but also at a significance level of 1%. Hence it may be concluded that the 
variance of unsecured debt ratio is significantly different between the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. It is 
to be noted here that the variance of the other debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short 
term debt ratio, total debt ratio and secured debt ratio, have not been found to be 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
Table 59b shows the results of the two sample t-test for mean unsecured debt ratio 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, in 
the Textiles industry. The t-test has been carried out with the assumption of unequal 
variance in the two samples, becatise the results of the F-test show that the variance is 
significantiy different between the two samples. The same samples as in the F-test for 
sample variance have been designated as Variable I and Variable 2. 
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Table 59a 
Textiles: 
F-test For Variance Of UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
F Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
F Critical One-tail (Upper Tail) a = 0.05 
Variable 1 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue 
Their Assets 
0.064504628 
0.007019739 
87 
86 
3.818370494' 
3.99443E-05 
1.692669736 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.039369178 
0.001838412 
32 
31 
Note: 'a' indicates significance at 1% level. 
Table 59b 
Textiles: 
t-test For Mean UDR Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Degrees of Freedom 
t Statistic 
P-value One-tail 
t Critical One-tail 
P-value Two-tail 
t Critical Two-tail a = 0.05 
Variable I 
Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue . 
Their Assets 
0.064504628 
0.007019739 
87 
0 
105 
2.138610063" 
0.017392969 
1.659495384 
0.034785938 
1.982815217 
Variable 2 
Firms Which 
Revalue Their 
Assets 
0.039369178 
0.001838412 
32 
Note: 'b' indicates significance at 5% level. 
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Table 59b shows the p-value and critical value for both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. 
Because the objective is to find out whether or not there is a significant difference in the 
mean unsecxxred debt ratio between the two categories of firms, the test is two-tailed by 
nature. So the two-tailed critical value and p-value are relevant in this context. 
The two-tailed p-value is less than the significance level (a = 0.05) and the t statistic goes 
beyond the two-tailed critical value. Therefore the results clearly indicate that the t-
statistic is significant at a significance level of 5%. Hence it may be concluded that the 
mean unsecured debt ratio is significantly different between the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
DISCUSSION ON THE RESUTS OF T TESTS OF DEBT RATIOS 
The results of the t-tests provide evidence in support of hypothesis HIO for the debt ratios 
long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio and secured debt ratio in all the 
five industries. However, the t-test results for imsecured debt ratio provide mixed 
evidence with reference to hypothesis HID. The mean unsecured debt ratio was found not 
to be significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets in all the Chemicals industry,. Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals industry, Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry and the Food 
industry; so the findings on unsecured debt ratio support hypothesis HIO in these four 
industries. However, the mean unsecured debt ratio was found to be significantly 
different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets in the Textiles industry thus providing evidence against hypothesis HIO. 
Thus we may conclude that there is no significant difference in the debt ratios long term 
debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio and secured debt ratio between the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. However, it is 
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likely that unsecured debt ratio may be significantly different between the two categories 
of firms in some of the industries. 
MANN-WHITNEY U TESTS FOR DIFFERENCE IN DEBT RATIOS BETWEEN 
FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS AND FIRMS WHICH DO NOT 
REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Table 60 shows the results of the Mann-Whiney U-tests for difference in each of the five 
types of debt ratios between the two categories of firms viz. those which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. For all the 
debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt 
ratio and unsecured debt ratio, the p-values (p-level as mentioned in the table) and the Z-
values indicate that the U-statistic is not significant at any of the conventional levels i.e. 
1%, 5% or 10%. Hence it may be concluded that there is no significant difference in any 
of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and those which do not 
revalue their assets, in the Chemicals industry. 
Table 61 shows the results of the Mann-Whiney U-tests for difference in each of the five 
types of debt ratios between the two categories of firms viz. those which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
industry. For all the debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt 
ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio, the p-values (p-level as mentioned in 
the table) and the Z-values indicate that the U-statistic is not significant at any of the 
conventional levels i.e. 1%, 5% or 10%. Hence it may be concluded that there is no 
significant difference in any of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
industry. 
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Table 60 
Chemicals: 
Mann Whitney U Tests For Debt Ratios Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
U 
Z 
p-Ievel 
Z adjusted 
p-level 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Valid N For Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their Assets 
LTDR 
6062.000 
17158.00 
4351.000 
-0.498943 
0.617820 
-0.498943 
0.617820 
58 
157 
STDR 
6183.000 
17037.00 
4472.000 
-0.200071 
0.841425 
-0.200071 
0.841425 
58 
157 
TDR 
5980.000 
17240.00 
4269.000 
-0.701485 
0.483001 
-0.701485 
0.483001 
58 
157 
SDR 
5834.000 
17386.00 
4123.000 
-1.06211 
0.288188 
-1.06211 
0.288188 
58 
157 
UDR 
6664.000 
16556.00 
4153.000 
0.988007 
0.323150 
0.988043 
0.323133 
58 
157 
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Table 61 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals: 
Mann Whitney U Tests for Debt Ratios Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
U 
Z 
p-level 
Z adjusted 
p-level 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Valid N For Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their Assets 
2* 1 sided exact p 
LTDR 
806.0000 
1895.000 
517.0000 
0.353396 
0.723792 
0.353396 
0.723792 
21 
52 
0.730377 
STDR 
801.0000 
1900.000 
522.0000 
0.292466 
0.769931 
0.292511 
0.769896 
21 
52 
0.776307 
TDR 
810.0000 
1891.000 
513.0000 
0.402140 
0.687581 
0.402140 
0.687581 
21 
52 
0.694298 
SDR 
783.5000 
1917.500 
539.5000 
0.079209 
0.936866 
0.079210 
0.936866 
21 
52 
0.937371 
UDR 
901.0000 
1800.000 
422.0000 
1.511072 
0.130771 
1.511084 
0.130768 
21 
52 
0.133111 
Note: The last row '2*1 sided exact p' appears for those samples which are treated as small or 
moderate sized by the STATISTICA software. For such type of samples STATISTICA computes an 
exact probability associated with the respective U statistic. This probability is based on the 
enumeration of all possible values of U (unadjusted for ties), given the number of observations in 
the two samples. 
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Table 62 shows the results of the Mann-Whiney U-tests for difference in each of the five 
types of debt ratios between the two categories of firms viz. those which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products industry. For all the debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio, the p-values (p-level as 
mentioned in the table) and the Z-values mdicate that the U-statistic is not significant at 
any of the conventional levels i.e. 1%, 5% or 10%. Hence it may be concluded that there 
is no significant difference in any of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products industry. 
Table 63 shows the results of the Mann-Whiney U-tests for difference in each of the five 
types of debt ratios between the two categories of firms viz. those which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Food industry. For all the debt 
ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio 
and unsecured debt ratio, the p-values (p-level as mentioned in the table) and the Z-
values indicate that the U-statistic is not significant at any of the conventional levels i.e. 
1%, 5% or 10%. Hence it may be concluded that there is no significant difference in any 
of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and those which do not 
revalue their assets, in the Food industry. 
Table 64 shows the results of the Mann-Whiney U-tests for difference in each of the five 
types of debt ratios between the two categories of firms viz. those which revalue their 
assets and those which do not revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. For all the 
debt ratios viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt 
ratio and unsecured debt ratio, the p-values (p-level as mentioned in the table) and thfe Z-
values indicate that the U-statistic is not significant at any of the conventional levels i.e. 
1%, 5% or 10%, Hence it may be concluded that there is no significant difference in any 
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Table 62 
Ferrous Metal & Metal Products: 
Mann Whitney U Tests For Debt Ratios Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
U 
Z 
p-level 
Z adjusted 
p-level 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
2* 1 sided exact p 
LTDR 
652.0000 
1763.000 
462.0000 
-0.174632 
0.861369 
-0.174632 
0.861369 
19 
50 
0.867800 
STDR 
759.0000 
1656.000 
381.0000 
1.262722 
0.206690 
1.262722 
0.206690 
19 
50 
0.211051 
TDR 
705.0000 
1710.000 
435.0000 
0.537328 
0.591041 
0.537328 
0.591041 
19 
50 
0.598627 
SDR 
757.0000 
1658.000 
383.0000 
1.235855 
0.216513 
1.235855 
0.216513 
19 
50 
0.221070 
UDR 
602.0000 
1813.000 
412.0000 
-0.846292 
0.397390 
-0.846323 
0.397373 
19 
50 
0.404343 
Note: The last row '2*1 sided exact p' appears for those samples which are treated as small or 
moderate sized by the STATISTICA software. For such type of samples STATISTIC A computes an 
exact probability associated with the respective U statistic. This probability is based on the 
enumeration of all possible values of U (unadjusted for ties), given the number of observations in 
the two samples. 
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Table 63 
Food: 
Mann Whitney U Tests For Debt Ratios Between Firms Whicii Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
U 
Z 
p-level 
Z adjusted 
p-level 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Valid N For Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their Assets 
2* 1 sided exact p 
LTDR 
182.0000 
1249.000 
154.0000 
-0.183892 
0.854098 
-0.183892 
0.854098 
7 
46 
0.867360 
STDR 
225.0000 
1206.000 
125.0000 
0.945732 
0.344286 
0.945809 
0.344247 
7 
46 
0.358839 
TDR 
211.0000 
1220.000 
139.0000 
0.577948 
0.563300 
0.577948 
0.563300 
7 
46 
0.579882 
SDR 
209.5000 
1221.500 
140.5000 
0.538542 
0.590203 
0.538553 
0.590196 
7 
46 
0.597706 
UDR 
192.5000 
1238.500 
157.5000 
0.091946 
0.926741 
0.091965 
0.926726 
7 
46 
0.928353 
Note: The last row '2*1 sided exact p' appears for those samples which are treated as small or 
moderate sized by the STATISTIC A software. For such type of samples STATISTIC A computes an 
exact probability associated with the respective U statistic. This probability is based on the 
enumeration of all possible values of U (unadjusted for ties), given the number of observations in 
the two samples. 
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Table 64 
Textiles: 
Mann Whitney U Tests For Debt Ratios Between Firms Which Do And Do Not Revalue Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Rank Sum For Firms Which 
Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
U 
Z 
p-level 
Z adjusted 
p-level 
Valid N For Firms Which 
Revalue Their Assets 
Valid N For Firms Which Do 
Not Revalue Their Assets 
2* 1 sided exact p 
LTDR 
2118.000 
5022.000 
1194.000 
1.186672 
0.235358 
1.186672 
0.235358 
32 
87 
0.237849 
STDR 
1792.000 
5348.000 
1264.000 
-0.767141 
0.442998 
-0.767141 
0.442998 
32 
87 
0.446688 
TDR 
2062.000 
5078.000 
1250.000 
0.851047 
0.394744 
0.851047 
0.394744 
32 
87 
0.398279 
SDR 
2150.000 
4990.000 
1162.000 
1.378457 
0.168063 
1.378457 
0.168063 
32 
87 
0.169815 
UDR 
1742.000 
5398.000 
1214.000 
-1.06681 
0.286060 
-1.06703 
0.285957 
32 
87 
0.288983 
Note: The last row '2*1 sided exact p' appears for those samples which are treated as small or 
moderate sized by the STATISTICA software. For such type of samples STATISTIC A computes an 
exact probability associated with the respective U statistic. This probability is based on the 
enumeration of all possible values of U (unadjusted for ties), given the number of observations in 
the two samples. 
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of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and those which do not 
revalue their assets, in the Textiles industry. 
DISCUSSION ON THE RESUTS OF T TESTS AND MANN-WHITNEY U TESTS 
OF DEBT RATIOS 
Thus it can be seen from the results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests that for all the five 
industries there is no difference in any of the debt ratios between the firms which revalue 
their assets and those which do not revalue their assets. Similar results have been shown 
by the t-tests in all the five industries for the debt ratios long term debt ratio, short term 
debt ratio, total debt ratio and secured debt ratio. Unsecured debt ratio was found to be 
significantly different in the t-test between the two categories of firms in the Textiles 
industry. However, it is to be noted that the unsecured debt ratio was not found to be 
significantly different between the two categories of firms in any of the other four 
industries; the only exception was Textiles industry. 
If we look closely into the t-test results for unsecured debt ratio in the Textiles industry, it 
can be found that the p-value was only marginally less than the significance level (a) of 
0.05. The difference between the p-value and a is less than 0.02. Moreover, if we use a 
significance level of 1% (a = 0.01) the t-statistic will not be considered significant. So, it 
is highly likely that the t-statistic was fovmd to be significant only due to random errors 
and in reality the difference may not be significant at all. 
Further, Anderson, Sweeny and Williams (2002)' explain "In many cases where a non-
parametric method as well as a parametric method can be applied, the non-parametric 
method is almost as good as or ahnost as powerfiil as the parametric method." As shown 
in Table 60, in the Mann-Whitney U-test for unsecured debt ratio in the Textiles industry 
the p-values (p-level for Z: 0.286060; p-level for Z adjusted: 0.285957; 2*1 sided exact p 
for the U statistic: 0.288983) were found to be much higher than any of the 
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conventionally used significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 10%. With this and the above 
mentioned observations it seems reasonable to conclude that unsecured debt ratio is not 
significantly different between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets. 
From the above observations we find that the findings fi:om the t-tests and the Mann-
Whitney U-tests provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis HIO. It is concluded 
that there is no significant difference in the debt ratios long term debt ratio, short term 
debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio between the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. This 
conclusion leads us to a new possibility. It has been found in the presence of revaluation 
of assets that there is no significant difference between the two categories of firms. It may 
be possible that with no revaluation of assets taking place the debt ratios would have been 
significantly different. 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
Tables 65 and 66 provide the correlation matrices for the firms which revalue their assets 
and the firms which do not revalue their assets respectively. In table 65 it can be seen that 
for firms which revalue their assets the signs of the correlation coefficients between 
profitability and the different measures of leverage are all negative as predicted by theory 
(and prior empirical evidence) except for unsecured debt ratio. As predicted by theory 
there is a positive correlation between firm size and the different measures of leverage 
except for short term debt ratio. Further except short term debt ratio and unsecured debt 
ratio tangibility is positively related with the other three measures of leverage as 
predicted by theory. Contrary to the theoretical predictions and general empirical findings 
the correlation between growth opportunities and the various measures of leverage except 
short term debt ratio is positive. 
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Three out of the five measures of leverage have a negative correlation with earnings 
volatility as per the theoretical predictions and the general empirical evidence; the 
exceptions are long term debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. Three out of the five 
measures of leverage have a positive correlation with non-debt tax shields contrary to the 
theoretical predictions; only short term debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio are negatively 
correlated as per the theoretical predictions. For all the five measures leverage the 
correlations with non-financial costs are negative as per the prediction of hypothesis H8 
which is based on the empirical evidence collected in this context and presented in Tables 
67(a) through 67(e); so far no predictions on the basis of theories of capital structure or 
from other empirical studies have been found in this regard. 
In Table 66 it can be seen that for firms which do not revalue their assets the signs of the 
correlation coefficients between profitability and the different measures of leverage are 
all negative as predicted by theory and prior empirical evidence. Except short term debt 
ratio the other measures of leverage are positively correlated with firm size as per 
theoretical predictions and prior empirical findings. Again except short term debt ratio 
the other measures of leverage are positively correlated with tangibility as per the 
theoretical predictions and prior empirical evidence. Contrary to the theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence the growth opportunities are positively correlated with 
four out of the five measures of leverage. 
Earnings volatility is negatively correlated with four out of the five measures of leverage 
as per the theoretical predictions and empirical findings. Contrary to theoretical 
predictions non-debt tax shields are positively related with four out of the five measures 
of leverage. For all the five measures leverage the correlations with non-financial costs 
are negative as per the prediction of hypothesis H8 which is based on the empirical 
evidence collected in this context and presented in Tables 67(a) through 67(e). 
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From the correlation matrix it can be observed that among all the seven types of 
determinants used in this study non-financial costs have the most consistent nature of 
correlation with all the five types of debt ratios in both categories of firms. Further the 
correlation matrices for both categories of firms also provide the correlation between the 
pairs of determinants. Given the correlations among the various determinants, whether 
there is any problem of multicoUinearity or not, was verified through appropriate 
statistical measure. 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR VARIOUS DEBT RATIOS OF FIRMS WHICH 
REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Tables 68 to 72 show the summary results of OLS regression for all the five debt ratios 
used in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio, on the basis of the Models A, B and C, for firms 
which revalue their assets. Model A includes only the determinants selected fi-om prior 
empirical literature and it does not include the industry dunmiies. Model B extends 
Model A by including the industry dummies. Model C extends Model B by including the 
newly identified determinant in this study. 
For each type of debt ratio the regression output for all the three models have been placed 
adjacent to each other in the Tables 68 to 72. The regression output has been presented in 
this manner in order to facilitate comparison between the three models for the same type 
of debt ratio. Since the purpose of the aforementioned tables is to facilitate comparison 
between the three models for each debt ratio, only the most relevant parts have been 
extracted firom the detailed OLS regression output and presented in the aforementioned 
tables. 
The presence or absence of the problem of multicoUinearity has been formally checked 
by the computation of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each of the determinants 
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and the average VIF (VIF) for all the determinants. According to statistical literature a 
VIF in excess of 10 is an indication of the presence of multicoUinearity. The average VIF 
is also used as an index of multicoUinearity for all the determinants taken together. Table 
83 (given later) shows the computation of VIF for the firms which revalue their assets. 
The table shows that the VIF for each of the determinants as well as the average VIF for 
all the determinants is far below 10 (for profitability VIF is below 3 and for the others it 
is below 2), which shows that there is no problem of multicoUinearity in the data. 
Further Chatteijee, Hadi and Price (2000)^  explain that the problem of heteroscedasticity 
is usually detected by the scatter plot of the standardised residuals against each of the 
predictor variables. Accordingly standardised residual plots were made with the help of 
the Statistica (Release 8) software package for each of the five types of debt ratios. Since 
the graphs of the standardised residual plots were very similar for all the five types of 
debt ratios only the standardised residual plots for long term debt ratio (LTDR) have been 
shown in the Annexures. 
Annexure-3 shows the standardised residual plots for long term debt ratio against each of 
the independent variables for firms which revalue their assets. The graphs of the 
standardised residuals do not reveal any systematic patterns which would suggest 
increase or decrease in residual variance with the values of the independent variables. 
Chatterjee, Hadi and Price (2000)' explain that heteroscedasticity v^ll be detected if the 
standardised residuals tend to have a funnel-shaped distribution, either fanning out or 
closing in Math the values of the predictor variables. They explain that in general if the 
residuals tend to diverge as the predictor variable increases the residual variance is said to 
be increasing with the predictor variable. On the other hand if the residuals tend to 
converge as the predictor variable increases the residual variance is said to be decreasing 
with the predictor variable. 
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In order to demonstrate that the standardised residioals do not follow any systematic 
patterns as explained above the standardised residual plot of a heteroscedastic data set has 
been provided in Annexure-5. The example and the data for illustrating how the 
standardised residual plot of heteroscedastic data looks like have been taken from 
Chatterjee, Hadi and Price (2000) .^ A comparison of all the standardised residual plots 
(i.e. those which have been shown in Annexure-3 as well as those which have not been 
shown in the Annexures) with that of the standardised residual plot in Annexure-5 
strongly indicates that the problem of heteroscedasticity does not affect the regression 
analysis of any of the debt ratios in this study. 
LONG TERM DEBT 
Table 68 shows the summary results of OLS regression for long term debt ratio (LTDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different from zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between long term debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides strong 
evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and 
the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show 
that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each 
independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
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Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is significant and negative in all the three 
models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with long term debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984'^ ) and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. The results are also consistent with the findings of most of the 
prior studies. Almost all the earlier studies have reported a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. 
For firms which revalue their assets it can be concluded that profitability is negatively 
related with long term debt ratio. 
Size: Size of the firm is found to have a positive relationship vnth long term debt ratio in 
all the three models and this relationship is highly significant (at 1% level or even lower) 
in all the three models. The results are also consistent with the findings of some of the 
major studies such as Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)'^ , and contradict 
the findings of Saravanan (2006)'^. The empirical literature mostly reports a positive 
relationship between size and long term debt. These results support the trade-off theory 
and agency theory, and contradict the pecking order hypothesis. These results provide 
evidence m support of hypothesis H3. For firms which revalue their assets it can be 
concluded that size is positively related with long term debt ratio. 
TangibUity: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a significant 
and positive relationship with long term debt ratio. These results are consistent vwth the 
findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Kakani (1999)''*, and contradict those of 
Pandey (2001)'^  and Saravanan (2006)''. The empirical literature mostly reports a 
positive relationship between leverage and tangibility. 
The results for tangibility also support the trade-off theory and agency theory. The 
positive relationship between tangibility and long term debt might have arisen because, as 
the assets are more tangible (which means that there is a higher concentration of fixed 
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assets in the total assets of the firai) the requirement for long term fmancing will be 
higher, which in the absence of sufficient amoimt of internally generated funds can be 
ideally raised in the form of long term debt. These results provide evidence in support of 
hypothesis H4. For firms which revalue their assets it can be concluded that tangibility is 
positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: It is found that growth opportunities have a highly significant 
and positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
contradict the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ and are consistent partly with 
Pandey (2001)'^  and fully with Kakani (1999)''^  and Saravanan (2006)'^ This factor has 
been mostly reported to have a negative relationship with leverage in empirical literature. 
This lack of consistency with the generally found evidence in empirical literature may be 
due to the possibility that the measure of growth opportunities used in this study is unable 
to distinguish between the growth options available to the firms and growth arising out of 
the investments already made by the firms. 
The results on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory. These 
results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms which revalue their 
assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively related with long 
term debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis of this evidence 
that growth opportunities are positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: The results for all the three models show an insignificant and 
positive relationship between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio. The nature of 
relationship found tends to be consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993)\ Saravanan (2006)*' and Pandey (2001)'^ It should be noted that past empirical 
Chapter 5 283 
studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings volatility and 
leverage. 
These results contradict the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage. Further, these results provide evidence against 
hypothesis H6. Hence it cannot be concluded that earnings volatility is negatively related 
with long term debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three models. These results are 
consistent v^ dth Kakani (1999)*^ and contradict Bennett and Donnelly (1993) .^ It should 
be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between 
non-debt tax shield and leverage. These results contradict the prediction of the trade-off 
theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage. 
Further, these results provide evidence against hypothesis H7. Hence it cannot be 
concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with long term debt ratio for 
firms which revalue their assets. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis of 
this evidence that non-debt tax shields are positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with long term debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findmgs in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and long term debt ratio. These results provide 
evidence m support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a negative 
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relationship between non-financial costs and long term debt ratio for firms which revalue 
their assets. 
It is further foxmd that there is no significant impact of foreign currency loans of any type 
on long term debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on long 
term debt ratio. There is no significant impact of the industry factor on long term debt 
ratio; the industry coefficients show that the long term debt ratios in the Chemicals 
industry, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry 
are not significantly higher or lower than that in the Textiles industry (the control group). 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 0.5% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant non-financial costs improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 7.1%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases the 
explanation of the behaviour of long term debt ratio significantly. Moreover as the 
adjusted R^  increases significantly in Model C this model is considered to be the fmal 
model for long term debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. 
In the final model, Model C, the extent of influence on the long term debt ratio 
notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-debt tax shields, followed by non-financial 
costs, growth opportunities, profitability, tangibility and size. The impact of volatility is 
not significant. It can be seen that the same firm specific factors other than the non-
financial costs which are found to be significant or insignificant in the Models A and B 
are also found to be so in Model C. 
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SHORT TERM DEBT 
Table 69 shows the summary results of OLS regression for short term debt ratio (STDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves fi-om Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between short term debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of 
the three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the 
associated serial correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides 
strong evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is 
negligible and the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of 
residuals show that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots 
against each independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative in all the three models and is 
highly significant. These results support the pecking order hypothesis and contradict the 
trade-off theory of capital structure with regard to debt in general. The results are partly 
consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and wholly consistent with 
the findings of Pandey (2001)'^ and Kakani (1999)''*. These results provide evidence in 
support of hypothesis H2. Hence for firms wliich revalue their assets it can be concluded 
that profitability is negatively related with short term debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have a positive relationship with short term debt ratio in Models A 
and B but a negative relationship in Model C; however the relationship is not significant 
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in any of the three models. The results are partly consistent with the findings of Bennett 
and Donnelly (1993)^  and wholly consistent with the findings of Pandey (2001)'^ The 
final model. Model C tends to support the pecking order hypothesis with regard to debt in 
general. These results do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H3. For 
firms which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present 
evidence that size is positively related with short term debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a highly 
significant and negative relationship with short term debt ratio. The significant negative 
relationship between tangibility and short term debt might have arisen because as the 
concentration of fixed assets in the total assets of the firm increases the need for long 
term financing increases vis-a-vis short term financing. These resuhs contradict the 
findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and are consistent with Pandey (2001)''. The 
empirical results on the relationship between short term debt and tangibility are few and 
mixed. The results do not support the trade-off theory and agency theory with regard to 
debt in general. 
These results do not provide evidence in support of hypothesis H4. Hence for firms 
which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that tangibility is positively related with 
short term debt ratio. It is rather concluded from the results that tangibility is negatively 
related with short term debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunities are found to have positive relationship 
with short term debt ratio in all the three models; however this relationship is not 
significant in any of the three models. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ and Pandey (2001)'^ The results on the relationship 
between growth opportimities and leverage weakly support the pecking order hypothesis 
and contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory with regard to debt in general. 
Chapter 5 288 
These results do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H5. Therefore for 
firms which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present 
evidence that growth opportunities are negatively related with short term debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is fo\md to have a significant and negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. These results are consistent 
with the findmgs of Kakani (1999)''*. However, the results contradict the findings of 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)'^ . It should be noted that past empirical 
studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings volatility and 
leverage in general. These results indicate that firms having higher earnings volatility 
tend to carry lower levels of short term debt. 
In comparison to long term debt, short term debt puts greater pressure on the cash flows 
of the firms for the debt service payments. Hence there is a greater likelihood of financial 
distress arising out of the possibility of defaulting on the debt service payments 
associated with short term debt compared to long term debt. The likelihood of financial 
distress arising out of the possibility of defaulting on the debt service payments is higher 
for firms which face higher volatility of earnings; hence we can find a significant inverse 
relationship between earnings volatility and short term debt ratio. The fact that earnings 
volatility does not have any significant relationship with long term debt ratio whereas it 
has a significant negative relationship with short term debt ratio illustrates this point. 
These results support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. Further, these results 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it can be concluded that earnings 
volatility is negatively related with short term debt ratio for firms which revalue their 
assets. 
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Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
and negative relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
are consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ and Kakani (1999)^ '*. It 
should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship 
between non-debt tax shield and leverage in general. These results weakly support the 
prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and 
leverage in general. Although the results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H7 a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and short term debt ratio should not be 
concluded on the basis of the present evidence, because the negative coefficients are not 
significant. 
The opposite behaviour of long term debt ratio and short term debt ratio with regard to 
non-debt tax shields arises because the non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and 
amortisation tend to increase with fixed assets and other long term assets (such as 
intangible or fictitious assets) which in turn give rise to increasing long term financing 
requirements. If long term financing requirements cannot be met through retention of 
earnings then such requirements can be ideally met through long term debt because long 
term assets can be appropriately financed firom long term sources of financing (matching 
the maturity of assets and sources of finance). So under normal circumstances firms 
would not finance their long term requirements through short term debt. However they 
may use short term debt for this purpose when long term debt is not available and renew 
the short term debt upon matiuity or replace it with long term debt later on. 
This simply means that non-debt tax shields tend to increase with fixed assets. As fixed 
assets increase the long term financing requirements tend to increase which may lead to 
either higher retention of earnings or higher long term debt. In either case short term debt 
ratio should tend to decrease with non-debt shields. So it is likely that long term debt and 
short term debt may respond to the non-debt tax shields in different ways. 
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Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with short term debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and short term debt ratio. These results provide 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between non-financial costs and short term debt ratio for firms 
which revalue their assets. 
It is fiirther found that there is no significant impact of foreign currency loans of any type 
on short term debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on short 
term debt ratio. In the final model. Model C, except the Food industry there is no 
significant impact of the industry factor on short term debt ratio; the coefficient for the 
Food industry dummy indicates that the Food industry has a significantly higher short 
term debt ratio than the Textiles industry (which is the control group). However the 
industry coefficients of the other three industries suggest that the short term debt ratios in 
those mdustries are not likely to be significantly more or less than that in the Textiles 
industry. 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 1.93% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant non-financial costs improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 6.91%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases the 
explanation of short term debt ratio significantly. In the final model, Model C, the extent 
of influence on the short term debt ratio notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-
financial costs followed by volatility, profitability and tangibility. The factors size, 
growth and non-debt tax shields do not have significant impact on short term debt ratio. It 
can be seen that the same firm specific factors other than the non-financial costs which 
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are found to be significant or insignificant in the Models A and B are also found to be so 
in Model C. 
TOTAL DEBT 
Table 70 shows the summary results of OLS regression for total debt ratio (TDR) on the 
basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for firms 
which revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10%. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves firom Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between total debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the three 
models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated serial 
correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides strong evidence 
that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and the 
models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show that 
they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each independent 
variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and highly significant in all the 
three models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with total debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984*') and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. The results also confirm the findings of most of the prior 
studies. Almost all the earlier studies have reported a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. 
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For firms which revalue their assets it can be concluded that profitability is negatively 
related with total debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have a significant and positive relationship with total debt ratio in 
all the three models. The results are consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993^, Rajan and Zingales (1995)'* and Pandey (2001)'^ These results support the 
trade-off theory and contradict the pecking order hypothesis with regard to debt in 
general. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. For firms which 
revalue their assets it can be concluded that size is positively related with total debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has an 
insignificant relationship with total debt ratio; it is positive in Model B, and negative in 
Models A and C. These results are not consistent with the findings of Bermett and 
Dormelly (1993) ,^ and Rajan and Zingales (1995)**. The empirical literature mostly 
reports a positive relationship between leverage in general and tangibility. 
The results show that the relationship between tangibility and total debt ratio is not 
significant. The results do not provide evidence in support of hypothesis H4, Hence for 
firms which revalue their assets it caimot be concluded whether tangibility is negatively 
or positively related with total debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportimities are fovmd to have a highly significant and 
positive relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Pandey (2001)'' and contradict the findings of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995)'*. This factor has been mostly reported to have a negative relationship 
with leverage in empirical literature. This lack of consistency with the generally found 
evidence in empirical literature may be due to the possibility that the measure of growth 
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opportunities used in this study is unable to distinguish between the growth options 
available to the firms and growth arising out of the investments already made by the 
firms. 
The results on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and, contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory with 
regard to debt in general. These results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. 
Therefore for firms which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that growth 
opportunities are negatively related with total debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be 
concluded on the basis of this evidence that growth opportunities are positively related 
with total debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is found to have a negative relationship with 
total debt ratio in all the three models; however it is not significant. Except for the 
insignificance these results are consistent with the findings of Kakani (1999)''*. However, 
the results contradict the fmdings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)". 
It should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage. These results indicate that firms having higher 
earnings volatility tend to carry lower levels of total debt. 
Though not significant, these results support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the 
relationship between earmngs volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. 
Further, these results do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence 
it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that earnings volatility is 
negatively related with total debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. 
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Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
and positive relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
contradict the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and partly contradict Kakani 
1^999)14 jQtai jg|5t ratio gj^ j^ short term debt ratio are found to respond differently to 
non-debt tax shields. This might happen because a greater portion of the total debt might 
be in the form of long term debt which tend to increase with non-debt tax shields as the 
increase in non-debt tax shields tend to be associated v^th increase in fixed assets. 
It should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. These results do not support the prediction of 
the trade-off theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage with 
regard to debt in general. The results do not provide significant evidence in support of 
hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that 
non-debt tax shields are negatively related vwth total debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with total debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not come 
across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on capital 
structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this relationship 
between non-financial costs and total debt ratio. These results provide strong evidence in 
support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a negative relationship 
between non-financial costs and total debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. 
It is fiirther found that there is no significant impact of foreign currency loans of any type 
on total debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on total debt 
ratio. There is no significant impact of the industry factor on total debt ratio; this 
indicates that the total debt ratios in the other four industries are not likely to be 
significantly more or less than that in the Textiles industry which is the control group. 
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The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 2.12% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 12.48%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases 
the explanation of total debt ratio significantly. In the final model, Model C, the extent of 
influence on the total debt ratio notvydthstanding the sign is highest due to non-financial 
costs followed by growth, profitability and size. The factors tangibility, volatility and 
non-debt tax shields do not have significant impact on total debt ratio. It can be seen that 
the same firm specific factors which are found to be significant or insignificant in the 
Models A and B are also found to be so in Model C. 
SECURED DEBT 
Table 71 shows the summary results of OLS regression for secured debt ratio (SDR) on 
the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for firms 
which revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different from zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between secured debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides strong 
evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and 
the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show 
that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each 
independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Chapter 5 297 
^ 
^ 
"o* 1 
.0 
w •«4
.a 
M 
s U 
'£ u 
o 
o 
-1 
2 •fi 
E2 Q 
"O 
4> 
U 
a 
o Vi 
o 
b 
•s 
S 
a 
a 
Ml 
1^  1 
PQ 
iJ 
§ 
"$, 
< 
§ 
s 
1 
v o. 
CQ 
-r-
s? s? iJ 
<!. 
CQ 
H ^ 
4> 
^ 
^ 
Q. 
CQ 
1 
iH 
e 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
< 
oe fo 
• * 
« 
• 
«s 
*r> VJ 
•t 
00 
fO 
o 
o 
oa 
00 
TH 
^ 
vc 1 ^ 
o 
1 ^ 
t^  tr> 
Tf 
fO 
o d 
ea 
«s 1^ 
o Tf 
1-t 
d 
u 
1 
VO 
•rf 
fO 
1 ^ 
•* O 
d 
n 
fO 
<s J8 
r~; d 1 
o\ 
«s 
m 
o 
o 
o 
d 
< 
00 
00 
r^  
• * 
tn 
1-5 
fO 
Tf 
O 
o 
o o d 
-< 
r-i-H 
fO 
fS 
«o 
t 
^ 
1 — C 
d 
s 
OH 
m 
o 
o 
en 
d 
• ^ 
Ov 
o d 
1 ^ 
t-
• 1 * 
«s 
o 
o 
d 
•< 
• * 
0\ 
9\ 
fO 
o 
d 
00 
fs 
o fO 
o o d 
< 
i« 
• * 
o Tf 
o 
d 
W N 
t-H 
00 
VO 
ro Ti-
t^ 
m 
d 
m 
vo ts 
o 
d 1 
r-VO 
OS 
VO 
d 
«s 
o 
o VO 
o d 
ro 
VO 
Ov 
m l-M 
0\ 
d 
(S 
tr» 
m 
o d 
a 
o 
•«r 
*\ rH 
• « * 
•«r 
o 
d 
*« \e 1-H 
2S 90 
ON 
e 
ON 
•<t 
>H 
•<» 
00 
o 
d 
u 
00 
fO 
f> 
<^  
«i 
o 
OS 
• * 
•* 
^H 
fO 
o d 
CD 
CJ ON 
00 
Ov 
rH 
i ^ 
1 
o 
VO 
r<-i 
m O 
<N 
d 
o 
ON 
«-H 
vrj 
d 1 
•<i-
Tf 
o 
•t 
r-~ f<) 
d 
c~ 
o 0\ 
00 
CO 
d 1 
m 
»-H 
o 
o VO 
d 
00 
<s 
>n Tj-
VO 
d 1 
d 
H 
<: 
o 
> 
o 
VO 
VO 
»-H 
m 
> — ' 
d 
(N 
<*1 
<N 
O 
VTl 
^ 
ON 
ir> 
CO 
0\ 
t~-
^ 
O 
CO 
o ON 
lo 
•>* 
<N 
00 
VO 
Ov 
d 
r-
00 
m OS 
vq 
f—H 
H Q 
«s 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
d 
• < 
o 
•* 00 
*^ 
"* 
«? 
O 
(S 
cs VO 
<s VO 
CN 
d 
o 
VO 
m 
ro O 
d 
VO 
ir> 
• ^ 
o 
• ^ 
r-
d 
ON 
VO 
o 
o d 
^ - • * 
•<i-
• * 
VO 
r~ 
d 
00 
00 
00 
f-H 
o d 
Q 
1 
X 
C/3 
o 
00 
c«^  
• * 
t^ 
<N 
d 
o 
m VO 
C^t 
O 
d 
m VO 
• ^ 
r^  VO 
n 
d 
ON 
••I-
as 
m 
o d 
^ 
cs 
»o ir> 
CM 
d 
(N 
TT 
m <N 
O 
d 
Pi 
a o 
< 
«n 
in 
m iH
o 
• 
o 
•< 
00 
rH 
Tf 
rH 
rH 
d 
1 
«S 
o 00 
fO 
o 
o 
d 
"^ ifi 
fO 
rH 
rH d 1 
00 
1 
•* 
o 
•«t 
t~-
«s 
e 
d 
« 
!2 »\ 
• * 
o rH 
d 
» — * ON 
fS 
lo 
oo 
o 
d 
ON 
r-00 
00 
o d 1 
CL, 
r-
in 
r~ 
r-
•^  
w-> 
d 
• ^ 
00 
(N 
O 
d 
t-~ 
t-~-
r--00 
m 
m 
d 
• * 
r-00 
''t 
o d 
CO 
ID 
Q 
W 
<o 
<N 
fn 
• * 
(S 
VO 
d 
o 
OS 
CO 
o d 
r--1—1 
o 
o 00 
ON 
d 
r-
r-1-^ 
o 
o d 
Q 
O 
O 
Os 
m 
r~ (N 
o 
• < * 
d 
o 
VO 
m 00 
00 
<s 
d 
CM 
>n 
<o 
o 
o fN 
d 
Pi 
•a 
u 
•4-» 1/1 
3 
< 
r-
•t 
r~ 
• ^ 
•t 
d 
^^  
o 
o 00 
U~t 
—^  
d 
m 
VO 
rf 
r~ VO 
-^  
d 
5J 
w 
(4-1 
o 
fc 
M 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
d 
< 
r^  
r< 
m 
•^ V) 
o 
00 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
* 
o 
< 
ON 
T-t 
fO 
«s OS 
in 
o 
f i 
o 
o 
o o 
d 
•< 
m 
r~ VO 
Tf 
VO 
tn 
•r—t 
r-
00 
VO 
m 
o OS 
"^  
o\ 
r~-VO 
m 00 
o 
r4 
• * 
•«i-
ir> 
o fo 
oo 
t3 
a 
o 
c 
3 
Q 
00 
Os 
00 
NO 
• * 
o 
d 
o 
00 
l-H 
fs 
'* 
o d. 1 
lO 
» — t 
VO 
• < * 
00 
o 
d 
G 
O 
1 
o 
(L> 
4> 
> 
O. 
U 
> 
o 
o 
o 
1 
u 
1 
U 
T3 
a. 
i2 
I 
Chapter 5 298 
ProHtability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and highly significant in all the 
three models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with secured debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984*^ ) and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structvire. 
The researcher has not come across any earlier study on secured debt; so these results 
cannot be compared with any prior studies. Most of the empirical literature reports a 
negative relationship between profitability and long term debt or total debt. These results 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. For firms which revalue their assets it can 
be concluded that profitability is negatively related with secured debt ratio. 
Size; Size is found to have a highly significant and positive relationship with secured 
debt ratio in the Models A and B but it loses its significance in Model C. These results 
support the trade-off theory and agency theory, and contradict the pecking order 
hypothesis; though size loses its significance in Model C it still has a positive coefficient. 
The researcher has not come across any earlier study on secured debt; so these results 
cannot be compared with any prior studies. However the empirical literature mostly 
reports a positive relationship between size and long term debt or total debt. 
These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. Though the p-value in Model 
C has exceeded the 10% level by approximately 3%, it might have been due to random 
errors; this increases the likelihood of a Type I error in Model C. Hence with a higher 
likelihood of a Type I error for firms which revalue their assets it is concluded that size is 
positively related with secured debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has an 
insignificant relationship with secured debt ratio; the relationship is positive in Models A 
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and B, and negative in Model C. The researcher has not come across any earlier study on 
secured debt; so these results cannot be compared with any prior studies. The empirical 
literature mostly reports a positive relationship between long term debt or total debt and 
tangibility. These results are not significant and they are not consistent across the three 
models; hence the results do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H4. 
Hence for firms which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on the basis of the 
present evidence that tangibility is positively related with secured debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunities are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. The researcher has 
not come across any earlier study on secured debt; so these results caimot be compared 
with any prior studies. This factor has been mostly reported to have a negative 
relationship with long term debt or total debt in empirical literature. 
The results on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and, contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory. These 
results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms which revalue their 
assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively related with 
secured debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis of this evidence 
that growth opportunities are positively related with secured debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is found to have a negative relationship with 
secured debt ratio in all the three models; however it is not significant even at the 10% 
level. In Model A the p-value suggests significance at 17% level, in Model B the p-value 
suggests significance at 38% level and in Model C the p-value suggests significance at 
21% level. Except for the lack of significance at the conventional levels the negative 
coefficients in the three models suggest a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility and secured debt ratio. 
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These results indicate that firms having higher earnings volatility tend to carry lower 
levels of secured debt. This might happen because if earnings are more volatile then there 
is a greater likelihood of financial distress and the possibility that in the event of financial 
distress the firms will have to lose their investment in the assets which have been offered 
as security. Hence firms with higher earnings volatility are likely to have lower levels of 
secured debt because such firms would like to protect their investment in the secured 
assets which might be otherwise offered as security for obtaining the debt. 
The researcher has not come across any prior studies on secured debt. It should be noted 
that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage; though several studies on long term debt or total debt report a 
negative relationship between the two. 
Though not significant, these results support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. 
Further, these results do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence 
it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that earnings volatility is 
negatively related with secured debt ratio for fums which revalue their assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
and positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. In Model A the 
p-value suggests significance at 12% level, in Model B the p-value suggests significance 
at 18% level and in Model C the p-value suggests significance at 14% level. It should be 
noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between non-
debt tax shields and leverage. 
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These results do not support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage in general. The results do not provide 
significant evidence in support of hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which revalue their 
assets it cannot be concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with secured 
debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with secured debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and secured debt ratio. The regression results 
provide very strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that 
there is a negative relationship between non-financial costs and secured debt ratio for 
firms which revalue their assets. 
It is fiuther found that there is no significant impact of secured foreign currency loans on 
secured debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on secured debt 
ratio. There is a significant impact of the industry factor for Chemicals industry and 
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry on secured debt ratio. The dimmiies for these two 
industries indicate that the secured debt ratios in the Chemicals industry and Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals industry are likely to be significantly lower than that in the Textiles 
industry which is the control group. 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 8.78% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 11.44%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases 
the explanation of secured debt ratio significantly. In the final model. Model C, the extent 
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of influence on the secured debt ratio notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-
financial costs followed by growth and profitability. The factors size, tangibility, 
volatility and non-debt tax shields do not have significant impact on secured debt ratio. It 
can be seen that except size the same firm specific factors which are found to be 
significant or insignificant in the Models A and B are also found to be so in Model C. 
UNSECURED DEBT 
Table 72 shows the summary results of OLS regression for unsecured debt ratio (UDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between unsecured debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero in Model A. 
In Models B and C the Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2; however the serial 
correlations are somewhat higher than for the other debt ratios - it is -0.181254 for Model 
B and -0.178265 for Model C. The problem of autocorrelation among the residuals is 
negligible for Model A and somewhat higher for Models B and C compared with tiie 
corresponding models for the other debt ratios. The normal residual plot of residuals 
show that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each 
independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
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Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and insignificant in all the three 
models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with unsecured debt ratio though it 
is insignificant. These results tend to support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 
1984*^ ) and contradict the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
The researcher has not come across any earlier study on unsecvired debt; so these results 
cannot be compared with any prior studies. Most of the empirical literature reports a 
negative relationship between profitability and long term debt or total debt. These results 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. However the evidence is not strong 
because of the lack of significance. Hence for firms which revalue their assets it cannot 
be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that profitability is negatively related 
with unsecured debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have an insignificant and positive relationship with unsecured debt 
ratio in all the three models. These results support the trade-off theory and contradict the 
pecking order hypothesis. The researcher has not come across any earlier study on 
unsecured debt; so these results cannot be compared with any prior studies. The empirical 
literature mostly reports a positive relationship between size and long term debt or total 
debt. 
These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. However the evidence is not 
strong enough to draw any conclusions. Hence for firms which revalue their assets it 
cannot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that size is positively related 
with unsecured debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has an 
insignificant and negative relationship with unsecured debt ratio. The researcher has not 
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come across any earlier study on unsecured debt; so these results cannot be compared 
with any prior studies. The empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship 
between long term debt or total debt and tangibility. These results do not provide strong 
evidence in support of hypothesis H4. Hence for firms which revalue their assets it 
caimot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that tangibility is positively 
related with unsecured debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportimities are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with unsecured debt ratio in Models B and C; the relationship is 
insignificant and positive in Model A. The researcher has not come across any earlier 
study on imsecured debt; so these results caimot be compared with any prior studies. The 
growth opportunities have been mostly reported to have a negative relationship with long 
term debt or total debt in empirical literature. 
The results support the pecking order hypothesis and, contradict the trade-off theory and 
agency theory. These results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms 
which revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively 
related with imsecured debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis 
of this evidence that growth opportunities are positively related with unsecured debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility; Earnings volatility is found to have a positive and insignificant 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. This may indicate that 
firms which revalue their assets, do not reduce their unsecured debt in response to higher 
earnings volatility. Given that such types of debt are not secured this may be the expected 
behaviour of the firms because higher earnings volatility do not concern them too much 
for the repayment of such debt. 
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The researcher has not come across any prior studies on unsecured debt. It should be 
noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage; though several studies on long term debt or total debt 
report a negative relationship between the two. Further, these results do not provide 
evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it cannot be concluded that earnings 
volatility is negatively related with unsecured debt ratio for firms which revalue their 
assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models; this relationship is negative 
in Model A and positive in Models B and C. The researcher has not come across any 
prior studies on unsecured debt. It should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed 
results about the relationship between non-debt tax shields and long term debt or total 
debt; though some of the studies show a negative relationship. 
These results do not support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage in general. Further the results do not provide 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which revalue their assets it 
cannot be concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with unsecured debt 
ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with unsecured debt ratio and are insignificant The researcher has so far not come 
across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on capital 
structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) indicate a negative 
relationship between non-financial costs and unsecured debt ratio; though this correlation 
appears to be less than the correlations with the other debt ratios. The regression results 
do not provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it cannot be 
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concluded that there is a negative relationship between non-financial costs and unsecured 
debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. 
It is further found that there is no significant impact of unsecured foreign currency debt 
on unsecured debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on 
unsecured debt ratio. There is a significant impact of the industry factor for Chemicals 
industry, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry and Food industry on imsecured debt ratio; 
the unsecured debt ratios in these three industries are significantly higher than that in the 
Textiles industry which is the control group. 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 13.71% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, decreases the explanatory 
power by approximately 0.028%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs cannot 
explain the variations in unsecured debt ratio for firms which revalue their assets. In the 
final model. Model C, the extent of influence on the unsecured debt ratio notwithstanding 
the sign is highest due to growth opportunities followed by the industry dummies. The 
factors profitability, size, tangibility, volatility, non-debt tax shields and non-financial 
costs do not have significant impact on imsecured debt ratio. 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION RELATIONSHIPS FOR VARIOUS DEBT 
RATIOS OF FIRMS WfflCH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
A comparison of the regression relationships for the various types of debt ratios for the 
firms which revalue their assets reveals the following: 
1. The explanatory power (adjusted R )^ of all the determinants taken together in the 
final model. Model C, is highest for long term debt ratio (44.38%) followed in the 
decreasing order by secured debt ratio (40.27%), total debt ratio (33.27%), short term 
debt ratio (24.80%) and unsecured debt ratio (10.83%). (For unsecured debt ratio the 
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explanatory power actually decreases by the addition of the new determinant, non-
financial costs, by 0.028%; excluding non-financial costs (i.e. Model B) the 
explanatory power of all the other determinants is 10,86%.) This observation provides 
evidence in support of hypothesis H9. All empirical studies on capital structure 
determinants which have been reviewed in this research work and have been found to 
use multiple measures of leverage based on different types of debt have reported 
different explanatory powers of the determinants for the different measures of 
leverage. Hence it can be concluded that the determinants taken together do not 
equally explain the cross-sectional variations in the different types of debt ratios. 
2. The finding that the explanatory power of the regression models in which long term 
debt is used as the measure of leverage is more than that of those regression models in 
which total debt may imply that firms use short term debt when they temporarily stray 
fi-om their target long term leverage (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993 )^. 
3. The finding that the explanatory power of the regression models in which secured 
debt is used as the measure of leverage the explanatory power is greater than that of 
the models in which total debt is used as the measure of leverage may imply that 
firms use unsecured debt only when they temporarily deviate fi-om their target 
secured leverage. 
4. It can also be observed fi-om the adjusted R^  values that out of the various types of 
debt ratios long term debt ratio is most systematically related vdth the firm 
characteristics and imsecured debt ratio is least systematically related with the firm 
characteristics. More specifically the firm characteristics provide higher explanation 
for long term debt than short term debt, and higher explanation for secured debt than 
unsecured debt. The unsecured type of debt involves more risk for the lender 
compared to the secured debt. Hence it is more expensive as well as less easy to 
obtain for the borrower. This implies that the unsecured debt ratio is less likely to be 
systematically related with the various firm characteristics because firms may resort 
to financing by the unsecured type of debt only when the secured type of debt is not 
available, notv^thstanding the influence of the firm characteristics. Further, long term 
debt entails commitments for making debt service payments for a long period of time 
unlike short term debt; firms may use short term debt to meet any temporary 
Chapter 5 309 
shortages of funds. Because long term debt entails a long term commitment for the 
firms in comparison to short term debt, they tend take into consideration all factors 
that are relevant and may have an impact on the borrowing decision. This implies 
that the firm characteristics are more likely to influence the long term borrowing than 
the short term borrowing practices of the firms. 
5. For all the five types of debt ratios, inclusion of the industry factor (nature of 
industry) increases the explanatory power of the determinants. The increase in 
explanatory power by inclusion of the mdustry factor is highest for unsecured debt 
ratio (13.71%) followed in the decreasing order by secured debt ratio (8.78%), total 
debt ratio (2.12%), short term debt ratio (1.93%) and long term debt ratio (0.5%). 
This indicates that for firms which revalue their assets, the entire explanation for the 
variations in unsecured debt ratio arises out of the industry factor. Of all the various 
types of debt ratios it is the one which is least systematically related with the various 
firm characteristics (the adjusted R^  for unsecured debt ratio with only the firm 
characteristics is -0.028427 i.e. -2.84%); it actually appears not to have any 
systematic relationship with the firm characteristics at all. The explanatory power of 
secured debt ratio also significantly improves by the inclusion of the industry factor. 
Availing of secured debt is a major decision for the firm because it requires some of 
the assets of the firm to be offered as collateral security. Since the extent of debt 
financing required may differ from industry to industry so will be the requirement of 
secured debt in spite of the influence of the firm characteristics. The other types of 
debt ratios appear to be determined more by the firm characteristics than by the 
industry factors. 
6. The inclusion of non-financial costs increases the explanation of the behaviour of 
long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio but not 
the unsecured debt ratio. The increase in the explanation of the debt ratios resulting 
from the inclusion of non-financial costs is highest for total debt ratio (12.48%) 
followed in the decreasing order by secured debt ratio (11,44%), long term debt ratio 
(7.1%) and short term debt ratio (6.91%). The inclusion of non-financial costs 
reduces the explanatory power for unsecured debt ratio by 0.028%. It has been 
explained earlier that non-fmancial costs are likely to have a negative relationship 
Chapters 310 
with leverage. However its inclusion does not improve the explanation for all types of 
debt ratios equally. The inclusion of non-fmancial costs does not improve the 
explanation for unsecured debt ratio because the fums may resort to fmancing 
through unsecured debt only when they do not have recourse to other types of debt. 
7. It can be seen that long term debt ratio is significantly influenced by the largest 
number of firm characteristics. Six out of the seven firm characteristics viz. 
profitability, size, tangibility, growth opportxuiities, non-debt tax shields and non-
financial costs, significantly influence the long term debt ratio. 
8. Short term debt ratio is significantly influenced by four out of the seven firm 
characteristics viz. profitability, tangibility, volatility and non-financial costs. 
9. Total debt ratio is significantly influenced by four out of the seven firm 
characteristics viz. profitability, size, growth opportimities and non-financial costs. 
10. Secured debt ratio is significantly influenced by only three out of the seven firm 
characteristics viz. profitability, growth opportimities and non-financial costs. 
11. For firms which revalue their assets unsecured debt ratio is significantly influenced 
by only one of the seven firm characteristics - growth opportunities. 
12. Profitability, growth opportunities and non-financial costs significantly influence four 
out of the five types of debt ratios. Hence for firms which revalue their assets 
profitability, growth opportunities and non-financial costs are the most important firm 
characteristics. 
13. Tangibility and firm size each significantly influence only two types of debt ratios. 
14. Non-debt tax shield and volatility each significantly influence only one type of debt 
ratio. 
15. Industry factors do not significantiy influence the behaviour of long term debt ratio 
and total debt ratio. However industry factors significantly influence the behaviour of 
short term debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. 
16. Use of foreign currency debt does not significantiy influence any of the debt ratios. 
17. Acquisition of other firms does not significantiy influence any of the debt ratios. 
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REGRESSION RESULTS FOR VARIOUS DEBT RATIOS OF FIRMS WHICH 
DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Tables 73 to 77 show the s\immary results of OLS regression for all the five debt ratios 
xised in this study viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secxired 
debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio, on the basis of the Models A, B and C, for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. Model A includes only the determinants selected firom 
prior empirical literature and it does not include the industry dummies. Model B extends 
Model A by including the industry dummies. Model C extends Model B by including the 
newly identified determinant in this study. 
For each type of debt ratio the regression output for all the three models have been placed 
adjacent to each other in the Tables 73 to 77. The regression output has been presented in 
this maimer in order to facilitate comparison between the three models for the same type 
of debt ratio. Since the purpose of the aforementioned tables is to facilitate comparison 
between the three models for each debt ratio, only the most relevant parts liave been 
extracted firom the detailed OLS regression output and presented in the aforementioned 
tables. 
The presence or absence of the problem of multicoUinearity has been formally checked 
by the computation of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each of the determinants 
and the average VIF (VIF) for all the determinants. It is suggested that a VIF in excess 
of 10 is an indication of the presence of multicoUinearity. The average VIF is also used as 
an index of multicoUinearity. Table 84 (given later) shows the computation of VIF for the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. The table shows that the VIF for each of the 
determinants as well as the average VIF for all the determinants is far below 10 (all the 
VIF values are below 2), which shows that there is no problem of multicoUinearity in the 
data. 
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Further Chatteijee, Hadi and Price (2000)' explain that the problem of heteroscedasticity 
is usually detected by the scatter plot of the standardised residuals against each of the 
predictor variables. Accordingly standardised residual plots were made with the help of 
the Statistica (Release 8) software package for each of the five types of debt ratios. Since 
the graphs of the standardised residual plots were very similar for all the five types of 
debt ratios only the standardised residual plots for long term debt ratio (LTDR) have been 
shown in the Aimexures. 
Annexure-4 shows the standardised residual plots for long term debt ratio against each of 
the independent variables for firms which do not revalue their assets. The graphs of the 
standardised residuals do not reveal any systematic patterns which would suggest 
increase or decrease in residual variance with the values of the independent variables. 
Chatterjee, Hadi and Price (2000)' explain that heteroscedasticity will be detected if the 
standardised residuals tend to have a funnel-shaped distribution, either fanning out or 
closing in with the values of the predictor variables. They explain that in general if the 
residuals tend to diverge as the predictor variable increases the residual variance is said to 
be increasing with the predictor variable. On the other hand if the residuals tend to 
converge as the predictor variable increases the residual variance is said to be decreasing 
with the predictor variable. 
In order to demonstrate that the standardised residuals do not follow any systematic 
patterns as explained above the standardised residual plot of a heteroscedastic data set has 
been provided in Aimexure-5. The example and the data for illustrating how the 
standardised residual plot of heteroscedastic data looks like have been taken from 
Chatterjee, Hadi and Price (2000)', A comparison of all the standardised residual plots 
(i.e. those which have been shown in Annexure-4 as well as those which have not been 
shown in the Aimexures) with that of the standardised residual plot in Annexure-5 
strongly indicates that the problem of heteroscedasticity does not affect the regression 
analysis of any of the debt ratios in this study. 
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LONG TERM DEBT 
Table 73 shows the summary resuhs of OLS regression for long term debt ratio (LTDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the 
regression coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 
1%, 5% and 10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. 
significantly different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the 
regression coefficients changes as one moves fi*om Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between long term debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero for all the three models. This provides strong evidence 
that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and the 
models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show that 
they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each independent 
variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is significant and negative in all the three 
models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with long term debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984'*) and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. The results are also consistent with the findings of most of the 
prior studies. Almost all the earlier studies have reported a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. 
For firms which do not revalue their assets it can be concluded that profitability is 
negatively related with long term debt ratio. 
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Size: Size is found to have a positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three 
models and this relationship is highly significant (at 1% level or even lower) in all the 
three models. The results are also consistent with the findings of some of the major 
studies such as Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)'\ and contradict the 
findings of Saravanan (2006)''. The empirical literature mostly reports a positive 
relationship between size and long term debt. These results support the trade-off theory 
and agency theory, and contradict the pecking order hypothesis. These results provide 
evidence in support of hypothesis H3. For firms which do not revalue their assets it can 
be concluded that size is positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a highly 
significant (at 1% level or even lower) and positive relationship with long term debt ratio. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Beimett and Donnelly (1993)'' and 
Kakani (1999)'\ and contradict those of Pandey (2001)'^  and Saravanan (2006)'^ The 
empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship between leverage and 
tangibility. 
The results for tangibility also support the trade-off theory and agency theory. The 
positive relationship between tangibility and long term debt might have arisen because as 
the assets are more tangible (which means that there is a higher concentration of fixed 
assets in the total assets of the firm) the requirement for long term financing will be 
higher, which in the absence of sufficient amount of internally generated funds can be 
ideally raised in the form of long term debt. These results provide evidence in support of 
hypothesis H4. For firms which do not revalue their assets it can be concluded that 
tangibility is positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: It is found that growth opportunities have an insignificant and 
positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
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contradict the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ and are consistent partly with 
Pandey (2001)'^ and fully with Kakani (1999)"' and Saravanan (2006)•^ This factor has 
been mostly reported to have a negative relationship with leverage in empirical literature. 
This lack of consistency with the generally found evidence in empirical literature may be 
due to the possibility that the measure of growth opportunities used in this study is unable 
to distinguish between the growth options available to the firms and growth arising out of 
the investments already made by the firms. 
The resuhs on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory. These 
results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms which do not revalue 
their assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively related with 
long term debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis of this 
evidence that growth opportunities are positively related with long term debt ratio. 
Earnings VolatUity: The results for all the three models show negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio; the relationship is significant in 
Models A and B but not significant in Model C. Moreover the influence of earnings 
volatility, ignoring sign, also decreases from Model A to Model C. The nature of 
relationship found tends to contradict the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ 
Saravanan (2006)'^ and Pandey (2001)'^ It should be noted that past empirical studies 
show mixed results about the relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. 
These results support the prediction of the trade-oflf theory on the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage. Further, these results provide evidence in support of 
hypothesis H6, though the evidence is not very strong (because earnings volatility loses 
significance in Model C). Hence it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present 
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evidence that earnings volatility is negatively related with long term debt ratio for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three models. These results are 
consistent v^th Kakani (1999)''* and contradict Bennett and Donnelly (1993) .^ It should 
be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between 
non-debt tax shield and leverage. These results contradict the prediction of the trade-off 
theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage. 
Further, these results provide evidence against hypothesis H7. Hence it cannot be 
concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with long term debt ratio for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the 
basis of this evidence that non-debt tax shields are positively related with long term debt 
ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with long term debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and long term debt ratio. These results provide 
evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a negative 
relationship between non-financial costs and long term debt ratio for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
It is further foimd that there is a significant influence of foreign currency loans of any 
type on long term debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on 
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long term debt ratio. There is no significant impact of the industry factor on long term 
debt ratio; the industry coefficients show that the long term debt ratios in the Chemicals 
industry, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry, Ferrous Metal and Metal Products industry 
are not significantly higher or lower than that in the Textiles industry (the control group). 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 0.82% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant non-financial costs improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 19.54%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases 
the explanation of the behaviour of long term debt ratio significantly. Moreover as the 
adjusted R^  increases significantly in Model C this model is considered to be the final 
model for long term debt ratio for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
In the final model. Model C, the extent of influence on the long term debt ratio 
notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-financial costs, followed by non-debt tax 
shields, profitability, tangibility and size. The impact of volatility and growth 
opportunities is not significant. It can be seen that except volatility the same firm specific 
factors other than the non-financial costs which are found to be significant or 
insignificant in the Models A and B are also found to be so in Model C. 
SHORT TERM DEBT 
Table 74 shows the summary results of OLS regression for short term debt ratio (STDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the 
regression coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 
1%, 5% and 10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. 
significantly different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the 
regression coefficients changes as one moves fi-om Model A to Model C. 
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The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between short term debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of 
the three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the 
associated serial correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides 
strong evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is 
negligible and the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of 
residuals show that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots 
against each independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative in all the three models and is 
highly significant. These results support the pecking order hypothesis and contradict the 
trade-off theory of capital structure with regard to debt in general. The results are partly 
consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and wholly consistent with 
the findings of Pandey (2001)*' and Kakani (1999)''*. These results provide evidence in 
support of hypothesis H2. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it can be 
concluded that profitability is negatively related with short term debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have a positive relationship with short term debt ratio in all the 
three models; however the relationship is not significant in any of the three models. The 
results are partly consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and 
wholly consistent with the findings of Pandey (2001)'^ These results tend to support the 
trade-off theory with regard to debt in general; however they are not significant. Because 
of the lack of significance these results do not provide strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis H3. For firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on the 
basis of the present evidence that size is positively related v^ dth short term debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The restilts for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a highly 
significant and negative relationship with short term debt ratio. The significant negative 
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relationship between tangibility and short term debt might have arisen because as the 
concentration of fixed assets in the total assets of the firm increases the need for long 
term financing increases vis-a-vis short term financing. These results contradict the 
findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and are consistent with Pandey (2001)'^ . The 
empirical results on the relationship between short term debt and tangibility are few and 
mixed. The results do not support the trade-off theory and agency theory with regard to 
debt in general. 
These results do not provide evidence in support of hypothesis H4. Hence for firms 
which do not revalue their assets it caimot be concluded that tangibility is positively 
related with short term debt ratio. It is rather concluded firom the results that tangibility is 
negatively related with short term debt ratio for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunities are found to have a highly significant and 
positive relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)'', The 
results on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the pecking 
order hypothesis and contradict the trade-ofif theory and agency theory with regard to 
debt in general. These results do not support hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms which do 
not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively 
related with short term debt ratio. However for such firms it can be concluded that growth 
opportunities are positively related to short term debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is found to have a significant and negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Kakani (1999)*'*. However, the results contradict the findings of 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ and Pandey (2001)'^ It should be noted that past empirical 
studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings volatility and 
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leverage in general. These results indicate that firms having higher earnings volatility 
tend to carry lower levels of short term debt. 
In comparison to long term debt, short term debt puts greater pressure on the cash flows 
of the firms for the debt service payments. Hence there is a greater likelihood of fmancial 
distress arising out of the possibility of defaulting on the debt service payments 
associated with short term debt compared to long term debt. The likelihood of fmancial 
distress arising out of the possibility of defaulting on the debt service payments is higher 
for firms which face higher volatility of earnings; hence we fmd a significant inverse 
relationship between earnings volatility and short term debt ratio. The fact that earnings 
volatility does not have any significant relationship with long term debt ratio whereas it 
has a significant negative relationship with short term debt ratio illustrates this point. 
These results support the prediction of the trade-oflf theory on the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. Further, these results 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it can be concluded that earnings 
volatility is negatively related with short term debt ratio for firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
and negative relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
are consistent with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^ and Kakani (1999)*'*. It 
should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage in general. These results weakly support the 
prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and 
leverage in general. Although the results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H7 a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and short term debt ratio should not be 
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concluded on the basis of the present evidence, because the negative coefficients are not 
significant. 
The opposite behaviour of long term debt ratio and short term debt ratio with regard to 
non-debt tax shields arises because the non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and 
amortisation tend to increase with fixed assets and other long term assets (such as 
intangible or fictitious assets) which in turn give rise to increasing long term financing 
requirements. If long term financing requirements caimot be met through retention of 
earnings then such requirements can be ideally met through long term debt because long 
term assets can be appropriately financed fi-om long term sources of financing (matching 
the maturity of assets and sources of finance). So under normal circumstances firms 
would not finance their long term requirements through short term debt. However they 
may use short term debt for this purpose when long term debt is not available and renew 
the short term debt upon maturity or replace it with long term debt later on. 
This simply means that non-debt tax shields tend to increase with fixed assets. As fixed 
assets increase the long term financing requirements tend to increase which may lead to 
either higher retention of earnings or higher long term debt. In either case short term debt 
ratio should tend to decrease with non-debt shields. So it is likely that long term debt and 
short term debt may respond to the non-debt tax shields in different ways. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with short term debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and short term debt ratio. These results provide 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a 
Chapter 5 324 
negative relationship between non-financial costs and short term debt ratio for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
It is further found that there is no significant impact of foreign currency loans of any type 
on short term debt ratio. There is a significant impact of acquiring other firms on short 
term debt ratio. In the final model, Model C, except the Ferrous Metal and Metal 
Products industry there is a significant impact of the industry factor on short term debt 
ratio. The coefficients for the Chemicals and, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industries show 
that the short term debt ratio in these two industries is significantly lower than that in the 
Textiles industry (which is the control group). The coefficient for the Food mdustry 
dummy indicates that the Food industry has a significantly higher short term debt ratio 
than the Textiles industry. 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 1.67% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant non-financial costs improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 12.6%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases the 
explanation of short term debt ratio significantly. In the final model. Model C, the extent 
of influence on the short term debt ratio notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-
financial costs followed by volatility, growth, tangibility and profitability. The factors 
size and non-debt tax shields do not have significant impact on short term debt ratio. It 
can be seen that the same firm specific factors other than the non-financial costs which 
are found to be significant or insignificant in the Models A and B are also found to be so 
in Model C. 
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TOTAL DEBT 
Table 75 shows the summary results of OLS regression for total debt ratio (TDR) on the 
basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10%. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different from zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between total debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the three 
models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated serial 
correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides strong evidence 
that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and the 
models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show that 
they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each independent 
variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and highly significant in all the 
three models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with total debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984*^ ) and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. The results also confirm the findings of most of the prior 
studies. Almost all the earlier studies have reported a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. 
For firms which do not revalue their assets it can be concluded that profitability is 
negatively related with total debt ratio. 
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Size: Size is found to have a highly significant and positive relationship with total debt 
ratio in all the three models. The resuUs are consistent with the findings of Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993)^ Rajan and Zingales (1995)'* and Pandey (2001)'^ These results 
support the trade-off theory and contradict the pecking order hypothesis with regard to 
debt in general. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. For firms 
which revalue their assets it can be concluded that size is positively related with total debt 
ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a highly 
significant relationship with total debt ratio; the relationship is positive in Models A and 
B, and negative in Model C. This result in the final model, Model C, is not consistent 
with the findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ and Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*; 
however it is consistent with Pandey (2001)'^ . The empirical literature mostly reports a 
positive relationship between leverage in general and tangibility. 
The results in the three models show a conflicting relationship between tangibility and 
total debt ratio though in all the three models the regression coefficients are highly 
significant. The results do not provide clear evidence either in support of hypothesis H4 
or against it. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on 
the basis of the present evidence about the nature of relationship between tangibility and 
total debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportxmities are foimd to have a positive relationship 
with total debt ratio in all the three models; the relationship is not significant in Models A 
and B but it is highly significant in Model C. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Pandey (2001)'^ and contradict the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995)'*. 
This factor has been mostly reported to have a negative relationship with leverage in 
empirical literature. This lack of consistency With the generally found evidence in 
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empirical literature may be due to the possibility that the measure of growth opportunities 
used in this study is unable to distinguish between the growth options available to the 
firms and growth arising out of the investments already made by the firms. 
The results on the relationship between growth opportxmities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and, contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory with 
regard to debt in general. These results provide evidence against hypothesis H5, 
Therefore for firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that growth 
opportunities are negatively related with total debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be 
concluded on the basis of this evidence that growth opportunities are positively related 
with total debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is found to have a highly significant and 
negative relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Kakani (1999)''*. However, the results contradict the 
findings of Bennett and Donnelly (1993)^  and Pandey (2001)'^. It should be noted that 
past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage. These results indicate that firms having higher earnings volatility 
tend to carry lower levels of total debt. 
These results strongly support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. Further, these 
results provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it can be concluded 
that earnings volatility is negatively related with total debt ratio for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
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Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a positive 
relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models; it is insignificant in Models A 
and B and significant in Model C. These results contradict the findings of Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993)^  and partly contradict Kakani (1999)'''. Total debt ratio and short term 
debt ratio are found to respond differently to non-debt tax shields. This might happen 
because a greater portion of the total debt might be in the form of long term debt which 
tend to increase with non-debt tax shields as the increase in non-debt tax shields tend to 
be associated with increase in fixed assets. 
It should be noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage. These results do not support the prediction of 
the trade-ofif theory on the relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage with 
regard to debt in general. Fiirther the results do not provide significant evidence in 
support of hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be 
concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with total debt ratio. However 
it can be concluded for such firms on the basis of these results that there is a positive 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and total debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with total debt ratio and are very highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and total debt ratio. These results provide very 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between non-financial costs and total debt ratio for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. 
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It is further found that there is no significant impact of foreign currency loans of any type 
on total debt ratio. There is a significant impact of acquiring other firms on total debt 
ratio. There is a significant impact of the industry factor on total debt ratio. The total debt 
ratio in the Chemicals industry and. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry are significantly 
less than that in the Textiles industry which is the control group and the total debt ratio in 
the Food industry is significantly higher than the Textiles industry. 
The change in the adjusted R between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 1.10% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 28.42%. Thus it can be said fi*om the final Model C, that non-
financial costs increases the explanation of total debt ratio significantly. In the final 
model, Model C, the extent of influence on the total debt ratio notwithstanding the sign is 
highest due to non-financial costs followed by non-debt tax shields, earnings volatility, 
growth opportunities, profitability, size and tangibility. All the firm characteristics have a 
significant relationship with total debt ratio. It can be seen that except growth and non-
debt tax shields the other firm specific factors which are found to be significant or 
insignificant in the Models A and B are also found to be so in Model C. 
SECURED DEBT 
Table 76 shows the summary results of OLS regression for secured debt ratio (SDR) on 
the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the regression 
coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 1%, 5% and 
10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. significantly 
different from zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the regression coefficients 
changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
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The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between secured debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero for each of the three models. This provides strong 
evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and 
the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show 
that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each 
independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and significant in all the three 
models. Thus profitability has a negative relationship with secured debt ratio. These 
results support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984'^ ) and contradict the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. 
The researcher has not come across any earlier study on secured debt; so these results 
cannot be compared with any prior studies. Most of the empirical literature reports a 
negative relationship between profitability and long term debt or total debt. These results 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis H2. For firms which do not revalue their assets 
it can be concluded that profitability is negatively related with secured debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have a highly significant and positive relationship with secured 
debt ratio in the all the three models. These results support the trade-off theory and 
contradict the pecking order hypothesis. The researcher has not come across any earlier 
study on secured debt; so these results cannot be compared with any prior studies. 
However the empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship between size and 
long term debt or total debt. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. 
Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it is concluded that size is positively 
related with secured debt ratio. 
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Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has a highly 
significant relationship with secured debt ratio; it is positive in Models A and B, and 
negative in Model C. The researcher has not come across any earlier study on secured 
debt; so these results caimot be compared with any prior studies. The empirical literature 
mostly reports a positive relationship between long term debt or total debt and tangibility. 
However these results provide strong but conflicting evidence with regard to hypothesis 
H4. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded on the basis 
of the present evidence whether tangibility is positively or negatively related with secured 
debt ratio. 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunities are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. The researcher has 
not come across any earlier study on secured debt; so these results caimot be compared 
with any prior studies. This factor has been mostly reported to have a negative 
relationship with long term debt or total debt in empirical literature. 
The results on the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage support the 
pecking order hypothesis and, contradict the trade-off theory and agency theory. These 
results provide evidence against hypothesis H5. Therefore for firms which do not revalue 
their assets it cannot be concluded that growth opportunities are negatively related with 
secured debt ratio. Instead for such firms it can be concluded on the basis of this evidence 
that growth opportunities are positively related with secured debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is found to have a highly significant and 
negative relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. These results 
indicate that firms having higher earnings volatility tend to carry lower levels of secured 
debt. This might happen because if earnings are more volatile then there is a greater 
likelihood of financial distress and the possibility that in the event of financial distress the 
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firms will have to lose their investment in the assets which have been offered as security. 
Hence firms with higher earnings volatility are likely to have lower levels of secured debt 
because in the event of financial distress such firms are likely to lose their investment in 
the assets which might have been offered as security. So this behaviour of secured debt 
indicates that the fijms with higher earnings volatility tend to avoid this situation. 
The researcher has not come across any prior studies on sec\ired debt. It should be noted 
that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage; though several studies on long term debt or total debt report a 
negative relationship between the two. 
These results support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage with regard to debt in general. Further, these results do 
provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it can be concluded that 
earnings volatility is negatively related with secured debt ratio for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a positive 
relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. The positive relationship is 
significant in Model C; however it is not significant in Models A and B. It should be 
noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between non-
debt tax shields and leverage though it has shown a negative relationship in several 
studies. 
These results do not support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage in general. The results of the fmal model, 
Model C, provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which do 
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not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively 
related with secured debt ratio. However, on the basis of these results it can be concluded 
that for such firms non-debt tax shields are positively related with secured debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively 
related with secured debt ratio and are highly significant. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) support this 
relationship between non-financial costs and secured debt ratio. The regression results 
provide very strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that 
there is a negative relationship between non-fmancial costs and secured debt ratio for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. 
It is fijrther found that there is a significant impact of secured foreign currency loans on 
secured debt ratio. There is a significant impact of acquiring other firms on secured debt 
ratio. The results show that the Chemicals industry and Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
industry have significantly higher secured debt ratio than Textiles industry, which is the 
control group. 
The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 2.33% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, improves the explanatory 
power by approximately 25.9%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs increases the 
explanation of secured debt ratio significantly. In the final model. Model C, the extent of 
influence on the secured debt ratio notwithstanding the sign is highest due to non-
financial costs followed by non-debt tax shields, volatility, growth, profitability, 
tangibility and size. It can be seen that except non-debt tax shields the same firm specific 
factors which are found to be significant or insignificant in the Models A and B are also 
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found to be so in Model C. Further in Model C it is found that all the firm characteristics 
have a significant relationship with secured debt ratio for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
UNSECURED DEBT 
Table 77 shows the summary results of OLS regression for unsecured debt ratio (UDR) 
on the basis of all the three models proposed viz. Model A, Model B and Model C, for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. In all the three models the significance of the 
regression coefficients have been recognised at the conventional significance levels viz. 
1%, 5% and 10 %. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant (i.e. 
significantly different fi-om zero) have been highlighted. The significance of the 
regression coefficients changes as one moves from Model A to Model C. 
The F statistics for all the three models are highly significant. This shows that the 
relationship between unsecured debt ratio and the determinants represented by each of the 
three models is significant. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is close to 2 and the associated 
serial correlation is close to zero in all the three models. The problem of autocorrelation 
among the residuals is negligible for Model A and somewhat higher for Models B and C 
compared with the corresponding models for the other debt ratios. This provides strong 
evidence that the problem of autocorrelation among the residuals, if any, is negligible and 
the models are not affected by this problem. The normal residual plot of residuals show 
that they are normally distributed and the standardised residual plots against each 
independent variable show that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Profitability: The coefficient of profitability is negative and significant in all the three 
models. Thus profitability has a significant and negative relationship with unsecured debt 
ratio. These results tend to support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984) and 
contradict the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
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The researcher has not come across any earlier study on unsecured debt; so these results 
cannot be compared with any prior studies. Most of the empirical literature reports a 
negative relationship between profitability and long term debt or total debt. These results 
provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H2. Hence for firms which do not 
revalue their assets it can be concluded that profitability is negatively related with 
unsecured debt ratio. 
Size: Size is found to have an insignificant and positive relationship with unsecured debt 
ratio in all the three models. These results support the trade-off theory and contradict the 
pecking order hypothesis. The researcher has not come across any earlier study on 
unsecured debt; so these results caimot be compared with any prior studies. The empirical 
literature mostly reports a positive relationship between size and long term debt or total 
debt. 
These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H3. However the evidence is not 
strong enough to draw any conclusions. Hence for firms which do not revalue their 
assets it cannot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that size is positively 
related with unsecured debt ratio. 
Tangibility: The results for all the three models indicate that tangibility has an 
insignificant relationship with imsecured debt ratio; the relationship is positive in Models 
A and B, and negative in Model C. The researcher has not come across any earlier study 
on unsecured debt; so these results cannot be compared with any prior studies. The 
empirical literature mostly reports a positive relationship between long term debt or total 
debt and tangibility. These results do not provide strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis H4. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets it cannot be concluded 
on the basis of the present evidence whether tangibility is positively or negatively related 
with unsecured debt ratio. 
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Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunities are found to have an insignificant and 
negative relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. The researcher 
has not come across any earlier study on unsecured debt; so these results cannot be 
compared with any prior studies. The growth opportvmities have been mostly reported to 
have a negative relationship with long term debt or total debt in empirical literature. 
The results support the trade-off theory and agency theory, and contradict the pecking 
order hypothesis. These results provide evidence in support of hypothesis H5; however 
due to the lack of significance the results are not strong enough to draw any conclusions 
as to the nature of relationship. Therefore for firms which do not revalue their assets it 
cannot be concluded on the basis of the present evidence that growth opportunities are 
negatively related with imsecured debt ratio. 
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is fovmd to have a positive and insignificant 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. This may indicate that 
firms which do not revalue their assets, do not reduce their imsecured debt in response to 
higher earnings volatility. Given that such types of debt are not secured this may be the 
expected behaviour of the firms because higher earnings volatility do not concem them 
too much for the repayment of such debt. 
The researcher has not come across any prior studies on unsecured debt. It should be 
noted that past empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage; though several studies on long term debt or total debt 
report a negative relationship between the two. Further, these results do not provide 
evidence in support of hypothesis H6. Hence it cannot be concluded that earnings 
volatility is negatively related with unsecured debt ratio for firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
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Non-Debt Tax Shields: Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an insignificant 
and positive relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. The researcher 
has not come across any prior studies on unsecured debt. It should be noted that past 
empirical studies show mixed results about the relationship between non-debt tax shields 
and long term debt or total debt; though some of the studies show a negative relationship. 
These results do not support the prediction of the trade-off theory on the relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and leverage in general. Further the results do not provide 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H7. Hence for firms which do not revalue their 
assets it cannot be concluded that non-debt tax shields are negatively related with 
unsecured debt ratio. 
Non-Financial Costs: The results show that the non-financial costs (NFC) are highly 
significant and negatively related with unsecured debt ratio. The researcher has so far not 
come across any empirical study explaining the influence of non-financial costs on 
capital structure. However, the findings in Tables 67(a) through 67(e) indicate a negative 
relationship between non-financial costs and unsecured debt ratio; though this correlation 
appears to be less than the correlations with the other debt ratios. The regression results 
provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis H8. Hence it can be concluded that 
there is a negative relationship between non-financial costs and unsecured debt ratio for 
firms which do not revalue then: assets. 
It is further foimd that there is a highly significant impact of imsecured foreign currency 
debt on imsecured debt ratio. There is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on 
unsecured debt ratio. There is a significant impact of the industry factor for Chemicals 
industry. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry and Food industry on imsecured debt ratio; 
the unsecured debt ratios in these three industries are significantly higher than that in the 
Textiles industry which is the control group. 
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The change in the adjusted R^  between the three models shows that the inclusion of the 
industry factor improves the explanatory power of the models by approximately 2.16% 
and the inclusion of the new determinant, non-financial costs, increases the explanatory 
power by approximately 2,03%. Thus it can be said that non-financial costs explain the 
variations in unsecured debt ratio to a lesser extent than for the other debt ratios. In the 
final model. Model C, the extent of influence on the imsecured debt ratio notwithstanding 
the sign is highest due to non-financial costs followed by profitability, unsecured foreign 
exchange debt and the industry dummies. The factors size, tangibility, growth, volatility 
and non-debt tax shields do not have significant impact on imsecured debt ratio. 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION RELATIONSfflPS FOR VARIOUS DEBT 
RATIOS OF FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
A comparison of the regression relationships for the various types of debt ratios for the 
firms which do not revalue their assets reveals the following: 
1. The explanatory power (adjusted R )^ of all the determinants taken together in the 
final model. Model C, is highest for long term debt ratio (55.49%) followed in the 
decreasing order by total debt ratio (48.58%), secured debt ratio (47.62%), short term 
debt ratio (26.09%) and unsecured debt ratio (11.63%). This observation provides 
evidence in support of hypothesis H9. All empirical studies on capital structure 
determinants which have been reviewed in this research work and have been found to 
use multiple measures of leverage based on different types of debt have reported 
different explanatory powers of the determinants for the different measures of 
leverage. Hence it can be concluded that the determinants taken together do not 
equally explain the cross-sectional variations in the different types of debt ratios. 
2. The finding that the explanatory power of the regression models in which long term 
debt is used as the measure of leverage is more than that of those regression models in 
which total debt is used may imply that firms use short term debt when they 
temporarily stray from their target long term leverage (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993 )^. 
3. The finding that the explanatory power of the regression models in which secured 
debt is used as the measure of leverage the explanatory power is in general greater 
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than that of the models in which total debt is used as the measure of leverage (the 
only exception to this is Model C for total debt and secured debt wherein the adjusted 
R^  for secured debt marginally falls short of that for total debt) may imply that firms 
use unsecured debt only when they temporarily deviate from their target secured 
leverage. 
4. It can also be observed from the adjusted R^  values that out of the various types of 
debt ratios long term debt ratio is most systematically related with the firm 
characteristics and unsecured debt ratio is least systematically related with the firm 
characteristics. More specifically the firm characteristics provide higher explanation 
for long term debt than short term debt, and higher explanation for secured debt than 
unsecured debt. The unsecured type of debt involves more risk for the lender 
compared to the secured debt. Hence it is more expensive as well as less easy to 
obtain for the borrower. This impUes that the unsecured debt ratio is less likely to be 
systematically related with the various firm characteristics because firms may resort 
to financing by the unsecured type of debt only when the secured type of debt is not 
available, notwithstanding the influence of the firm characteristics. Further, long term 
debt entails commitments for making debt service payments for a long period of time 
unlike short term debt; firms may use short term debt to meet any temporary 
shortages of fimds. Because long term debt entails a long term commitment for the 
firms in comparison to short term debt, they tend take into consideration all factors 
that are relevant and may have an impact on the borrowing decision. This implies 
that the firm characteristics are more likely to influence the long term borrowing than 
the short term borrowing practices of the firms. 
5. For all the five types of debt ratios, inclusion of the industry factor (nature of 
industry) increases the explanatory power of the determinants. The approximate 
increase in explanatory power by inclusion of the industry factor is highest for 
secured debt ratio (2.33%), followed in the decreasing order by unsecured debt ratio 
(2.16%), short term debt ratio (1.67%), total debt ratio (1.10%), and long term debt 
ratio (0.82%). Except long term debt ratio, the improvement in explanation of the 
various types of debt ratios due to the inclusion of industry factor is more for the 
frnns which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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6. The inclusion of non-financial costs increases the explanation of the behaviour of all 
the five types of debt ratios. The increase in the explanation of the debt ratios 
resulting from the inclusion of non-financial costs is highest for total debt ratio 
(28.42%) followed in the decreasing order by secured debt ratio (25.9%), long term 
debt ratio (19.54%), short term debt ratio (12.6%) and unsecured debt ratio (2.03%). 
It has been explained earlier that non-financial costs are likely to have a negative 
relationship with leverage. However its inclusion does not improve the explanation 
for all types of debt ratios equally. Compared to the other debt ratios the inclusion of 
non-financial costs improves the explanation for imsecured debt ratio by a lower 
extent (2.03%) because the firms may resort to financing through unsecured debt only 
when they do not have recourse to other types of debt. 
7. It can be seen that total debt ratio and secured debt ratio are significantly influenced 
by the largest number of firm characteristics. All the seven firm characteristics viz. 
profitability, size, tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, non-debt tax 
shields and non-financial costs, significantly influence the total debt ratio and secured 
debt ratio. 
8. Long term debt ratio and short term debt ratio are each influenced by five out of the 
seven firm characteristics. Long term debt ratio is influenced by profitability, size, 
tangibility, non-debt tax shields and non-financial costs whereas short term debt ratio 
is influenced by profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, 
and non-financial costs. 
9. For firms which do not revalue their assets unsecured debt ratio is significantly 
influenced by only two of the firm characteristics viz. profitability and non-financial 
costs. 
10. Profitability and non-financial costs significantly influence all the five types of debt 
ratios. Hence for firms which do not revalue their assets profitability and non-
financial costs are the most important firm characteristics in terms of the types of debt 
they influence. 
11. Tangibility significantly influences four out of the five types of debt ratios. Thus 
tangibility is also an important firm specific determinant. 
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12. Size, growth opportunities, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields significantly 
influence three of the five types of debt ratios. 
13. Industry factors do not significantly influence the behaviovir of long term debt ratio. 
However industry factors significantly influence the behaviour of short term debt 
ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. 
14. Use of foreign currency debt, whether secured or unsecured, significantly influences 
long term debt ratio, secured debt ratio and xmsecured debt ratio. It does not 
significantly influence the behaviour of short term debt ratio and total debt ratio. 
15. Acquisition of other firms significanfly influences short term debt ratio, total debt 
ratio and secured debt ratio. 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION RELATIONSHIPS FOR VARIOUS DEBT 
RATIOS BETWEEN FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS AND FIRMS 
WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
The similarities and differences in the regression relationships of the five types of debt 
ratios between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets are described below for each debt ratio individually. 
SIMILARITIES 
Long Term Debt 
1. Considering the final model, Model C, for both categories of firms the factors which 
are common and significantly influence long term debt are profitability, tangibility, 
size, non-debt tax shields (NDTS) and non-financial costs (NFC). 
2. Considering the final model for both categories of firms earnings volatility does not 
significantly influence long term debt. 
3. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
profitability has a greater influence on long term debt ratio than tangibility which in 
turn has a greater influence than size. 
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4. For both categories of firms profitability has a negative relationship with long term 
debt ratio. The negative relationship is consistently found in all the three models for 
both categories of firms. Increase in profitability tends to increase the ability of the 
firms to retain profits in order to meet their financing needs. So this relationship 
between profitability and long term debt ratio can be expected. 
5. For both categories of firms size is found to have a highly significant and positive 
relationship with long term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models. As the borrowing capacity and the financing needs of the firms 
tend to mcrease with firm size, the positive relationship of firm size with long term 
debt ratio can be expected. 
6. For both categories of firms tangibility has a significant and positive relationship with 
long term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in all the three 
models. As tangibility of assets increase with the level of fixed assets which in turn 
increase the long term financing needs the positive relationship with long term debt 
ratio can be expected. 
7. For both categories of firms growth opportunities have a positive relationship with 
long term debt ratio in all the three models. This relationship is highly significant for 
firms which revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. Given that firms that have more growth opportunities tend to 
have greater requirement for fimds largely due to the need to investment fixed assets. 
Since investment in fixed assets needs to be financed by long term sources the 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and long term debt ratio can be 
expected. Despite the similarity in nature this relationship is not significant for firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
8. For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a 
significant and positive relationship wdth long term debt ratio in all the three models. 
Given the fact that non-debt tax shields tend to increase with fixed assets which in 
turn give rise to higher long term financing needs the positive relationship with long 
term debt ratio can be expected. 
9. For both categories of firms non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively related with 
long term debt ratio and are highly significant. Because higher non-financial costs 
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leave smaller margin for covering the financial costs (interest on debt) the negative 
relationship with long term debt ratio can be expected. 
10. For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on 
long term debt ratio and this is consistently observed in all the three models. 
11. For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of the industry factor on 
long term debt ratio; the industry coefficients show that the long term debt ratios in 
the Chemicals industry. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry. Ferrous Metal and 
Metal Products industry are not significantly higher or lower than that in the Textiles 
industry. 
Short Term Debt 
1. Considering the final model, Model C, for both categories of firms the factors which 
are common and significantly influence short term debt are profitability, tangibility, 
earnings volatility and non-financial costs. 
2. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, size and non-debt tax shields 
do not significantly influence short term debt. 
3. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
non-financial costs have the highest influence on short term debt ratio followed by 
earnings volatility. 
4. For both categories of firms profitability has a highly significant and negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models. With increasing profitability firms can retain more profit in order 
to meet their financing needs. So this relationship between profitability and short term 
debt ratio can be expected. 
5. For both categories of firms tangibility has a highly significant and negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models. As tangibility of assets increases with the level of fixed assets 
which can be better financed by long term sources the firms normally do not use short 
term debt to finance long term assets. This leads to a negative relationship between 
tangibility and short term debt. 
Chapter 5 347 
6. For both categories of firms growth opportunities are foxmd to have a positive 
relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. However, the positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and short term debt ratio is highly 
significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for 
the firms which revalue their assets. Despite the similarity in nature this relationship 
is not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
7. For both categories of firms earnings volatility is has a significant and negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models. Given the fact that short term debt results in greater pressure on 
the cash flows of the firms for debt service payments compared to long term debt this 
type of relationship with short term debt ratio can be expected. 
8. For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have an 
insignificant and negative relationship with short term debt ratio and this is observed 
in all the three models. Given the fact that non-debt tax shields tend to increase with 
fixed assets which in turn give rise to higher long term financing needs the negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio can be expected. Despite the similarity in 
nature this relationship is not significant for both categories of firms. 
9. For both categories of firms non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively related with 
short term debt ratio and are highly significant. As higher non-financial costs leave 
smaller margin for covering the financial costs (interest on debt) the negative 
relationship with short term debt ratio can be expected. 
10. For both categories of firms the short term debt ratio in the Food industry is 
significantly higher than that in the Textiles industry. 
11. For both categories of firms it is found that there is no significant impact of foreign 
currency debt of any type (secured or unsecured) on short term debt ratio. 
Total Debt 
1. Considering the final model, Model C, for both categories of firms the factors which 
are common and significantly influence total debt are non-financial costs (NFC), 
growth opportunities, profitability and size. 
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2. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
non-financial costs have the greatest influence on total debt ratio. 
3. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
growth opportvmities have greater influence on total debt ratio than profitability 
which in turn has greater influence than size. 
4. For both categories of firms profitability has a highly significant and negative 
relationship with total debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in all 
the three models. Increase in profitability tends to increase the ability of the firms to 
retain profits in order to meet their financing needs. So this relationship between 
profitability and total debt ratio can be expected. 
5. For both categories of firms size is foimd to have a significant and positive 
relationship with total debt ratio consistently in all the three models. The borrowing 
capacity and the financing needs of the firms tend to increase with firm size. So the 
positive relationship of firm size with long term debt ratio can be expected. 
6. For both categories of firms tangibility is found not to have a clear relationship with 
total debt ratio. It is negative in the final model, Model C, for both the categories 
whereas it is either positive or negative in the other two models. Further the 
relationship is not significant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is highly 
significant for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
7. For both categories of firms growth opportimities are found to have a positive 
relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which do not 
revalue their assets this relationship is significant only in the final model, Model C, 
whereas for firms which revalue their assets this relationship is significant in all the 
three models. 
8. For both categories of firms earnings volatility is found to have a negative 
relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. This relationship is highly 
significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas for firms which 
revalue their assets this relationship is not significant. As increasing earnings 
volatility tends to increase the chances of financial distress, the firms with higher 
earnings volatility tend to borrow less; this leads to a decrease in total debt with 
Chapter 5 349 
increase in earnings volatility. Despite the similarity in nature this relationship is not 
significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
9. For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a positive 
relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which do not 
revalue their assets this relationship is significant only in the final model, Model C, 
whereas for firms which revalue their assets this relationship is not significant in all 
the three models. The positive relationship, whether significant or not, might arise 
because higher non-debt shields are associated with higher investment in fixed assets 
which in turn gives rise to higher financing requirements; if sufficient internal 
financing is not available then the firms might have to borrow in order to meet their 
financing needs. Despite the similarity in nature this relationship is not significant for 
firms which revalue their assets. 
10. For both categories of firms non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively related with 
total debt ratio and are highly significant. As higher non-financial costs leave smaller 
margin for covering the financial costs (interest on debt) the negative relationship 
between non-financial costs and total debt ratio is expected. 
11. For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of either secured or 
unsecxired foreign currency loans on total debt ratio. 
Secured Debt 
1. Considering the final model, Model C, for both categories of firms the factors which 
are conunon and significantly influence secured debt are profitability, growth and 
non-financial costs (NFC). 
2. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
non-financial costs have the greatest influence on secured debt ratio. 
3. Considering the final model for both categories of firms, notwithstanding the sign, 
growth opportunities have greater influence on secured debt ratio than profitability. 
4. For both categories of firms profitability has a significant and negative relationship 
with secured debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in all the three 
models. Given that increase in profitability tends to increase the ability of the firms to 
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meet their financing needs by retaining profits this relationship between profitability 
and secured debt ratio can be expected. 
5. For both categories of firms size has a positive relationship with secured debt ratio in 
all the three models. The difference is that it is significant in all the three models for 
firms which do not revalue their assets whereas this relationship is not significant in 
the final model. Model C, for firms which revalue their assets. As the borrowing 
capacity and the financing needs of the firms tend to increase with firm size the 
positive relationship between size and secured debt ratio can be expected. Despite the 
similarity in nature this relationship is not significant in the final model for firms 
which revalue their assets. 
6. For both categories of firms the relationship between tangibility of assets and secured 
debt ratio is positive in Models A and B, and negative in Model C. The difference is 
that the relationship is highly significant in all the three models for firms which do 
not revalue their assets whereas the relationship is not significant in any of the models 
for firms which revalue their assets. Despite the similarity in the pattern of 
relationship it is not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
7. For both categories of firms growth opportunities are found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. Given that the 
financing needs of firms tend to increase with their growth opportimities the positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and secured debt ratio can be expected. 
8. For both categories of firms earnings volatility is foimd to have a negative 
relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models; the relationship is highly 
significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for 
firms which revalue their assets. Firms with higher earnings volatility are likely to 
have lower levels of secured debt because in the event of financial distress such firms 
are likely to lose their investment in the assets which might have been offered as 
security. So this behaviour of secured debt indicates that the firms with higher 
earnings volatility tend to avoid this situation. Despite the similarity in nature this 
relationship is not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
9. For both categories of firms, non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are found to have a 
positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which 
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do not revalue their assets this relationship is significant only in the final model 
whereas for firms which revalue their assets this relationship is not significant in any 
of the three models. The positive relationship notwithstanding their significance or 
otherwise might arise because higher non-debt shields are associated with higher 
investment in fixed assets which in turn gives rise to higher financing requirements; if 
sufficient internal financing is not available then the firms might have to borrow in 
order to meet their financing needs. Despite the similarity in nature this relationship is 
not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
10. For both categories of firms non-financial costs (NFC) are negatively related with 
secured debt ratio and are highly significant. Given that higher non-financial costs 
leave smaller margin for meeting the financial costs (interest on debt) the negative 
relationship between non-financial costs and secured debt ratio is expected. 
Unsecured Debt 
1. Considering the final model, Model C, for both categories of firms size, tangibility, 
earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields do not have any significant impact on 
unsecured debt. 
2. For both categories of firms profitability has a negative relationship with xmsecured 
debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which revalue their assets this relationship 
is insignificant in all the three models whereas for firms which do not revalue their 
assets this relationship is significant in all the three models. Whether significant or 
not this relationship between profitability and vmsecured debt ratio can be expected 
because increases in profitability tend to increase the ability of firms to retain profits 
thus reducing their dependence on borrowed fimds of any type. Despite the similarity 
in nature this relationship is not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
3. For both categories of firms size is found to have an insignificant and positive 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. The positive 
relationship can be expected because the larger the size of the firm more will be its 
financing needs and the greater will be its borrowing capacity. However, given that 
the firms have other alternatives to borrow at costs lower than that of unsecured type 
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of debt this may not be the widespread practice. Hence despite the similarity in nature 
this relationship is not significant for both categories of firms. 
4. For both categories of firms earnings volatility has a positive and insignificant 
relationship with imsecured debt ratio in all the three models. It has already been 
found earlier that for both categories of firms earnings volatility has a negative 
relationship with secured debt ratio. This implies that firms with higher earnings 
volatility tend to borrow less amounts of secured debt. Nonetheless such firms may 
meet their external financing requirements with the help of unsecured debt. However, 
given that imsecured debt is more expensive and that borrowing in the face of higher 
earnings volatility is a highly risky proposition, such firms in general may tend to 
avoid borrowing altogether unless it becomes an extreme necessity. This might be the 
reason behind the positive but insignificant relationship between earnings volatility 
and unsecured debt. 
5. For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) on unsecured debt ratio. For firms which do not revalue their assets the 
relationship between non-debt tax shields is positive in all the three models whereas 
for firms which revalue their assets it is positive only in Models B and C. Despite the 
similarity in nature this relationship is not significant for both categories of firms. 
6. For both categories of firms non-financial costs (NFC) have a negative relationship 
with imsecured debt ratio. The relationship is highly significant for firms which do 
not revalue their assets whereas it not significant for firms which revalue their assets. 
Despite the similarity in nature this relationship is not significant for firms which 
revalue their assets. 
7. For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of acquiring other firms on 
unsecured debt ratio. 
8. For both categories of firms there is a significant impact of the industry factor for 
Chemicals industry. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry and Food industry on 
unsecured debt ratio. The unsecured debt ratios in these three industries are 
significantly higher than that in the Textiles industry which is the control group. 
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Other Similarities 
1. For both categories of firms the explanatory power (adjusted R )^ of the regression 
models in which long term debt is used as the measure of leverage is more than that 
of those regression models in which total debt or other definitions of debt are used as 
measures of leverage. As explained by Bennett and Donnelly (1993) ,^ particularly 
with reference to total debt, long term debt, and short term debt, this may imply that 
firms use short term debt when they temporarily stray firom their target long term 
leverage. 
2. In a shnilar manner in those regression models, for both categories of firms, in which 
secured debt is used as the measure of leverage the explanatory power is in general 
greater than that of the models in which total debt is used as the measure of leverage 
(the only exception to this is Model C for total debt and secured debt for the firms 
which do not revalue their assets wherein the adjusted R^  for secured debt marginally 
fall short of that for total debt). This may imply that firms use unsecured debt when 
they temporarily deviate firom their target secured leverage. 
3. For both categories of firms the adjusted R^  of the final model is highest for long term 
debt ratio and lowest for unsecured debt ratio. This indicates that the systematic 
influence of the various firm characteristics and the industry characteristics is highest 
for long term debt (notwithstanding whether it is of secured or unsecured type) and 
lowest for unsecured debt (notwithstanding whether it is short term or long term debt) 
for both categories of firms. This implies that usage of unsecured debt by the firms is 
least predictable and usage of long term debt is comparatively more predictable. 
4. For both categories of firms the industry factor adds little explanation of the 
behaviour of long term debt ratio compared to the other debt ratios - for firms which 
revalue their assets the industry factor adds a mere 0.50% to the adjusted R^  and for 
firms which do not revalue their assets the industry factor adds 0.82% only to the 
adjusted R .^ This implies that for firms in both categories .the firm characteristics 
provide the major part of the explanation of the behaviour of long term debt ratio than 
the industry factor. 
5. For both categories of firms the new determinant, non-fmancial costs, adds the 
highest amount of explanation for total debt ratio followed in the decreasing order by 
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secured debt ratio, long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio. 
The finding that non-financial costs add the highest amount of explanation for total 
debt ratio compared to the other types of debt ratios implies that the variations in the 
overall mdebtedness of the firm are better explained by non-financial costs than the 
variations in the other debt ratios. Further, tiie findmg that non-financial costs add the 
least amount of explanation for unsecured debt ratio compared to the other types of 
debt ratios implies that compared to the other debt ratios the variations in the 
unsecured debt ratio are least explained by non-financial costs; that means the 
variations in the unsecured debt ratio are explained to a larger extent by other factors 
than the non-financial costs. 
Further it can be said on the basis of the above finding that non-financial costs 
provide more explanation for secured debt ratio than for the unsecured debt ratio i.e. 
secured debt ratio is more predictable than unsecured debt ratio on the basis of non-
financial costs. As the consequences of not being able to meet the debt service 
payments for secured debt are worse than those for imsecured debt, other things 
remaining the same, the usage of secured debt by the firms will better respond to the 
level of non-financial costs than the usage of unsecured debt. This is because the 
ability of the firms to meet the interest part of the debt service payments depends 
upon the amoimt of profit margin that remains after the deduction of the non-financial 
costs and default of interest on secured debt will result in more serious consequences 
for the firms than default of interest on unsecured debt. 
Moreover, it can also be said on the basis of the above finding (3) that non-financial 
costs provide more explanation for the long term debt ratio than for the short term 
debt ratio. This implies that long term debt ratio is more predictable than short term 
debt ratio on the basis of non-financial costs. As the debt service payments and 
particularly the payment of the interest part will continue for a longer period of time 
(for several accoimting periods) for long term debt than that for short term debt, the 
long term ability of the firms to meet the interest payments v^ U critically depend on 
the level of non-financial costs. So the usage of long term debt by the firms is likely 
to show greater response to the level of non-financial costs than the usage of short 
term debt. 
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DIFFERENCES 
Long Term Debt 
1. For fimis which revalue their assets growth opportunities significantly influence long 
term debt whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets growth opportunities do 
not significantly influence long term debt. 
2. Notwithstanding the sign, for firms which revalue their assets non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) have the highest influence on long term debt ratio whereas for firms which 
do not revalue their assets non-financial costs (NFC) have the highest influence on 
long term debt ratio. 
3. For firms which revalue their assets there is an insignificant and positive relationship 
between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio in all the three models. For firms 
which do not revalue their assets there is a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility and long term debt ratio in all the three models; the relationship is 
significant in the Models A and B, whereas it is not significant in the final model, 
Model C. This implies that firms which revalue their assets do not have lower long 
term debt ratio even under higher earnings volatility whereas firms which do not 
revalue their assets tend to have lower long term debt ratio under higher earnings 
volatility. 
4. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of either secured or 
unsecured foreign currency loans on long term debt ratio whereas for firms which do 
not revalue their assets there is a significant impact of either secured or unsecured 
foreign currency loans on long term debt ratio. To be specific within the category of 
firms which do not revalue their assets the long term debt ratio is significantly higher 
for firms which have either secured or unsecured foreign currency loans than for 
firms which do not have such loans. 
Short Term Debt 
1. For firms which revalue their assets profitability has a greater influence on short term 
debt ratio than tangibility whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets 
tangibility has a greater influence on short term debt ratio than profitability. 
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2. For firms which revalue their assets size is found to have a negative and insignificant 
relationship with short term debt ratio in the final model. Model C whereas for firms 
which do not revalue their assets size has a positive and insignificant relationship 
with short term debt ratio in the final model. For both categories of firms the 
relationship between size and short term debt ratio is positive and insignificant in the 
Models A and B. Thus the relationship between size and short term debt ratio is not 
sufficiently clear in both the categories. 
3. For firms which revalue their assets growth opportunities do not significantly 
influence short term debt whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets growth 
opportunities significantly influence short term debt. 
4. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of acquiring other 
firms on short term debt ratio whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets 
there is a significant impact of acquiring other firms on short term debt ratio. Within 
the category of firms which do not revalue their assets firms which have acquired 
other firms tend to have significantly lower short term debt ratio than firms which 
have not acquired other firms. 
5. For the firms which revalue their assets the short term debt ratios for the Chemicals 
industry, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry, Ferrous Metal and Metal Products 
industry are not significantly more or less than that for the Textiles industry whereas 
for firms which do not revalue their assets the short term debt ratios for the Chemicals 
industry and. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry are significantly lower than that for 
the Textiles industry. 
Total Debt 
1. For fuins which revalue their assets there is no significant influence of tangibility, 
earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields on total debt whereas for firms which do 
not revalue their assets tangibility, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields 
significantly influence total debt. 
2. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of the industry 
factor on total debt ratio; this indicates that the total debt ratios in the other four 
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industries are not likely to be significantly more or less than that in the Textiles 
industry which is the control group. However, for firms which do not revalue their 
assets the total debt ratio in the Chemicals industry and, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
industry are significantly less than that in the Textiles industry; further the total debt 
ratio in the Food industry is significantly higher than that in the Textiles industry. 
For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of acquiring other 
firms on total debt ratio whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets there is a 
significant impact of acquiring other firms on total debt ratio. To be specific within 
the category of firms which do not revalue their assets the firms which have acquired 
other firms tend to have significantly lower total debt ratio than the firms which have 
not acquired other firms. 
Secured Debt 
1. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of size, tangibility, 
earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields (NDTS) on secured debt whereas for 
firms which do not revalue their assets size, tangibility, earnings volatility and non-
debt tax shields have a significant influence on secured debt. 
2. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of secured foreign 
currency loans on secured debt ratio whereas for firms which do not revalue their 
assets there is a significant impact of secured foreign currency loans on secured debt 
ratio. 
3. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of acquiring other 
fums on secured debt ratio whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets there 
is a significant impact of acquiring other firms on secured debt ratio. To be specific 
within the category of firms which do not revalue their assets the firms which have 
acquired other firms tend to have significantly lower secured debt ratio than the firms 
which have not acquired other firms. 
4. For firms which revalue their assets the secured debt ratios in the Chemicals industry 
and, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry are significantly lower than that in the 
Textiles industry whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets the Chemicals 
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industry and Drugs and Pharmaceuticals industry have significantly higher secured 
debt ratio than the Textiles industry. 
Unsecured Debt 
1. Considering the final model profitability has a significant influence on unsecured debt 
for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas profitability does not have a 
significant influence on unsecured debt for firms which revalue their assets. 
2. For firms which revalue their assets tangibility has an insignificant and negative 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. However, for firms 
which do not revalue their assets the relationship between tangibility and unsecured 
debt ratio is not significant and the nature of relationship is not consistently positive 
or negative; it is positive in Models A and B, and negative in Model C. 
3. For firms which revalue their assets growth opportunities are significant (in Models B 
and C) and positively related with unsecured debt ratio whereas for firms which do 
not revalue their assets growth opportxmities are insignificant and negatively related 
with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. Considering the final model, Model 
C, growth opportunities have a significant influence on unsecured debt for firms 
which revalue their assets whereas growth opportunities do not have a significant 
influence on unsecured debt for firms which do not revalue their assets. This implies 
that firms which revalue their assets tend use more unsecured debt with increasing 
growth opportunities whereas firms which do not revalue their assets tend to use 
lower levels of imsecured debt (or do not increase their unsecured debt) with 
increasing growth opportunities. 
4. For firms which revalue their assets there is no significant impact of unsecured 
foreign currency debt on unsecured debt ratio whereas for firms which do not revalue 
their assets there is a significant impact of imsecured foreign currency on unsecured 
debt ratio. Within the category of firms which do not revalue their assets firms which 
have unsecured foreign currency debt have significantly higher unsecured debt ratio 
than the firms which do not have unsecured foreign currency debt. 
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Since firms either revalue their assets or they do not, these two categories are mutually 
exclusive in nature. So by looking into the similarities and differences in capital structure 
behaviour in these two categories some generalised observations may be made which 
may be applicable to all firms in general. On the basis of the similarities and differences 
in regression relationships between the firms in these two categories the following 
observations can be made about the nature of relationship between the firm specific 
determinants and the various measures of leverage. These observations will lead to the 
conclusions on whether the nature of relationships remain similar or tend to be different 
for firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not. 
NATURE OF RELATIONSfflP BETWEEN PROFITABILITY AND LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms profitability has a negative 
relationship with long term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models. This finding strongly supports hypothesis HU. Hence it can be 
concluded that the nature of relationship between profitability and long term debt 
ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms profitability has a highly significant 
and negative relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is 
consistently observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis Hll. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
profitability and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms profitability has a highly significant and 
negative relationship with total debt ratio and this relationship is consistently 
observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports hypothesis Hll. 
Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between profitability and 
total debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets. 
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4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms profitability has a significant and 
negative relationship with secured debt ratio and this relationship is consistently 
observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports hypothesis Hll. 
Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between profitability and 
secured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
5. Unsecured Debt: For both categories of firms profitability has a negative 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio and this relationship is consistently observed in 
all the three models; however this relationship is insignificant for firms which revalue 
their assets whereas it is significant for firms which do not revalue their assets. Due to 
the lack of significance in case of firms which revalue their assets the findings do not 
strongly support hypothesis Hll. Hence it cannot be concluded with the present 
evidence that the nature of relationship between profitability and unsecured debt ratio 
is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to long term debt, short term 
debt, total debt and secured debt that the nature of relationship between profitability and 
leverage is similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets, and profitability negatively influences each of these types of 
leverage. But the nature of relationship is not similar with regard to unsecured debt. 
NATURE OF RELATIONSfflP BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms size is found to have a highly 
significant and positive relationship with long term debt ratio and this relationship is 
consistentiy observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis H12. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
firm size and long term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets 
and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms the relationship between firm size 
and short term debt ratio lacks significance. Further for firms which revalue their 
assets the relationship is not clear. These findings do not strongly support hypothesis 
HI2. Hence it cannot be concluded that the nature of relationship between firm size 
and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms size is found to have a significant and 
positive relationship with total debt ratio consistently in all the three models. This 
finding strongly supports hypothesis HI2. Hence it can be concluded that the nature 
of relationship between firm size and total debt ratio is similar for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms size has a positive relationship with 
secured debt ratio in all the three models; for firms which do not revalue their assets 
this relationship is significant in all the three models whereas for firms which revalue 
theu* assets this relationship is not significant in the final model, Model C. Due to the 
lack of significance of this relationship in the final model for firms which revalue 
their assets this finding partly supports hypothesis HI2. Hence it cannot be concluded 
with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between firm size and 
secured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
5. Unsecured Debt: For both categories of firms size is found to have an insignificant 
and positive relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. Though 
this finding supports hypothesis H12 it is not statistically significant. Hence in spite 
of the apparent similarity in the nature of relationship it cannot be concluded with the 
present evidence that the nature of relationship between firm size and unsecured debt 
ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to long term debt and total debt 
that the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is similar between firms 
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which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, and firm size 
positively influences both these types of leverage. But the nature of relationship is not 
similar with regard to short term debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. 
NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TANGIBILITY AND LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms tangibility has a significant and 
positive relationship with long term debt ratio and this relationship is consistently 
observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports hypothesis HI3. 
Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between tangibility and long 
term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets. 
2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms tangibility has a highly significant 
and negative relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is 
consistently observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis HI3. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
tangibility and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets 
and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms tangibility is found not to have a clear 
relationship with total debt ratio. It is negative in the final model. Model C, for both 
the categories whereas it is either positive or negative in the other two models. 
Further the relationship between tangibility and total debt ratio is not significant for 
firms which revalue their assets whereas it is highly significant for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. Though the relationship found in the final model apparently 
supports hypothesis HI3 it lacks consistency in the other models. Further it is not 
statistically significant for the firms which revalue their assets. Hence it cannot be 
concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between 
tangibility and total debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and 
the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms the relationship between tangibility of 
assets and secured debt ratio is positive in Models A and B, and negative in Model C. 
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The difference is that the relationship is highly significant in all the three models for 
firms which do not revalue their assets whereas the relationship is not significant in 
any of the models for firms which revalue their assets. The relationship between 
tangibility and secured debt ratio is not consistent across the three models for both 
categories of firms. Further the relationship is not statistically significant for firms 
which revalue their assets. The findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI3. 
Hence it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship 
between tangibility and secured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Unsecured Debt: For firms which revalue their assets tangibility has an insignificant 
and negative relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. For firms 
which do not revalue their assets the relationship between tangibility and unsecured 
debt ratio is not significant and the nature of relationship is not consistently positive 
or negative; it is positive in Models A and B, and negative in Model C. These 
findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI3.Hence it cannot be concluded with 
the present evidence that the nature of relationship between tangibility and unsecured 
debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do 
not revalue their assets. 
On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to long term debt and short 
term debt that the nature of relationship between tangibility and leverage is similar 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets - the 
relationship is positive for long term debt and negative for short term debt. However the 
nature of relationship is not similar with regard to total debt, secured debt and unsecured 
debt. 
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NATURE OF RELATIONSfflP BETWEEN GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND 
LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms growth opportunities have a positive 
relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three models. This relationship is 
highly significant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for 
firms which do not revalue their assets. Though the relationship apparently supports 
hypothesis H14 it lacks significance for the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Hence it caimot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship 
between growth opportunities and long term debt ratio is similar for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms growth opportunities are found to 
have a positive relationship with short term debt ratio in all the three models. The 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and short term debt ratio is highly 
significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for 
the firms which revalue their assets. The relationship apparently supports hypothesis 
HI4. However it lacks significance for the firms which revalue their assets. Hence it 
caimot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between 
growth opportunities and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms growth opportunities are found to have a 
positive relationship wdth total debt ratio in all the three models. Considering the final 
model. Model C, this relationship is significant for both categories of firms. This 
finding strongly supports hypothesis HI4. Hence it can be concluded that the nature 
of relationship between growth opportunities and total debt ratio is similar between 
firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms growth opportimities are found to have a 
significant and positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. 
This finding strongly supports hypothesis HI4. Hence it can be concluded that the 
nature of relationship between growth opportunities and secured debt ratio is similar 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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5. Unsecured Debt: For firms which revalue their assets growth opportunities are 
significant (in Models B and C) and positively related with unsecured debt ratio 
whereas for firms which do not revalue their assets growth opportunities are 
insignificant and negatively related with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. 
The findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI4. Hence it cannot be concluded 
that the nature of relationship between growth opportunities and unsecured debt ratio 
is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to total debt and secured debt 
that the nature of relationship between growth opportimities and leverage is similar 
between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, and 
growth opportunities positively influence both these types of leverage. However the 
relationship is not similar with regard to long term debt, short term debt and unsecured 
debt. 
NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EARNINGS VOLATILITY AND 
LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For firms which revalue their assets there is an insignificant and 
positive relationship between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio in all the 
three models. For firms which do not revalue their assets there is a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio in all the three 
models; the relationship is significant in the Models A and B, whereas it is not 
significant in the final model, Model C. These findings do not strongly support 
hypothesis HI5. Hence it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the 
nature of relationship between earnings volatility and long term debt ratio is similar 
for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
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2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms earnings volatility is has a significant 
and negative relationship with short term debt ratio and this relationship is 
consistently observed in all the three models. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis HI 5. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
earnings volatility and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms earnings volatility is foxmd to have a 
negative relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. This relationship is 
highly significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas for firms which 
revalue their assets this relationship is not significant. Due to the lack of significance 
for fums which revalue their assets these fmdings do not strongly support hypothesis 
HI 5. Hence it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of 
relationship between earnings volatility and total debt ratio is similar for the firms 
which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms earnings volatility is found to have a 
negative relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models; the relationship 
is highly significant for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not 
significant for firms which revalue their assets. Due to the lack of significance for 
firms which revalue their assets these fmdings do not provide strong support to 
hypothesis HI5. Hence it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the 
nature of relationship between earnings volatility and secured debt ratio is similar for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
5. Unsecured Debt: For both categories of firms earnings volatility has a positive and 
insignificant relationship with unsecured debt ratio in all the three models. Due to the 
lack of significance the findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI 5. Hence it 
cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between 
earnings volatility and unsecured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to short term debt that the 
nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage is similar between firms 
which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, and earnings 
volatility negatively influences short term debt. However the relationship is not similar 
with regard to long term debt, total debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. 
NATURE OF RELATIONSfflP BETWEEN NON-DEBT TAX SHIELDS AND 
LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields are found to have 
a significant and positive relationship with long term debt ratio in all the three 
models. This finding strongly supports hypothesis HI6. Hence it can be concluded 
that the nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and long term debt ratio is 
similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. 
2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields are foimd to 
have an insignificant and negative relationship with short term debt ratio and this is 
observed in all the three models. These findings do not strongly support hypothesis 
HI6. Hence it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and short term debt ratio is similar for the 
firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms non-debt tax shields are found to have a 
positive relationship with total debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which do 
not revalue their assets this relationship is significant only in the final model. Model 
C, whereas for firms which revalue their assets this relationship is not significant in 
all the three models. Due to the lack of significance of the relationship for firms 
which revalue their assets the findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI6. Hence 
it cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and total debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue 
their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms, non-debt tax shields are found to have a 
positive relationship with secured debt ratio in all the three models. For firms which 
do not revalue their assets this relationship is significant only in the final model 
whereas for firms which revalue their assets this relationship is not significant in any 
of the three models. Due to the lack of significance of the relationship for firms which 
revalue their assets the findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI6. Hence it 
cannot be concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and secured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
5. Unsecured Debt: For both categories of firms there is no significant impact of non-
debt tax shields on unsecured debt ratio. For firms which do not revalue their assets 
the relationship between non-debt tax shields is positive in all the three models 
whereas for firms which revalue their assets it is positive only in Models B and C. 
Due to the lack of significance of the relationship for both categories of firms the 
findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI6. Hence it cannot be concluded with 
the present evidence that the nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
unsecured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms 
which do not revalue their assets. 
On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to long term debt that the 
nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage is similar between firms 
which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets, and non-debt tax 
shields positively influence long term debt. However the relationship is not similar with 
regard to short term debt, total debt, secured debt and unsecured debt. 
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NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-FINANCIAL COSTS AND 
LEVERAGE 
1. Long Term Debt: For both categories of firms non-financial costs are negatively 
related with long term debt ratio and are highly significant. This finding strongly 
supports hypothesis HI7. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship 
between non-financial costs and long term debt ratio is similar for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
2. Short Term Debt: For both categories of firms non-financial costs are negatively 
related with short term debt ratio and are highly significant. This finding strongly 
supports hypothesis HI7. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship 
between non-financial costs and short term debt ratio is similar for the firms which 
revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
3. Total Debt: For both categories of firms non-financial costs are negatively related 
with total debt ratio and are highly significant. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis HI7. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
non-financial costs and total debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
4. Secured Debt: For both categories of firms non-financial costs are negatively related 
with secured debt ratio and are highly significant. This finding strongly supports 
hypothesis HI7. Hence it can be concluded that the nature of relationship between 
non-financial costs and secured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
5. Unsecured Debt: For both categories of firms non-financial costs have a negative 
relationship with unsecured debt ratio. The relationship is highly significant for firms 
which do not revalue their assets whereas it not significant for firms which revalue 
their assets. Due to the lack of significance of the relationship for firms which revalue 
their assets the findings do not strongly support hypothesis HI7. Hence it cannot be 
concluded with the present evidence that the nature of relationship between non-
financial costs and unsecured debt ratio is similar for the firms which revalue their 
assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
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On the basis of the above it can be concluded with regard to long term debt, short term 
debt, total debt and secured debt that the nature of relationship between non-financial 
costs and leverage is similar between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do 
not revalue their assets, and non-financial costs negatively influence each of these types 
of leverage. However the relationship is not similar with regard to unsecured debt. 
COMPARISON OF EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE DETERMINANTS FOR 
VARIOUS DEBT RATIOS BETWEEN FIRMS WHICH REVALUE THEIR 
ASSETS AND FIRMS WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
Tables 78 through 82 reproduce the values of Adjusted R^  for the three different models 
for the various debt ratios used in this study, for the two categories of firms viz. frnns 
which revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets. This facilitates 
comparison of the explanatory power of the determinants between the firms which 
revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets. Each table refers to a 
specific type of debt ratio used in this study. 
Table 78 refers to the Models A, B and C for long term debt ratio (LTDR). The values of 
adjusted R^  for these three models for both categories of firms show that the explanatory 
power of both Models A and B for long term debt ratio are greater for firms which 
revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their assets. This means that 
collectively the empirically known firm characteristics and the industry factor explain the 
cross-sectional variations in long term debt ratio to a greater extent for firms which 
revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
However the adjusted R^  value for the final model. Model C, is remarkably higher for 
firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets. Model C 
introduces the new determinant, non-financial costs. This implies that non-financial costs 
can explain the cross-sectional variations in long term debt ratio of firms which do not 
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revalue their assets to a significantly larger extent than for firms which revalue their 
assets. 
This shovk^ s that firms which do not revalue their assets are more likely to decide on the 
amount of long term debt on the basis of non-financial costs than the firms which revalue 
their assets. The tables showing the regression summaries show that the regression 
coefficient for non-financial costs is much higher in absolute terms for firms which do 
not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets. This means that the 
influence of non-financial costs on long term debt ratio is much greater for firms which 
do not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets. 
Table 79 refers to the Models A, B and C for short term debt ratio (STDR). The 
observations are similar to Table 78. The values of adjusted R^  for Models A and B are 
greater for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. This means that collectively the empirically known firm characteristics and the 
industry factor explain the cross-sectional variations in short term debt ratio to a greater 
extent for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
As observed in Table 78 the adjusted R^  value for the final model, Model C, is 
remarkably higher for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which 
revalue their assets. This implies that non-financial costs (introduced in Model C) can 
explain the cross-sectional variations in short term debt ratio of firms which do not 
revalue their assets to a significantly larger extent than for firms which revalue their 
assets. This shows that firms which do not revalue their assets are more likely to decide 
on the amount of short term debt on the basis of their non-financial costs than the fums 
which revalue their assets. Further the regression coefficient for non-financial costs is 
much higher in absolute terms for fums which do not revalue their assets than for firms 
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which revalue their assets, which means that the influence of non-financial costs on short 
term debt ratio is much greater for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms 
which revalue their assets. 
Table 80 refers to the Models A, B and C for total debt ratio (TDR). The observations are 
partly similar to Tables 78 and 79. The adjusted R^  for Model A for firms which revalue 
their assets is lower than that for firms which do not revalue their assets (which is 
contrary to the observations in Tables 78 and 79) whereas it is opposite for Model B 
(which is consistent with observations in Tables 78 and 79). This still means that 
collectively the empirically known firm characteristics and the industry factor explain the 
cross-sectional variations in total debt ratio to a greater extent for firms which revalue 
their assets than for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
As observed in Tables 78 and 79 the adjusted R^  value for the final model. Model C, is 
remarkably higher for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which 
revalue their assets. This implies that non-financial costs (introduced in Model C) can 
explain the cross-sectional variations in total debt ratio of firms which do not revalue 
their assets to a significantly larger extent than for firms which revalue their assets. This 
shows that firms which do not revalue their assets are more likely to decide on the 
amount of total debt on the basis of their non-financial costs than the firms which revalue 
their assets. Further the regression coefficient for non-financial costs is much higher in 
absolute terms for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue 
their assets. This means that the influence of non-financial costs on total debt ratio is 
much greater for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue 
their assets. 
Table 81 refers to the Models A, B and C for secured debt ratio (SDR). The observations 
are similar to the earlier tables in that the adjusted R^  values in Models A and B are 
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greater for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. This means that collectively the empirically known firm characteristics and the 
industry factor explain the cross-sectional variations in secured debt ratio to a greater 
extent for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
As observed in the earlier tables the adjusted R^  value for the final model, Model C, is 
remarkably higher for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which 
revalue their assets. This implies that non-financial costs (introduced in Model C) can 
explain the cross-sectional variations in secured debt ratio of firms which do not revalue 
their assets to a significantly larger extent than for firms which revalue their assets. This 
shows that firms which do not revalue their assets are more likely to decide on the 
amount of secured debt on the basis of their non-financial costs than the firms which 
revalue their assets. Further the regression coefficient for non-financial costs is much 
higher in absolute terms for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which 
revalue their assets. This means that the influence of non-financial costs on secured debt 
ratio is much higher for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which 
revalue their assets. 
Table 82 refers to the Models A, B and C for unsecured debt ratio (UDR). Except for 
Model A the observations are similar to those for the earlier tables. The adjusted R^ , 
which is negative for Model A, for the firms which revalue their assets, is less than that 
for the firms which do not revalue their assets. This means that the empirically known 
firm characteristics do not explain the cross-sectional variations in unsecured debt ratio 
for firms which revalue their assets whereas they explain to some extent the variations in 
unsecured debt ratio for firms which do not revalue their assets. The adjusted R^  for 
Model B for the firms which revalue their assets is higher than that for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. This means that collectively the empirically known firm 
characteristics and the industry factor explain the cross-sectional variations in unsecured 
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debt ratio to a greater extent for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. 
As observed in the earlier tables the adjusted R^  value for the final model, Model C, is 
higher for firms which do not revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their 
assets; however in this case difference in adjusted R^ is rather small and not as large as in 
the case of the other types of debt ratios. This implies that non-financial costs can explain 
the cross-sectional variations in unsecured debt ratio of firms which do not revalue their 
assets to a larger extent than for firms which revalue their assets. Further the regression 
coefficient for non-financial costs is higher in absolute terms for firms which do not 
revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets. This means that the 
influence of non-financial costs on imsecured debt ratio is higher for firms which do not 
revalue their assets than for firms which revalue their assets. 
In the above discussion it is foxmd that in eight out of the ten cases (Models A and B for 
the five debt ratios) the adjusted R^ values are higher for firms which revalue their assets 
than for firms which do not revalue their assets. This indicates that there is a high 
likelihood that the explanatory power of the empirically identified firm characteristics 
and industry factor is higher for firms which revalue their assets than for firms which do 
not revalue their assets. Further in all the five cases for the final model (Model C for the 
five debt ratios) the adjusted R'^  values are higher for firms which do not revalue their 
assets than for firms which revalue their assets. This indicates that there is a high 
likelihood that the inclusion of non-financial costs in addition to the empirically 
identified firm characteristics and the industry factor, results in a significant improvement 
in the explanation of the cross-sectional variations in the various types of debt ratios and 
the improvement in explanation is remarkably higher for the firms which do not revalue 
their assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. 
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The above observations for firms which revalue their assets as well as for firms which do 
not revalue their assets do not support hypothesis HI8. Hence it is concluded that the 
explanatory power of the determinants for the different types of debt ratios is not equal 
for firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. This 
conclusion is of course subject to the limitation that the sample sizes for the two 
categories are not equal. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a discussion of the results obtained from the statistical 
techniques that were carried out for drawing conclusions. The major statistical techniques 
that were used are computation of industrywise and categorywise descriptive statistics, 
ANOVA of different types of debt ratios across the industries studied, Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVA by Ranks of different types of debt ratios across the industries, t tests for 
difference between mean debt ratios of firms which revalue their assets and firms which 
do not revalue their assets, Mann-Whitney U tests for comparison of different types of 
debt ratios between firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their 
assets, cross-sectional correlation analysis to find out evidence of correlation between 
debt ratios and non-financial costs and OLS multiple regression analysis. 
The major aspects covered in the discussion include the findings from ANOVA, Kruskal-
Wallis ANOVA, t tests, Mann-Whitney U tests and OLS multiple regression analysis. 
The ANOVA resuhs for long term debt ratio (LTDR), short term debt ratio (STDR), total 
debt ratio (TDR), secured debt ratio (SDR) and unsecured debt ratio (UDR) were 
obtained separately for firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue 
their assets across the five industries covered in this study. Likewise the results of 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks for LTDR, STDR, TDR, SDR and UDR were 
separately obtained for the two categories of firms across the five industries. The results 
oft tests and Mann-Whitiiey U tests for LTDR, STDR, TDR, SDR and UDR between the 
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firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets were 
separately obtained for each of the five industries. 
The results of OLS multiple regressions for LTDR, STDR, TDR, SDR and UDR were 
obtained separately for the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets. For each category of firms the regression results of the various debt 
ratios were compared. Next comparison of the regression relationships for each type of 
debt ratio was made between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do 
not revalue their assets and the similarities and differences were found out. Chapter 6 
which follows next presents the conclusions and suggestions of this study based on the 
findings in the present chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Suggestions 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The previous chapter has provided a detailed discussion of the results obtained from the 
statistical techniques that were carried out. The results obtained reveal the findings about 
the industry influence on leverage, relationship between leverage and the determinants of 
capital structure for the firms which revalue their asset and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets, and comparison of capital structure and its behaviour between firms 
which revalue their assets and firms which do not revalue their assets. As it has been seen 
in the previous chapter the findings support some of the hypotheses whereas they do not 
support the others. This leads us to draw conclusions from the findings, which has been 
covered in the present chapter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidences found in this study show that long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, 
total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and unsecured debt ratio significantly differ across the 
five industries studied viz. chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and textiles industry. This is 
found for firms which revalue their assets as well as for firms which do not revalue their 
assets. Hence it can be generally concluded that the debt ratios differ across these five 
industries irrespective of whether they revalue their assets or not. 
In other words it can be generalised that the industry factor influences the capital 
structure of firms. This might indicate that firms belonging to a specific industry tend to 
follow a capital structure that is desirable for that industry from the perspective of the 
operating characteristics and business risks of that industry. The desirable capital 
structure is typical for the specific industry and it is different for different industries. 
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In each industry it is found that there is no significant difference in any of the debt ratios 
(viz. long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio) between the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets. This implies that even after revaluation of assets the debt ratios of the 
firms which revalue their assets do not significantly differ firom the pattern of debt ratios 
in a particular industry. This conclusion leads us to a new possibility. 
As it has been found that after the effect of revaluation there is no significant difference 
in the debt ratios between the firms which revalue their assets and firms which do not 
revalue their assets, it might indicate the possibility that without revaluation of assets the 
debt ratios may significantly differ between the firms. This can be a subject matter for 
fixture research. However if this is true this may indicate that firms revalue their assets so 
that their debt ratios fit into the desired pattern of debt ratios in their industry. 
For both categories of firms in the five industries long term debt is influenced by 
profitability, tangibility, firm size, non-debt tax shields and non-financial costs. Since 
firms either revalue their assets or they do not, it can be generalised for all firms in the 
five industries that long term leverage is influenced by these five firm characteristics. In 
general for the firms in the five industries long term leverage is not influenced by 
volatility of earnings. Earnings volatility essentially refers to the volatility of annual 
earnings (i.e. earnings measured over a standard accounting period) whereas the life of 
any long term debt covers several accoxmting periods. So it can be said that cross-
sectionally the use of long term debt by firms in these five industries is not affected by 
the variability of their earnings. 
In general for the firms in the five industries profitability has a consistent inverse 
relationship with long term leverage. This indicates that highly profitable firms tend to 
meet most of their long term financing needs by retaining their profits. Further m general 
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firm size has a consistent positive relationship with long term leverage. The financing 
needs and the borrowing capacity of the firms tend to increase with their size. Moreover 
for firms it is more convenient to meet their financing requirements by long term debt 
because the debt service payments for long term debt are spread over a longer period of 
time. 
Generally for the firms in the five industries tangibility of assets is consistently positively 
related with long term leverage. Tangibility of assets increases with a higher degree of 
fixed assets in the asset structure of the firms. This in turn increases the long term 
financing needs of the firms. In general for the firms in the five industries non-debt tax 
shields are positively related with long term leverage. This happens because non-debt tax 
shields tend to increase with the level of fixed assets which in turn give rise to higher 
long term financing needs. In general long term leverage for the firms in the five 
industries is negatively related with non-financial costs because higher non-financial 
costs leave a smaller margin for covering the costs of debt financing. 
In general for the firms in the five industries in the Indian manufacturing sector long term 
leverage is related with profitability, firm size and tangibility in a similar manner to the 
firms in the manufacturing sector in the developed economies like U.S. While the nature 
of influence of profitability on long term leverage matches with the prediction of the 
pecking order hypothesis, the nature of influence of firm size and tangibility matches 
with the prediction of trade-off theory and agency theory. The nature of influence of non-
financial costs also follows the prediction of trade-ofif theory; however no comparable 
evidences were found in the prior studies. The nature of influence of non-debt tax shields 
on long term leverage is positive which matches with some of the prior studies only and 
not across all of the known evidence; moreover the relationship does not match with the 
prediction of the trade-off theory. 
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For both categories of firms in the five indiistries short term debt is influenced by 
profitabiUty, tangibility, earnings volatility and non-financial costs. The influence of firm 
size and non-debt tax shields on short term debt is not clear after the new determinant, 
non-financial costs, is introduced. In general for firms in all the five industries 
profitability, tangibility, earnings volatility and non-financial costs are all negatively 
related with short term leverage. 
The negative influence of profitability on short term leverage arises because firms with 
higher profitability can retain more profits hence they are more capable to meet not only 
their long term financing needs but also their short term financing needs. The negative 
relationship between tangibility and short term leverage arises because higher tangibility 
implies higher extent of fixed assets which can be more appropriately financed by long 
term debt than by short term debt. The negative influence of earnings volatility on short 
term leverage arises because short term debt service payments put greater pressure on the 
operating cash flows of the firm compared to long term debt service payments. The 
negative iixfluence of non-financial costs implies that firms with higher non-financial 
costs not only carry less long term debt but also they carry less short term debt in order to 
keep their overall indebtedness low. 
The nature of influence of profitability and earnings volatility on short term leverage 
follows the prediction of pecking order hypothesis and trade-off theory respectively. The 
nature of influence of tangibility on short term leverage does not follow any theoretical 
prediction. The nature of influence of non-financial costs follows the prediction of trade-
offtheory. 
For both categories of firms in the five industries total debt is influenced by profitability, 
firm size, growth opportunities and non-financial costs, hi general for firms in all the five 
industries profitability and non-financial costs are negatively related with total leverage 
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whereas firm size and growth opportunities are positively related with total debt ratio. 
The negative influence of profitability on total debt ratio arises because firms with higher 
profitability can retain more profits to meet their financing needs; so this reduces their 
overall borrowing requirements. 
The negative influence of non-financial costs on total debt ratio arises because firms with 
high degree of non-financial costs tend to keep their borrowing costs low by reducing 
their total debt. The positive influence of firm size arises because the total financing 
needs as well as the borrowing capacity of the firms increase with their size. The positive 
influence of growth opportunities arises because higher growth opportunities tend to 
increase the overall financing needs and the borrowing requirements of the firms. 
The nature of influence of profitability and non-financial costs on total debt ratio follows 
the prediction of pecking order hypothesis and trade-off theory respectively. The nature 
of influence of firm size on total debt ratio follows the prediction of the trade-off theory 
and agency theory whereas the nature of influence of growth opportunities follows the 
prediction of pecking order hypothesis. Further for the firms in the five industries in the 
Indian manufacturing sector total debt ratio is related to profitability and firm size in a 
similar manner to the fums in the manufacturing sector in the developed economies 
whereas it is found to be related with growth opportunities in a manner opposite to that 
generally observed in the developed economies. 
For both categories of firms in the five industries secured debt is influenced by 
profitability, growth opportunities and non-financial costs. In general for firms in all the 
five industries profitability and non-financial costs are negatively related with secured 
debt ratio whereas growth opportunities are positively related. The negative influence of 
profitability on secured debt ratio suggests that firms with higher profitability tend to use 
lower levels of secured debt because much of their financing needs can be met through 
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retained earnings, which reduces their need to borrow by offering their assets as 
collateral. 
The negative influence of non-financial costs on secured debt ratio arises because firms 
with high degree of non-financial costs tend to keep their borrowing costs low by using 
lower amount of leverage. Such firms particularly use lower levels of secured debt 
because securing the debt by creating a charge over the assets decreases the risk of the 
lenders but increases the risk of the shareholders due to higher likelihood of financial 
distress. Hence firms with higher non-financial costs tend to reduce the risks of their 
shareholders by using lower levels of secured debt. In general for firms in all the five 
industries growth opportunities are positively related with secured debt ratio. This is 
expected because the firms having higher growth opportunities require more financing in 
order to invest in their fixed assets and other business related investments, and debt is 
easier to obtain if the firms can secure the debt by offering their assets as collateral. 
The nature of influence of profitability and growth opportunities on secured debt ratio 
follows the prediction of pecking order hypothesis whereas the nature of influence of 
non-financial costs on secured debt ratio follows trade-off theory. In general for the firms 
in the five industries in the Indian manufacturing sector the secured debt ratio is related to 
profitability in a manner similar to the one that has been found in the developed 
economies whereas it is foimd to be related with growth opportimities in a manner 
opposite to the one that has been generally observed in the developed economies. 
However no evidence of the influence of non-financial costs has been found in the prior 
studies. Further the nature of influence of profitability and non-financial costs is similar 
for long term debt, short term debt, total debt and secured debt. 
For both categories of firms in the five industries xmsecured debt is not significantly 
influenced by firm size, tangibility, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields. 
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Moreover because the influence of these factors is not significant it cannot be clearly 
inferred whether any of the capital structure theories can explain the cross-sectional 
variations in the use of unsecured debt. Further there is no prior empirical evidence on 
unsecured debt with which the findings of this study may be compared. 
For both categories of firms in the five industries the firm characteristics taken together 
provide the highest extent of explanation for the cross-sectional variations in long term 
debt ratio and the least explanation for the cross-sectional variations in unsecured debt 
ratio. Further in general the extent of explanation for long term debt ratio and secured 
debt ratio is higher than that for total debt ratio, which happens because the firm 
characteristics provide smaller extent of explanation for short term debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio. This is likely to happen due to the possibility that the types of 
borrowing generally used by the firms are long term debt and secured debt, and the firms 
are likely to use short term debt or unsecured debt in the event of any unforeseen or 
temporary shortage of funds. This indicates that for the firms in the five industries the 
change in the optimal capital structure of firms is more likely to take place due to changes 
in the use of long term debt or secured debt. 
Apart fi-om the similarities some differences in capital structure behaviour have been 
observed between the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue 
their assets. The actual reasons for such differences are not known and hence it is difficult 
to conclude whether such differences in capital structure behaviour are a result of the 
practice of revaluation of assets. Nevertheless these differences do show us the directions 
for future research in this context so that it may be found out through further research 
whether in reality the capital structure responds to the firm characteristics differently for 
the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their assets. The 
answer to such a question might indicate possible differences in the financing policies 
and practices followed by the two categories of the firms. Moreover such research may 
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also help us find out whether the practice of revaluing assets has any connection with the 
financing policies and practices of such firms. 
Long term leverage is significantly influenced by growth opportunities for firms which 
revalue their assets whereas it is not significantly influenced by growth opportunities for 
the firms which do not revalue their assets. For the firms which revalue their assets higher 
earnings volatility does not tend to have a negative impact on the long term leverage 
whereas for the firms which do not revalue their assets higher earnings volatility is likely 
to have a negative impact on the long term debt ratio. For the firms which revalue their 
assets growth opportunities do not influence short term leverage significantly whereas 
growth opportunities significantly influence short term leverage in firms which do not 
revalue their assets. 
Tangibility, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields do not significantly influence 
total debt ratio of firms which revalue their assets whereas these firm characteristics 
significantty influence total debt ratio of firms which do not revalue their assets. Size, 
tangibility, earnings volatility and non-debt tax shields do not significanfly influence the 
secured debt ratio of firms which revalue their assets whereas these firm characteristics 
significantly influence the secured debt ratio of firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Profitability has a significant influence on the unsecured debt ratio of firms which do not 
revalue their assets whereas profitability does not have a significant influence on the 
unsecured debt ratio of firms which revalue their assets. Growth opportunities have a 
significant influence on the unsecured debt ratio of firms which revalue their assets 
whereas growth opportimities do not significantly influence the unsecured debt ratio of 
firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Thus the following generalised conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 
relationships between the firm characteristics and leverage fi-om the similarities in the 
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relationships observed between the finns which revalue their assets and the firms which 
do not revalue their assets in the chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, 
ferrous metal and metal products industry, food industry and the textiles industry. At the 
same time the differences have been pointed out so that the same can provide the 
directions for future research for extending knowledge in this direction. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between profitability and leverage is 
inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, short 
term debt, total debt and secured debt. But the nature of relationship is different 
for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not when leverage 
is measured with regard to unsecured debt - it is insignificant for firms which 
revalue their assets whereas it is significantly negative for firms which do not 
revalue their assets. So the difference observed between the two categories is that 
the use of unsecured debt does not significantly change with profitability across 
the firms which revalue their assets whereas it tends to decrease with increasing 
profitability across the firms which do not revalue their assets. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is 
positive when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt and total debt. 
But the nature of relationship between firm size and leverage is different for the 
two categories when leverage is measured with regard to secured debt - it is 
insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly 
positive for firms which do not revalue their assets. For both categories of firms 
the relationship with firm size is insignificant for short term debt and unsecured 
debt. Thus the difference observed between the two categories is that the use of 
secured debt does not significantly change with firm size across firms which 
revalue their assets whereas it tends to increase with increasing firm size across 
firms which do not revalue their assets. 
• For both categories of firms it can be generally concluded that the nature of 
relationship between tangibility and leverage is similar when leverage is measured 
in terms of long term debt and short term debt. The relationship is positive for 
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long term debt and negative for short term debt in both the categories and hence is 
applicable to all firms. However the nature of relationship is different for the two 
categories when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and secured debt -
it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets whereas it is significantly 
negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. For both categories of firms 
the relationship with tangibility is insignificant for unsecured debt. Thus in 
general the use of long term debt tends to increase and the use of short term debt 
tends to decrease with increase in tangibility across all the firms in the five 
industries. However the difference observed between the two categories is that the 
total debt and secured debt does not significantly change with tangibility across 
firms which revalue their assets whereas total debt as well as secured debt 
decreases with increase in tangibility across firms which do not revalue their 
assets. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is positive when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and 
secured debt. However difference in relationship has been observed between the 
two categories of firms when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, 
short term debt and unsecured debt. When leverage is measured in terms of long 
term debt the nature of relationship is positive for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is insignificant for firms which do not revalue their assets. When 
leverage is measured in terms of short term debt the nature of relationship is 
positive for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is insignificant for 
firms which revalue their assets. When leverage is measured in terms of 
unsecured debt the nature of relationship is positive for firms which revalue their 
assets whereas it is insignificant for firms which do not revalue their assets. This 
implies that for firms which revalue their assets long term debt, secured debt and 
unsecured debt tend to increase with growth opportunities (i.e. growing firms in 
this category tend to increase borrowings in the form of all these three types of 
debt); this results in the increase in their total debt in their capital structure. 
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However for firms which do ndt revalue their assets total debt tends to increase 
with growth opportxinities due to increase in secured debt and short term debt. 
Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage 
is inverse in nature, when leverage is measured with regard to short term debt. For 
both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when leverage is 
measured in terms of long term debt and imsecured debt. However the difference 
observed between the two categories is that when leverage is measured with 
regard to total debt and secured debt the relationship is significant and negative 
for firms which do not revalue their assets whereas it is not significant for firms 
which revalue their assets. This implies that firms which revalue their assets tend 
to use lower levels of short term debt relative to their capital if their earnings are 
volatile; however total debt does not change significantly across the firms. Firms 
which do not revalue their assets tend to use lower levels of short term debt as 
well as secxired debt in their capital structure if their earnings are volatile; for such 
firms this results in lower levels of total debt with increasing earnings volatility. 
Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage is positive when leverage is measured in terms of long term debt. For 
both categories of firms the relationship is insignificant when leverage is 
measured with regard to short term debt and unsecured debt. However it is 
observed that the nature of relationship is different for the two categories of fmns 
when leverage is measured with regard to total debt and secured debt - it is 
significant and positive for both measures of debt for firms which do not revalue 
their assets whereas it is not significant for both measures of debt for firms which 
revalue their assets. This implies that the use of long term debt in capital structure 
tends to increase with non-debt tax shields across firms which revalue their assets; 
the increase in the use of long term debt however does not significantly increase 
their total debt in their capital structure. The use of long term debt and secured 
debt tends to increase with non-debt tax shields across firms which do not revalue 
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their assets; this results in increase in total debt with increasing non-debt tax 
shields for such firms. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the nature of relationship between non-financial costs and leverage 
is negative when leverage is measured with regard to long term debt, short term 
debt, total debt and secured debt. However it is observed that the nature of 
relationship is different for the two categories of firms when leverage is measured 
in terms of unsecured debt - it is insignificant for firms which revalue their assets 
whereas it is significant and negative for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
This implies that the use of long term debt, short term debt and secured debt in 
capital structure tends to decrease with increase in non-financial costs across 
firms which revalue their assets; for such firms this decreases the use of total debt 
in capital structure with increase in non-financial costs without resulting in any 
significant change in the use of unsecured debt. For firms which do not revalue 
their assets the use of all types of debt including imsecured debt and total debt in 
capital structure tends to decrease with increase in non-financial costs. 
• Finally it can be concluded that though the debt ratios differ across the industries 
studied, within each of the industries the debt ratios do not significantly differ 
between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. This implies that even after revaluation of assets the debt ratios of such 
firms fit into their characteristic pattems within specific industries i.e. revaluation 
of assets does not cause the debt ratios to differ significantly from their pattems in 
the specific industries. 
The following conclusions can be drawn with reference to the five industries covered in 
the study about the explanatory power of the determinants for various measures of 
leverage for the firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not revalue their 
assets. The differences observed between the two categories of firms in this context have 
also been discussed. 
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• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that the determinants taken together do not equally explain the cross-
sectional variations in the different measures of leverage used in this study viz. 
long term debt ratio, short term debt ratio, total debt ratio, secured debt ratio and 
unsecured debt ratio. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it can be generally 
concluded that collectively the determinants provide the highest amount of 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the long term debt ratio and the 
lowest amoimt of explanation for the unsecured debt ratio. This means that among 
the debt ratios the relationship between long term debt and the firm characteristics 
is most systematic and orderly whereas the relationship between imsecured debt 
and the firm characteristics is the least systematic and orderly by nature. 
• The industry factor and the empirically identified firm characteristics viz. 
profitability, firm size, tangibility of assets, growth opportunities, earnings 
volatility and non-debt tax shields collectively have higher explanatory power for 
the cross-sectional variations in leverage for firms which revalue their assets than 
for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
• The inclusion of non-financial costs in addition to the empirically identified firm 
characteristics and the industry factor, results in a significant improvement in the 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in the various types of debt ratios for 
both categories of firms. However the improvement in explanation due to the 
inclusion of non-financial costs is remarkably higher for the firms which do not 
revalue their assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. Collectively the 
explanation of the cross-sectional variations in all the debt ratios provided by the 
empirically known determinants and the newly introduced determinant, non-
financial costs, is remarkably higher for the firms which do not revalue their 
assets than for the firms which revalue their assets. Hence in general the 
determinants of capital structure can be extended by including the non-financial 
costs as a potential determinant of firm leverage. However the capital structure of 
firms which do not revalue their assets are foimd to be more systematically related 
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to the non-financial costs than the capital structure of firms which revalue their 
assets. 
It can be generally concluded that the explanatory power of the determinants for 
the different types of debt ratios is not equal for firms which revalue their assets 
and firms which do not revalue their assets. This means that the cross-sectional 
variations in the different types of debt ratios are not equally explained by the 
determinants for both categories of firms. This might happen because the debt 
ratios of the firms in the two categories have different extent of systematic 
relationship with the determinants. 
The following additional findings have been made (please refer to Tables 85 and 86): 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the various measures of leverage (i.e. based on long term debt, short term debt, 
total debt, secured debt or unsecured debt) are not related with all the firm 
characteristics used in this study in the same way as predicted by one or more of 
the theories viz. trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and agency theory. 
That is each measure of leverage is related only to some of the firm characteristics 
in the same maimer as predicted by one or more of the theories. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the relationships between the firm characteristics and unsecured debt follow the 
predictions of the theories to the least extent. It is already established by the 
regression findings that among all types of debt unsecured debt is the least 
systematically related with the firm characteristics. This implies that the 
behavioiir of the imsecured debt ratio is least likely to be predicted by the 
theories. 
• For the other types of debt the observed relationships with the firm characteristics 
follow the theoretically predicted relationships to different extent for both 
categories of firms. 
• Irrespective of whether the firms revalue their assets or not it has been found that 
the relationships between the firm characteristics and unsecured debt exhibit the 
Chapter 6 398 
99 
^ 
4> 
« 
oj 
la 
^ 
M 
S 
a 
o 
• Hri 
•«rf 
C M 
o 
a 
a 
a 
«3 
>> 
9 
la 
H 
a 
a 
s 
o 
2 
a 
o 
9t 
§ 
<& .2 
"O 
S 2 
•^ Pi 
U 
•pN 
a >> 
•^ 
1 
(3lS 
^ 
Pi 
Q 
O 
H 
P< 
O 
H 
1/1 
en 
H 
h:) 
5 
o 
OH 
H 
O 
H 
C/J 
z 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
+ 
1 
+ 
H-1 
PQ 
< H 
S 
o, 
1/3 
Z 
00 
Z 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1 
+ 
C/D 
O l 
^ 
z 
1/3 
1 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
t: 
o 
H 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1 
1 
1 
+ 
1 
ffi 
H 
^ 
S 
a 
(Zl 
z 
V3 
z 
CO 
Z 
1 
z 
1 
1 
o 
+ 
1 
t: 
1—1 
H 
< 
o 
> 
( / I 
z 
00 
z 
«/3 
z 
z 
+ 
1 
1 
o 
+ 
1 
Vi 
H 
^ 
CO 
Z 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
•o 
c 
3 
o 
o 
Z 
1 
z 
»—H 
ro 
•«t 
CO 
w-i 
1 O 
9) 
1 
o 
^ 
1 
2 
en 
a 
3 
ai 
<4-l 
o 
d Z 
l - H 
( N 
m 
<N 
•* 
u o 
c 
u 
T3 
73 
o 
•c 
'5. 
B 
w l l 
o 
•c 
o. 
^ 
60 
C 
15 o 
IS 
e 
^ 
"«? 0!j 
C M 
O 
d 
Z 
^ 
1 
s 
00 
< 
2 
2 
c2 
SJ 
H 
< 
c« 
(U 
:S 
o 
& 
U 
•s 
o 
60 
c 
o 
u PL, 
o 
Ol 
h i 
2i 
r« 
X 
o 
^ 
o 
u JS 
H 
O 
1 
2 
p 
CA 
.u 
«<-i 
u 
1? 
a> 
V) 
'tn 
•3 
o 
a. 
Jj i 
—' 
"nl 
O 
l a 
S u 
c 
'"• 
-o 
•c 
o 
EX il> 
Ui 
>> 
O 
O . 
c 
o 
ts 
S 
a> 
T3 
O 
O . 
Pi 
>> 
o 
hi 
Ci^  
Q 
H 
W 
S) 
O 
a 
O . 
J2 
en 
o 
ii (U 
•a 
ta 
6 
(A 
•o 
_c 
CO 
z 
^ 
^ 
M 
•C 
c 
IS 
Q 
•a 
CO 
Q 
5 
o 
1^  
• * - » 
j j 
4> 
Q 
u H 
C 
o 
00 
d" 
«2 
JD 
Q 
g 
<i> 
H 
60 
c (J 
2 
u> 
•a 
os: 
J 3 
a 
IS 
o 
»* 
w Q 
(Zl 
k 
Q 
>» 
1) 
u 
4> 
o 
ts 
»; 
X ) 
Q 
T3 
(1> 
r/) 
C 
T3 
O 
1 
Chapter 6 399 
« 
w 
^ 
w 
s 
1^ 
•** 
o 
^ : 
o 
Q 
-1 
00 fs, 
a 
a 
o 
1X4 
ja 
3 K 
o 
s 
a s 
</) 
i ? 
s 
••l> 
.a 
J3 
H 
a 
a s 
o 
PE< 
09 
a 
a 
o 
••c 
^ .s 
Pf5 
• P 4 
.1.1 
1 
cti 
g 
OiS 
s 
« 
Q H 
0$ 
i / i 
5 
o 
AH 
H 
0 
H 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
+ 
1 
+ 
>^ 
1 
PTl 
P-. 
r/1 
z 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1 
+ 
Vi 
V) 
% 
1 
1 
1 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
o 
H 
r/i 
:z 
+ 
+ 
+ 
CO 
1 
1 
1 
+ 
1 
% 
o 
r/) 
Z 
1 
1 
1 
Z 
1 
1 
(a 
o 
+ 
1 
< 
O 
> 
;o 
Z 
+ 
+ 
on 
+ 
1 
o 
+ 
1 
on 
H 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
c 
3 O 
1 
O 
<N| 
i n 
lO 
•q-
M-
o 
1 
cd 
1 
o 
•B 
00 
e 
la 1 
o. 
j i : (A 
C3 
O 1 
(4-1 
(J 
d 
Z 
' ! l -
• * 
(N 
• * 
O 
a 
O 
:s 
I t 
_o 
'C 
:S 
00 
e 
2 
^ 
s 
o 
< 4 - l 
o 
d 
Z 
o 
H 
>^  
u 
c 
bO 
< 
<4-l 
< 
•B oi 
I 
Q 
E2 
o S 
u 
o 
o. 
: ^ 
V 
2 .2 
I .& 
412 1/1 
bO 
C 
o u 
OH 
u 
«4- l U 
Ec 
o 
:s £ 
ex 
S ^ 
.S ta 
O ^ 
E ? 
4> 
Q 
H 
t i 
o 
JS 
=3 
^ . 2 
& . ^ .2 I -i' ii 
o 
Z 
o 
u 
H 
2 
H 
o 
<4H 
u 
H 
^ . en 
£ is 
^ .S 
« §r 
-d ^ 
o "^ 
p ^ 4 ) 
•g s 
(/) O 
5^ ^ 
Chapter 6 400 
least matching with the empirical evidence for other measxires of debt found in the 
developed coimtries like USA. No empirical evidence on the relationship between 
firm characteristics and unsecured debt have been foimd in the context of the 
USA or other developed coimtries or even in the studies in some of the 
developing countries. 
For the other measures of debt the observed relationships with the firm 
characteristics match with the empirical evidence found in the developed 
countries to different extent for both categories of firms. However there is greater 
evidence for matching relationships for firms which do not revalue their assets. 
In general the evidences show that the capital structure behaviour of the firms in the 
chemicals industry, drugs and pharmaceuticals industry, ferrous metal and metal products 
industry, food industry and textiles industry do not provide complete support for any 
single theory on capital structure. The trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis and 
agency theory can individiially describe only some important aspects of the capital 
structure behaviour in these industries. So the observed capital structure behaviour in 
these five industries fits better with the collective explanation provided by these three 
capital structure theories. Moreover the evidences found in these five manufacturing 
industries in the Indian context partially match with the generally found evidence in the 
developed coimtries like USA. 
SUGGESTIONS 
On the basis of the findings fi"om this study the following suggestions are made for the 
financial theorists and the practitioners: 
• It should be noted by the financial theorists that the trade-off theory, pecking 
order hypothesis and the agency theory do not individually provide complete 
explanation for the cross-sectional variations in capital structure of firms. 
However they collectively explain a significant part of the variations. Hence each 
of these three theories has some relevance in explaining the capital structure 
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behaviour of firms. This impHes that firms do attempt to achieve an optimal 
capital stracture by trying to balance between the benefits and costs of debt 
financing, and also by taking into consideration the agency costs. At the same 
time for raising their financing they do follow a pecking order in order to adjust 
their financing practices with the information asymmetries. 
It should be noted by the financial practitioners that the optimal capital structure 
of firms is likely to change under the influence of the firm characteristics as 
discussed in this study. Thus the firm characteristics profitability, firm size, 
tangibility of assets, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields 
-and non-financial costs are likely to influence the optimal capital structure of 
firms. 
However all the firm characteristics do not tend to influence all the measures of 
debt. So different measures of leverage based on different measures of debt are 
likely to be influenced by some of the firm characteristics only. 
In plaiming for their capital structure the firms should take into consideration at 
least those firm characteristics which significantly influence specific types of 
debt. At the same time while deciding on the amoimts of different types of loans 
to be given to the firms, the banks and financial institutions should take into 
consideration those firm characteristics which significantly influence specific 
types of debt. 
Moreover as found in this study capital structure of firms which revalue their 
assets is likely to be influenced by the firm characteristics in somewhat different 
maimer firom the capital structure of firms which do not revalue their assets. 
Hence the optimal capital structure of these two categories of firms is likely to 
change with some difference under the influence of the firm characteristics. The 
firms as well as their lenders should consider this possibility so that the firms can 
follow an optimal capital structure policy. 
In order to plan for long term debt the firms as well as their lenders should take in 
to consideration the profitability, size, tangibility, non-debt tax shields and non-
financial costs of the firms. In addition the firms which revalue their assets should 
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also take into consideration the growth opportunities, which is a significant factor 
for them particularly. 
In order to plan for short term debt the firms as well as their lenders should take 
into consideration the profitability, tangibility of assets, earnings volatility and 
non-financial costs of the firms. The firms which do not revalue their assets 
should also take into consideration growth opportunities because this factor is 
particularly significant for them. 
In order to plan for the total debt the firms as well as their lenders should take into 
consideration the profitability, size, growth and non-financial costs of the firms. 
Additionally the firms which do not revalue their assets should also take into 
consideration tangibility and earnings volatility because these factors are 
particularly significant for such firms. 
In order to plan for secured debt the firms as well as their lenders should take into 
consideration the profitability, growth and non-financial costs of the firms. Apart 
firom these factors the firms which do not revalue their assets should also take into 
consideration size, tangibility and earnings volatility becaiise these factors are 
particvilarly significant for them. 
It can be understood for all firms irrespective of whether they revalue their assets 
or not that under the influence of the firm characteristics the optimal capital 
structure with reference to total debt is more likely to change due to the changes 
in long term debt or due to the changes secured debt. So in order to move closer to 
the optimal capital structure the firms should follow a target capital structure fixed 
in terms of long term debt or secured debt. 
Under the normal circumstances the firms should avoid using unsecured debt. The 
firms should borrow unsecured debt only as a temporary measure such as when 
there is a sudden contingency. Unsecured debt is more expensive due to its 
unsecured nature. Moreover raising unsecured debt is likely to send a signal that 
that the firm is uncertain about its ability to repay its debt. So using unsecured 
debt may cause a deviation fi-om the optimal capital structure due to its possible 
adverse signaling impact on the market value of the firm. 
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• Firms whose earnings are volatile should be particularly careful about the use of 
short tenn debt. For such firms indiscriminate use of short term debt can increase 
the risk of financial distress which will have an adverse impact on their market 
value resulting in a deviation fi:om the optimal capital structure. 
• One of the major findings firom this study is that the non-financial costs have a 
very significant negative influence on the capital structure of firms. So other 
things remaining the same, for firms which have high levels of non-financial 
costs, the optimal capital structure is likely to consist of lower levels of debt and 
vice versa. For such firms using higher debt levels is likely to increase the risk of 
financial distress which may cause an adverse impact on their market value 
resulting in a deviation fi-om the optimal capital structure. 
• As found in this study, the capital structure of firms which do not revalue their 
assets is better explained and hence more predictable on the basis of the firm 
characteristics than that of the firms which revalue their assets. This might be 
because of the reason that the basis for revaluing the assets may have no relation v 
with the firm characteristics or the factors which influence capital structure and so 
the practice of revaluing the assets might distort the likely relationships between 
capital structure and its determinants. Hence compared to firms which revalue 
their assets firms which do not revalue their assets are likely to be in a better 
position to plan and implement a policy of targeting an optimal capital structure 
because such firms can fix a more accurate target capital structure on the basis of 
the firm characteristics than the firms which revalue their assets. So in general for 
better capital structure planning and practice it can be suggested that unless there 
is a highly compelling need the firms should avoid revaluing their assets. 
This study makes a modest attempt to contribute to the body of knowledge in several 
ways. It has revisited the relationships between firm characteristics and leverage foimd in 
the prior empirical studies in the US and other developed countries, and also in some of 
the developing countries. It has extended the determinants of capital structure by making 
a maiden attempt to introduce a new determinant, non-financial costs, together with other 
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firm characteristics to explain capital structure behaviour. It has extended the explanation 
of capital structure behaviour by making a maiden attempt to explain the behaviour of 
secured debt and unsecured debt on the basis of the firm characteristics. It has extended 
the research work in this area by comparing the capital structure and its behaviour for 
firms which revalue their assets and those which do not revalue their assets. 
However this study has two limitations. The scope of the study does not cover the entire 
manufacturing sector - it covers five industries within the manufacturing sector which 
together constitute approximately 62 percent of the listed companies in the manufacturing 
sector. The next limitation is that the study does not attempt to explain the short term 
variations in capital structure i.e. the variations in capital structure over time - it takes 
into consideration the variations in capital structure over the cross-section of firms in the 
industries that were studied. 
This study provides directions for fiiture research by revealing the differences in capital 
structure behaviour between firms which revalue their assets and the firms which do not 
revalue their assets. Such research work may lead tp the finding of possible differences, if 
any, in the financing policies and practices of the firms which revalue their assets and the 
firms which do not revalue their assets. Moreover research work in this new direction 
may also help to find out whether there is any connection between the practice of 
revaluation of assets and the financing behaviour of firms which revalue their assets. 
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ANNEXURE-1: INDUSTRYWISE AND CATEGORY WISE PROBABILITY-PROBABILITY 
PLOTS OF LONG TERM DEBT RATIO 
GRAPH 1 
Chemicals Industry 
Probability-Probability Plot of LTDR For Firms Wliich Revalue Their Assets 
Distribution: Nomial(0.208157, 0.137008) 
0.4 0.6 0.8 
Theoretical cumulative distribution 
1.0 1.2 
GRAPH 2 
Drugs & Phamiaceuticals Industry 
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GRAPH 3 
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Probability-Probability Plot of LTDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Distribution: Normal(0.229373, 0.138402) 
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Probability-Probability Plot of LTDR For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Distribution: Normal(0.299292, 0.171515) 
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GRAPH? 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Industry 
Probability-Probability Plot of LTDR For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Distribution: Normal(0.150742, 0.117358) 
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ANNEXURE-2: CATEGORYWISE NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOT OF RESIDUALS 
GRAPH U 
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ANNEXURE-3: STANDARD RESIDUALS VERSUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR FIRMS 
WHICH REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
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Standard residuals vs. PROFITIABILITY For Firms Whicii Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .12E-7 + 0.0000 * PROFITABILITY 
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LTDR 
Standanj residuals vs. SIZE For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .50E-7 + 0.0000 * SIZE 
Correlation: r = -.1E-7 
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GRAPH 15 
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LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. TANGIBILITY For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .15E-7 + 0.0000 * TANGIBILITY 
Correlation: r = -.3E-8 
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GRAPH 16 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. GROWTH For Fimns Which Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + .46E-6 * GROWTH 
Correlation: r = .16E-7 
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GRAPH 17 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. VOLATILITY For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .17E-7 - .2E-6 * VOLATILITY 
Con-elation: r = -.7E-8 
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GRAPH 18 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. NDTS For Firms Which Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + .43E-6 * NDTS 
Correlation: r = .68E-8 
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GRAPH 19 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. NFC For Firms Whidi Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + 0.0000 * NFC 
Conrelation: r = .24E-9 
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ANNEXURE-4: STANDARD RESIDUALS VERSUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR FIRMS 
WHICH DO NOT REVALUE THEIR ASSETS 
GRAPH 20 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. PROFITABILITY For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + .18E-7 * PROFITABILITY 
Correlation; r = .11E-8 
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GRAPH 21 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. SIZE For Finns Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + 0.0000 * SIZE 
Correlation: r = .85E-8 
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GRAPH 22 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. TANGIBILITY For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .14E-7 + 0.0000 * TANGIBILITY 
Correlation: r = -.7E-8 
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GRAPH 23 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. GROWTH For Finns Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + 0.0000 * GROWTH 
Conflation: r = -.8E-9 
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GRAPH 24 
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LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. VOLATILITY For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = 0.0000 + .90E-7 * VOLATILITY 
Correlation: r = .38E-8 
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LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. NDTS For Finns Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = .15E-7 - .5E-6 " NDTS 
Congelation: r = -.9E-8 
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GRAPH 26 
LTDR 
Standard residuals vs. NFC For Firms Which Do Not Revalue Their Assets 
Standard residuals = -.2E-6 + .17E-6 * NFC 
Correlation: r = .42E-8 
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ANNEXURE-5: PATTERN OF STANDARD RESIDUALS VERSUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
FOR HETEROSCEDASTIC DATA - A SPECIMEN 
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GRAPH 27 
Standard residuals vs. X 
Standard residuals = .79E-7 + 0.0000 * X 
Correlation: r = -.5E-7 
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Source: Example and Data taken from Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A.S. and Price, B. (2000), Regression Analysis 
by Example, 3rd Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. p. 153-176 
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